State of Tennessee v. Jordan Thomas Peters
Defendant, Jordan Thomas Peters, was convicted of one count of delivery of psilocin, a Schedule I controlled substance, and one count of delivery of psilocin within 1000 feet of a school. Defendant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to serve at 100%. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether a retrial for delivery of a controlled substance violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy after Defendant was originally acquitted of sale of a controlled substance; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery of the case names and files of other cases in which the confidential informant had been involved; (3) whether the trial court erred by giving acquittal-first jury instructions, precluding the jury from considering the inference of casual exchange; (4) whether the trial court erred in not giving a specific instruction with regard to the defense of entrapment by luring into a school zone; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (6) whether his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and therefore unconstitutional. Upon our thorough review of the arguments, record, and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jordan Thomas Peters - concurring
Given the clear and apparently controlling case law concerning convictions enhanced pursuant to the Drug Free School Zone Act (the Act), I must reluctantly concur. However, I write separately to set forth my ever increasing concern regarding enhancement of convictions under the Act. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Seagraves
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Roy Seagraves, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant. He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question of law is dispositive of the case. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges with prejudice. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, D/B/A Erlanger Health System
We granted permission to appeal to address whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this lawsuit brought by a hospital against a TennCare managed care organization (MCO). The hospital alleged in its complaint that the MCO had not paid the hospital all of the monies due for emergency services provided to the MCO’s TennCare enrollees. In its answer, the MCO asserted that it had paid the hospital in accordance with TennCare regulations; the MCO also filed a counterclaim regarding overpayments made pursuant to the TennCare regulations. The MCO filed a motion for partial summary judgment. It argued that the hospital’s allegations implicitly challenged the applicability and/or validity of the TennCare regulations, so the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) required the hospital to exhaust its administrative remedies by bringing those issues to TennCare prior to filing suit. Absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, the MCO argued, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The trial court agreed; it dismissed the hospital’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the MCO’s counterclaim as well. The Court of Appeals reversed; it concluded that the hospital’s lawsuit was simply a dispute regarding the interpretation of statutes and regulations, over which the trial court had jurisdiction. The MCO appeals. Looking at the substance of the parties’ dispute rather than simply the face of the hospital’s complaint, we hold that the UAPA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies in this matter to the extent that resolution of the parties’ claims would necessarily require the trial court to render a declaratory judgment concerning the validity or applicability of TennCare regulations. While the UAPA prohibits the trial court from rendering such declaratory relief absent exhaustion of administrative remedies, it does not address claims for damages. In this case, both parties have asserted damage claims that hinge on the issues to be addressed in the administrative proceedings. Under these circumstances, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint and the counterclaim and remand the case to the trial court with directions to hold the parties’ damage claims in abeyance pending resolution of administrative proceedings regarding the validity or applicability of the TennCare regulations at issue. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shelby Lesean Harris
The Defendant, Shelby Lesean Harris, was indicted for one count of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403. The trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine into his conviction for facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years and six months. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the in-court identification of the Defendant by two confidential informants; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ray Neil Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ray Neil Thompson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and later entered a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. For these offenses, he received an effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shasta Jackson
Defendant, Shasta Jackson, appeals after being convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court's refusal to allow an expert witness testify about eyewitness identification; (3) introduction of evidence relating to Defendant's membership in the “Westside 111 Neighborhood Crips”; (4) introduction of pictures from Defendant's Facebook page; (5) the decision by the trial court to strike the testimony of a defense witness after he refused to answer a question on cross-examination; and (6) the length of her sentence. After a review of the record, we determine that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Thomas Kendrick III v. State of Tennessee
This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner, Edward Thomas Kendrick III,1 was convicted by a jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, raising, inter alia, numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, a panel of this court granted the Petitioner post-conviction relief, concluding that he had established that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to (1) trial counsel‘s failure to offer expert proof about the trigger mechanism in the rifle, which was known to cause accidental shootings; and (2) trial counsel‘s failure to seek to admit, as excited utterances, out-of-court statements by a crime-scene investigator made to his fellow officers after he shot himself in the foot with the Petitioner‘s rifle. Our supreme court disagreed, reversing our conclusion that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with regard to these two issues. The case has now been remanded to us for consideration of the issues that were pretermitted by this court after finding the two issues to be meritorious. Those pretermitted issues are as follows: (1) whether trial counsel erred by waiving the Petitioner‘s attorney-client privilege with his divorce attorney and, in so doing, allowed the State to insinuate adultery as a motive for the shooting; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the Petitioner‘s cousin, Randall Leftwich, to testify about the Petitioner‘s activities on the day of the shooting and about his discovery of cabbage simmering on the Petitioner‘s stove immediately following the shooting; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective when he ―opened the door‖ on direct examination of the Petitioner for the State to inquire about additional misdemeanor convictions on cross-examination that had not been previously admissible; (4) whether trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately challenge Lennell Shepheard‘s testimony that the Petitioner stood over the victim‘s body and said "I told you so" six times; (5) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Officer William Lapoint to testify about the Petitioner‘s "very distraught" demeanor at the airport just after the shooting; (6) whether trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective when they did not object or raise on appeal the issue of Detective Mark Rawlston‘s volunteered testimony that the Petitioner never told him that the gun accidentally discharged when interviewed in the back of a patrol car at the airport; (7) whether trial counsel‘s failure to seek curative measures for a security officer‘s, Ms. Martha Maston, surprise testimony about the Petitioner‘s daughter‘s statement at the airport was ineffective; and (8) whether the cumulative impact of counsels‘ errors entitle him to relief. After consideration of these remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charlotte D. Culpepper v. Brandon K. Culpepper
This appeal arises from an action for divorce wherein the trial court ordered the parties’ marital debt to be divided in a nearly equal fashion. The trial court awarded child support to the wife, who was designated primary residential parent and who received a greater share of co-parenting time with the children. The court also awarded child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the divorce complaint. In addition, the court allocated both federal tax exemptions for the children to the wife. The husband has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with a slight modification in the amount of the child support arrearage award. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
SNS Electrical Inspections, P.C., et al v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission involving a contract dispute. The Claims Commissioner concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to damages other than for services rendered because their services contract with the State was terminated for cause. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Cheryl Erma Green v. YMCA of Memphis and the Mid-South
Appellant appeals the trial court‘s order enforcing a settlement agreement, arguing that the agreement was the product of coercion on the part of her attorney. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Rhea Helton v. Gregory Herbert Helton
This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to terminate his spousal support obligation and to add his current wife as a beneficiary to his life insurance policy. We affirm the court's denial of the termination of the support obligation but reverse the court's denial of the request to amend the life insurance policy. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Curtis Scott Harper
A Knox County jury found Curtis Scott Harper (“the Defendant”) guilty of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, three counts of vehicular homicide by creating a substantial risk of death and serious bodily injury, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of tampering with evidence, one count of leaving the scene of an accident, one count of driving under the influence, and, in a subsequent deliberation, one count of driving under the influence (second offense). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective thirty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the introduction of fifty crime scene and autopsy photographs, many of which were gruesome, graphic, or horrifying, deprived the Defendant of a fair trial by inflaming the passions of the jury; (2) the State presented false expert testimony concerning the speed of the Defendant's vehicle, thereby depriving the Defendant of due process; (3) the State violated Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide to the Defendant a copy of the article the forensic pathologist relied upon during his testimony; (4) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, including personal attacks on defense counsel, that violated the Defendant's right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences; and (6) the cumulative effect of the error requires a new trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting numerous graphic and gruesome crime scene and autopsy photographs, the prejudicial effect of which far outweighed their probative value, and such error was not harmless. We, therefore, reverse the judgments of the criminal court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Scott Harper - concurring
I believe that the majority opinion provided an excellent discussion of the photographs and subsequent legal analysis of their admissibility; I write separately only to amplify the gruesome and appalling nature of the photographs. “Surely, there is a line between admitting a photograph which is of some help to the jury in solving the facts of the case and one which is of no value other than to inflame the minds of the jurors. That line was crossed in this case.” People v. Burns, 241 P.2d 308, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). The photographs in this case were, without a doubt, the most grotesque, horrifying, and unnecessary photographs that I have viewed in 17 years on this court. These photographs served no purpose other than “to arouse passion and shock at the sight of a gory event.” Clark v. Com., 833 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Ky. 1991). As the majority opinion correctly concludes, the State was more than able to present a compelling case for conviction without the addition of the grisly autopsy and crime scene photographs. The photographs were overwhelmingly prejudicial to the defendant, and the gruesome nature and sheer volume of the photographs comes close to indicating a lack of respect for the victims themselves. A combination of overzealous prosecuting and weak gatekeeping by the trial court can result in an unfair trial for a defendant. That is precisely what happened in this case. The trial court repeatedly expressed apprehension about the admission of the photographs. The trial court should have stood firm in its concerns and warnings and prevented the prosecutor’s overzealous prosecution of the defendant. The failure to do so requires a remand and a new trial in this case. I am authorized by Judge Norma McGee Ogle to say she also joins in this concurring opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cody Wade By His Co-Conservators, et al v. Tennessee Department of Finance And Administration, et al.
Appellant TennCare enrollee has been receiving 24/7 care from a private duty nurse in the home of his grandparents in Martin, Tennessee. TennCare determined that he could receive adequate care for less cost in a special respiratory care unit in St. Francis Hospital in Memphis. Enrollee, through his grandparents as his co-conservators, filed an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge agreed with TennCare. Appellants appealed that decision to chancery court, which reversed the administrative law judge’s decision as being arbitrary and capricious. TennCare appealed. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and affirm the administrative law judge’s opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Nichols v. Knox County, Tennessee
On August 13, 2010, following a violation of his probation, Donald Nichols began serving a sentence at the Knox County Detention Facility (KCDF). He was assigned to a second floor cell. The only bed available there was a top bunk. On August 20, 2010, Nichols was subjected to a physical examination by KCDF's medical staff. The staff detailed his medical history as pain in his lower back and extremities, as well as surgeries on his knee, foot, and ankle. On August 27, 2010, while he was asleep, Nichols rolled off his bed and hit the floor. As a result, his head was bloody, and he had intense pain in his neck and back. The on-duty nurse examined him and gave him ibuprofen for pain. In the weeks that followed, Nichols continued to have ongoing pain. He made multiple requests for medical assistance. He had an x-ray on November 5, 2010. That x-ray and a subsequent CT Scan and MRI revealed that he had several cervical fractures as a result of his fall. Through the efforts of his criminal attorney, Nichols was released from KCDF on November 10, 2010. Thereafter, in January 2011, he had surgery and incurred medical expenses of approximately $240,000. He filed a complaint against Knox County, alleging common law negligence. Nichols filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Knox County filed a motion for summary judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Anthony v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Richard Anthony, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his 1990 convictions for aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and resulting concurrent sentences of twelve years and six years, respectively. As we understand, the petitioner claims that, although he has had no contact with trial counsel in the last twenty-five years, he was unaware that counsel was not pursuing a second-tier appeal of the convictions. As relief, he asks that his convictions be vacated or, in the alternative, that he have counsel appointed to pursue a second-tier direct appeal of his convictions. The post-conviction court determined both that his petition was untimely and without merit, even if considered as a motion to reopen a similar 1997 petition. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Smith v. Doug Cook, Warden
The petitioner, James Smith, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2000 conviction of first degree murder, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was void. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of summary dismissal. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Ray Graves, Jr.
In 2013, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number F-13761 to two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000, and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance. The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number F-14140 to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. For these convictions, the trial court imposed a six-year sentence in case number F-13761 and a two-year consecutive sentence in case number F-14140, for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served on supervised probation. In 2014, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lea Ann Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., et al.
This products liability case arises out of an accident which resulted from the failure of a tire purchased less than three months before the accident. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff’s vehicle was totaled. Subsequently, the entire vehicle, including the tire, was destroyed. This case presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss this case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the Defendants on the issues of causation and whether the tire was defective or unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on the issue of the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine. Upon a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err with respect to any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Lea Ann Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., et al - Concurring in Part, Concurring in the Judgment
The majority has resolved the summary judgment issue by applying the federal standard recently adopted by this Court in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, No. W2013-00804-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. 2015). As explained in my dissent in Rye, I disagree with the adoption of the federal standard and would instead retain our former summary judgment standard. In this instance, however, I would reach the same conclusion as the majority pursuant to the former standard. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brent Hicks
In February 2013, the Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Brent Hicks, for theft of merchandise over $1,000, a Class D felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Martindill
Defendant, Jason Martindill, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ray Rowland
Ray Rowland (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion for Return of Property pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed the Defendant’s motion. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court does have jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Yuell Frank Reeves
Yuell Frank Reeves (“the Defendant”) appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In September 1990, the Defendant was sentenced to four years for burglary, an offense which the Defendant committed in May 1990 (“the May offense”). In November 1990, the Defendant pleaded guilty to two additional burglaries committed in June and July 1990 (“the June/July offenses”) and received an effective four-year sentence which was ordered to run concurrently with the four-year sentence for the May offense. Approximately twenty-four years later, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion seeking to set aside his plea alleging he was released on bail for the May offense when he committed the June/July offenses. The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion, and the State concedes that the case should be remanded for a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the Rule 36.1 motion as to the May offense and reverse the judgment summarily dismissing the motion as to the June/July offenses and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |