Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al - Concurring
I was not serving on the Supreme Court in 2008 when Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) was argued. Had I participated in the Hannan decision, I would have joined in the majority opinion. However, after observing the application of the unique Hannan standard over the past seven years, I conclude that the Hannan standard is unworkable and should be replaced. Although it is often easier to maintain the status quo rather than admit that a mistake was made, we do not have this option. We must change course when we realize we are headed in the wrong direction. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al - Concurring
I concur in all respects with the excellent opinion in this case authored by Justice Clark. I write separately solely to address from a somewhat different perspective some of the points raised by the dissent. The dissent claims that Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) simply “refined” the summary judgment standard adopted by this Court dating back to 1993 in Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). Based in part upon my first-hand experiences in the trenches as a trial court judge, I beg to differ. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Michelle Rye, et al v. Women Center of Memphis, MPLLC, et al - Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
The majority opinion accurately recounts the development of this area of the law but ultimately concludes that the summary judgment standard first articulated in Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993), and later refined in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), and other decisions of this Court, must now be overruled. In my view, the principles articulated in Hannan, when interpreted in light of the history of summary judgment in Tennessee, set forth the preferable standard for shifting the burden of proof at summary judgment—one that is fully consistent with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. By granting Rule 11 review in a case which pre-dated the passage of a statute purporting to set a new standard for summary judgment, by rejecting the well-established doctrine of stare decisis, and by acquiescing to the standard proposed by the General Assembly, my colleagues have preempted the future consideration of an important constitutional issue—whether the General Assembly, by its enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101 (Supp. 2014), has violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. In the interest of consistent, predictable procedural guidelines of adjudication, I would hold that Byrd, Hannan, and their progeny should be reaffirmed as the standard for summary judgment in Tennessee and should be applied to the facts before us. Moreover, in my assessment, even the federal standard, as adopted in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), does not warrant dismissal on all of the claims. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Dupra Drennon
The appellant, Casey Dupra Drennon, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a seven-year sentence with credit for 149 days already served and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott Edward Robins
The Appellant, Scott Edward Robins, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Ray King v. State of Tennessee
Eleven years after he entered a guilty plea to second degree murder, the Petitioner, Jimmy Ray King, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations, which was granted by the coram nobis court. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether due process required tolling of the statute of limitations. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antoine Tony Blugh
The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Tony Blugh, was charged by presentment in count 1 of violating the Sex Offender Registration Act by establishing a residence within 1000 feet of a public park, in count 2 of violating the Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to timely register within forty-eight hours of changing his residence, in count 3 of an enhanced violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act by establishing a residence within 1000 feet of a public park after already having been convicted of a prior sex offender registry violation, and in count 4 of an enhanced violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act by failing to timely register after already having been convicted of a prior sex offender registry violation, all of which were Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 40-39-211, -208. Prior to trial, Blugh filed a motion to dismiss the presentment, which the court denied. At trial, the jury acquitted Blugh in counts 1 and 3 but convicted him of count 2, and, following the second part of the bifurcated trial, convicted him of the enhanced violation in count 4. After merging count 2 with count 4, the trial court imposed a sentence of two years and six months, with a mandatory minimum sentence length of 180 days‟ imprisonment. See id. § 40-39-208(d). On appeal, Blugh argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the presentment; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the applicable law regarding his status as a sexual offender in Tennessee; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was a fatal variance between the crimes alleged in the presentment and the evidence presented at trial. Upon review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marvin Matthews v. Henry Steward, Warden
The Petitioner, Marvin Matthews, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Currie
The defendant, Maurice Currie, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He asserts that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion because Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure does not place a time limit on the filing of a claim and the court improperly treated the motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Philander Baldon
The defendant, Stacey Philander Baldon, appeals the summary denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, which the State concedes, the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion. In consequence, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Philander Baldon-Concurring
I concur with the results of the majority, but from a somewhat different view. I agree the arrival of Rule 36.1 has produced an anathema. I further agree that the trial court misapprehended Defendant’s claim as one that would result in permissive sentence alignment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Eberbach v. Christopher Eberbach
This post-divorce case involves issues concerning reimbursement for the parties’ children’s uncovered medical expenses and an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Mother. Father/Appellant contends that he is not responsible for the uncovered medical expenses on grounds that Mother/Appellee failed to timely send him copies of the bills as required under the permanent parenting plan. Father also contests the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Garner v. Coffee County Bank
Plaintiff and his former wife purchased a house together in 2002. The former wife moved out of the house with all of her belongings in 2009, and the house suffered damage from a fire in 2010. The former wife was a named insured on the house, and each of the insurance checks issued to cover property loss and living expenses was made payable to both Plaintiff and his former wife. The president of the bank that held a mortgage on the house had a separate business relationship with the former wife. According to Plaintiff, the bank president informed him that he could not have any of the insurance proceeds unless one-half was given to the former wife, which proceeds were used to pay down the former wife’s separate and unrelated loan. The bank ultimately foreclosed on the house because the loan became delinquent. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the bank and president asserting conversion, wrongful foreclosure, and other related causes of action. The bank and the president filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file his opposition within the time prescribed by the procedural rules, and the trial court granted the bank and the president’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in some respects and reverse the judgment in other respects. Plaintiff’s deposition transcript that the trial court considered in ruling on the motion for summary judgment raised genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on several of the causes of action alleged. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Michael Hooten v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Christopher Michael Hooten, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition presented a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. The State concedes that the Petitioner presented a colorable claim for relief. Following our review, we agree with the parties and remand for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Junior P. Samuel v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Junior P. Samuel, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2015 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2009 convictions of rape and sexual battery by an authority figure. Because the petition was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations, because this is the petitioner’s second successive petition for post-conviction relief, and because the petitioner failed to prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce Turner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bruce Turner, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for rape of a child and his twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brittany Hatcher Loewen v. Jeffrey Wade Loewen
This is a divorce case. Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of transitional alimony in the amount of $1,625.00 per month for three years. Because the record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings, nor a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 statement of evidence, we have no basis on which to review the ruling of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re: A.J.
This is the second appeal from a finding of criminal contempt. Appellant and his wife originally filed a petition to have the Appellees’ daughter adjudicated dependent and neglected. The trial court entered an order, in which the parties could not contact each other or each other’s families. Appellant made contact with Appellees’ daughters on multiple occasions via text message and once in person. The Appellees filed a petition for contempt against Appellant, and the trial court found the Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt and sentenced Appellant to the maximum punishment allowed for each contempt conviction with the sentences to run consecutively. On the first appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions of criminal contempt but vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to resentence the Appellant and explain its reasons for the sentence it imposed. On remand, the trial court found the Appellant guilty of twenty eight counts of criminal contempt. The trial court imposed twenty-four hour sentences for each count except one, for which the trial court imposed a five-day sentence. Appellant appeals from the convictions, the sentence, and the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jon Michael Johnson
Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant, Jon Michael Johnson, who pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), appeals two related certified questions of law relative to the validity of the instrument used to measure his blood alcohol level following his arrest. Because neither of the certified questions presented is dispositive of the defendant’s case, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Turner v. Stephanie D. Turner
We granted this appeal to determine whether the courts below erred in concluding that the mother must be afforded relief from a void default judgment terminating her parental rights even though she did not seek relief from the void judgment under Rule 60.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure until more than eight years after it was entered. We agree with the courts below that the default judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and also conclude that the reasonable time filing requirement of Rule 60.02 does not apply to petitions seeking relief from void judgments under Rule 60.02(3). Nevertheless, we hold that relief from a void judgment should be denied if the following exceptional circumstances exist: “(1) [t]he party seeking relief, after having had actual notice of the judgment, manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid; and (2) [g]ranting the relief would impair another person’s substantial interest of reliance on the judgment.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 (1982). We hold that the record has not been sufficiently developed to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial court to determine, after a hearing, whether exceptional circumstances justify denying relief in this case. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
City of Oak Ridge v. Joseph J. Levitt, Jr.
The Oak Ridge City Court found the manager of three apartment buildings liable for several violations of the local building code. The manager appealed to the circuit court, and the City moved to amend the cause to add the purported owner of the properties as a defendant. The case proceeded to trial. After the City closed its proof, the trial court noticed that the purported owner of the property had not been properly made a party to the action. Accordingly, the trial court granted the City‟s motion to amend. Although the purported owner moved for a mistrial and/or a continuance, the trial court proceeded on to rule against the purported owner for several violations of the local building code. The purported owner appeals. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to allow the purported owner of the properties an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the allegations against him in accordance with Rule 15.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Charles Austin v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jason Charles Austin, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted for one count of first degree murder. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to 23 years incarceration. Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. Charles Austin, No. E2010-00796-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2445058 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 28, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 21, 2012). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Having reviewed the entire record before us and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court's findings and conclusions. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Abbigail C.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, vacate as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support by an incarcerated parent, and affirm as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. We also affirm the trial court's finding that termination is in the child's best interest. Accordingly we affirm the termination of Father's parental rights |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Smith
The defendant, Michael Smith, was convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years, the sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence previously imposed in another matter. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by the following rulings: (1) instructing as to flight; (2) concluding that the defendant could be impeached with prior convictions for rape and attempted rape; (3) engaging in an ex parte communication with the jury; (4) refusing to grant a mistrial; (5) concluding the defendant could receive a fair trial even though the State had lost or destroyed recordings of telephone calls and jail visits; and (6) not allowing the defendant to present certain proof to impeach one of the State's witnesses. Following our review, we conclude that the issues raised on appeal are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Sample
The defendant, Edward Sample, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his other crimes, that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial, and that he was improperly fingerprinted during trial without counsel present. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of other crimes, and we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |