Daniel G. Lewis v. Comcast
Daniel G. Lewis, the employee, was a cable technician who made a claim for workers' compensation benefits from Comcast, the employer, after he fell from a pole during a climbing recertification procedure. The employer provided medical care and paid temporary disability benefits but denied that the employee had sustained a permanent impairment or disability. Ultimately, the trial court awarded 70% permanent partial disability. The employer appeals, contending that the trial court erred by excluding evidence about the employee's history of drug abuse and by awarding permanent disability benefits. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In re Makenzie L.
In this termination of parental rights case, paternal great-aunt and great-uncle, who were named ―primary residential parents' of a minor child, filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights to their daughter on the grounds of persistence of conditions that led to removal, severe abuse, abandonment by failure to visit, and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court held that grounds did not exist for termination and returned the child to the custody of the parents. We have reviewed the record and affirm the trial court‘s findings with respect to persistent conditions and abandonment by failure to visit. However, we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged sibling abuse in rendering its decision that the grounds of severe abuse were not proven. In addition, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parents abandoned the child by failing to support her in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. Finally, we affirm the trial court‘s holding with respect to attorney‘s fees. Therefore, having found that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of alleged sibling abuse and that a ground exists for termination, we remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) is proven by clear and convincing evidence and whether termination of parental rights is in the child‘s best interest. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Makenzie L.
In this termination of parental rights case, paternal great-aunt and great-uncle, who were named ―primary residential parents' of a minor child, filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights to their daughter on the grounds of persistence of conditions that led to removal, severe abuse, abandonment by failure to visit, and abandonment by failure to support. The trial court held that grounds did not exist for termination and returned the child to the custody of the parents. We have reviewed the record and affirm the trial court‘s findings with respect to persistent conditions and abandonment by failure to visit. However, we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of alleged sibling abuse in rendering its decision that the grounds of severe abuse were not proven. In addition, we hold that there is clear and convincing evidence that the parents abandoned the child by failing to support her in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. Finally, we affirm the trial court‘s holding with respect to attorney‘s fees. Therefore, having found that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of alleged sibling abuse and that a ground exists for termination, we remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the ground of severe abuse, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) is proven by clear and convincing evidence and whether termination of parental rights is in the child‘s best interest. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC v. Alice McCormick-Jackson
This is an appeal from the trial court's order granting Appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings in a breach of contract case. After the trial court granted Appellee's motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal pro se. Due to deficiencies in Appellant's brief, we are unable to address the issues she raises on appeal. We therefore affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shelton Pope
The defendant, Shelton Pope, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial in response to the jury’s being exposed to improper influence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Bland
The defendant, Michael Bland, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by not giving his requested accomplice instruction to the jury, by instructing the jury on the law of criminal responsibility, and by overruling his objection to the opinion testimony of a police officer regarding his honesty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy Carter v. City of Carthage, Tennessee and Tennessee Second Injury Fund
Employee alleged that he sustained an injury to his lower back while lifting a heavy grate in the course of his work. Employer provided medical care, but denied that he had sustained a permanent injury. The trial court awarded permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning causation, permanency, and impairment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse and dismiss. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Katherine Sanko v. Clinton Sanko
This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother's notice of intent to relocate to Pennsylvania with the parties' minor children. The father responded by filing a petition in opposition to the requested relocation. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the father's petition. The mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kyle Beverly et al. v. Hardee's Food Systems, LLC
This is a premises liability case in which the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant, alleging that Kyle Beverly slipped and fell on the floor after entering the defendant’s dining establishment. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Kyle Beverly was comparatively negligent and that the plaintiffs could not prove that its employees had notice of the dangerous condition prior to the fall. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendant had notice of the dangerous condition prior to the fall. The plaintiffs appeal. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Todd Tucker
The Defendant, Adam Todd Tucker, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for two counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and ordering his effective eight-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heather Dawn Lyons Heilig v. Robert Todd Heilig
This is a post-divorce parent relocation case. Robert Todd Heilig (Father) notified Heather Dawn Lyons Bevil, formerly Helig (Mother) of his intent to move with the parties' minor son from Chattanooga to Toccoa, Georgia, about three and a half hours away, in order to assume new employment. Mother opposed the move and filed a petition asking the trial court to disallow it. Mother alleged that the parties were spending substantially equal intervals of time with the child, and that the move was not in the best interest of the child. The trial court, applying the parent relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108 (2014), found that Father was spending substantially more time with the child than Mother, and held that Mother “failed to prove that the relocation does not have a reasonable purpose, that the relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to [the child] or that the Father's motive is vindictive.” The trial court allowed Father to relocate with the child. Mother appeals, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in its calculation of the parties' respective parenting time, and whether it should have found such time “substantially equal.” We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carrie Coggins et al. v. Holston Valley Medical Center
On August 6, 2011, Carrie Coggins and her husband Joel R. Coggins (Plaintiffs) visited a patient at Wellmont Holston Valley Medical Center (Hospital). While there, Mrs. Coggins tripped and fell, sustaining serious injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit and alleged that Mrs. Coggins tripped over a feeding tube that, according to Plaintiffs, had been negligently left near her friend’s bed in such a way as to create a dangerous condition. Before they filed suit, Plaintiffs served Hospital with pre-suit notice of their intent to file. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012). Hospital filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The trial court granted Hospital summary judgment. The court held that (1) Plaintiffs’ action was an ordinary negligence action based on premises liability, not a health care liability action; and (2) Plaintiffs could not rely upon (a) Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the applicable statutes of limitations and repose for 120 days when pre-suit notice is properly given, or (b) Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(e), which provides that “[i]n the event that a complaint is filed in good faith reliance on the extension of the statute of limitations or repose granted by this section and it is later determined that the claim is not a health care liability claim, the extension of the statute of limitations and repose granted by this section is still available to the plaintiff.” We agree with the trial court’s holding that Plaintiffs’ claim sounds in ordinary negligence under a premises liability theory. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company a/s/o Kenneth L. Couch v. Jackson Madison School System Board of Education
This case arises from a non-contact accident between a John Deere crop sprayer and a school bus. The sprayer, which is insured by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company as subrogee of the owner, Appellee Kenneth L. Couch, was driven by Mr. Couch‘s employee, Cameron Martin. The school bus, which is owned by Appellant Jackson Madison School System Board of Education, was driven by its employee, Lawrence Davis. The trial court held that Mr. Davis was negligent in failing to appreciate the situation so as to ―take reasonable action to avoid an accident.‖ We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court‘s finding of negligence on the part of Mr. Davis. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellant. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re M.P.H.
J.L.W. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, M.P.H. (the Child). Based on evidence of Mother’s drug abuse, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) removed the Child from Mother’s custody and placed her in foster care. The Child was later adjudicated dependent and neglected. Eighteen months after the Child’s removal, DCS filed a petition to terminate each of her parents’ rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition. As to Mother, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) multiple grounds for termination exist, and (2) termination is in the Child’s best interest. Mother challenges each of these determinations. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
In re Aisha R., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christee R. and Matthew R. to two of their minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent's parental rights on the statutory grounds of persistence of conditions and mental incompetence and that termination of their rights was in the best interest of the children. The parents appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Steven C.
A father’s parental rights to his child were terminated on the grounds that the father failed to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans developed when the child went into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal persisted. Father appeals, contending that the Department did not use reasonable efforts to reunite him with his child and that the court erred in finding that the child had been removed from Father’s home. Finding that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the grounds for termination of Father’s rights, and that termination of those rights is in the best interest of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Fredrico A. Dixon, III v. Patricia Grissom
The dispute central to this interlocutory appeal involves a failed real estate transaction and alleged breach of a real estate agent‘s fiduciary duty to her client. The plaintiff buyer entered into an agreement to purchase improved real property from the seller but failed to obtain financing to complete the purchase. In a previous action brought by the seller against the buyer, the trial court found that the buyer‘s attempted termination of the contract was ineffective and that he therefore breached the contract. On appeal, this Court affirmed that judgment in favor of the seller. The buyer subsequently brought the instant action against the defendant real estate agent, alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on the agent‘s failure to confirm delivery of the buyer‘s credit declination letter to the seller. The agent filed a motion for summary judgment, averring that the buyer had filed this action outside the time parameters of the applicable statute of limitations. Following a hearing, the trial court applied the discovery rule to find that knowledge of the agent‘s alleged failure to terminate the contract could not be imputed to the buyer before April 22, 2010, when the seller‘s counsel had raised the issue during trial in the original action. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Mann v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andrew Mann, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel due to trial counsel’s advice that he testify in his own defense. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Lee Hibbens v. Ashley Elizabeth Rue
This appeal involves an award of retroactive child support. The child‘s father is in the military and was deployed overseas during part of the relevant time period. The trial court initially set the child support obligation based on the number of days the father would have had with the child pursuant to the parties‘ mediated agreement, regardless of the fact that he did not exercise all of that time due to his deployment. After considering a post-trial motion filed by the mother, the trial court altered the award to set the child support obligation based on the number of days the father actually spent with the child, not the number of days he was provided under the mediated agreement. The father appeals, challenging substantive and procedural aspects of the court‘s decision. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In re Kalob S., et al.
This case involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his seven children. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. Because the grounds for termination are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the minor children at issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Bundren v. Thelma Bundren, et al.
Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Wayne Johnson
Defendant, Randy Wayne Johnson, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. He argues that the kidnapping was merely incidental to the accompanying assault, of which he was also convicted. Because Defendant's conduct in committing the kidnapping constituted a separate and independent offense, there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction, and Defendant is not entitled to relief. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malik Hardin
The defendant, Malik Hardin, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of cocaine in a drug free school zone, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of a controlled substance, and criminal trespass. He received a total effective sentence of fifteen years to be served at 100 percent. As part of his guilty plea, the Defendant sought to reserve two certified questions of law: (1) whether the defendant's arrest for the offense of criminal trespass was “objectively reasonable” under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution in light of the “cite and release” rule codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-118(b)(1); and (2) whether the seizure of the Defendant's automobile was based upon reasonable suspicion that the automobile was or contained evidence or fruits of criminal activity, and whether there was “reasonable cause” to believe that impoundment was “reasonably necessary” under the circumstances. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant's custodial arrest for criminal trespass was not in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-118 and that the trial court did not err in failing to suppress evidence seized subsequent to the defendant's arrest. The judgments of the trial court are, therefore, affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malik Hardin - dissenting opinion
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Defendant’s custodial arrest for criminal trespass was proper. The Defendant was arrested for criminal trespass based on the exception to the cite and release statute that allows for a custodial arrest for a misdemeanor when “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood that the offense would continue or resume . . . .” See Tenn. Code Ann. 40-7-118(c)(2). Because I do not believe that exception was properly applied in this case, I have concluded that the Defendant was subjected to a custodial arrest in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 40-7-118(b)(1). Accordingly, I would not reach the Defendant’s second issue challenging the legality of the search of his vehicle following his arrest. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: Bonnie L., et al
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The children were removed from their parents’ home because of drug exposure and domestic violence. A court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected about six months after their removal. Nearly two years later, the Department of Children’s Services petitioned to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court found that two statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s rights— substantial noncompliance and persistent conditions. The court found that three grounds existed to terminate Father’s rights—abandonment for failure to visit, substantial noncompliance, and persistent conditions. The court also concluded that the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother appeals the court’s determination that there were statutory grounds to terminate her rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Father also appeals the court’s best interest determination, but he appeals the court’s decision on only two of the three statutory grounds to terminate his rights. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals |