Timothy Davis ex rel. Katherine Michelle Davis v. Michael Ibach, MD, et al.
The Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the Defendants. Following the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the action, asserting that the certificate of good faith was noncompliant with the requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122(d)(4) (Supp. 2008), the trial court granted the Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss the action. The Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court. We granted review to determine whether the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122(d)(4) that a certificate of good faith filed in a medical malpractice action disclose the number of prior violations of the statute by the executing party also requires disclosure of the absence of any prior violations of the statute. We hold that it does not. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Deborah B. Bowes
The appellant, Deborah B. Bowes, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to one count of filing a false report, for which she received a sentence of eight years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
|
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harry Joseph Chase v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Harry Joseph Chase, appeals as of right from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because lead trial counsel was not present when he pled guilty, did not review the Petitioner’s discovery with him, and did not fully discuss a possible self-defense claim with the Petitioner. Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Sanders, by and through her next of kin, Tonita Minter v. Harbor View Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a healthcare liability case. The Decedent executed a power of attorney in favor of her daughter, the Appellee, granting Appellee broad powers, but exempting healthcare decisions. The Decedent was subsequently admitted to the Appellant nursing facility. The Appellee signed the Decedent's admission contract and a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. After the Appellee filed this action against the nursing facility and its managing companies, the Appellants filed motions to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement signed at the time of the Decedent's admission. The trial court denied the motions. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christie Crews v. Gary Jack
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant in general sessions court. After the general sessions court entered judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court conducted a trial de novo, but the defendant failed to appear and defend. The circuit court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff after she presented her proof. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment alleging that he never received notice of the trial date in circuit court. The circuit court denied defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. We reverse the circuit court's ruling and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re Adison P.
This case arises from a writ of mandamus issued by the Circuit Court for Henderson County. The writ of mandamus directed Appellant/Judge Robert Stevie Beal, of the Juvenile Court for Henderson County, to hold a hearing on Appellee’s motion for a show cause order in the underlying child custody case. Appellant appeals, arguing that the Circuit Court did not have authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the Juvenile Court because the Circuit Court and Juvenile Court have concurrent jurisdiction over custody matters. Before oral argument in the instant appeal, this Court entered judgment in Appellee’s separate, accelerated, interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. In re Adison P., No. W2015-00393-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1869456 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 21, 2015) (“Adison I”). In Adison I, this Court reversed Judge Beal’s order denying Appellee’s motion for recusal. Although not part of our appellate record in this appeal, we take judicial notice of our judgment in Adison I. Having removed Judge Beal from the underlying case, we conclude that the writ of mandamus, which is issued directly to “Judge Beal,” is rendered null by his removal from the case. Because no present ongoing controversy remains in this case, this appeal is dismissed as moot. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Braydon C.
Petitioners Father and Stepmother filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to visit and failure to support. The trial court denied the petition upon determining that Petitioners failed to demonstrate willful abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re Wesley P.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both mother and father on the ground of severe abuse. Because there is sufficient evidence to conclude that mother and father were engaged in methamphetamine manufacture in their home, we affirm the finding of severe abuse. However, because no clear and convincing evidence exists in the record that termination is in the child's best interest, we reverse the termination of both mother's and father's parental rights. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Justin H.
This appeal involves a child support order entered after an international adoption. The trial court found that the child's adoptive mother failed to pay child support as previously ordered by the court, and therefore, the mother was adjudged in contempt. On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the previous order requiring her to pay child support and also lacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt of that order. Alternatively, she argues that she did not willfully violate the court's order. Finally, the mother argues that a separate injunction entered by the trial court is also void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or procedural irregularities. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Leonard Malugin
This is a will contest case. The Decedent executed a will in 2006 and a codicil to the will in 2012. The will specifically disinherited the Appellant, and the codicil removed one of the Decedent’s children as co-executor of the estate. Appellant contested the will, arguing both that the Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute either the will or the codicil and that the will was executed under undue influence. The trial court found that the Decedent possessed the testamentary capacity necessary to execute both the will and the codicil and that the Decedent did not execute the will or codicil under undue influence. On appeal, Appellant only challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the Decedent’s testamentary capacity. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
David Wayne Britt v. Debra Johnson, Warden
The Petitioner, David Wayne Britt, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County‘s denial of his third petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court‘s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State‘s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Williams aka Antwoin Williams
Appellant, Antonio Williams a.k.a. Antwoin Williams, pleaded guilty to selling a controlled substance and received a suspended three-year sentence with eighteen months on probation. Appellant’s probation officer issued a probation violation warrant before appellant had completed his eighteen months on probation. While the warrant was pending, appellant received four additional charges and subsequently pleaded guilty to the violation of probation and the four additional charges, receiving concurrent sentencing. Appellant later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues he stated a colorable claim in his motion because the trial court erroneously imposed concurrent sentencing and the trial court failed to make proper findings during sentencing. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Robert Hamby
Appellant, George Robert Hamby, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range II offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in not accepting a negotiated guilty plea; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the evidence and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Lynn King v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Terry Lynn King, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for felony murder, for which he was sentenced to death, and for armed robbery, for which he is serving 125 years. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition because it was untimely and because due process did not require tolling the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
|
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alejandro Neave Vasquez v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Alejandro Neave Vasquez, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. He received concurrent twenty-year sentences for each count, for a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel: (1) failed to utilize an interpreter during all meetings and at trial; (2) advised petitioner not to testify; and (3) failed to adequately explain the school-zone enhancement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phyllis Smith v. Shelby County
In this premises liability action, Appellant Phyllis Smith (“Ms. Smith”) appeals the trial court’s finding that Shelby County (“the County”) is immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Because we conclude that the order appealed from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ophelia Carney v. Santander Consumer USA
This appeal involves the trial court's denial of a recusal motion. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion to recuse, but vacate the order entered by the trial court while the recusal motion was pending. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deanty Montgomery
The Defendant, Deanty Montgomery, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, which resulted in an effective five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly permitted the State‘s argument that the Defendant was engaged in unlawful activity and was, therefore, not excused from the duty to retreat under a theory of self-defense; (2) whether the trial court committed error during jury deliberations in its response to a question from the jury about a person‘s duty to retreat when engaged in an unlawful activity; and (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the trial court‘s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas Wayne Young v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Douglas Wayne Young, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2009 Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and four counts of aggravated rape, claiming that the post-convction court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Ariana S., et al
This case arises from the termination of parental rights of the father of two children, Ariana S., born April 2002, and Luis S., born February 2003. Father left his children and moved to Puerto Rico in 2007; he has been incarcerated since 2012. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit or support and persistence of conditions; he appeals. We reverse the termination on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and persistence of conditions and affirm the termination of Father’s rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Conservatorship of Timothy Beasley
A man was injured in an accident, and his relatives initiated conservatorship proceedings in the probate court of Rutherford County. The conservators were dissatisfied with the probate court’s handling of the case and moved to have the case removed to the chancery court. The probate court granted the motion to remove, but the chancery court determined the removal was improper and sent the case back to the probate court. The conservators appealed the chancery court’s decision to review the probate court’s order granting the removal. On appeal, we note that the probate court and the chancery court in Rutherford County have concurrent jurisdiction over conservatorship proceedings. Neither court is inferior to the other, and an appeal from either court is to the Court of Appeals. The chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine any issues in the conservatorship once the case was filed in the probate court. We vacate the judgment by the chancery court and remand the case to the probate court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Abdelrahman Amrokbeer v. Richard Roberts, et al.
A corporate officer responsible for paying over the sales taxes collected by a corporation pled guilty to attempted tax evasion under Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-1-1440. As part of his plea agreement, the criminal court ordered the corporate officer to pay restitution in the amount of $17,500. After completing probation, the Department of Revenue notified the corporate officer of an individual sales tax assessment of $137,493.76 arising from the corporation’s operations. The corporate officer filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging the assessment. The corporate officer argued that the amount of the criminal restitution, which he had already paid, was the full amount of his individual liability to the Department. The Department filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Concluding that criminal restitution and civil tax liability are separate and distinct, we affirm the dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Milton Arledge v. Brenda Pauletter Cripps Arledge, et al.
This case concerns the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) requires the trial court to award the dismissed party his or her reasonable attorney’s fees. In this case, Appellant was dismissed from the lawsuit, but the trial court denied an award of attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s orders do not specify on what grounds it dismissed Appellant, we cannot determine whether Section 20-12-119(c) was triggered in this case. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for entry of an order specifying the grounds for dismissal. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. White, et al v. Turnberry Homes, LLC, et al.
Homeowners sued the builder and others for defects in their home. The builder sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration except as to the fraudulent inducement claim. The builder appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
James Randall Roskam v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Roskam, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to twenty years in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. Petitioner challenged his conviction on appeal, and a panel of this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. James Randall Roskam, No. M2011-02071-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3611749 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug. 20, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 26, 2012). On appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial, failing to investigate whether exculpatory video evidence existed, failing to acquire 911 recordings, and failing to communicate with Petitioner during voir dire. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |