Jerry Bundren v. Thelma Bundren et al.
Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Bundren v. Thelma Bundren, et al.
Thelma Bundren and George David Bundren (“Defendants”) appeal the order of the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the survey prepared by Comparoni & Associates establishes the boundary lines between real properties owned by Defendants and real property owned by Jerry Bundren (“Plaintiff”). We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and we affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Dansby Frazier
The defendant, Adam Dansby Frazier, appeals his Hickman County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, possession of contraband in a penal institution, aggravated assault, and facilitation of felony reckless endangerment, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted second degree murder and that the trial court erred by impermissibly commenting upon the evidence at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William C. Boles
The defendant, William C. Boles, appeals his Clay County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of the delivery of oxycodone, a Schedule II drug, in a drug-free school zone and one count of possession with the intent to sell oxycodone in a drug-free school zone, for which he received a total effective sentence of 60 years’ incarceration, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Because we conclude that no error attends the convictions or sentences, the convictions and sentences are affirmed. Because we detect error in the judgment forms, however, the case must be remanded to the trial court for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the mandatory minimum period of incarceration as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432. |
Clay | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua Faulkner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joshua Faulkner, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault, with a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed, pro se, a petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that Counsel was ineffective because he coerced the Petitioner into entering a guilty plea. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: William B.
In this termination of parental rights case, the father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his son on the grounds of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to father’s incarceration. The father also asserts the court erred in finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the decision of the trial court and affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Matthew Phillips
This appeal involves the interpretation of an insurance policy in order to determine whether the policy provided coverage for damage caused by arson. The insurer and the insured filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on this issue. The trial court found the policy ambiguous and construed it in favor of coverage, holding that arson was covered under the policy. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insured and denied the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the insurer. The insurer appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Darien C. Houston v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darien C. Houston, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief for having been untimely filed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Rankin Zemp
The Defendant, Charles Rankin Zemp, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, a Class E felony, and one count of operating a motor vehicle after being declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO), a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -402(a)(4), -616. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to four years for each count. The trial court ordered the Defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel David Eden v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Daniel David Eden, appeals as of right from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The Petitioner contends that Young v. State, 101 S.W.3d 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002), on which the post-conviction court relied in its summary dismissal, should be abrogated because it offends equal protection guarantees. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cody Lee Crawford
Defendant, Cody Lee Crawford, challenges the trial court’s decision ordering him to register as a sex offender after he pled guilty to two counts of statutory rape. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, et al
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their products liability cases. The trial court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to a prior forum non conveniens dismissal. The trial court reasoned that, at the time of the prior forum non conveniens dismissal, Appellant should have foreseen that the foreign forum would be unavailable to them and that issue should have been raised in previous proceedings. Because we conclude that an alternative exception to the application of collateral estoppel may apply, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Jean Kerr, individually, and on behalf of Willie M. Kerr v. Tommy C. Thompson, M.D.
The trial court denied the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action on the ground that the plaintiff had substantially complied with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122, despite the fact that her certificate of good faith did not contain a statement that the executing party had no prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. This Court granted an interlocutory appeal. While this appeal was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its Opinion in Davis v. Ibach, No. W2013-02514-SC-R11-CV, --- S.W.3d ---, 2015 WL 3451613 (Tenn. May 29, 2015), ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122 does not require a party executing a certificate of good faith to note the absence of any prior violations of the good faith certificate requirement. Based on Davis, we conclude that plaintiff’s certificate of good faith was fully compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122. Accordingly, although we rely on different grounds, we affirm the trial court’s ruling denying the defendant doctor’s motion to dismiss. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert T. Hughes, et al. v. Henry County Medical Center d/b/a Lake Haven Behavioral Center
This is a healthcare liability action, arising from alleged injuries to Appellant, Melba Hughes. Mrs. Hughes' husband, Robert Hughes, filed this action against Appellee, Henry County Medical Center (“HCMC”), and Dr. Donald Gold, who is not a party to this appeal. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121. Specifically, Appellee challenged whether the medical authorization provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). An error in the medical authorization form provided to HCMC did not permit HCMC to obtain medical records from Dr. Gold. However, Dr. Gold saw the patient only at HCMC, and he had no records independent of the hospital's records. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the action without prejudice. Mr. and Mrs. Hughes timely filed their appeal. We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Smartt
A jury convicted the defendant, Marcus Smartt, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and one count of solicitation of a minor to engage in aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years’ imprisonment for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served consecutively, and to five years for the solicitation conviction, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial and the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that he asserts is inadmissible propensity evidence. He also alleges prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error on the grounds presented, and we affirm the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery. However, we conclude that the solicitation conviction must merge into one of the aggravated sexual battery convictions, and we remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Jason Harris
A Bedford County Jury convicted Defendant, William Jason Harris, of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, and Defendant pled guilty to failure to appear. He received consecutive sentences of twelve years for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and six years for failure to appear to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach his mother’s testimony with Defendant’s prior convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Defendant’s past use and manufacture of methamphetamine to rebut Defendant’s assertion that he was coerced and threatened into committing the offense of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture; (3) that the trial court improperly allowed the State to admit the “pseudoephedrine log” which contained Defendant’s past attempts to purchase pseudoephedrine; (4) the trial court did not fulfill its role as thirteenth juror, by allowing the jury’s verdict to stand; and (5) the trial court erroneously denied Defendant’s request for a sentence of community corrections. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric O. Turner
The defendant, Eric O. Turner, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a persistent offender to nine years for each conviction, with one conviction to be served consecutively to the others for an effective sentence of eighteen years. After pleading guilty, the defendant was immediately released on probation. Within two weeks of the defendant’s release, a warrant was issued for a violation of the probationary terms after it was discovered that the defendant had been staying with his girlfriend who had minor children who were not biologically related to the defendant. The trial court found that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation and consequently ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, asserting that the trial court erred in its factual findings, that the defendant received insufficient notice of the basis for the revocation, that the trial court erred in not making written findings, and that the trial court erred in not considering sentencing alternatives. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Ridenour, et al v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Mary Ridenour, individually, and, Jacob Ross Ridenour, a minor by Mary Ridenour (“Plaintiffs”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Phillips v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Michael Phillips (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Gillis v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Keith Gillis (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Raby v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Connie Raby (“Plaintiff”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiff to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiff's claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Micah Noelle Lewellen, et al v. Covenant Health, et al.
This appeal arises from a construction negligence case. Micah Noelle Lewellen, individually, and, Cale Ryan Lewellen, a minor by Micah Noelle Lewellen (“Plaintiffs”), sued Covenant Health, Rentenbach Engineering Company, and TEG Architects, LLC, (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs alleged that the absence of shielding in a portion of the radiology facilities in the new emergency department at Methodist Hospital caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages from excessive radiation exposure. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2000), as a complete defense. The Trial Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court arguing, in part, that the statute of repose did not run because the absence of the required shielding in the radiology facilities meant the project was not substantially completed on the date as found by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the radiology facilities, while perhaps defective, were used for their intended purpose and were substantially complete as found by the Trial Court. The construction statute of repose expired and serves to defeat Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Gene Clark
The appellant, Derek Gene Clark, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to aggravated domestic assault, a Class C felony; theft of property valued more than $1,000, a Class D felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; and retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences except that the appellant was to serve the sentences for the aggravated domestic assault and theft convictions concurrently. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that concurrent sentencing for his aggravated domestic assault and theft convictions is illegal because he was on bail for the theft when he committed the aggravated domestic assault, that the lengths and manner of service of his sentences are excessive, and that the trial court erred by ordering that the serve the sentences for coercion of a witness and retailiation for past action consecutively to the other two sentences. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the appellant's convictions and sentences but remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Anthony R.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Father appealed. We reverse because when Father engaged in the conduct at issue, in fact, Father did not know of his parentage. A father cannot exercise wanton disregard for the welfare of a child if he does not know the child exists. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tamar v. William B. Batte, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. Although Appellant was represented by counsel at oral argument, she filed her initial appellate brief and reply brief to this Court pro se. Significant procedural shortcomings in Appellant’s brief prevent this Court from reaching the merits of the appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |