Sheila Brown v. Rico Roland
This appeal involves the amount of damages a plaintiff may seek on a de novo appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court. The plaintiff filed suit in the Davidson County General Sessions Court seeking damages sustained in an automobile accident. She also notified her uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier of her suit. After deciding that her damages exceeded the general sessions court’s jurisdictional limit, the plaintiff requested the general sessions court to dismiss her suit. The general sessions court obliged, and the plaintiff perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. After the plaintiff accepted the defendant’s $25,000 settlement offer, the plaintiff’s insurance carrier moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim because her settlement with the defendant equaled the amount of damages she had sought in general sessions court. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint increasing the amount of her damages claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Brown v. Roland, No. M2009-01885-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3732169 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010). The plaintiff filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal, asserting that she was not limited to the amount of damages she sought in general sessions court after she perfected a de novo appeal to the circuit court. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Clifford Leon Houston v. James B. Scott et al
The plaintiff filed this civil action in the shadow of a criminal case brought against him, which resulted in an acquittal. The defendants named in this civil action include two trial judges who presided over different aspects of the criminal case, the Circuit Court Clerk and two deputy court clerks of Roane County, Tennessee, and the State of Tennessee. All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss the civil action or motions for summary judgment on various grounds including judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and that all of the alleged acts or omissions were performed under the color of law or in the performance of their official duties. The trial judge dismissed the civil action against the judges based upon judicial immunity, dismissed the action against the State upon sovereign immunity, and summarily dismissed the action against the clerks upon the unrefuted fact that the clerks properly fulfilled their official duties and because the complaint failed to explain how the plaintiff was damaged by the clerks’ actions. The trial court also dismissed Roane County, which was named as a defendant, because no specific allegations were made against the county independent of the claims against the clerks. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ellis Randall Darnell, Jr.
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Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian Leroy Scott
Following an indictment charging three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of rape, a Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Adrian Leroy Scott, of three counts of assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(3) (2003); one count of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, see id. §§ 39-13-527(a)(1)(B), 39-12-101; and one count of attempted sexual battery, see id. §§ 39-13-505(a)(1), 39-12-101. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years’ split confinement consisting of six months’ incarceration in the workhouse followed by two and one-half years on probation. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying (1) his motion to suppress his statement to the police,(2) his motion for a mistrial based upon the undisclosed testimony of a rebuttal witness, (3) his motion to dismiss counts three and five based upon a fatal variance between the indictment allegations and the proof presented at trial, and (4) his request to present evidence at trial concerning the sexual offender registry. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and denying him full probation. The State concedes that the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences and also notes that the trial court failed to merge two sets of alternative counts. On remand, the trial court shall enter corrected judgments reflecting merger and concurrent sentences. Discerning no other error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christie Quinn-Glover v. The Regional Medical Center at Memphis
Plaintiff filed a retaliatory discharge claim against her employer pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304 and the Tennessee common law. The employer filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the employer’s motion without granting Plaintiff’s requests to amend her complaint. From the record, it is unclear whether the trial court considered Plaintiff’s requests, and if it did, the reasons for its denial of such are not apparent. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and we remand for consideration of her requests to amend and for express findings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus L. Branner
The defendant, Marcus L. Branner, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (1997), and two counts of attempted second degree murder, see id. §§ 39-13-210; 39-12-101, for which he received an effective sentence of 24 years’ incarceration. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed error at sentencing by imposing enhancement factors not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury to increase his sentence beyond the statutory minimum. We determine that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed no reversible error at sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wade Payne
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Wade Payne, of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, possessing cocaine, and possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. The three convictions were merged into a single conviction for selling cocaine, for which the appellant received a sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State failed to sufficiently establish a chain of custody for the cocaine. He also contends that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of an officer regarding the preliminary testing of the cocaine and in admitting recordings of telephone calls made by the appellant while he was in jail. Further, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie J. Porter
The appellant, Jackie J. Porter, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years, six months with part of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patricia Carlene Mayfield v. Phillip Harold Mayfield
In this case, Patricia Carlene Mayfield (“Wife”) sought a divorce from Phillip Harold Mayfield (“Husband”). The parties had two minor children, a daughter (“Daughter”), born on September 10, 1998, and a son (“Son”), born on March 2, 2001. The trial court granted the divorce and designated Wife as the primary residential parent of the two minor children, divided the marital property, and awarded Wife discretionary costs. The court denied Husband’s request for alimony. Husband appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Keara J. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving siblings, Keara J. and Sierra J. (collectively “the Children”), the minor daughters of Christie J. (“Mother”) and Kenneth J. (“Father”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received a referral from Keara’s pediatrician concerning her persistent lack of growth and development; at some 16 months old, she weighed only 19 lb., and was unable to walk, stand, or speak. DCS immediately removed Keara from her parents’ custody and filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights, alleging that Keara was severely abused as a result of her parents’ neglect. Because of the severe abuse of Keara, she and her later-born sister, Sierra, were placed in separate foster homes. After a bench trial, the court granted the petition and terminated both parents’ rights to the Children. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
George Sanders, Individually and d/b/a SMS Contractors, Inc. v. Breath of Life Christian Church, Inc., et al.
This is a contract case. The construction contract at issue provided for a specific contract amount plus a commission to the general contractor on any work done beyond the additional contract amount. After being dismissed from the job, the project manager for the general contractor sued both the general contractor and the owner of the property. The general contractor and the property owner then both sued the project manager and each other. After the property owner failed to satisfactorily respond to discovery requests, the trial court excluded all evidence of the property owner’s damages that had not already been provided in detail in discovery. The parties proceeded to trial, at which point the chancellor ordered that all issues of damages beyond the base contract damages would be referred to a special master. After trial, the chancellor found that the property owner materially breached the contract and awarded the remaining balance to be paid on the contract to the general contractor. The special master awarded the project manager damages for work performed as a direct subcontractor on the project and awarded the general contractor delay damages and the commission on all extra work done on the project. The trial court concurred in the findings of the special master and the property owner appealed, raising a number of issues. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Jeffrey Stancil v. Paul Edwin Stancil
Jennifer Jeffrey Stancil (“Wife”) filed for divorce against her husband, Paul Edwin Stancil (“Husband”), in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). In the course of the divorce, Wife filed a motion for temporary alimony. Husband, in his response to Wife’s motion, alleged that an antenuptial agreement precluded Wife from receiving any alimony. Wife asserted that the antenuptial agreement was invalid. After a trial, the Trial Court held that the antenuptial agreement was enforceable. Wife appeals. We hold that, as Wife was misled into signing the antenuptial agreement and adequate disclosure was not made, the antenuptial agreement is invalid. We reverse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Jeffrey Stancil v. Paul Edwin Stancil - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with the majority that Mr. Stancil, as the proponent of the validity of the antenuptial agreement, “has the burden of establishing the existence and terms of the agreement, . . .” and, going further, that he has the burden to ... |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Chudney Valaryck Goff v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Chudney Valaryck Goff, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his two convictions for sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class B felony, and his effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b) and (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing (a) to provide the Petitioner with the State’s discovery materials before the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas, (b) to provide the Petitioner with a defense, and (c) to communicate adequately and effectively with the Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Crayton
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, William Crayton, of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life without parole in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the second count of the indictment, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony T. Woods
The Defendant, Anthony T. Woods, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of one count of facilitation of intent to deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and one count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to six years for the facilitation conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple possession conviction. The Defendant now appeals. The Defendant claims that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) denying the Defendant’s request to introduce either an audio tape recording or a transcript of certain testimony from the preliminary hearing; and (3) finding sufficient evidence to support the convictions. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial before the trial court. Additionally, the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Finally, he has made no request and offers no evidence to support this Court waiving the untimely notice of appeal in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Yates v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2003 conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred (1) by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim for post-judgment jail credit and (2) by failing to address whether the sentence and judgment are void because the trial court relied on an invalid prior conviction to classify him as a Range III, career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shavon Hurt v. John Doe, et al.
Plaintiff filed a personal injury action arising out of a pedestrian-vehicle collision, naming as defendant the owner of the car that allegedlystruck the plaintiff. After discovery, plaintiff amended the complaint to add “John Doe/Jane Doe” as a defendant and served process on her uninsured motorist carrier. Plaintiff subsequently settled with the named defendant and dismissed the action against that defendant; the uninsured motorist insurance carrier then filed a motion to dismiss the uninsured motorist claim. The trial court granted the motion, holding that, in light of the settlement, the uninsured motorist claim no longer existed and dismissed the case. We find that the court erred in dismissing the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elaine Pijan v. Brett W. Pijan
The trial court awarded the wife a divorce after a marriage of over 30 years and divided the marital property between the parties. The financial assets of the parties were divided more or less equally, but the marital residence, valued at $130,000, was awarded to the wife. To equalize the division of property, the trial court awarded the husband a $65,000 security interest in the residence. The court also ordered the wife to redeem the husband’s security interest by amortizing it over a period of 30 years at an interest rate of 4% a year, which obligated her to pay the husband $310.32 monthly. The sixty-three year old husband argues on appeal that the property division was inequitable as to him because, in light of his age and life expectancy, the security interest in the home was an illusory award. We affirm the division of the property, but conclude that the method for payment of Husband’s share is inequitable under the circumstances. Therefore, we modify the property division so as to award the marital home to the wife and husband in joint tenancy. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Pleas Joseph Reed v. Cori Lavonne Reed
Pro se Husband filed a complaint for divorce alleging irreconcilable differences. The trial court dismissed Husband’s complaint because it did not conform to the Tennessee statutory requirements. Husband appealed the dismissal of his complaint, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Husband and Wife must comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-103 to be entitled to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Freddy Edwards v. Rodney Collins
The circuit court entered a judgment against Defendant following a bench trial. Defendant appealed, but he failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our limited ability to review the proceedings below, we affirm the decision of the |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Russell Wilder v. Joseph Chamblee Wilder
In this contentious divorce action, after numerous hearings, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce incorporating the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement and the Permanent Parenting Plan. The Court suspended the PPP and reserved the child support issues. The mother appealed, arguing that the Trial Court refused to permit her to produce her argument, and erred in confirming the referee's recommendations. We hold that the record before us does not substantiate her contentions, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dannye J.C.
At a proceeding in Juvenile Court, appellant was found guilty of severe child abuse, which she appealed to the Circuit Court. On motion of the Department of Human Services, the Trial Court dismissed the appeal without a trial. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court on the grounds that Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159 requires the Trial Judge to conduct a de novo trial on the appeal from Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC et al
The first time this case was before us, see Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC, No. E2009-00116-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852317 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Sept. 29, 2010) (“Rand I”), we reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment decreeing that Automation Industrial Group, LLC (“Automation”) was not entitled to recover on its counterclaim due to its fraud and we reinstated the trial court’s earlier judgment awarding Automation $2,270,759.22 plus prejudgment interest of $256,705.19. The trial court had entered its earlier judgment against Tennessee Rand, Inc. (“Rand”) on Automation’s counterclaim, and then set it aside on Rand’s motion to alter or amend. Although the parties had not addressed in the first appeal the prejudgment interest portion of the trial court’s earlier judgment, we, without extended discussion, reinstated the prejudgment interest as originally calculated by the trial court. What the parties did not put at issue or otherwise stress in the first appeal was the fact that Rand had challenged, in its motion to alter or amend, the accuracy of the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. In that motion, Rand had argued that the trial court had obviously miscalculated prejudgment interest. In Rand I, we also reversed an award of discretionary costs to Rand because we concluded that Automation was the new prevailing party. Upon remand following our decision in Rand I, Rand asked the trial court to correct the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Rand also asked the court to start the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment on remand. Automation filed a motion for discretionary costs as the new prevailing party. The trial court on remand determined that it had miscalculated prejudgment interest but held that our opinion in Rand I prevented it from granting Rand any relief with respect to the miscalculation as well as with respect to the other relief requested by Rand. The trial court also denied Automation’s motion for discretionary costs, based, at least in part, on Automation’s substantial windfall award of prejudgment interest due to the miscalculation. Rand now appeals the denial of its motions, and Automation challenges the denial of its request for discretionary costs. Automation also asks us to determine an issue pertaining to interest on the unpaid portion of the judgment entered on remand. We conclude that, in the interest of justice, we must take corrective action pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36 by granting Rand relief from the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Since the erroneous and inflated award of prejudgment interest was one of the reasons given by the trial court for denying discretionary costs, we vacate that denial and remand for further consideration of Automation’s request. We affirm that part of the judgment, as modified by us, holding that Automation is entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment in its favor. Rand obtained a stay of collection of Automation’s judgment pending appeal upon posting a bond to cover interest accrued between the original judgment date and the date of the judgment on remand. The amount set by the trial court to obtain a stay did not include interest accrued on the unpaid portion of the judgment. We hold that Automation is entitled to recover post-judgment interest accrued on the judgment. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in part and modified in part. As vacated and modified, the judgment is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas Cofer v. Donnie Harris and Marcia Harris
This case arises from a dispute over an alleged partnership. Douglas Cofer (“Cofer”) filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) against Donnie Harris and Marcia Harris (“the Harrises”, collectively). Cofer alleged that the Harrises were successors in a partnership established between Cofer and the Harrises’ father, Homer Harris, regarding the development of a trailer park on Homer Harris’s land. After a trial, the Trial Court found that, rather than a partnership, a lease relationship existed between the parties. The Trial Court awarded the Harrises damages for unpaid rent. Cofer appeals, raising various issues. The Harrises raise one issue on appeal concerning the calculation of damages. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |