Gary Joseph Latham v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gary Joseph Latham, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts in this Court that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial which resulted in his conviction for aggravated child abuse. He also argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because “the introduction of perjured testimony [at trial] invalidate[s] the conviction.” Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
CK Development, LLC v. Town of Nolensville, et al.
The Developer of a Planned Unit Development in Nolensville sought final approval from the planning commission of phase 7 of the development. The planning commission conditioned its approval of the plan on the developer’s agreement to construct the roads in phase 7 in accordance with more recent road standards that were adopted in 2007. The developer filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming it had vested rights in the earlier road standards and that complying with the more rigorous standards would require it to spend more money than it had originally planned. The trial court agreed with the developer and concluded that it had vested rights in the earlier road standards. The town appealed. We reverse the trial court’s decision because the developer did not rely on any final governmental approval, the application of the improved road standards was not a zoning change, and the developer has neither engaged in substantial construction of phase 7 nor incurred substantial liabilities with respect to phase 7. We also reject the developer’s argument that the planning commission exceeded its jurisdiction by acting in a legislative rather than an administrative capacity when it determined the developer was required to comply with the 2007 road standards. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Frederica April Dawn Bell v. Dennis Lynn Bell
This is an appeal from an order returning temporary custody of the parties’ child to the father pending a further hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Flippo v. State of Tennessee
Randy Flippo (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea to theft of property between five hundred and one thousand dollars; and (2) that his plea was not voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed solely as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael V. Morris v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s sentencing him in violation of ex post facto protections; that appellate counsel failed to address the lack of a written waiver of ex post facto protections;and that trial counsel failed to review discovery,namely a surveillance video of the robbery, with him. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demeturus Alexander
The defendant, Demeturus Alexander, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
2850 Parkway General Partnership v. C. Dan Scott, et al
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment, asking the Court to declare that while plaintiff's sublease required it to pay the property taxes, the master lease required the lessor to pay the property taxes, and asked the Court to declare the lessor liable for the property taxes. Following trial, the Trial Court declared that the sublessee was liable for the property taxes, as it agreed to pay under the sublease. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that under the fact of this case, plaintiff is equitably estopped to avoid paying property taxes, as agreed to in the sublease. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Alexandria Price v. Christopher Childers
The State brought this action against the defendant to establish paternity and require support for the dependent child. A default judgment was taken against defendant, which determined that he was the father of the child and he was ordered to pay child support, and it was ordered that the child support be withheld from his paycheck. During these proceedings the defendant was a member of the United States military, and he subsequently filed a pro se motion for DNA testing. The DNA test established that he was not the biological father of the child, and the support withheld from his paycheck was ordered reimbursed to defendant. The State appealed, and we hold that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require the State to reimburse defendant for the child support withheld from his paycheck. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sheddrick Harris
The defendant, Sheddrick Harris, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006), and especially aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-403. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found two enhancement factors beyond a reasonable doubt: “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person,” see id. § 39-13-204(i)(2); and “[t]he murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any . . . robbery,” see id. § 39-13-204(i)(7), and it unanimously imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, see id. § 39-13-204(f)(2). At a separate sentencing hearing concerning the especially aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 60 years’ incarceration as a career offender to be served consecutively to the life without parole sentence. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of first degree felony murder, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) imposing increased security procedures during trial, (2) denying his motion for mistrial, (3) limiting his cross-examination of a witness, and (4) excluding residual doubt evidence from the penalty phase of the trial. Discerning no paucity of evidence and no error, the judgments of the criminal court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Benjamin M. Bates and Estate of Pearl Bates
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents’ estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee’s claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents’ former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Anne Chavez v. James Albert Chavez, Jr.
Wife sought a divorce and Husband counterclaimed for a divorce. The trial court granted the divorce to both parties. Wife was designated the primary residential parent and was awarded transitional alimony and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William N. Nusbaum v. Lucile E. Nusbaum
In this divorce appeal, wife challenges the distribution of husband’s federal retirement benefits, the award of transitional alimony, and the court’s failure to award her attorneyfees. Because of an error in the percentage of husband’s FERS classified as marital assets, we reverse the trial court’s decision. As to transitional alimony, we affirm the award of $500 per month but extend the award until the time of husband’s retirement. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
Decedent’s next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility’s management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent’s death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline L. Shultz v. Kirby Fuller
Upon the divorce of the parties, the permanent parenting plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the couple’s daughter. Both parties eventually filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstance and that it was in the best interest of the daughter that her parenting be shared equally between the parties. Mother appeals the trial court’s modification decision. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the best interest of the child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Marie Lott vs. State of Tennessee
Sheila Marie Lott (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her open plea and effective sentence of eighteen years and six months to one count of theft over $1000, eight counts of criminal simulation, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card; and (2) that her plea was not voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Steven Devore v. Rhonda M. Devore
This is a post-divorce case in which Mark Steven Devore (“Husband”) petitioned for modification of child support. Rhonda M. Devore (“Wife”) counter-petitioned for contempt. The trial court held that Husband was no longer liable for child support because the children had reached the age of majority but that the amount of overpayment was offset by obligations provided for in the marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The court also held that Husband was liable for future college expenses. Following Wife’s motion to reconsider, the court held that Husband owed $11,230.43 for past due college expenses. Husband appeals. We hold that the court erred because it did not use a child support worksheet to calculate the amount of support owed. We vacate and remand for the court to utilize a worksheet. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. J'Menski Holt
A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, J’Menski C. Holt, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jereme Dannuel Little
A Hamilton County grand jury charged the defendant, Jereme Dannuel Little, in case number 253372, with two counts of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006), and, in case number 253374, with one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-305. At the close of proof at trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgments of |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jereme Dannuel Little -Disenting Opinion
Based on the cumulative effect of the errors committed in this case, I would reverse the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, I respectfully dissent. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherri A. Elliott
The defendant, Sherri A. Elliott, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve eight months of split confinement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tom Perry Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1979 convictions for two counts of second degree criminal sexual conduct and petition for post-conviction relief from his 1984 conviction for attempt to commit a felony. The trial court summarily dismissed both petitions as untimely. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petitions without an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. The Petitioner also contends that the original trial court erred by failing to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Workers' Compensation Division
This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ Compensation.The stated reason for the penaltywas the failure to file Form C-20,Tennessee Employer’s First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty. We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department’s basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner’s due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its “interpretation” of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court’s holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Billy D. H.
Mother’s parental rights to her son were terminated on grounds that she was mentally incompetent to provide for the child and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. She appeals, contending that the grounds are not supported by the evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is the second appeal arising from a disputed “temporary” conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). The petitioner was appointed “Temporary Conservator” and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a “disabled person” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a “fiduciary” was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the “prevailing party.” The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the “temporary conservator” and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dontayvis Brown
The defendant, Dontayvis Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of ten years for each conviction. He raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior conviction for facilitation of aggravated robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge certain lesser-included offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |