Carl Ross v. State of Tennessee
W2011-01634-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Walker, III

The Petitioner, Carl Ross, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1995 convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft over $1000, and resulting sentence of 162 years’ confinement. The Petitioner contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as a Range III, career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

Redland Insurance Company v. Don Willis
M2011-02158-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

The appellant has appealed from an August 30, 2011 final judgment awarding him $1733.00 in damages. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re: The Estate of Bessie Louise Thornton
M2011-01287-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

In this will contest, the jury found that a confidential relationship existed between the principal beneficiary of the will and the testatrix; however, the jury also found that the will was not the result of undue influence and, therefore, the will was valid. The contestant filed post-trial motions pursuant to Rules 50.02 and 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court set aside the judgment of the jury, and entered judgment declaring the will invalid on the grounds that it was the result of undue influence. The trial court did not expresslyrule on the alternative motion for a new trial.The proponent of the will appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict and entering judgment in favor of the contestant. We agree that the trial court erred by entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; however, we have also concluded that the trial court, acting in its role as thirteenth juror, implicitly and conditionally granted the contestant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.
 

Wilson Court of Appeals

Minor Miracle Productions, LLC, et al. v. Randy Starkey
M2011-00072-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge George C. Sexton

A pro se defendant appeals the decision of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a domesticated foreign judgment on the grounds that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case and that the judgment of the foreign court was obtained fraudulently. We affirm the trial court because the foreign court had jurisdiction, the judgment was not the product of fraudulent acts that were pled with specificity, and the judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy.
 

Cheatham Court of Appeals

Lemar Brooks v. State of Tennessee
M2010-02451-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

The Petitioner, Lemar Brooks, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel regarding his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call two potential witnesses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to request a jury out hearing” regarding the State’s cross-examination about a witness’ gang affiliation; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prejudicial remarks made by the State during closing arguments; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object “to the selective and vindictive prosecution by the State”; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the “physical facts” rule;(7)appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the voluntary intoxication jury instruction issue on appeal; (8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s prejudicial remarks on appeal; (9) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s “selective and vindictive prosecution” on appeal; (10) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the standard of review used by the trial court in denying the Petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis; (11) the cumulative effect of trial and appellate counsels’ errors establishes that their performance was deficient and that the Petitioner was prejudiced by their performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Timothy Leon McKenzie
M2010-01168-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy Easter

The defendant, Timothy Leon McKenzie, pled guilty to theft of more than $10,000 and forgery, receiving an agreed term of ten years probation in conjunction with a grant of judicial diversion. Also included in the plea agreement was a condition that the defendant pay the victim of the crimes $157,900 in restitution at a rate of $1315 per month. Thereafter, the defendant was found to be in violation of his probation based upon his failure to report to his probation officer and failure to pay restitution as ordered. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years, which the court ordered to be served in confinement. The court further reaffirmed restitution due in the amount of $156,000 and ordered that payment of such restitution be made a condition of the defendant’s parole. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of confinement; (2) the trial court lacked the authority to impose the special condition that ordered the defendant to make restitution when he was paroled; and (3) the court erred in imposing the full amount of restitution absent an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial could did not err in ordering a sentence of confinement. However, the court did lack the authority to impose payment of restitution as a condition of parole and did fail to appropriately determine the amount of restitution in consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay. As such, remand is necessary for a determination of the proper amount of restitution in this case.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Herbal Integrity, LLC, et al. v. Scott Huntley, Jr., et al.
M2011-00810-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The parties agreed to submit the valuation of Defendants’ membership in Plaintiff LLC to arbitration. Following arbitration, Defendants moved to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment in the matter. Defendants appeal. We affirm.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Annia J.
M2010-02236-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donna Scott Davenport

The trial court modified a previous custody order and named father the primary residential parent. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding a material change in circumstances. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
 

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Elizabeth Ann (Stickney) Compton v. Neil Scott Stickney
M2011-01520-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

This is a post-divorce dispute over father’s obligation to help pay for the parties’ child’s college education. We conclude that, pursuant to the parties’ permanent parenting plan, father is contractually obligated to continue paying support in the amount of $790 a month until the child reaches the age of 21 as long as the child is in college. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified.
 

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Chadwick David Dorman Moyer v. Nashville Midnight Oil, LLC, d/b/a Cadillac Ranch
M2011-00808-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Jane McClendon

Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained while riding a mechanical bull in a bar owned byDefendant. Defendantappeals the trial court’s determination that it was 100% at fault and resulting judgmentfor plaintiff. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Landon H.
M2011-00737-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip E. Smith

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground that Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Father appeals, contending that the pleadings did not allege abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought; Father also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his counter-petition for custody. Because we have concluded that the petitioners failed to plead abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we vacate the termination of Father’s parental rights on that ground and remand for consideration of whether Father’s parental rights should be terminated based on a ground alleged in the petition or supplemental petition; we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s counterpetition for custody.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, et al.
M2011-00588-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This is a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-14102.The petitioner, who was convicted of three felony drug offenses in Georgia, was granted a full pardon by the State of Georgia that expressly restored his right to possess a firearm, now resides in Tennessee and desires to purchase and possess firearms. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony offense for a person, who has been “convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon” or who has been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm in Tennessee. Therefore, Petitioner filed this action seeking a declaration that he would not be in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) by purchasing or possessing a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee responded to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Second Amendment, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution.The chancery court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the State’s Rule 12.02(1); however, the chancery court granted the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution,the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The State raises one issue on appeal, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed for that reason. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction. As for the decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we have determined that the complaint for declaratory relief states facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy concerning the matter at issue; therefore, the chancery court erred by granting the State’s motion pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) instead of rendering a declaratory judgment as the facts and law require. Accordingly, the complaint for declaratory relief is reinstated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Tracy Glenn v. State of Tennessee
W2011-00399-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn L. Peeples

The petitioner, Tracy Glenn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her Class E felony theft conviction, arguing that she was denied a fair trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury was not instructed on facilitation as a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Gibson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Antonio Turner
W2010-02423-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

The defendant, Antonio Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery, all Class A felonies, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for each conviction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Aisha Wiggins v. State of Tennessee
W2011-00670-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The Petitioner, Aisha Wiggins, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Dyer Court of Criminal Appeals

Joshua N. Lee v. Lyons Construction Company, Inc.
E2010-02388-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard Vance

Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Rebecca L. Inman v. James A. Inman, et al.
E2011-01748-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson

A show cause order was entered in this case on November 21, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. The appellant has responded to the show cause order within the time specified, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Specifically, the order of dismissal does not address the counterclaims filed by the appellees below or finally resolve the award of attorneys’ fees to the appellees. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. John C. Crim
M2010-01281-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Earl Durham

 A jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, John C. Crim, of eight counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years old, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him to an effective 212-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the judgments of conviction. We further agree with the state that the matter should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
 

Wilson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Ryan Mallady
M2010-02142-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robbie T. Beal

Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth Ryan Mallady, was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the offenses of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and aggravated assault. He appeals the trial court’s order denying discharge from involuntary commitment under the terms of a mandatory outpatient treatment program. Mallady argues that the trial court’s finding that he was unsuitable for discharge was in error because it contradicted the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order discharging Mallady to mandatory outpatient treatment.

Hickman Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Sidney S. Stanton, III
M2010-01868-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton, Special Judge

The Defendant, Sidney S. Stanton, III, appeals from the Warren County Circuit Court’s order denying the Defendant relief from the assistant district attorney general’s denial of pretrial diversion. After a hearing, the trial court affirmed the denial of diversion and found no abuse of prosecutorial discretion but granted the Defendant’s motion for this interlocutory appeal. The Defendant contends that the assistant district attorney general abused his discretion by denying the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion and that the trial court erred in declining to grant certiorari, finding that there was no abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Warren Court of Criminal Appeals

RonAllen Hardy v. State of Tennessee
M2011-00497-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge David M. Bragg

The petitioner, Ronallen Hardy, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his four felony convictions and the accompanying effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years, alleging that his counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Marcus Donnell Jones
M2010-02597-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The Defendant entered a negotiated best interest plea to three counts of theft over $1,000. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Defendant received an effective sentence of six years, to be served on probation, and the State dismissed other pending charges against him. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine whether the Defendant’s probationary status should be governed by the judicial diversion provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for diversion. The Defendant now appeals that judgment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Randy Ray McFarlin a/k/a Mac Ray McFarlane
M2010-00853-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The defendant, Randy Ray McFarlin, also known as Mac Ray McFarlane, appeals as of right his Rutherford County Criminal Court jury convictions of one count of first degree premeditated murder, see T.C.A. §39-2402(a) (1981), and one count of second degree murder, see id. § 39-2403(a), for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting (1) scenes from the movie Miller’s Crossing, (2) evidence of the defendant’s and victim’s participation in a 1982 robbery, (3) evidence of the defendant’s abusive treatment of his ex-wife, and (4) photographs of the victim’s partially decomposed body. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

James Leon Parker v. David R. Sexton, Warden
E2011-01472-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

Petitioner, James Leon Parker, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that his judgments were void or his sentences were expired, we affirm the denial of relief.

Johnson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Tom Perry Bell
E2010-01504-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don W. Poole

A Hamilton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Tom Perry Bell, for burglary, misdemeanor theft, possession of burglary tools, and vandalism valued at more than $10,000. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to burglary, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not properly apply enhancement and mitigating factors. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals