ICG Link, Inc. v. Philip Steen, et al. v. TN Sports, LLC v. ICG Link, Inc.
This is a dispute concerning payment for website development services. The plaintiff, a website development company, filed suit against the defendants, an LLC and its managing member in his individual capacity, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court found there was no express contract between the parties due to a lack of mutual assent. The court found there was a quasi-contract and that plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable value of its services, minus the costs incurred by defendants in attempting to repair the defects in the website. Last, the court held the individual defendant personally liable for the judgment. We affirm the finding of a quasi-contract and the personal liability of the individual defendant; however, we modify the trial court’s monetary award, finding the plaintiff is entitled to recover a judgment of $13,952.88. The court’s holding is affirmed in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mamakeh Mamadi Jawara v. Latoya Michelle Jawara
This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered on August 5, 2008. Because the appellant voluntarily dismissed her first appeal from the same divorce decree in 2008, and did not file her current notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert R. Smith, As Conservator for the Estate of H. Boyd Israel, Ward v. Mark Israel
Petitioner sought to domesticate four orders entered by a probate court in Georgia for the payment of money pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §26-6-101, et seq. The trial court granted the petitioner the relief he sought, and the debtor appealed, arguing Tennessee public policy should prevent the orders from being enforced based on the unusual circumstances surrounding the issuance of the orders and his attorney’s misconduct in the Georgia proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the Georgia court had jurisdiction to enter the orders and Tennessee courts are not in a position to review the facts leading to a foreign court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Smyrna, Tennessee v. Perry Bell
The Town of Smyrna annexed land in 1991 that included a retail furniture store. The owner of that business kept a number of tractor-trailers parked on his property to store some of his inventory. Several years after the annexation, the town cited the owner in an attempt to enforce a municipal ordinance regulating the parking of tractor-trailers on commercially zoned property. The municipal court ruled against the owner. He appealed to the Circuit Court,which held that the ordinance in question was a zoning regulation and that the owner’s use of the tractor- trailers was protected bythe grandfathering provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b)(1). The town contends on appeal to this court that the ordinance is a property maintenance regulation rather than a zoning regulation and that the owner’s use of the tractor-trailers is therefore not entitled to the protection of the grandfather clause. We agree, and we reverse the Circuit Court because the proof does not indicate that compliance with the ordinance would substantially interfere with the store owner’s use of the property as a retail furniture business. Thus, it cannot be considered a zoning ordinance as applied to him under the standard established by our Supreme Court in Cherokee Country Club v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.2d 466 (Tenn. 2004). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Winford McLean
A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Winford McLean, of one count of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver 300, grams or more of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 and §39-11-403(2006). He was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to fifteen years in prison. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court denied following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by admitting evidence of his prior convictions for use as impeachment at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Taylor BW, and Ashley NW
The father and his wife petitioned the Court to terminate the parental rights of the two minor children's mother and allow the father's wife to adopt the two minor children. After a myriad of pleadings, the Trial Court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the father had proved statutory grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights, and that it was in the best interest of the two minor children that her parental rights be terminated. The mother petitioned to reconsider, and upon further consideration the Trial Court reversed its ruling and held that it was not in the children's best interest to terminate her rights as a parent of the two children. Petitioners appealed, and on appeal we hold that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory grounds for termination and clear and convincing evidence established that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights. Further, that the Trial Judge in reversing her findings that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the parental rights of the mother, focused on the rights of the mother rather than the rights of the children, as required by the statute and authorities. We reinstate the original Judgment of the Trial Court terminating the mother's parental rights. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayne Robert Wait
A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Wayne Robert Wait, of second degree murder and, thereafter, the trial court imposed a sentence of 18 years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a police officer to testify about blood spatter evidence he observed at the scene when the officer was not tendered as an expert in blood spatter analysis; (2) whether the trial court erred in limiting the admission of prior violent acts allegedly committed by the victim offered to corroborate the Defendant’s contention that the victim was the first aggressor and to support his self-defense claim; and (3) whether his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to apply mitigating factors and gave too much weight to the sole enhancing factor. We conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kendra D. Carter, et al. v. Retha Batts
Plaintiffs prevailed in personal injury action against Defendant in Shelby County General Sessions Court. On appeal in Shelby County Circuit Court, the matter was tried before a jury and a judgment was rendered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion, but the parties settled the matter before retrial and signed a release memorializing the settlement. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) alleging that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and thus its judgment was void, because the Defendant failed to perfect the appeal from general sessions court. The circuit court denied the motion and Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that Defendant properly perfected the appeal from general sessions court, and that the release executed by the parties encompassed Plaintiffs’ claim, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Montell Williams
The Defendant, Michael Montell Williams, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for abuse of a corpse, especially aggravated kidnapping, felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted 1 of one count of premeditated first degree murder and one count of abuse of a corpse. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -17-312. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the abuse of a corpse charge from the premeditated first degree murder charge; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a toxicologist to testify regarding his opinion on the likelihood that prescription drugs found in the victim’s blood caused her death; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al.
The question in this case is whether the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice action. Because the lawsuit before this court was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roy L. Hamilton v. Elizabeth K. Hamilton
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody, restore telephone privileges, and re-evaluate income assignment. It found Father to be in contempt, and denied Mother’s request for attorney’s fees under Rule 11. The trial court awarded Mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Junkans v. Alamo Rentals, Inc. v. Pamela Junkans
Plaintiff and third-partydefendant appeal the circuitcourt’s denial of third-partydefendant’s motion to dismiss, grant of defendant/third-party plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against third-party defendant, and dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. Finding that defendant/thirdparty plaintiff’s complaint makes out a claim for relief as a matter of law, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the grant of the motion for sanctions. Finding that defendant negated an element of plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case against the defendant. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Franklin Bank v. J. Alan Riggs, et al.
In this case, the trial court entered a default judgment against J. Alan Riggs (“Husband”) and Deborah D. Riggs (“Wife”) and against Husband and Preston Park Development, LLC (“Preston Park”). Husband, Wife, and Preston Park (collectively “the Defendants”) filed a motion for a new trial or to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Wife was not liable for one of the counts in the judgment entered against her. The trial court upheld the entirety of the other counts as they related to each of the Defendants. The Defendants appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Rhynuia L. Barnes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rhynuia L. Barnes, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In the petition he contends that in a letter purportedly written by his now deceased father, his father confessed to the murder for which Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner asserts that the letter constitutes newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Amates Martinez
The grand jury of Smith County indicted Defendant, Jose Amates Martinez, for the Class A felony offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver 150 grams or more of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and after a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to serve twenty years. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment and/or suppress all evidence seized because the agents who stopped Defendant and searched the vehicle he was driving were working outside their territorial jurisdiction and beyond their lawful scope of authority; (3) the trial court erred by denying his additional motion to suppress evidence based upon Defendant’s assertions that Defendant was unlawfully stopped, Defendant’s consent to search was not knowingly and voluntarily given, and the search by the agents exceeded the scope of consent, if the consent was valid; (4) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s objection to the testimony of the forensic scientist regarding test results of the heroin seized; and (5) the trial court erred by overruling Defendant’s objection to a law enforcement officer’s testimony of the street value of the heroin seized. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Jefferson
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Devin Jefferson, of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of attempted robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress his statement to police because (1) the police continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to remain silent, (2) the police continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to counsel, and (3) his statement was coerced. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve Biggers v. Laurence K. Houchin
In the previous appeal of this case, we determined that the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff the opportunity to appeal the dismissal of his case and in awarding $1,151.75 in sanctions to Defendant. The case was remanded and, on remand, the trial court directed the Defendant to return the monetary sanction by depositing the money with the Clerk and Master. Plaintiff appeals and contends that the trial court erred in not distributing the funds to him directly. We affirm the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eva Weaver v. Priscilla Deverell, et al.
This is a case involving life insurance and a Power of Attorney. After Decedent named Appellant as his attorney-in-fact through a Power of Attorney, the Appellant changed Decedent’s life insurance policy to name herself as primary beneficiary. Appellee, the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Whitney Marie MacRae v. Thomas Paul MacRae
The trial court granted Whitney Marie MacRae (“Wife”) a divorce by default against Thomas Paul MacRae (“Husband”). The default was based upon Husband’s failure to comply with an order compelling him to respond to Wife’s discovery requests. Shortly after Wife remarried – which was nearly a year after the divorce judgment was entered – Husband filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied the motion. Husband appeals from that denial. Wife argues that the judgment should not be set aside; she seeks damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also find the appeal to be frivolous and remand to the trial court for a determination of the damages due Wife pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122 (2000). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mark D. Talley v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This appeal involves a disciplinaryproceeding against a Memphis lawyer who pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Shelby County to facilitating the felonious violation of the Tennessee Securities Act. After a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended that he be disbarred, the lawyer filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking judicial review of the hearing panel’s decision. The trial court affirmed the recommendation of the hearing panel, and the lawyer appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Board of Professional Responsibility asserts that the lawyer’s petition should be dismissed because his petition for writ of certiorari did not contain the recitation required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106 (2000). For his part, the lawyer asserts that the punishment of disbarment is excessive. We have determined that the lawyer’s deficient petition for writ of certiorari does not prevent the courts from reviewing the hearing panel’s decision. We have also determined that the record fully supports the hearing panel’s findings and that disbarring the lawyer is not an excessive punishment in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Mark D. Talley v. Board of Professional Responsibility - Concurring
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I do not concur in the reasoning of the majority opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Beeler
Defendant, James Beeler, an attorney, was cited for contempt of court in the Washington County Criminal Court because, during a court proceeding, he communicated with his client’s co-defendant who was represented by other counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court found Defendant in contempt of court and imposed a fine and a sentence of ten days in jail. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court suspended Defendant’s sentence. Defendant now appeals his conviction and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for contempt of court. He specifically argues that it was error for the trial court to enforce Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8 or to charge Defendant with criminal contempt for a violation of Supreme Court Rule 8. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William W. Stebbins v. Funderburk Management Company, LLC, et al.
Restaurant patron who was served food in which he found a tooth sued the restaurant for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. He sought compensatory and punitive damages. At trial, the court granted a directed verdict to defendant on the punitive damages and Consumer Protection Act claims and denied plaintiff’s special request that the court instruct the jury that recoverable damages for mental and emotional distress could also include anxiety or concern for others. Plaintiff appeals the grant of the directed verdicts and the failure to give the requested instruction. Finding no error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Jerrie Bryant v. State of Tennessee
A Van Buren County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerrie Bryant, of second degree murder. This Court affirmed the Defendant’s convictions,but we vacated her sentences and remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Jerrie Bryant, No. M2007-02057-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 544650, *1-13 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 20, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
U.S. Bank National Association, ad trustee v. Rodney T. Rzezutko, et al .
Rodney T. Rzezutko and Sandra Rzezutko (“Defendants”) appeal a Circuit Court order dismissing Defendants’ appeal of a General Sessions Court interlocutory order dated September 21, 2010. U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee (“Plaintiff”) raises an issue on appeal with regard to the Circuit Court vacating the General Sessions Court’s September 21, 2010 order. We find and hold that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a General Sessions Court order. The Circuit Court, therefore, correctly dismissed Defendants’ appeal. We affirm this dismissal. However, as the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction, it was error to vacate the September 21, 2010 General Sessions Court order. We, therefore, vacate that portion of the Circuit Court order vacating the September 21, 2010 order, and reinstate the September 21, 2010 General Sessions Court interlocutory order. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |