James W. Sharp v. Greg Wilson, et al.
Essentially, plaintiff's Complaint sets forth numerous refusals by the prison in denying him appropriate and proper medical treatment for his conditions. In their Answer, defendants denied the Complaint's allegations and subsequently moved for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. On appeal, we hold there are disputed issues of material facts and the summary judgment is reversed, as to the health administrator and the nurse practitioner. The summary judgment granted to the Warden of the Southeastern Tennessee State Correctional Facility is affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Majors v. Randstad Inhouse Services, L.P., et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was operating a torque gun which jerked and twisted her right hand while at work. She contended that her injury extended into her arm. Her employer agreed the injury was compensable but argued that the injury was limited to her index finger. The trial court found the injury was to the arm and awarded 70% permanent partial disability to that member. On appeal, her employer argues that the trial court erred by apportioning the award to the arm, that the amount of the award is excessive, and that the trial court erred by awarding certain discretionary costs. We affirm the judgment. |
Franklin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Dick Broadcasting Co., Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., et al
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants for causes of action sounding in contract after the defendants refused to consent to the assignment of certain agreements relating to the programming of a radio station. The parties filed competing summary judgment motions. The trial court dismissed the case, finding as a matter of law that the defendants did not breach one of the contracts at issue. The plaintiff appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Roberson v. State of Tennessee
In 1995, a Gibson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy Roberson, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, his second such petition, alleging that his conviction is void. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he contends: (1) the jury found him guilty of felony murder without first determining whether he had the intent to commit the predicate felonyof robbery; (2) the indictmentfor felonymurder failed to allege facts that constitute an offense; (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict because both convictions were based on one criminal episode, violating double jeopardy; (4) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (5) during sentencing, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that torture is an aggravating factor. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dimarko B. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dimarko B. Williams, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner contends that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v.Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), created a new constitutional right, tolling the limitations period. Following our review of the record and the relevant case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of : Elizabeth N. M., et al.
The mother of two minor children appeals the termination of her parental rights. She contends the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish a statutory ground supporting termination of her rights or that termination was in the children’s best interests. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s findings and, thus, affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Sterling Edward Hubbard v. Sherman-Dixie Concrete Industries, Inc., et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51 and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 225(e)(3), this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel. In this instance, an employee was injured when he tripped and fell over boxes while loading a truck. The employer, who contended that the injury was an aggravation of a pre-existing condition, requested two independent medical evaluations, the second of which the employee refused to attend. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to compel the second evaluation and, ultimately, awarded workers’ compensation benefits. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by failing to compel a second evaluation, by awarding benefits to the employee, and by failing to apportion liability to the Second Injury Fund. We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re: Natalie R.C.
Janet S. (“Grandmother”), maternal grandmother and custodian of the minor child Natalie R. C. (“the Child”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Kenneth C. (“Father”) in the Juvenile Court for Blount County (“the Juvenile Court”). Christy S. (“Mother”), the Child’s mother, is deceased. The Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of failure to pay child support and failure to visit the Child. Father appeals, arguing, among other things, that the petition to terminate his parental rights was fatally defective because of numerous deficiencies and therefore should have been dismissed. We hold that the petition to terminate parental rights was defective, although not fatally so, due to multiple deficiencies. We vacate the judgment of the Juvenile Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with our Opinion. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Michael A. Parish v. Highland Park Baptist Church, et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee was injured when he was thrown from a horse. He alleged that the injury arose in the course and scope of his employment. His Employer contended that the Employee was engaged in a purely private activity; therefore, the injury was not compensable. The trial court denied the claim. On appeal, the Employee contends that the trial court erred by finding his injury was not related to his employment. We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Brian Morton
The Defendant, Timothy Brian Morton, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Allen Boston
A Sumner County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jeffery Allen Boston, of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006); domestic assault, see id. §39-13-111; and assault, see id. § 39-11-101. At sentencing, the trial court merged the assault conviction into the domestic assault conviction and imposed a sentence of 25 years’ incarceration for the second degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to a sentence of 11 months and 29 days for the domestic assault conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress photographs of the murder victim taken before the victim’s death and by refusing to instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodreigors Jefferson
A Shelby County jury convicted Rodreigors Jefferson (“the Defendant”) of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to eighteen years, six months. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and that the trial court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement factor. Following a careful review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Duggan
A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant, David Duggan, of facilitation to commit theft of property valued between $1000 and $10,000, facilitation of fraudulent alteration of a manufacturer’s identification number, and facilitation of identity theft, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his convictions, claiming that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied the Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the use of the Defendant’s prior convictions during trial; (2) denied the Defendant’s motion for acquittal; and (3) denied the Defendant a new trial based upon the State’s improper closing argument. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. Based upon a clerical error on one of the judgments of conviction, as will be discussed below, we remand this case to the trial court to amend the judgment of conviction form to reflect the proper statute section for the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of fraudulent alteration of a manufacturer’s identification number. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Davis
The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, carjacking, attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempt to commit first degree murder. At issue is the legality of the stop of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, and whether the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder. We conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to permit the officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop of the car in which the defendant was a passenger. Further, we find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant and his fellow perpetrator planned and intended to kill the victim, and that the defendant’s conduct, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, constituted a substantial step sufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Trousdale | Supreme Court | |
Anthony M. Collier v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony M. Collier, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Davidson County. He pled guilty to nine counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of rape, a Class B felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner claims that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to request a mental health evaluation; and (2) his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terri L. Newsome
The Defendant,TerriL.Newsome,was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety days’ confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rondal Akers, et al. v. Prime Succession of Tennessee, Inc, et al.
This case is before us for the second time on appeal. In our first Opinion, Akers v. Buckner- Rush Enterprises, Inc., we held, inter alia, that Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and Lucinda Akers had standing to pursue their claims against T. Ray Brent Marsh; Marsh’s former business, Tri- State Crematory (“Tri-State”); and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc. Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc., 270 S.W.3d 67, 73-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). We remanded the case for trial. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding that Marsh had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the Akers, that Marsh had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and that Marsh had violated a bailment responsibility to the Akers. The jury awarded Dr. Akers $275,000 in damages and Mrs. Akers $475,000 in damages. Marsh filed a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Marsh a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversing the judgment for the claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment, and denied Marsh’s motion as to the remaining claims. Marsh appeals to this Court. The Akers raise an issue on appeal regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissing their claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment. We affirm the judgment in its entirety. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Bettye Grooms, et al. v. The City of Newport, Tennessee
The City of Newport (“Newport”) sought to annex certain properties in Cocke County. A number of affected parties (“the Plaintiffs”) objected to the annexation and filed a complaint against Newport in the Chancery Court for Cocke County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proving that the annexation was unreasonable or that the health, safety and welfare of the relevant citizens would not be materially retarded without the annexation. The Plaintiffs then sought to amend their complaint to allege that Newport was barred from annexation because of Newport’s allegedly having defaulted on a prior plan of services from an earlier annexation. The Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend on the basis, in part, that the issue was not timely raised, pled, or tried. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the udgment of the Trial Court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lewis
Appellant, Michael Lewis, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for child abuse. Appellant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to three years in incarceration. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the trial court. The State filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant toTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 and an application for stay. This Court granted the appeal and found that the trial court improperly granted the new trial, reinstating Appellant’s convictions and sentence. State v. Michael Lewis, No. E2008-02141-CCA-R9-CD, 2009 WL 4017158 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 20, 2009). On remand, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Appellant appeals to this Court, seeking resolution of the following issues: (1) whether the indictment was valid; (2) whether the verdict form was invalid; (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed testimony from Tonya Hickman and Rhonda Sills about statements made by the victim; (5) whether the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Appellant’s children at the sentencing hearing; and (6) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant is not entitled to relief with respect to issues 1-5. However, we determine that the trial courtimproperly ordered Appellant to serve his sentence consecutively to a sentence for civil contempt. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that Appellant’s sentence is to be served concurrently to his sentence for civil contempt. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara A. Lynch, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes, and Celine Hayes as an individual v. Loudon County, Tennessee, et al.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death. The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Scott M. Craig v. David Mills, Warden - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In July 1998, a Bradley County jury convicted Scott M. Craig (“petitioner”) of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping and assessed a twentyfive thousand dollar ($25,000) fine on one of the aggravated rape convictions and twenty thousand dollar ($20,000) fines on each of the other convictions, for aggregate fines of sixtyfive thousand dollars ($65,000). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for the aggravated rape convictions and a consecutive eight-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-three years. On July 27, 1998, judgments were entered reflecting each conviction and sentence; however, these judgments did not reflect the fines imposed by the jury, nor did these judgments reflect imposition of any sexual offense surcharge. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-709 (2010). |
Morgan | Supreme Court | |
Jacqueline G. Furlong v. Kevin Keane Furlong
Kevin Keane Furlong (“Husband”) is the estranged husband of Jacqueline G. Furlong(“Wife”). Wife secured an order of protection in Sevier County that generally prohibits Husband from committing any untoward act against Wife and having any contact with her. As later amended in the Knox County Circuit Court (“the trial court”), the order also states that Husband could come to the marital residence to repair Wife’s automobile. In addition, the court identified two dated time periods, and, with respect to each period, specified which of the parties would have the use of the “inside” of the marital home and when they would have that use, and which would have the use of the “outside,” i.e., presumably the parties’ realty surrounding the house, and when. When Husband came to the residence to repair Wife’s automobile at 7:10 p.m., which, according to the order of protection, was arguably ten minutes beyond the time within which the vehicle was to be repaired, Wife filed a motion asking that he be held in contempt for not repairing the vehicle and for coming about her outside the allowed time frame. The trial court held Husband in criminal contempt, sentenced him to ten days in jail, and extended the order of protection for five years. He was not to be released from jail unless and until he complied with a statute requiring him to post a bond in the minimum amount of $2,500. He served his sentence and obtained a stay of the bond requirement pending appeal. Husband appeals challenging the finding of contempt as well as the constitutionality of the statutory bond requirement. The Tennessee Attorney General ade an appearance on appeal to support the constitutionality of the statute. We reverse, in its entirety, the last order of protection and judgment of criminal contempt entered by the trial court on November 23, 2010. It is held for naught. In view of our reversal, we do not find it necessary or appropriate to reach the constitutional issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Pettigrew
The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Pettigrew, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Triangle American Homes v. Samuel B. Harrison, et al
In this indemnity case, Jere Krieg (“Builder”), through Triangle American Homes, Inc., initially filed a complaint for attachment and damages against Samuel and Lauren Harrison (collectively “the Harrisons”) relating to the construction of a modular home. When the Harrisons filed a counterclaim, arguing that Builder had failed to perform pursuant to their contract, Builder brought a third-party complaint against All American Homes of Tennessee, LLC (“Seller”), alleging that Seller should indemnify Builder. Builder and the Harrisons entered into a settlement agreement. In the remaining suit for indemnification, Seller argued that Builder was not entitled to indemnity because the damages and losses sustained by Builder were a result of Builder’s actions. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that Builder was entitled to damages in the amount of $45,000 and attorney fees in the amount of $45,000, for a total award of $90,000. Seller appeals. We modify the award of attorney fees to $18,084 and affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rebecca Ann Galyean
The Defendant-Appellant, Rebecca Ann Galyean, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, two counts of vehicular assault by intoxication, a Class D felony, and two counts of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions for driving under the influence into the conviction for vehicular homicide. The Defendant-Appellant received an effective eleven-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant-Appellant’s blood analysis tested positive for “less than 0.25 µg/ml” of Tramadol; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial based on the removal of Defendant-Appellant’s mother from the courtroom during trial; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions; however, we conclude that the trial court erroneously sentenced her beyond the statutory maximum for vehicular assault. Therefore, we modify the Defendant-Appellant’s sentences for vehicular assault to four years, the maximum in the range, and remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals |