Timothy C. Watson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy C. Watson, pro se, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2009 conviction for sale of cocaine over one-half gram and resulting fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he was denied the right to counsel at his trial and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sherrie L. Durham v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development by and through James Neeley in his Official Capacity et al.
This petition was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner seeks judicial review of an administrative decision by the Tennessee Civil Service Commission to uphold the termination of her employment with the Tennessee Department of Labor. On motion by the petitioner, the entire administrative record was struck from the record in the judicial proceedings. Having no administrative record upon which to review the Department’s decision, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Demcovitz
Mark Demcovitz (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to sell and received an eight year sentence. The trial court entered a judgment reserving two certified questions of law. On appeal, the Defendant asks that this Court answer the following certified questions: 1. Whether the stop of the defendant for “following too close” violated the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennessee
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether a notation in the prosecutor’s file written by an assistant prosecutor expressing her opinion as to the lack of credibility of two of the State’s witnesses is newly discovered evidence on which the defendant may base a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Over fifteen years after the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder became final, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that he had recently discovered a note written by the assistant prosecutor before his murder trial in which she expressed her opinion that it was a “good case but for most of Ws are juveniles who have already lied repeatedly.” The petition alleged that the note was exculpatory, newly discovered evidence and that the State’s failure to produce it before trial affected the outcome of the trial and undermined the reliability of the verdict. The trial court tolled the one-year statute of limitations on due process grounds, but summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s petition, concluding that the State had waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. We hold that the State did not waive the statute of limitations defense and that the trial court did not err in tolling the statute of limitations. We further hold that the handwritten note expressing the assistant prosecutor’s opinion as to the witnesses’ credibility was attorney work product. As such, it was neither discoverable nor admissible. Accordingly, the note was not newly discovered evidence on which a petition for writ of error coram nobis could be based. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition is reinstated. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Larry Holmes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Larry Holmes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary, and resulting effective sentence of seventy years. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions with the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the trial court failed to dismiss the kidnapping convictions and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Company et al.
In this appeal, the defendants seek a review of the trial court’s decision to award the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of inadequate maintenance of the cemetery where the plaintiff’s son was buried. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was either intentional or reckless, was so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society, and caused a serious mental injury to the plaintiff. The primary question presented is whether the plaintiff in this action proved the requisite serious mental injury to support the trial court’s award of compensatory and punitive damages. We hold that the plaintiff’s proof was deficient. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Jeffery Ratliff A/K/A Jeffery Absher v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jeffery Ratliff, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of six counts of rape of a child, six counts of incest, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. He is currently serving an effective sentence of one hundred twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because: (1) he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) his convictions violate the principle of double jeopardy; and (3) the State’s Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment failed to comply with statutory requirements. Following review of the record, we conclude that there was no error in the post-conviction court’s decision and affirm the denial of relief. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Durling Kemper v. Joe C. Baker, individually and in his capacity as City Manager of Berry Hill, Tennessee, et al.
This is a GTLA action against a city and city official following a construction accident in which an exterior wall of a building collapsed,causing serious injuries to one of the plaintiffs and causing the death of the other plaintiff. The building was being demolished and the plaintiffs were employed by a private company that was to disconnect gas utilities on the privately owned building. The plaintiffs claim the collapse was caused, in part, by the failure of the city and the city manager to enforce certain OSHA regulations and provisions of the municipal building code. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the city and the city official on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael H. Gaw, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University, et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. A surgeon performed a procedure on an infant to repair a birth defect at the defendant hospital. The infant sustained permanent injuries after the surgery. The parents filed suit on the infant’s behalf against the hospital for failing to adhere to the expected standard of care. At the conclusion of trial, the hospital moved for a directed verdict on all claims, with only the claims for informed consent and post-operative negligence being denied. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the infant. The hospital has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Monroe v. Travis Monroe
Husband appeals an order denying his motion to set aside a default judgment and the final judgment entered in his divorce action. On the facts presented, we hold that the default judgment should have been set aside; accordingly, we reverse the order denying Husband’s motion to set aside, and the case is remanded. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Consulting and Financial Services, Inc., et al. v. John H. Friedmann, Sr.
This suit arises as a result of the installation of tile flooring in a home. Homeowners sued the contractor for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court awarded $106,103.92 to homeowners and assessed $4,252.00 in discretionary costs. Contractor appeals asserting that, in finding liability, the trial court failed to apply the standard of performance set forth in the contract and that the court erred in calculating and measuring the damages. We have determined that the trial court applied an implied warranty or workmanship rather than the contractual standard; however we have reviewed the evidence de novo and modify the judgment to hold that the contractor breached the contractual standard. We remand the case for a determination of the appropriate amount of damages. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gina A.
Mother argues that the divestment of custody of her child from the Department of Children’s Services to a relative in another state constitutes de facto termination of her parental rights. We find no merit to this argument since the parent-child relationship was not terminated by the court’s custody decision. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Amy Trisler v. Scott A. Collins
Defendant Collins challenges his conviction for criminal contempt, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the use of certain evidence violated his constitutional rights. We affirm the conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Thomas R. Ralston v. Estate of Fred R. Hobbs
The defendant appeals from an Order of Sale of real property, which was sold pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.07 to satisfy a money judgment against the defendant. We have concluded that the defendant waived many of the issues raised and, as for its issue challenging the sufficiency of the notice of the sale, the sale may not be set aside on this ground because Rule 69.07(4) expressly provides that bona fide purchasers for value at the sale shall take free of any defects concerning notice. The purchaser here is a bona fide purchaser for value; thus, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis a/k/a Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the Anesthesia Defendants, among others. Prior to trial, one of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. McLaughlin, was excluded for failure to meet the requirements of the locality rule. Plaintiff proceeded to trial, and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. Plaintiff now appeals the expert’s exclusion and the subsequent jury verdict. In light of our previous vacation of the order excluding Dr. McLaughlin in Kennard 2, we remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of Dr. McLaughlin’s qualifications in light of Shipley. If the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin meets the requirements of the locality rule, as set forth in Shipley, it shall then consider whether he, as an OB-GYN, may testify against the Anesthesia Defendants. Finally, if the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin is competent to testify, it shall then determine whether his erroneous exclusion warrants a setting aside of the jury verdict rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tiffany Davis
The Defendant, Tiffany Davis, was indicted on eighteen felony drug counts following a series of controlled drug purchases conducted by law enforcement officers. The jury convicted the Defendant of one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; three counts of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, all Class B felonies; three counts of the delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, all Class C felonies; three counts of the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, all Class B felonies; two counts of conspiracy to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, both Class C felonies; and one count of the lesser included offense of facilitation of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony. She was found not guilty on the remaining five counts. At her sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a career offender based upon her seven prior Class B felony convictions, for which she previously had received a sixteen-year sentence. After merging alternative counts in this action, the trial court sentenced her to the mandatory sentence of fifteen years for each Class C felony and thirty years for each Class B felony. The trial court then ordered each of these sentences to run concurrently. After finding that the Defendant had an extensive prior record of criminal activity and that the present offenses were committed while she was on probation, the trial court ordered its effective thirty-year sentence in this case to run consecutively to the Defendant’s prior sixteen-year sentence. On appeal,the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each conviction. She also challenges her effective sentence, arguing that it is excessive. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of one count of aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated rape with bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to a cumulative sentence of thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape with bodily injury, (2) the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the length of his sentences but remand the case to the Criminal Court of Davidson County for additional findings regarding consecutive sentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Ralph, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Between the years of 1988 and 1996, the Petitioner, Lawrence David Ralph, Jr., pled guilty to the offenses of public drunkenness, resisting arrest, interfering with the duties of a police officer, disturbing the peace, two counts of assault, driving under the influence, and harassment. On May 17, 2011, the Petitioner filed five separate pro se petitions for post-conviction relief. In five separate orders, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief, concluding that the petitions were not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it summarily dismissed his petitions. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kendrick Miles
Appellant, Kendrick Miles, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to four years. The trial court held a sentencing hearing specifically for the purpose of addressing Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. The trial court denied Appellant’s request and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence in incarceration. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court considered the pertinent sentencing guidelines and principles and properly denied Appellant’s requestfor alternative sentencing. Therefore, we affirm the judgmentof the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Wayne Lankford
Appellant, Travis Wayne Lankford, pled guilty in Marshall County to three counts of especially aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of assault and one count of criminal responsibility for aggravated assault. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged two of the especially aggravated burglary convictions into the third especiallyaggravated burglary conviction and merged the criminal responsibility for aggravated assault into the aggravated robbery conviction. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in setting the sentence length at twelve years each for the especially aggravated burglary conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction by placing too much weight on the enhancement factors used. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the weighing of enhancement factors is in the discretion of the trial court under the law and that Appellant’s record of extensive criminal activity supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Eugene Scales, Jr. vs. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Larry Eugene Scales, Jr., was convicted by a jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and sentenced to twelve years at 100%. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but subsequently waived his right to appeal. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, in part on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief on the basis that Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitionerappealsfrom the denial of post-conviction relief,arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to: (1) get an independent measurement to determine whether the drug sale took place within 1,000 feet of a school zone; (2) request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of casual exchange; (3) raise, preserve, or present any issues on direct appeal. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Specifically, Petitioner failed to introduce proof at the post-conviction hearing that the sale of cocaine occurred outside the school zone. Petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(d)(2) and therefore cannot show prejudice from a lack of an objection by counsel to a denial of a jury instruction on casual exchange. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. d/b/a Centennial Medical Center et al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a medical malpractice action due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide a certificate of good faith. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the medical malpractice action based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which provides: “If the certificate is not filed with the complaint, the complaint shall be dismissed, as provided in subsection (c), absent a showing that the failure was due to the failure of the provider to timely provide copies of the claimant’s records requested as provided in § 29-26-121 or demonstrated extraordinary cause.” Because the plaintiff failed to make a showing that the omission was due to the failure of any healthcare provider to provide records or demonstrate extraordinary cause, the trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The plaintiff asserts on appeal that the statutory requirement violates the separation of powers clause and that it violates the due process and equalprotection guaranteesofthe constitution of Tennessee bytreating plaintiffs in suits for medical negligence differently from plaintiffs in other civil litigation and by allegedly restricting access to the courts. Finding no constitutional infirmities, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Entertainment, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board
A sexually oriented business appeals from the trial court’s denial of relief sought in a common law petition for writ of certiorari for review of the Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board’s decision finding the business in violation of ordinances governing sexually oriented businesses and for which it imposed a 31-day suspension of its license. Finding that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence, and that the business’s due process rights were not violated, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Francisco R. Liriano
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Francisco R. Liriano, of conspiring to deliver more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony. He received a community corrections placement of fifteen years following one year of confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence sufficiently established that Liriano was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Matthew C. Welker
Defendant-Appellant, Matthew C. Welker, appeals from the Stewart County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Welker pled guilty to residing with a minor as a sex offender, and he received a suspended sentence of two years following 90 days of confinement. On appeal, Welker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and in ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals |