State of Tennessee v. Shirley Larhonda Gagne
A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Shirley LaRhonda Gagne, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense; driving on a suspended license, second offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; violation of the seatbelt law; and violation of the open container law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 130 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence testimony pertaining to a blood sample taken from her; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for DUI, third offense. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew Helton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Andrew Helton, appeals the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the court’s judgment. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Phillips
assault by the use or display of a deadly weapon. After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of the charge. Appellant was later sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. He was ordered to serve the sentence on supervised probation and attend domestic violence counseling. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brooke Lee Whitaker
Defendant, Brooke Lee Whitaker, was indicted for aggravated rape. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, she was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of rape, with the trial court to determine the length of the sentence after a sentencing hearing. Defendant was sentenced to serve twelve years, and she appeals, arguing that the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jesse Grant Craven, Tommy Davenport & Greg Pope
In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellants, Jesse Grant Craven, Tommy Davenport, and Greg Pope, appeal the Warren County Circuit Court’s order denying them relief from the prosecutor’s denial of each of their respective applications for pretrial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Lee Bright
The Defendant, Carl Lee Bright, was convicted by a Monroe County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ confinement. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the case due to insufficient evidence, (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence, (3) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment or remand for a preliminary examination because his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, and (4) imposing confinement for the maximum allowable sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Assasdot Starling v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Assadot Starling, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone with the intent to sell or deliver. He received a sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua D. Schaffer v. State of Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of certiorari. The petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. The respondent, the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, denied the inmate’s request for parole. The inmate thereafter filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the chancery court challenging the Board’s decision as illegal, arbitrary, and fraudulent. The chancery court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the inmate did not file a verified, notarized petition within the sixty-day jurisdictional time limit. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Brandon C. S. (d/o/b 10/1/2002), a Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of persistence of conditions and severe child abuse. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Sarah A. Carver
This is a dispute over a real estate sales commission. The seller entered into a six-month exclusive listing agreement with a realty company. The agreement expired on August 21, 2007, one day before the eventual purchasers were shown the property. The realty company filed suit to recover a commission asserting it caused the property to be shown to the purchasers prior to August 21 and, in the alternative, the parties orally and through their actions extended the listing agreement to August 30, 2007. The trial court concluded the realty company was not entitled to a commission under the plain language of the listing agreement because the property was not shown or submitted to the purchasers prior to August 21 and the parties did not extend the agreement to August 30. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Crye-Leike, Inc. v. Sarah A. Carver - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion in this case, but write separately to emphasize that the Court’s interpretation of the term “shown” in the Agreement is limited to the facts and the proof in this case. Given the evolving importance in the real estate market of the realtor’s online presentation of property and the fact that properties are sometimes purchased by buyers who never view the property in person, with different proof, the term “shown” could be given a more expansive interpretation. However, with the proof submitted to the trial court and no contractual definition of the term “shown,” I agree with the majority’s result and reasoning. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
The trial court determined that the insuror of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for injuries to a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Wade McGaha v. State of Tennessee
A Cocke County jury convicted the Petitioner, Charles Wade McGaha, of first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which appointed counsel amended to allege the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Estate of Pauline Vernuse Butler v. Paul V. Peeples, Sr.
The representative of this Estate filed a "Motion to Marshal Assets" alleging that a California resident held assets of the Estate and had refused to turn them over to the Estate. The Trial Court summarily ordered the California resident to surrender any assets held and turn them over to the Estate. Paul V. Peeples, the California resident, filed a Motion in Probate Court that the Court had no personal jurisdiction over him, along with his affidavit. His Motion was denied. He appealed to this Court and we hold that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and reverse the orders against him and dismiss him as a party to the probate estate action. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy C. Russell v. Suzanne Colette Landry Lyubimov
On May 2, 2011, a show cause order was entered in this case, directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant responded to the show cause order, but the argument in the response does not establish good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The Order entered by the Trial Judge on November 8, 2010, demonstrates that there are issues yet to be resolved in the Trial Court before a Tenn. R. App. P. 3, appeal will lie. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the cost of the appeal is assessed to Timothy C. Russell. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lawrence E. Ralph
A Warren County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Lawrence E. Ralph, of violation of the seatbelt law, see T.C.A. § 55-9-603, and operating a vehicle in violation of restrictive condition #01 (driving without corrective lenses), see id. § 55-50-331. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 30 days and 11 months and 29 days, respectively, suspended to intensive probation following the service of 120 days in jail. Additionally, the trial court imposed fines totaling $1,010 and ordered the defendant to perform 40 hours of community service as a condition of his probation. The defendant appeals pro se, making various arguments concerning the propriety of his trial in circuit court and the trial court’s sentencing. Because the defendant filed his notice of appeal prior to his motion for new trial and failed to prepare an adequate record on appeal, we determine that his issues are waived and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darius Jones
The defendant, Darius Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, ten years for each of the aggravated robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery convictions, and four years for each of the attempted aggravated robbery and the aggravated burglary convictions, for an effective sentence of life plus eighty-one years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed all of the defendant’s convictions and his life sentence for the felony murder conviction but remanded for resentencing on the remaining convictions in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). This court also ordered that the trial court revisit the issue of consecutive sentencing and place its specific findings on the record. After being resentenced to life plus fifty-four years, the defendant appealed again, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. On direct appeal of the resentencing, this court observed that the trial court failed to place its findings regarding consecutive sentencing in the record, and we remanded the matter a second time. After conducting a sentencing hearing on remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences, which the defendant challenges on appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering consecutive sentencing in this case. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cedric Johnson
This appeal involves the application of the mandatory joinder provisions in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(1)(A). The defendant was charged with committing an aggravated robbery and was separately charged with initiating a false police report twelve hours later regarding his automobile that was somehow connected with the robbery. Approximately one month after he was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury for initiating a false police report, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to initiate a false police report. Thereafter, a Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for aggravated robbery. The defendant filed a motion in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to dismiss the aggravated robbery indictment in accordance with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(2) because the State had already prosecuted him separately on the initiation of a false police report charge. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and the State appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. A divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Johnson, No. W2008-01593-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4263653 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2009). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to address the application of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a)(1)(A) to offenses arising from the same criminal episode. We have determined that the two offenses involved in this case were not part of the same criminal episode and, therefore, that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by relying on Tenn. R. Crim P. 8(a)(2) to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Dunlap
The defendant entered pleas of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403(a) (2006); two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(3); three counts of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(2); one count of vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $10,000, see id. § 39-14-408(a); one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, see id. § 39-14-408, -105(2); and tampering with evidence, see id. § 39-16-503(a)(1). The trial court imposed a total effective entence of 15 years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
The trial court determined that the insuror of a bar was liable under its commercial general liability policy and liquor liability policy for the death of a bar patron. We have concluded that this occurrence is excluded under the assault and battery exclusion of the commercial general liability policy but is covered by the liquor liability policy. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Hendricks v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari alleging that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying him parole. After reviewing the record, the chancery court concluded that the Board acted lawfully, and it dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cauley McCliton Cross
The Defendant-Appellant, Cauley Cross, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of exhibition of obscene materials to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a child predator to concurrent terms of ten years for both aggravated sexual battery convictions. For the misdemeanor offenses, Cross was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, he claims: (1) his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) his sentences for aggravated sexual battery were excessive; and (3) his convictions for aggravated sexual battery should be merged. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emanuel Hamilton
The Defendant, Emanuel Hamilton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony, and ordering the remainder of his effective eleven-year sentence to be served in confinement. He contends that he should have been returned to probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Betty Saint Rogers v. Louisville Land Company, et al.
.Betty Saint Rogers (“Plaintiff”) sued Louisville Land Company and Joe V. Williams, III (“Defendants”) alleging claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee statutes governing cemeteries, outrageous conduct, and breach of contract, among other things. After a non-jury trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment awarding Plaintiff a judgment of $250.00 for breach of contract, $45,000.00 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, $250,000.00 in punitive damages, $37,306.25 in attorney’s fees, and $556.42 in discretionary costs. Defendants appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiff did not prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, and we, therefore, reverse the judgments for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. We also find and hold that because Plaintiff abandoned her statutory claim, she was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the statute, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We further find and hold that Plaintiff did prove breach of contract, and we affirm the award of damages for breach of contract, and the remainder of the Trial Court’s final judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
John Ernest Hayes v. American Zurich Insurance Company et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury. In addition, it found that the employee had a meaningful return to work, and his award of permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits was limited to one and one-half times his anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-241(d)(1). On appeal, the employee contends the trial court erred by finding that he had a meaningful return to work. The employer contends the trial court erred by admitting a discovery deposition of an expert into evidence over its objection based upon Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 32.01(3), and finding that the injury at issue was not concurrent with injuries which were the subject of a separate lawsuit. We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel |