State of Tennessee v. Darrell Anthony Jones
Appellant, Darrell Anthony Jones, was charged in two separate indictments by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of criminal impersonation, and one count of driving on a suspended, revoked, or canceled driver’s license. Appellant pled guilty to one count of felony possession of cocaine and one count of felony possession of marijuana, for a total effective sentence of four years. The remaining counts were dismissed. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the sentences were suspended, and Appellant was placed on four years of supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was filed. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation and imposed a sentence of one year to serve, after which Appellant was to be reinstated to probation for three years. Appellant contends on appeal that the evidence did not support the finding that he violated the terms of his probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked Appellant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Michael Holmes
The Defendant, Jeremy Michael Holmes, pled guilty as a career offender 1 to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, with an agreed sentence of 6 years at 60 percent, leaving the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dalton Reb Hughes et al. v. the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee et al.
After being injured when he jumped out of the path of a front-end loader owned by a governmental entity and operated by its employee, the plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the employee either was negligent in his operation of the equipment or had acted intentionally and that the governmental entity was liable under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against the governmental entity and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The governmental entity sought permission to appeal, arguing first that the employee had acted outside the scope of his employment and, secondly, that he had committed an assault against the plaintiff, either of which would preclude liability under the Act. Although we hold that the employee’s conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted the intentional tort of assault rather than negligence. The governmental entity cannot, therefore, be held liable under the Act absent proof of its negligent supervision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the governmental entity, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment against the employee. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Shawn Rafael Bough v. Jim Morrow, Warden
The Petitioner, Shawn Rafael Bough, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State of Tennessee has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John E. Lane
A Grainger County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, John E. Lane, of the premeditated first degree murder of Joe Brooks and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for first degree murder but reverse his conviction for conspiracy. |
Grainger | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Byron Avenue 3501, LLC v. Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, TN
The purchaser of historic property appeals the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission’s denial of a demolition permit based on economic hardship. The Commission’s denial was affirmed by the chancery court. We find that the Commission’s denial was not supported by material evidence and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the Commission for a new hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cory Tyler Meeks v. Kimberly Ann Meeks
This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court for Grundy County on March 14, 2011. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alton Walton
A jury convicted the defendant, James Alton Walton, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Ray Irick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 1987 convictions of felony murder and aggravated rape and resulting death sentence. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by ruling that due process considerations did not toll the oneyear statute of limitations applicable to coram nobis petitions, see T.C.A. § 27-7-103 (2000), and that the newly discovered evidence “would not have” resulted in a different verdict had it been presented to the convicting jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian Eric McGowen v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Brian Eric McGowen, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life plus forty years to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jake Reynolds
Appellant, Christopher Jake Reynolds, was indicted by the Giles County Grand Jury in October of 2003 for two counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a jury trial in June of 2005, Appellant was found not guilty of Count One and guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in Count Two. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years as a Career Offender. A motion for new trial was denied. Nearly one and a half years later, Appellant sought a delayed appeal and postconviction relief on the basis he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel had been disbarred. The trial court found that it was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s claims. Appellant seeks relief in this Court. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that he has failed to establish a reasonable explanation for the delay that would justify the tolling of the statute of limitations for purposes of a delayed appeal or post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Wayne Young
The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Young, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010), 39-13-502 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years’ confinement for especially aggravated kidnapping, twenty-five years’ confinement for each aggravated rape conviction, six years’ confinement for aggravated assault, and six years’ confinement for aggravated burglary. The kidnapping conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and by enhancing his sentence based upon enhancement factors not found by the jury or admitted by the Defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarvis Nichols
The defendant, Jarvis Nichols, appeals the judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering service of the balance of the sentence in confinement when less severe sanctions were available. Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timmy Reagan v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Timmy Reagan, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. Timmy Reagan, No. M2002-01472-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1114588 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Nashville, May 19, 2004). The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. See Timmy Reagan v. State, No. M2007-01396-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 230355 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 2, 2009). On appeal, this Court questioned the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief and remanded the case to the post-conviction court “for a determination of whether the petition was filed within one year of this court’s opinion affirming the petitioner’s conviction or whether due process requires the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations in this case.” Id. at *1. On remand, the post-conviction court first determined that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was untimely. Then, the post-conviction court held that trial counsel failed to withdraw pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and that his failure to withdraw or pursue an appeal was a misrepresentation to Petitioner of his intent to seek permission to appeal. Id. Based on this finding, the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel’s actions denied Petitioner the opportunity to seek post-conviction relief in a timely manner. The post-conviction court held that the statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s petition should have been tolled. Then the post-conviction court reviewed the post-conviction petition and the transcript from the previous post-conviction hearing as well as the trial record, and agreed with the prior determination of the post-conviction court that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, we determine: that the post-conviction court properly determined that Petitioner’s petition was untimely but improperly determined that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s post-conviction petition. Therefore, the post-conviction court improperly addressed the merits of the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnathan Leonard Sullivan v. Tracy L. Brooks
Mother appeals trial court’s decision to change the parties’ nonmarital child’s surname to that of the father. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of proving that a name change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen Anne Dilley v. James Kevin Dilley
In this divorce case the father appeals the trial court’s naming of the mother as the primary residential parent, the calculation of the mother’s income for purposes of child support, and the trial court’s valuation and division of marital assets. We find the record supports the trial court’s decision to name the mother the primary residential parent. We further find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s valuation and division of the parties’ marital assets. An equitable division of marital assets does not require an equal division between the parties, and the court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The trial court did not err in calculating the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. We conclude the mother is entitled to an award of some of the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal. We affirm the trial court in all respects and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the mother’s attorney’s fees on appeal to be paid by the father. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth W. Taylor v. Lawrence County, Tennessee Election Commission et al.
Unsuccessful sheriff candidate sued to void the August 5, 2010 Lawrence County sheriff’s election based on the ineligibility of one of the five candidates. The trial court found the challenged candidate ineligible but declined to void the election. On appeal, we find the plaintiff guilty of gross laches in waiting to file suit to the prejudice of the defendants. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas L. Grimes, et al. v. Helen Cornell
This appeal involves a will contest in which the trial court found that a will executed in 2005 was the product of undue influence and, as a consequence, admitted a will executed by the testator in 2004 to probate. The proponent of the 2005 Will appeals the finding of undue influence as well as the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs to be paid from the estate. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetria Nance
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Demetria Nance, was convicted of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c), -17-1307(d)(3). In this appeal, she raises the following issues for our review: (1) The State presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction for second degree murder; and (2) The trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial after a writing from the Defendant to the victim, which had not been given to the defense during pre-trial discovery, was mentioned in front of the jury. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s conviction of possession of a deadly weapon. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eugene Taylor
The Defendant, Eugene Taylor, entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent terms of four years as a Range I, standard offender for these convictions. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. We remand for the entry of a corrected judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Virgil Campbell
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Virgil Campbell, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(e)(1). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each count and ordered that the terms run consecutively. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) The trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the two offenses; and (2) The trial court erred when it sentenced him to consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wendell P. Baugh, III et al., v. Herman Novak et al.
This appeal raises the issue of whether a contract for the sale of an interest in a corporation and related indemnity agreements are unenforceable because they are contrary to public policy. The sellers of the corporate interest filed suit against the purchasers in the Chancery Court for Williamson County seeking damages for the purchasers’ alleged breach of their indemnity agreement. The purchasers counterclaimed asserting, among other things, that the sellers had fraudulently induced them to purchase the interest in the corporation. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded a $201,715.50 judgment to the sellers and dismissed the purchasers’ counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion, invalidated the stock purchase agreement and the related indemnity agreements on the ground that they were contrary to the public policy reflected in Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-16-208 (2002). Baugh v. Novak, No. M2008-02438-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2474714 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2009). We granted the sellers’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal and now find that the Court of Appeals erred by finding that the agreements at issue in this case were contrary to public policy. We have also determined that the evidence fully supports the trial court’s decision to dismiss the purchasers’ counterclaim for fraudulent inducement. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Dyron Norm Yokley
The Defendant, Dyron Norm Yokley, was convicted of second degree murder, for which he received a thirty-five-year sentence as a Range II, violent offender. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his four pretrial statements, (3) the State violated his due process rights by failing to update its discovery responses, (4) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view the scene, (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s affiliation with the Vice Lords gang, and (6) the trial court erred in imposing a lengthy sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark H. Ruth v. Robin M. Ruth
This appeal is before the Court due to the failure of appellant to respond to a Show Cause Order in this Court as to why the appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Appellant failed to respond to this Show Cause Order, and we order this appeal dismissed as premature. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
David G. Young, et al. v. City of LaFollette
This case stems from the suspension and later termination of David G. Young (“Young”) from his position as City Administrator for the City of LaFollette (“LaFollette”). Young filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court ruled in favor of Young and annulled the LaFollette proceedings that resulted in Young’s suspension and termination. The Trial Court also awarded Young, as the prevailing party, certain discretionary costs. LaFollette appeals. We hold that LaFollette did not act fraudulently, illegally, or arbitrarily in its termination of Young’s employment. We reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals |