Kim Brown v. Autozone, Inc., et al.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this action asserting claims for fraudulent misrepresentation; civil conspiracy; negligence, breach of contract; and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Minor Miracle Productions, LLC, An Idaho Limited Liability Company, and David L. Richards v. Randy Starkey
This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s enrollment of a foreign judgment acquired by the petitioners against the respondent in Idaho, and the case was remanded for enforcement proceedings. On remand the respondent refused to comply with the Idaho judgment, so the petitioners filed a motion for contempt and for an order to compel compliance with the judgment. The respondent did not attend the hearing. The trial court found the respondent to be in contempt of court for refusing to comply with the Idaho judgment. The respondent now appeals. We dismiss the appeal, because the issues raised on appeal were not first raised in the trial court, and the respondent did not comply with either Rule 24(c) or Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. TN Metro Holdings XII LLC et al
Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) initially brought this action for foreclosure and damages against a borrower,TN Metro Holdings XII LLC (“TN Metro XII”) alleging default by failure to make scheduled principal and interest payments, by improperly allowing liens against the mortgaged property in violation of the loan agreements and by misapplication of rents collected from leasing the mortgaged property. FNMA subsequently filed an amended complaint seeking relief in the nature of personal liability against Defendant Selim Zherka under the loan. The trial court granted FNMA summary judgment and held both the borrower and “Key Principal” liable for the deficiency following a foreclosure sale and for damages. We vacate the summary judgment, holding that (1) FNMA failed to provide written notice and a thirty-day period to cure the alleged defaults as required by the parties’ agreement; and (2) there are genuine issues of material fact making summary judgment improper regarding FNMA’s claim for damages resulting from the alleged misapplication of rents. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mya E. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case involving a set of young twins, Mya E. and Kaleah E. (“the Children”). The Children were born out of wedlock to Jasmine E. (“Mother”) and Darius M. (“Father”) on June 1, 2008. The Children, found to be dependent and neglected by Juvenile Court Order entered January 28, 2011, were placed in the custody of their maternal grandmother, Olivia E. Olivia E. filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother on March 30, 2012. The petition alleged as grounds statutory abandonment and persistence of conditions. Mother later joined in the petition to terminate her parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit and support them. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to removal persisted and were unlikely to be remedied in the near future. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Dean Harkleroad v. Linda Althea Turner Harkleroad
This appeal concerns a requested post-divorce modification of alimony in futuro. Husband sought a reduction in his support obligation owed to Wife, alleging that he had not received a paycheck in two years and that Wife was eligible for Medicare and no longer in need of his assistance for health insurance coverage. Following a hearing, the trial court reduced Husband’s health insurance obligation but held that Husband failed to prove a material change in circumstances that necessitated a modification in the remainder of his support obligation. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hope A.A.
This case concerns the termination of the mother’s parental rights. The subject child is the second born to the mother. The petitioner is a friend of the mother with whom the child has lived continuously for several years. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating the mother’s parental rights on the three grounds relied upon by the trial court: abandonment for failure to visit and to provide support and persistence of conditions. The record further supports the conclusion that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the findings of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
John R. Conder, and wife, Paula S. Conder v. William Salyers, and wife, Pam Salyers
This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. Appellees and Appellants both provided expert testimony and surveys from their respective surveyors. The trial court concluded that Appellees’ surveyor’s line was correct, and was not in conflict with the historic deeds. Accordingly, the court set the common boundary line between the parties’s properties in compliance with Appellees’ survey. In addition to the competing surveys, the court based its decision, in part, upon Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-2-109, which creates a presumption of ownership in a party who has paid taxes on property for more than twenty years. Based upon tax records, the court determined that Appellees had paid the property taxes on the disputed property for the relevant statutory period. Appellants appeal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determinations. Affirmed and remanded. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Goodman Rutherford v. Melodey Joice Lawson Rutherford
Mother, who spent greater time with the parties’ minor child, notified Father via certified letter of her intent to relocate out of state. Thirty-three days later, Father filed a petition in opposition to the move. The trial court allowed Father to oppose relocation, despite his failure to formally oppose the move within thirty days, noting that Mother had learned of Father’s opposition within the thirty-day period and that she had not relocated until “well after” Father filed his petition. In this statutory construction case, we conclude that Tennessee’s parental relocation statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108, mandates that a parent wishing to oppose relocation file a petition in opposition within thirty days of receipt of notice of the proposed relocation. If no written petition in opposition is timely filed, the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so, notwithstanding the absence of harm or prejudice to the relocating parent due to the untimely petition. Because Father failed to file a written petition in opposition to Mother’s proposed relocation within thirty days of receipt of her certified letter, we find the trial court erred in conducting any further analysis pursuant to section 36-6-108. The decision of the trial court is reversed, and Mother is permitted to relocate to Omaha, Nebraska, with the minor child. Father’s request for appellate attorney fees is denied, and all remaining issues are deemed pretermitted. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Goodman Rutherford v. Melodey Joice Lawson Rutherford - Dissent
Based on the application of Rule 6.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure to the facts of this case, I must respectfully dissent from the majority. While the majority concludes that Father’s petition is barred by his failure to timely file his petition in opposition to the relocation, I would instead remand to the trial court for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of whether Father’s delay in filing his petition was the result of excusable neglect. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Goodman Rutherford v. Melodey Joice Lawson Rutherford - Separate Concurrence
I have carefully considered Judge Stafford’s energetic dissent in this case, and find that I cannot agree. I submit this separate concurrence to explain my position. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Erykah C.
This case involves an appeal by a mother of the termination of her parental rights to her daughter. We conclude that the grounds for termination have been established by clear and convincing evidence. Further, there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: James C.E.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Robert E. and Susan E. to James C. E. The trial court terminated Robert E.’s parental rights, finding that he had abandoned James C. E. and that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of James C. E. Robert E. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff Finch v. Tina Raymer, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute over property allegedly owned by a partnership. The plaintiff and defendant lived together for about six years but never married. It is undisputed that they formed a partnership during that time for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. The parties bought, renovated, and sold numerous properties, and after they separated, they equally split the remaining profits from the property sales. However, they could not agree as to who owned the house where the parties were currently living and various items of personal property acquired during their relationship. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that all of the disputed property was partnership property and that each party held a one-half undivided interest in the property. Accordingly, the court declared that the parties owned the disputed real property as tenants in common, and it awarded the plaintiff a judgment for one-half of the value of certain personal property. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. The court further concluded that the defendant had fraudulently conveyed partnership property to her father, a co-defendant, and the court set aside the sale and held that the defendant was responsible for repaying to her father the amount he paid for the fraudulently conveyed property. The defendants appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Will J. Milton v. Saeed Etezadi, M.D.
This case presents the issue of whether proper service of process was accomplished regarding the defendant, Saeed Etezadi, M.D. Plaintiff, Will J. Milton, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Etezadi on April 14, 2003. The complaint and summons were served upon Dr. Etezadi’s office manager, with a notation appearing on the summons that service was accepted as “agent.” Dr. Etezadi filed an answer which, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Mr. Milton voluntarily dismissed that action and subsequently re-filed within one year of the non-suit. In connection with the second action, the complaint and summons were allegedly served upon Dr. Etezadi at his office. Dr. Etezadi filed an Answer, again raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Dr. Etezadi also asserted that all applicable statutes of limitation and repose had expired. He later filed a motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims against Dr. Etezadi, finding that there was no service of process in either action. Mr. Milton appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John McLaughlin v. John L. Tweedall, et al
The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 3, 2012. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on December 28, 2012, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Levi D.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds that Mother was incarcerated under a sentence of more than 10 years and her child was under the age of eight at time of sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that Mother was convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent, see Tenn. Code Ann. 36-1-113(g)(7). Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Martin William Huffman v. Angela Shayne Huffman
This is the second appeal of a post-divorce decision concerning child support. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to make the required findings to justify an upward deviation in child support, thus we vacated the award of child support and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court set the appropriate amount of child support and determined that Father had overpaid child support. The court did not award Father a judgment or credit in the amount of his overpayment, and Father appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Father a credit or judgment in the amount of his overpayment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Adrian Fields v. Byron Williams and Sterling Marshall
This is an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from general sessions court. Upon filing the appeal, Appellant paid costs in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8–21–401(b)(1)(C)(i), but did not submit a surety bond under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-5-103. The circuit court held that failure to post the surety bond under Section 27-5-103 resulted in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Accordingly, the trial court granted Appellees’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Based upon this Court’s recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Captain D'S Realty, LLC v. EP-D, Ltd.
This appeal involves the interpretation of a commercial lease. The lease gave the plaintiff tenant two successive options to extend the term of the lease, provided the tenant gave timely notice of its intent to exercise the renewal option. The tenant exercised the first renewal option, but did not give timely notice of intent to exercise the second option. The lease also contained language giving the tenant a grace period to exercise the option if the lessor gave notice that the lessor had not received notice of renewal. The lessor did not give the written notice to the tenant. The tenant filed a lawsuit against the defendant lessor, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff tenant asserted in the lawsuit that the tenant had the grace period to exercise the renewal option because the lease required the lessor to give written notice, and the lessor had failed to do so. Both parties filed dispositive motions based on their interpretations of the lease. Construing the lease, the trial court held that the grace period was never triggered so the tenant’s renewal option lapsed and granted a judgment in favor of the lessor. The tenant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Suzanna R. Phillips (Bobbitt) v. Anthony Phillips
This appeal concerns an overcollection of child support by the State in a Title IV-D matter. Anthony Phillips (“Father”) and Suzanna R. Phillips (“Mother”) divorced, and Father was ordered to pay child support. Later, Father’s child support obligation was suspended on account of his disability status. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) garnished Father’s Social Security checks to satisfy an arrearage. The Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”) found that Father had paid his arrears and, in fact, had overpaid. The Trial Court ordered the State to reimburse Father the overpayment and to pursue Mother for the overpayment sum. The State appeals, arguing that the Trial Court lacked authority because of the State’s sovereign immunity to render such an order. We affirm as modified. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Winfred Reeves v. Felicia Kimberly Reeves
At the time of the parties’ divorce, both parties lived in Tennessee, and Mother was named primary residential parent. Shortly thereafter, Mother was allowed to relocate to Georgia with the children, and Father’s requests that he be named primary residential parent were denied. Following the move, the parties were unable to agree to a parenting plan, and the circuit court resolved the remaining parenting issues and transferred future disputes to Georgia. On appeal, the pro se parties raise numerous issues related to various decisions of the trial court. We affirm in part and we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Powers v. Sherry Denise Powers
This case involves the construction of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Father appeals the transfer of his case from circuit court to chancery court, the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, and the trial court’s ruling finding him in breach of the post-majority support provision of the marital dissolution agreement and awarding Mother attorney fees. We reverse as to the attorney fee award, but affirm as to the remainder. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Carrie Mobley v. Mark Adam Mobley
This is divorce case pertaining to the marriage of Carrie Mobley (“Mother”) and Mark Adam Mobley (“Father”). The parties were married for 15 years. They have three minor daughters (collectively “Children”). Following a two-day trial, the court divorced the parties, divided their marital property, and made decrees regarding the custody of the Children. With respect to the Children, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent; it then ordered a 50/50 shared residential parenting arrangement. Following the divorce, the court found Mother to be in willful contempt of multiple provisions of its judgment. It sentenced her to ten days in jail on each of five counts. The court suspended the sentences on condition that there be no further violations. Mother appeals. She challenges the trial court’s judgment as to (1) the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, (2) portions of the residential parenting schedule, and (3) the inclusion of a “paramour provision” in the divorce judgment. In addition, she appeals the contempt findings, sentences, and award of fees to Father on the contempt proceedings. We reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Shyronne H., et al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights with respect to the six children at issue in this appeal. She concedes that grounds exist for termination, but she claims that termination is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Tower Music City II, LLC, et al
In this condemnation action, the condemning authority appeals the jury’s valuation of property taken and award of compensation to landowner. Finding that the valuation of the property is within the range of opinions of fair market value testified to at trial, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the court’s conduct of the trial was proper, we affirm the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
