In Re:Alyssa Y., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Alyssa Y. and Brian Y. (“the Children”), the minor twin children of Juanita Y. (“Mother”). When the Children were three months old, their maternal grandmother filed a petition with the Knox County Juvenile Court, asserting that the Children were dependent and neglected due to Mother’s drug use. The Children were placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother by order of the court entered January 23, 2009. When the maternal grandmother became unable to care for the Children in November 2010, they were taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother on April 26, 2012. The petition alleged several grounds for termination, including abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit and support the Children, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Children due to her failure to pay child support. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan and that termination of parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan K. Wilson v. David W. Dossett, American Honda Motor Co., and Fox Head, Inc.
This appeal concerns a landowner’s potential liability to a person injured while riding a motorcycle on the landowner’s property. Jordan K. Wilson (“Wilson”) suffered severe injuries in a motorcycle accident on property owned by David W. Dossett (“Dossett”). Wilson sued Dossett in the Circuit Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). Dossett filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense for landowners under Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. The Trial Court held that Dossett was afforded protection under the statute as Wilson had been engaged in recreational activities on Dossett’s land. At a subsequent hearing, the Trial Court found that no exception to the statutory defense was applicable. Wilson appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 applies to shield Dossett from liability as Wilson was engaged in recreational activities on Dossett’s property, and that no exception to the defense is applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Perdue v. Estate of Daniel Jackson, et al.
The trial court granted summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action, finding that the will at issue was unambiguous. Having determined that the will at issue contains a latent ambiguity that must be resolved through the use of extrinsic evidence, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Meadows, etc. v. Tara Harrison, etc., et al.
In this case, Partner and Decedent created Double J Company for the purpose of buying and selling real estate. One month following the creation of Double J Company, Decedent personally purchased the Property, which he thereafter deeded to Double J Company. Following Decedent’s death, Partner filed a complaint against Heirs and the estate for partition. Heirs objected, arguing that Partner and Decedent never formed a valid partnership and that the Property was subject to the administration of Decedent’s estate. Following a hearing, the trial court deemed the Property partnership property and ordered the sale of the Property. Heirs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Pirtle v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board et al
Petitioner, an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction, was charged with the prison disciplinary offense of Refusing a Drug Test because he failed to provide an adequate amount of urine for testing. Following a disciplinary hearing he was found guilty of the offense. He filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which was granted, and Respondents filed a certified copy of the record of Petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings. The trial court found the disciplinary board did not act in an illegal or arbitrary manner, and dismissed the case. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalyn L. Caffey v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee Board of Zoning Appeals and Elizabeth W. Blair
Neighbor of property owner who received a variance from a side yard setback requirement in zoning ordinance filed an action seeking certiorari review of the Board of Zoning Appeals’ grant of the variance. The trial court determined that the Board’s action was within its authority pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-7-207(3) and affirmed the grant of the variance. We concur with the trial court and affirm the Board’s action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. W. Phillip Reed, et al.
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) sued W. Phillip Reed, Personal Representative of the Estate of Carol LaRue; Rufus Everett; Delight Everett; and Lilla Farner seeking a declaratory judgment with regard to rights and obligations under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Tennessee Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Trial Court entered its order on June 12, 2012 granting Tennessee Farmers summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that the insurance policy was not ambiguous, that the phrase “property damage” in the insurance policy did not include the type of loss allegedly suffered by the Everetts and Ms. Farner, and that the commercial general liability insurance policy provides no coverage to W. Phillip Reed as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carol LaRue for the claims filed by the Everetts and Ms. Farner. Rufus Everett, Delight Everett, and Lilla Farner (“Defendants”) appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Anne Kraus v. Barry Martin Thomas
In this appeal from the Final Decree of Divorce, the father of the parties’ four minor children challenges the division of marital property, the permanent parenting plan, an upward deviation in child support of $16,875 per year to help pay for private school for three of the children, and a $50,000 judgment for the mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the division of the marital property and the parenting schedule. As for requiring the father to pay up to $16,875 per year toward private school costs of three of the children, we have determined that the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard for such an upward deviation and find that the father does not have the financial means to pay an upward deviation. As for requiring the father to pay $50,000 of the mother’s attorney’s fees, we have determined that she was given 60 percent of the marital assets and her income is substantially more than that of the father’s, thus, applying the ability to pay and the need standard, we find no basis for requiring the father to pay the mother’s attorney’s fees at trial or on appeal. Thus, we reverse the award for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board asserting violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board. Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court’s determination regarding the attorney’s right to records from certain Board meetings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Herbert S. Moncier, et al., v. Nancy S. Jones, et al.
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his complaint, which asserted numerous claims relating, inter alia, to the practice monitor condition of his suspension from the practice of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint finding the defendants in the action were immune under either sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, quasi-judicial quasi-prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, or Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 27 immunity. The trial court further found that the action was a collateral attack on the ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court regarding Petitioner’s suspension; thus, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on matters in the disciplinary proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on all claims except for the Public Records Act, which we remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the records requested are subject to inspection and whether they have in fact been made available for inspection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex re. Herbert S. Moncier, et al v. Nancy S. Jones, et al
Attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility filed suit against the Board’s counsel seeking damages for her conduct of the disciplinary proceeding and her removal from the position of Disciplinary Counsel; Attorney appeals the dismissal of his action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al
Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education appeals the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling it to hear an appeal of the termination of a non-teaching employee. The Board contends that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ and that state law preempts the right to a hearing granted to employees of the Board under the Metropolitan Charter. We affirm the holding that the chancery court has jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-102(a) and 29-25-101 to issue the writ; we vacate the judgment issuing the writ and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Board has developed a policy with respect to the dismissal of employees as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2301(b)(1)(FF) and whether such policy preempts the pertinent provisions of the Metropolitan Charter. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al. - Dissent
I concur in the majority’s holdings affirming the trial court’s jurisdiction and vacating the mandamus. However, I do not agree with the decision to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the declaratory judgment claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Mittie T. Alexander
Conservator filed suit to rescind a pre-conservatorship conveyance of real property by ward to her niece. The jury found in favor of niece and the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict. Conservator appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of her expert witness. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Brian J. & Nicole J.
This case involves an appeal from juvenile court to circuit court. The maternal grandmother of the child at issue filed a petition in juvenile court against her daughter, seeking court-ordered visitation with her grandson. The respondent mother of the child filed an answer denying all of the grandmother’s allegations and also filed a counter-petition for injunctive relief against the grandmother. The juvenile court granted the grandmother’s petition for court-ordered visitation but did not adjudicate the mother’s petition for injunctive relief. The mother then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The mother now appeals. We affirm the decision of the circuit court, vacate the orders of the juvenile court based on subject-matter jurisdiction, and remand to the juvenile court, with specific instructions, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Mary L. Sparks v. James E. Dillingham, et al and James E. Dillingham, et al v. Prestige Title, LLC, et al
This case presents a question of first impression regarding the scope of the term “lender” as used within the Tennessee Home Loan Protection Act. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff claiming that the Defendants were “lenders” subject to the Act and Defendants claiming that they were not “lenders” subject to the Act. The trial court concluded that Defendants were not “lenders,” and therefore it granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, we grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Paula Jean Holley v. James Franklin Holley, III
The issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court that had granted the divorce lost subject matter jurisdiction to hear a later petition for change of custody. James Franklin Holley, III (“Father”) and Paula Jean Holley (“Mother”) were divorced in the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Mother was given primary custody of the parties’ two minor children (“the Children”), with Father having co-parenting time. Later, Father filed a petition (“the Petition”) to change custody based on Mother’s alleged neglect of the Children’s psychological and educational issues. The Trial Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Petition as juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear petitions alleging dependency and neglect. Father appeals. We hold that the Petition did not allege under the relevant statutes that the Children were dependent and neglected and, therefore, the Trial Court did have jurisdiction to hear the Petition. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Courtney N.
Tina K. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Courtney N. (“the Child”), now age 12. The Child and her older sister, Tiffany N. (“Sister”) (collectively “the Children”) were placed in the protective custody of petitioners, Raymond and Charlene W., (“Uncle and Aunt”). They were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected in Mother’s care. In January 2012, Uncle and Aunt, together with Janie Lindamood, the Child’s court-appointed guardian ad litem, (collectively “Petitioners”), filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. The court stated that it made both findings by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals each of these determinations. We vacate the finding of abandonment based on conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare as such ground is not implicated by the facts of this case. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
John Pierce Lankford v. Southern Health Partners
This is an appeal from an order entered on March 12, 2013. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory E. Hearn et al v. Erie Insurance Exchange
Homeowners claim that cracks in the exterior bricks of their home were caused by blasting in the neighborhood. Their insurance company denied coverage under the homeowner policy. The juryreturned a verdict in favor of the homeowners. Based upon our construction of the insurance contract and its exclusion for damage caused by earth movement, we conclude that the judgment approving the verdict is erroneous and must be reversed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Arnold, an un-emancipated child, by Renate Arnold, Mother/Next-Best Friend v. Randy Kennedy
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for damages under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-21-108. We affirm |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann Woodard Maxwell v. Ronald Edward Woodard, Jr.
This appeal involves post-divorce modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties’ minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstances but declined to designate the father as primary residential parent. Instead, the trial court left the mother in place as primary residential parent and increased the father’s parenting time. The father now appeals the trial court’s decision not to designate him as the primary residential parent. We reverse, holding that the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court’s holding that it is in the child’s best interest for the mother to remain the primary residential parent, so the trial court erred in denying the father’s petition to designate him as the primary residential parent. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Lawson Miller v. Stephen Lee Miller
Stephanie Lawson Miller (“Mother”) appeals the Trial Court’s April 26, 2012 order finding and holding her in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan. Mother raises issues on appeal regarding whether Stephen Lee Miller (“Father”) proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother had violated the Permanent Parenting Plan, whether Mother could be jailed for said contempt, whether the parties’ minor child has a constitutional right to exercise his religious beliefs, and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to consider the testimony of the child. We find and hold that Father did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother violated the Permanent Parenting Plan, that Mother could be jailed for said contempt, that the Trial Court did not err in refusing to consider the child’s testimony about his religious decision making, and that the issue of whether the child has a constitutional right is not properly before this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Lawson Miller v. Stephen Lee Miller - Dissenting
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., Presiding Judge, dissenting. With all due respect to my colleagues, I believe the conduct, or lack thereof, of Mother has been blown way out of proportion. Certainly, not all of the i’s were properly dotted and not all of the t’s were correctly crossed, but, in the final analysis and way before the date scheduled for the Child’s Baptism, Father had ample opportunity to weigh in on the decision. He failed to stop the Baptism when he could. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Douglas Sprague v. Mary Nelle Sprague
In this post-divorce case, the issues are twofold: whether the trial court erred in awarding Mary Nelle Sprague (“Mother”) a judgment against her former spouse, Andrew Douglas Sprague (“Father”), in the amount of $5,604.65 for uncovered medical expenses pursuant to the terms of the parties’ parenting plan; and whether the trial court erred in the process of holding Father in criminal contempt of court. We modify the medical expense award by decreasing it to $2,124.32, the amount claimed by Mother and the amount established by the proof. Further, we reverse the criminal contempt finding because Father was not provided adequate notice of the criminal contempt charges as required by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
