Gerald Wallace Ardry et al. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
In this case arising out of a car accident, the defendant challenges the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on several bases, including comments and arguments of plaintiffs’ counsel and the evidence regarding loss of earning capacity. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with the jury’s verdict. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alicia K.A.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linda J.M.A. (“Mother”) to the minor child Alicia K.A. (“the Child”) . After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its Termination of Parental Rights and Final Decree of Guardianship finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(8), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: T.M.S.
This appeal involves disestablishment of paternity. The putative father allegedly signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and the child’s birth certificate when the child at issue was born. The mother did not tell him at the time that she had had sexual relations with another man during the time period in which the child was conceived. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of the mother, obtained an order against the putative father, establishing parentage and setting child support. After a private DNA test showed that the putative father was not the biological father of the child, he filed a petition in juvenile court to disestablish paternity and set aside under Tenn. R. Civ P. 60. The juvenile court denied the petition, holding that the putative father did not offer proof of fraud in the procurement of his signature on the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. The putative father now appeals. On appeal, we find no voluntary acknowledgment of paternity in the record, and no evidence regarding the alleged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, and so cannot consider it in the appeal. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the putative father’s petition to set aside the order establishing parentage and child support under Rule 60.02, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel B. Phillips v. Susan W. Phillips
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the denial of a motion to recuse the Trial Court Judge from presiding over post-divorce contempt proceedings initiated by Susan W. Phillips (“Former Wife”) against Samuel B. Phillips (“Former Husband”). Having reviewed Former Husband’s Petition for Recusal Appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, and upon consideration of Former Wife’s motion to dismiss the appeal, we deny Former Wife’s motion to dismiss this appeal and affirm the Trial Court’s denial of Former Husband’s motion to recuse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John H. Patty v. Ray Lane, et al
This appeal involves the breach of an oral contract. Defendants approached Plaintiff about utilizing fill dirt on Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff agreed. Defendants subsequently executed a plan to control the sediment as they excavated the property. Over the course of the next three years, the City of Knoxville sent Plaintiff two notices of violation, one of which carried a fine, for improper sediment control, illegal dumping and discharge, and failure to obtain a city permit. Defendants paid the fine, applied for a city permit as required, and attempted to stabilize the property. Two years later, Plaintiff received two more notices of violation, one of which carried a fine. Plaintiff paid the fine and hired an engineer to properly stabilize the property after Defendants refused to respond to his request for assistance. Plaintiff then filed suit for breach of contract, seeking reimbursement for his payment of the second fine and for the cost of professionally stabilizing the property. Defendants denied liability and asserted that a contract had never been formed. The trial court found that a contract existed, that Defendants breached the contract, and that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $29,249.02. Defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Womble v. State of Tennessee
A nurse whose employment at the University of Tennessee Regional Memorial Medical Center was terminated by the hospital brought a complaint against the State, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and negligent deprivation of her property right to her position as a career state employee. The Claims Commission, William O. Shults, Commissioner, dismissed the claims, concluding that the Commission was without subject matter jurisdiction. The nurse appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Copper Basin Federal Credit Union, et al v. Fiserv Solutions, Inc.
This action sounding in negligence and breach of contract was dismissed by the trial court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Defendant negligently performed professional services concerning the provision and maintenance of web defense software and that Defendant breached its contractual duty to protect the computer system of Copper Basin Federal Credit Union from computer incursion. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to allow the case to proceed, and, therefore, dismissal was in error. The decision below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Raleigh Commons, Inc. v. SWH, LLC, et al.
This appeal arises from a prolonged dispute among business associates which they have come to refer to as a “business divorce.” The parties in this matter, each doctors, formed a limited liability company for the purpose of acquiring property and constructing a medical office building on the property. In order to acquire the property from the current owner, the doctors executed an assumption and modification agreement whereby the LLC and the doctors each individually agreed to be jointly and severally liable to the current owner for its obligations on a promissory note. Subsequently, one of the doctors, the Appellee, withdrew membership from the LLC and executed an indemnity agreement with the remaining LLC members whereby the Appellee would be held harmless from any liability of the LLC, including the note. Thereafter, the LLC and its remaining members defaulted on the note, and the holder of the note filed a complaint against the Appellee, the LLC, and the individual LLC members, seeking to collect the balance due under the note. In order to avoid having a judgment entered against him, the Appellee purchased the note and pursued a claim against the LLC and its individual members for indemnification and breach of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on his indemnification claim, awarded him attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and dismissed the Appellant’s cross-claims against the Appellee. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Eberle et al v. Lisa Parrott Elliott, et al.
This is a contested easement action regarding wooded mountain property in Monroe County. The Plaintiffs/Appellants, James and Edna Eberle, filed a complaint requesting that the Defendant/Appellee, Lisa Parrott Elliott, be enjoined from crossing the Eberles’ property from her adjoining thirty-acre tract without benefit of an easement. Following a bench trial, the Monroe County Chancery Court dismissed the Eberles’ complaint for injunctive relief and ruled that an easement exists for ingress and egress over the Eberles’ property, appurtenant to and serving Ms. Elliott’s property. The Eberles have appealed. At issue is whether the trial court erred by finding the existence of an easement, either express, prescriptive, or implied. The Eberles also assert that the trial court erred by failing to limit the easement to a use no greater than the use previously made over the servient property. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that an easement exists for ingress and egress and the court’s dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Mack Phillips, Et Al. v. Montgomery County, Tennessee, Et Al.
Property owners submitted a subdivision plat to the local planning commission for approval. The planning commission denied the proposed plan because the property lies in the path of a planned highway extension. The property owners filed a complaint alleging the planning commission’s denial constitutes a regulatory taking that is prohibited by the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 21, and, also, inverse condemnation that is compensable pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123. The trial court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the claim based on inverse condemnation, but reverse the judgment refusing to dismiss the regulatory taking claim. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Crunk Telfer v. George Curtiss Telfer
This divorce appeal involves the classification of the appreciation in value of separate property. During the marriage, the wife’s family gave her ownership interests in two family companies. The parties used marital funds to pay their tax liabilities arising out of income from the companies that was attributed to them for tax purposes but retained by the companies. The trial court held that the appreciation in value of the wife’s ownership interests in the family companies were her separate property. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the parties substantially contributed to the preservation and appreciation in value of the wife’s separate assets, and so reverse the trial court’s classification of the appreciation in value as her separate property. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, Robert e. Cooper, Jr., Tennessee Attorney General, Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District Attorney General, Kim Helper, District Attorney General, and The State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Full Faith and Credit Clause and firearm rights. The petitioner was convicted of felony drug offenses in Georgia. The State of Georgia granted the petitioner a full pardon for his crimes; his Georgia pardon expressly restored his right to possess a firearm. The petitioner now resides in Tennessee. A Tennessee statute provides that it is a felony for a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense to possess a firearm, and it does not make an exception for persons who have been pardoned for their crime. The petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action against the State of Tennessee, seeking a declaration that, because he received a pardon for his drug offenses in Georgia, he can purchase or possess a firearm in Tennessee without violating the Tennessee statute. The trial court held in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize Georgia’s pardon in full and to permit the petitioner to carry a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee now appeals. On appeal, we consider the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. We hold that Tennessee’s public policy on the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted non-violent drug felon is not entirely inconsistent with Georgia’s public policy, so the public-policy exception to full faith and credit is not applicable in that situation. However, Tennessee public policy proscribes the restoration of firearm rights for a convicted violent drug felon, contrary to Georgia’s public policy allowing the restoration of firearm rights for all felons, violent or not. This Tennessee policy implicates public safety so as to warrant application of the public-policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause under the appropriate circumstances. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Timothy Brown v. Janine Biache Brown
In this divorce case, the trial court divided property which had not been previously divided by agreement of the parties and awarded Wife alimony in solido. Wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property as marital or separate prior to division, and in failing to award her alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, transitional alimony, or attorney’s fees. Finding no error we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel E. Foster et al v. Walter William Chiles, III et al
This is a health care liability case. Samuel E. Foster and his wife, Mary Foster, timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to the potential defendants as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a) (2012). After nonsuiting their first lawsuit, they timely filed a second complaint in which they alleged the same cause of action against the same defendants. The second complaint alleged compliance with section 121(a), citing the notices already properly sent before the first complaint was filed. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the notice requirement of section 121(a). We hold that plaintiffs complied with section 121(a)’s notice requirement by giving a written notice of their potential health care liability claim to each defendant at least 60 days prior to the filing of their second complaint. We further hold that section 121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms, and that plaintiffs’ inadvertent failure to file – with the second complaint – proof of their service of the subject notices does not warrant dismissal with prejudice. We vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Wheatley Sparkman v. Jason Aaron Sparkman
This appeal involves post-divorce proceedings arising out of numerous disputes between the parties. The only rulings that are challenged on appeal are the trial court’s conclusions that: (1) Father was required to pay uncovered medical expenses for the children’s counseling, pursuant to the divorce decree; and (2) Father must pay $14,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision on both issues. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Pearlie Mae Dunigan, Next of Kin/Personal Representative of Estate of Grover Dunigan, Deceased v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a claim for damages filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission, arising out of the death of an inmate while he was housed in a state penitentiary. The Claims Commission denied the claimant’s motion for a default judgment. Thereafter, the Claims Commission determined that the gravamen of the complaint was for medical malpractice, and consequently, it granted the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimant’s failure to comply with various provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. The claimant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Sneed v. The City of Red Bank, Tennessee A Municipality
After his discharge as the Chief of Police for Red Bank, Tennessee, Larry Sneed filed suit against Red Bank pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. He requested a jury trial on both claims. Red Bank filed a motion to transfer to circuit court and to proceed without a jury pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court transferred the case and ordered the case to proceed without a jury on the Tennessee Public Protection Act claim. Relying on University of Tennessee of Chattanooga v. Farrow, E2000-02386-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 935467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001), the court held that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act did not preclude a jury trial on the remaining claim. Red Bank pursued this interlocutory appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act applies to claims brought against a municipality pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act; therefore, that claim must also be tried without a jury. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Jane Kathryn Ross
The trial court decreed a resulting trust in a house paid for by the decedent on property owned by her son. We have concluded that the trial court erred. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Don Mabee v. Gayle Mabee
The ex-husband of the defendant filed a petition to terminate alimony. The parties’ 2010 marital dissolution agreement provides that the petitioner shall pay alimony to his ex-wife for a specified period or upon her cohabitating with another man, and petitioner alleges that the defendant has been cohabitating with another man. The trial court made findings that, although the defendant had an intimate relationship with another man, she was not cohabitating as that term is defined; thus, the trial court denied the petition and awarded the defendant an arrearage judgment for alimony the petitioner failed to pay. Finding the trial court applied the correct legal standard and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
City of South Pittsburg, Tennessee v. James C. Hailey and Company, et al
In April 2008 the City of South Pittsburg hired a contractor to enlarge its sewage treatment plant. During construction of the project several sink holes developed, the last of which occurred in February of 2009 and caused the plant’s lagoon to collapse. The City made claim on the contractor’s builders’ risk insurance policy; the insurer denied the claim, contending that construction of the project was complete at the time of the collapse. The City, which had filed suit against the contractor, amended the complaint, adding the insurer as a party and asserting a claim for breach of contract against the company; the City also requested that the court issue a declaratory judgment that the losses sustained by the city were covered by the policy. The court subsequently granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment and denied the city’s motion for partial summary judgment. The city and the engineering firm engaged by the City to plan the project appeal the grant of summary judgment to the insurer and the denial of the city’s motion. We have determined that the court erred in granting the insurer’s motion and denying the City’s; consequently, we reverse both judgments. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Lisa Gail Hayes v. Mark C. Pierret
In these acrimonious post-divorce proceedings, the father of two minor children filed a petition seeking, inter alia, to be given sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency health care, religion, and extracurricular activities, and to be designated the primary residential parent or alternatively to receive more parenting time. The trial court found a material change of circumstances had occurred due to the parties’ total inability to cooperatively co-parent and that it was in the children’s best interest to spend more quality time with their father. However, the court found it was in the children’s best interest for the mother to remain the primary residential parent and to have final authority over the children’s non-emergency medical care after consultation with the father. The court found that the other major decisions concerning the children should be made jointly. Each party was ordered to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. We affirm the foregoing decisions; however, we have determined the father may be entitled to a modification of his child support obligation, which was not addressed in the trial court’s final order, and we remand this issue for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kitty Fern (Darden) Sartain v. Mitchell Carl Sartain
This appeal arises from the second divorce between these parties. Husband and Wife were married for nineteen years, divorced in 1997, and then married again for thirteen additional years. In this second divorce, the trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido in addition to 45% of Husband’s military retirement pay. As part of the first divorce the trial court had awarded Wife 36% of Husband’s military retirement pay. Although Husband retired in 2006, Wife had not received any portion of his retirement pay. Wife requested the court in this second divorce award her the money she should have been paid from the date of Husband’s retirement to the date of the second divorce. The trial court declined to make that award. On appeal we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. We reverse the court’s judgment denying Wife the portion of Husband’s retirement pay she had been awarded in the first divorce, and we remand the case for a hearing on the issues surrounding the Survivor Benefit Plan. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Nigel Marlin Reid Sr. v. Morristown Power et al
Nigel Marlin Reid, Sr. filed a complaint in the trial court. The court, sua sponte, held that the complaint is “frivolous” and that plaintiff’s claims against his brother are barred by res judicata. The court dismissed the action. Because the complaint fails to state a cause of action, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Sabra Elaine Ellis O'Daniel v. Rusty Wade O'Daniel
The issues in this divorce case focus, for the most part, on the enforceability and interpretation of a prenuptial agreement entered into by Sabra Elaine Ellis O’Daniel (“Wife”) and Rusty Wade O’Daniel (“Husband”). Shortly after their marriage, Wife was diagnosed with a serious illness that resulted in several extensive hospitalizations. We have determined that the enforcement of the provisions limiting and waiving alimony contained in the parties’ prenuptial agreement is likely to render Wife a public charge. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment holding that these “alimony” provisions are valid and enforceable. We affirm the trial court’s award to Wife of 67 months of health insurance, but do so on a ground other than the one articulated by the trial court. We affirm the trial court’s award to Wife of a judgment for $16,000 based upon Husband’s breach of the prenuptial agreement requiring him to fund a retirement account for Wife. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings (1) to consider anew Wife’s request for alimony and (2) to set her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This appeal involves a dispute over an attorney’s fee in a wrongful foreclosure case filed by Client against Bank of America. Client originally signed a contingency fee contract with Attorney, who later withdrew from the case. Client hired a new law firm to represent him and subsequently prevailed following a jury trial. Attorney filed suit, alleging that he was entitled to recover his original contingency fee because Client’s behavior forced him to withdraw from representation. The trial court limited Attorney’s recovery of fees pursuant to quantum meruit. Attorney appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Appeals |
