COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Melissa A. Rhymer, Legal Custodian of Robert A. Trivett and wife, Maria Trivett, v. 21st Mortgage Corporation and Southern Showcase Housing, INC., d/b/a Homes America
E2006-00742-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II

In this case defendants moved to arbitrate the dispute since plaintiff signed a contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff pled incompetence to contract, but the Trial Court held that issue was subject to arbitration. We vacate and remand and instruct the Trial Court to decide the issue of incompetency.

Hawkins Court of Appeals

R.D.M. v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, In the Matter of: D.J.M.M., Jr., D.O.B. 8/28/2000
E2006-00283-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas A. Austin

Appellant, who was married to the mother at the birth of the child, claims the Trial Court erred in failing to engage in a comparative fitness test in awarding the child to a person who by DNA testing was shown to be the biological father.  We affirm.

Roane Court of Appeals

C.S.C., et. al. v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
E2006-00087-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

In this class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, were guilty of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional violations in the design and implementation of theBoard’s evening alternative education program for students who are expelled or suspended from their regular schools.  The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges.  The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

In the Matter of: S. L. A.
M2006-01536-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paul Crouch

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, contending the evidence was not clear and convincing that she abandoned her child and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child. The trial court found the mother had abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, which conduct included ingesting drugs while pregnant and while breast feeding, and the manufacture of methamphetamine in the family home. We affirm.

Fentress Court of Appeals

Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al. - Concurring
M2004-02663-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

I concur in the opinion of the Court and write separately in order to re-emphasize and reaffirm the sound rules of law stated in Holt v. Citizen Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn.1984).  Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Holt, an innocent purchaser at a foreclosure sale had constantly to look back over his shoulder for fear that someone would challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale in equity under the “shock the conscience of the court” standard. Holt makes it clear that, in the absence of misconduct or fraud, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale where the property brings less than true value is free from a constant cloud upon his title.

Franklin Court of Appeals

Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al.
M2004-02663-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

This case involves a creditor’s entitlement to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale in which the creditor was the only bidder, and in which he paid considerably less for the large tract of mountaintop property than the debtor alleged it was worth. The trial court awarded the creditor’s successor-in-interest a deficiency judgment of over $4 million, holding that in accordance with the rule of Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1984), the debtor should not be permitted to challenge the legal presumption that the value of the property at the time of foreclosure was equal to the sale price because there was no evidence of “irregularity, misconduct, fraud or unfairness on the part of the mortgagee.” Since the Holt case did not involve a deficiency judgment, we believe it is inapplicable. After examining both the law of Tennessee and that of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to challenge the presumption by attempting to prove that the sale price was grossly inadequate. We accordingly reverse.

Franklin Court of Appeals

Edwin R. Oliver, Individually as Next Friend of Edwin C. Oliver, a Minor v. Prologis Trust
W2006-00584-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

In this premises liability case, the minor plaintiff received a severe foot injury while assisting an independent contractor straighten concrete poles with a forklift on defendant premises owner’s property. The plaintiff’s father sued the independent contractor and the premises owner on his minor
son’s behalf, alleging negligence and workers’ compensation liability. The trial court tried the workers’ compensation claim first and entered a judgment for the plaintiff. The Special Workers’ Compensation Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to the premises owner, finding that the premises owner was not the statutory employer of the plaintiff. The case returned to the trial court for trial of the negligence claim. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the independent contractor from the action, leaving the premises owner as the only defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner, finding that the premises owner owed no duty to prevent the independent contractor from hiring the plaintiff, and finding that the facts of the case did not fall into any exception to the general rule that a premises owner is not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, alleging that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Adam Charles Partin v. Delores Lourraine Wallis
E2006-418-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Swann

Adam Charles Partin (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his child support obligation claiming that a significant variance existed between his income at the time his child support obligation was originally calculated and his current income. The case was tried and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that a significant variance did exist making the child support order eligible for modification. The Trial Court then reduced Father’s child support. Delores Lourraine Wallis (“Mother”) appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in calculating Father’s income and that a significant variance does not exist. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Oscar Sevilla v. Douglas Cox
W2006-01009-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber Mccraw

The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action.  We affirm.

Fayette Court of Appeals

Eugene L. Lampley, et al. v. Melvin D. Romine, et al.
M2005-01726-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard W. Martin

In a boundary dispute, the trial court refused to find estoppel by deed since the party raising the estoppel had not relied on the erroneous deeds. We affirm.

Dickson Court of Appeals

Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., f/k/a Holiday Inns Franchising v. States Resources, Inc., et al.
W2006-00845-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

The issue presented in this priority dispute between a first deed of trust holder and a judgment lien creditor involves the legal effect of the inadvertent and erroneous release of the deed of trust. States Resources Corporation (SRC), Defendant/Appellant, holds two liens on the same real property: one as successor-in-interest to a judgment creditor and the other as assignee of a promissory note for a construction loan, secured by a deed of trust originally held by Trust One Bank. Plaintiff/Appellee Holiday Hospitality Franchising (Holiday) also holds a judgment lien that, in relation to SRC’s filings, was filed last in time. SRC appeals summary judgment entered in favor of Holiday and contends that as assignee of Trust One’s note and first-filed deed of trust, it occupies the most senior lien position, notwithstanding the mistaken release of the deed prior to the assignment. Because Trust One’s release was inadvertent and unintended, and because restoring the deed of trust to its original priority position would not prejudice the rights of Holiday, an intervening judgment lien creditor, we hold that, as a matter of law, the mistaken release should be cancelled in part and the deed as to Lot 30 should be restored to its position as first deed of trust. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
W2006-00732-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ cause of action as time-barred under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 6-51-102(a)(1) & 103.  We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Richard John Jolly v. Lynette Suzanne Jolly
W2005-01845-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Martha B. Brasfield

After a decree was entered in a divorce proceeding in Kansas, wife attempted to enforce the decree in Tennessee as it pertains to, inter alia, a division of marital property. The case reached the Supreme Court, and that Court determined that relief sought involved the enforcement of the Kansas decree, and that the decree had not been properly registered and notice given, required by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The case was remanded to the trial court to insure that the registration and notice procedures of UIFSA were followed and that husband be allowed to present defenses thereto. The trial court made a division of the parties' marital property in Tennessee and allowed credit to wife for arrearage of child support decreed by the Kansas court.  Husband has appealed. We affirm.

McNairy Court of Appeals

Travis Jones v. State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Keva Coleman
W2006-00540-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge George E. Blancett

This is an appeal from the ruling of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County overruling the juvenile Referee’s finding that Appellant’s voluntary acknowledgment of paternity should be set aside under T.C.A. § 24-7-113. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding concerning fraudulent procurement, we vacate the Order of the trial court and remand for reinstatement of the previous Judgment of the trial court affirming the Referee’s Judgment.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Susan Small-Hammer v. Edward C. Troutt, et al.
M2005-00861-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment following a jury trial. She contends the trial court erred by denying her Motion in Limine and by giving the jury an erroneous jury instruction. Finding the plaintiff failed to raise either issue in a motion for new trial, which is a mandatory condition precedent, we affirm.

Sumner Court of Appeals

Galadriel Basham v. Mark K. Greaves - Concurring
M2006-00281-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge William C. Koch, Jr
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This appeal is yet another effort to provide the courts with a permissible vehicle for circumventing the legislatively mandated “locality rule” uniquely applicable to medical malpractice cases. Galadriel Basham seeks to hold the trial court in error for using an instruction based on the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions. She insists that the trial court should have given a broader instruction equating the nationwide “community” of board-certified emergency room physicians with the geographical concept of “community” plainly embodied in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1) (Supp. 2006).
Ms. Basham cannot make this argument now because she failed to request the trial court to give a broader instruction. Rule v. Empire Gas Corp., 563 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tenn. 1978) (distinguishing between erroneous instructions and omitted instructions for the purpose of Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 51.02); Jones v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).  Parties who failed to take actions reasonably available to them to prevent or

Davidson Court of Appeals

Galadriel Basham, Individually and as Next-Of-Kin of Baby Girl Basham, Deceased v. Mark K. Greaves, M.D.
M2006-00281-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff contends the emergency room physician failed to comply with the applicable standard of care, which she contends is the standard for board-certified emergency room physicians, regardless of the locale in which the physician practices, and that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury concerning the applicable community. The novel issue presented is whether the term “community,” as it applies to the so-called locality rule, can be construed to mean the medical community of specialists who are board-certified as emergency room physicians without regard to the geographic location of their practice. Although we find the issue intriguing, the facts of this case render the issue moot.  Accordingly, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Phillip Wayne Crocker v. Nancy Jo Reece Crocker
W2006-00353-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor George R. Ellis

This case involves a divorce ending a five year marriage. Wife/Appellee was awarded a divorce on grounds of Husband/Appellant’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded Wife/Appellee alimony in futuro. Husband/Appellant appeals the award of alimony in futuro.  We affirm.

Gibson Court of Appeals

Larry P. Conway and Marilyn J. Conway v. Eastern Savings Bank, FSB
W2005-02919-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This is a petition to set aside a foreclosure sale. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, borrowed over $1.1 million from the defendant bank in order to buy the subject home. The plaintiffs later defaulted on the loan. The husband filed a petition in bankruptcy and listed the home as a part of his bankruptcy estate. The bank obtained relief from the automatic stay, accelerated the debt, and began foreclosure proceedings. The day before the scheduled foreclosure sale, the wife filed a petition in bankruptcy and listed the home as part of her bankruptcy estate. The foreclosure sale was postponed.  The bank obtained relief from the automatic stay in the wife’s bankruptcy case, and the foreclosure sale was conducted. The bank purchased the home for a credit bid of $750,000. Eight months later, the husband and wife filed this action for injunctive relief and to vacate the foreclosure sale. They alleged, among other things, inadequate consideration and lack of proper notice. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted based in part on earlier findings by the bankruptcy court in the plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceedings. The husband and wife now appeal, again arguing inadequate consideration and lack of notice. We affirm, finding that the plaintiffs failed to proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact for trial.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Volunteer Concrete Walls v. Community Trust & Banking Co., and Construction Consultants, Inc.
E2006-00602-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

In this breach of contract action, the Chancellor dismissed the Complaint and Counter-Complaint and Ordered plaintiff to remove the lien on the property where the construction of a wall was placed. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Jeanne L. Schuett v. Egon Horst Schuett, Jr.
W2005-02482-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rita L. Stotts

This is the second appeal of a divorce case involving alimony and child support. In the original divorce proceeding, we reversed the trial court’s holding that the increase in value of the wife’s inheritance was separate property, as well as its award of child support, based on a floating schedule.  The case was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the child support, equitably divide the appreciation in value of the inheritance, and then reconsider the division of the marital assets and the award of alimony and attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court divided the appreciation in value of the inheritance, recalculated the child support obligation, and reaffirmed its remaining rulings. The husband now appeals for the second time, arguing that the trial court erred in awarding the wife alimony in solido and in not applying the new incomes shares child support guidelines. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the award of alimony in solido, and holding that the husband cannot raise the revised child support guidelines for the first time on appeal.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Paul H. Martin v. Billy W. Long
M2005-02521-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

This case is based on the existence of an oral contract. The trial court determined that there was insufficient proof on damages to allow the plaintiff any recovery. We remand the case for findings about the existence and terms of the alleged oral contract.

Coffee Court of Appeals

Douglas Edward Corder v. Valerie Jean Corder - Dissenting
W2005-01711-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers

I am in agreement with the majority’s well-written and well-reasoned opinion with one exception. I would not hold that the trial court’s requirement for the father to provide financial information to mother constitutes impermissible “support” after the children reach majority. I
otherwise concur in the holding.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Douglas Edward Corder v. Valerie Jean Corder
W2005-01711-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge George R. Ellis

This case involves a divorced parent’s obligation to support college-age children. After the divorce, the mother was the primary residential parent for the parties’ two children, who are now adults. In 1999, when both children were still minors, the father’s child support obligation was increased, and he was ordered to provide to the mother financial documents and financial information necessary to assist the children with their private high school and college expenses. The mother later filed a petition for contempt, arguing that the father failed to comply. At a 2001 contempt hearing, the mother asked that the father be held in contempt for, among other things, his failure to provide Mother with his 2000 tax returns for a financial aid application for the older child’s Ivy League college tuition. The trial court reserved the issue until further evidence could be presented. Soon after the hearing, in June 2001, the older child graduated from high school and the father unilaterally reduced his child support payments without seeking a modification of the trial court’s support order.  Four years went by without a court hearing, and both children reached majority. In 2005, the father filed a petition to resolve all outstanding matters and close the case. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the father was in contempt of court for his failure to provide the mother with the financial documents necessary to complete a financial aid application for the older child’s college education and awarded damages to Mother. The trial court further held that the father was not permitted to unilaterally reduce his child support payments when the older child graduated from high school and, consequently, assessed a child support arrearage against him. The father appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part holding, inter alia, that once the parties’ child was emancipated, the trial court was without authority to require the father to provide financial documents to assist her in obtaining college financial aid.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Dennis Coker, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. The Purdue Pharama Company, et al.
W2005-02525-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

This is a class action involving federal preemption. The defendants own a series of patents for the prescription pain medication OxyContin®. In prior separate litigation between the defendants and a generic drug manufacturer, a federal district court in New York found that the defendants committed inequitable conduct before the United States Patent Office in procuring the patents. After this order was entered by the federal court in New York, the plaintiff filed the instant class action in Shelby County, Tennessee, on behalf of all consumers of OxyContin, alleging violations of the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and common law monopolization. These state law claims were based on the defendants’ conduct before the United States Patent Office. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court for the Western
District of Tennessee. The district court remanded the case back to the Tennessee trial court, holding that the finding of inequitable conduct against the defendants by the federal court in New York operated as collateral estoppel on the issue regarding the federal patent laws. On remand, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on federal preemption. The trial court granted the motion. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff’s antitrust and unfair competition claims, based on the defendants’ conduct before the Patent Office, are preempted by the federal patent laws.

Shelby Court of Appeals