Alexander Wells v. Tennessee Board of Regents, et al.
Following termination of his employment, a professor at Tennessee State University prevailed in this protracted tenure termination proceeding. On remand to Chancery Court following a successful appeal, the professor filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the pre-appeal judgment to assert a claim for back pay. The Chancellor granted relief and awarded back pay, which the defendants challenge on two grounds. They contend the court abused its discretion by awarding Rule 60 relief, and because back pay is not specifically authorized by statute, an award of back pay violates the sovereign immunity doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Kham Fongnaly v. Vienqrhone Vickie Fongnaly - Dissenting
I cannot concur in the conclusion of the majority opinion, i.e., that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s judgment designating the husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children. My review of the record persuades me that the trial court went against the overwhelming weight of the evidence favoring an award of primary custody to the wife for one reason and one reason only, i.e., because of the wife’s admitted adulterous relationship during the marriage. I believe the trial court premised its decision on an incorrect interpretation of the law and/or made a factually-erroneous decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Fongnaly v. Vienqrhone Vickie Fongnaly
In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded primary custody of the parties’ minor children to the father. The mother appealed and we affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Walker, et al. v. Rande Lazar, M.D., et al.
The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on the statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the statute of repose was tolled where the action was brought on behalf of their minor children and commenced before December 9, 2005. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Bass v. Larry D. Billeaudeaux, Jr., et al.
This is a personal injury action. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sara Jane Davidson v. Tom Davidson, et al.
Husband, a farmer, and wife, a teacher, married in 1992. In 1993 or 1994, they purchased an eighteen acre parcel of real property located in Newbern, Dyer County, Tennessee. In 1995, the couple secured an insurance policy from Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company through their local Farm Bureau agent. The policy covered husband’s farming operation and the house under one policy. In 2001, husband andwife separated. The couple renewed the insurance policy annually, |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Harper-Wittbrodt Automotive Group, LLC, v. Sam Teague, et al.
This is an appeal from the granting of specific performance pursuant to an option to purchase contained in a lease agreement between Sam Teague and Sam Teague Chrysler, Inc., and the predecessor in interest of Harper-Wittbrodt Automotive Group, LLC. Each of the parties have made numerous assignments of error with respect to the ruling of the trial court and the relief granted by it. After consideration of each of the issues raised by the parties, we affirm, in all respects, the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Lyn Christ v. Kery N. Homonai
This appeal involves a dispute over a non-marital child's surname. Father/Appellant filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Shelby County, seeking to legitimate his son and to give him his surname. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court legitimated the child, and directed that the
1Because juvenile courts are courts of record, T.C.A. § 37-1-159(a) (2005), appeals in proceedings such as this one proceed directly to this court. T.C.A. § 37-1-159(g). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Neal Elizabeth Barrentine v. Timothy Tyrone Barrentine
This appeal stems from a divorce. In this appeal, the husband asserts that the circuit court erred when it (1) awarded his wife transitional alimony in the amount of $4,000 per month for the first four years and $1,000 per month for the next five years, (2) assigned 100% of the parties’ marital debts to him, and (3) allocated $650 for his wife’s work related child care expenses when calculating the parties’ child support obligations. Husband argues that the amount of transitional alimony was excessive as he did not have the ability to pay that amount and that the amount exceeded his wife’s needs. He also argues that the circuit court should have equitably distributed the parties’ marital debts and that the circuit court should not have allocated work related child care expenses in excess of his wife’s monthly gross income. Additionally, the wife has requested that this Court award her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm as modified the decisions of the circuit court. We decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Nashville Education Association, et al. v. Metropolitan Board of Public Education - Concurring and Dissenting
I agree with most of the majority’s analysis in this case, and in particular I agree with the majority’s holding that the question of the applicability of the arbitration agreement is a “gateway” issue, properly before this Court. However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the dispute as to Mr. Fuller’s coaching position was subject to arbitration. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Nashville Education Association, et al. v. Nashville Board of Education
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Board of Education, vacating a portion of an arbitration award that required reinstatement of Plaintiff to his high school coaching assignment. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa Godbee v. Robert M. Dimick, M.D.
Patient filed a medical malpractice claim against an orthopedic surgeon for his alleged negligence in her diagnosis and spinal surgery. After a three week trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the physician. The patient appealed, claiming that she was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred with regard to several evidentiary rulings, its communications with the jurors, its jury instructions and verdict form, and its decision to permit the jury to examine medical articles used in cross-examination. We have determined that the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Mairose, et al. v. Federal Express Corporation
This is the second time this case has been on appeal. This case stems from an alleged breach of an employment contract between an employer and its employees. In this appeal, we are asked to determine (1) whether the chancery court erred when it dismissed eight of the ten plaintiffs from the appeal as they had not perfected an appeal to the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict that was reversed on appeal; (2) whether the chancery court erred when it found that the employer had not breached its contract when it incorporated an integrated master seniority list that did not “endtail” pilots from another corporation that merged into the employer; (3) whether, assuming that a breach occurred, the employees waived their breach of contract claims by failing to object to the alleged breach in a timely fashion; and (4) whether the chancery court erred when it awarded discretionary costs for court reporter expense for hearings. On appeal, the employees contend that the chancery court erred when it dismissed eight of the ten employees as they had not properly perfected an appeal because the eight employees should be able to benefit from the appellate decision regarding the remaining two employees. The employees also assert that the employer breached their employment contract when it incorporated an integrated seniority list altering their seniority rights and that they had not waived any claim for breach of contract because of their conduct. Finally, the employees contend that the chancery court erred when it awarded discretionary costs for court reporter expenses for hearings as rule 54.04(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the recovery of court reporter expenses for depositions or trials only. The employer contends that it did not breach the employment contract and that, assuming breach, the employees waived any breach of contract claim because they failed to challenge the arbitration award that established the integrated master seniority list in a timely fashion and that they failed to object to the breach of contract in a timely fashion after the breach. We affirm the decision of the chancery court finding that the employer had not breached its employee contract with its employees and affirm the decision of the chancery court dismissing eight of the ten employees from the new trial as they had not properly perfected an appeal to the chancery court’s original judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Further, we affirm the chancery court’s award of discretionary costs. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Owens v. Shelby County Government
This is a lawsuit for on-the-job injury benefits. The plaintiff was employed as a jailer for the defendant county government. She injured her back in a slip-and-fall accident which occurred during the scope of her employment. The county paid her on-the-job injury benefits while she was being treated for her injuries. After about two months, her treating physician released her from his care, stated that she had no permanent anatomical disability, and determined that she was capable of unrestricted work. The county stopped paying her on-the-job injury benefits and she returned to full-dutywork. Later, complaining of continued back pain, the plaintiff saw another physician. This physician opined that the plaintiff had a 6% permanent disability to her body as a whole as a direct result of the slip-and-fall accident. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit for further benefits under the county’s OJI policy. After a trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff did not have a permanent vocational disability and held in favor of the county. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that there is no reason to reject the trial court’s determinations of credibility and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Nepp, et al. v. Margaret Hart, et al.
This is an appeal of a judgment on a jury verdict. Plaintiffs- homeowners contracted with a construction company, a corporation wholly owned by a single stockholder, to construct their residence. Because of alleged breach of contract and negligent construction, the homeowners filed suit against the corporation and also the sole stockholder and his wife, a director, alleging that they were in fact the alter egos of the corporation. Prior to trial, the corporation was voluntarily dismissed by the homeowners, and the case was tried against the individual defendants on the alter ego theory. The jury found that owner-defendants were liable under the alter ego theory for negligent construction and breach of contract. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict. Plaintiffshomeowners appealed stating that the trial court erred in dismissing some of the other causes of action, but a review of the record reveals that no motion for a new trial was filed by plaintiffs homeowners as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e), and thus those issues are waived. The individual defendants asserted affirmative issues for review as cross appellants. Although the individual defendants filed a motion for a new trial, many of the issues raised were not specifically stated therein and are consequently considered waived on appeal by virtue of Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e). Finding that there is material evidence to support the jury verdict, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Annesia W. Jarrett v. Eric D. Cross
The current round in this on-going child support dispute arises from Mother’s petition for contempt for failure to pay child support filed in April 2004, and Father’s cross-petition to modify child custody. The eldest of the parties’ four children had reached the age of majority when the 2004 petitions were filed, and the parties agreed that Father would assume custody of their son, Darius. Father does not dispute that he does not spend any time with the parties remaining two minor children. Mother requested visitation time with Darius after the change of custody. Thus, the proceedings required a resetting of child support. The issues raised by Mother for our review are |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Barney Newcomb v. Kohler Company
In April 2003, the plaintiff’s employer terminated his employment. The employer, citing the company’s respectful workplace policy, fired the employee for allegedly cursing a fellow employee. The employee subsequently filed suit against the employer for retaliatory discharge. The employee alleged that his prior workers’ compensation claims were the real reason that his employer terminated his employment. In his complaint, the employee sought compensatory and punitive damages, but did not set forth the amount requested. After the jury trial got underway, the trial court allowed the employee to amend his complaint to request a specific amount of damages for back pay and front pay, but ultimately dismissed the claim for punitive damages. At the conclusion of the employee’s case-in-chief, the employer moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. At the close of the employer’s proof, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee finding that his workers’ compensation benefits were a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. At the end of trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the issue of whether to |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Lynn Fox v. Terry Wayne Fox
This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a marriage that lasted approximately ten years. Both parties sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Putnam County. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and approved a permanent parenting plan designating her as primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. In addition, the trial court classified the parties’ assets, divided the marital estate, reduced the husband’s alimony arrearage to a judgment for alimony in solido, and ordered the husband to pay the wife $350 per month in longterm alimony. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified the parties’ assets and divided the marital estate and with the trial court’s decision to require him to pay long-term alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of the parties’ property. However, we find that the evidence fully supports the manner in which the trial court divided the parties’ marital estate, as well as the trial court’s decision to award the wife long-term alimony. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Lynn Fox v. Terry Wayne Fox - Concurring
I concur in the results reached by the majority and agree with most of the reasoning. However, I do not fully agree with the analysis used to determine whether the Carol Lane Property and the Buffalo Valley Road Property were marital or separate. The analysis used by the majority starts with the presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital, relying on the definition of marital property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). While the opinion acknowledges in a footnote the definition of separate property that includes property acquired in exchange for pre-marital separately owned property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B), the analysis fails to take that definition into account.1 Logically, that definition should also create a “rebuttable presumption” that is equal in weight to the one used as the basis for the analysis herein. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Melissa Wimmer
A woman bought a used automobile, financing the purchase with a loan from the plaintiff credit company. The loan was secured through a UCC Article 9 security interest in the vehicle. When the buyer fell behind in her payments, the creditor repossessed the car and sent her notice by certified mail that it intended to sell the car and that she would face a deficiency judgment if the sale price was less than the amount she still owed. She did not receive the notice, and the certified letter was returned unclaimed to the creditor the day after the sale. The creditor sued for a deficiency of over $3,400, and the circuit court granted it judgment for the amount claimed. The buyer sought statutory damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-625 arguing that the attempted notice was inadequate, and the trial court dismissed her counterclaim. The buyer appeals this dismissal. We reverse the trial court because we find Auto Credit did not act reasonably in proceeding to sell the car without affirming that the notice had in fact been delivered. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Melissa Wimmer - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Auto Credit failed to give Ms. Wimmer reasonable notice of the scheduled sale of the collateral. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Leonard Frazier v. Donal Campbell, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a state prisoner. After drugs were discovered in the inmate’s incoming mail, he was sentenced to punitive segregation. He sought review of his conviction in the Shelby County Chancery Court, which later dismissed his case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. The inmate filed a notice of appeal which we have determined was untimely and therefore a nullity. As a result, we must dismiss this appeal without considering the issues presented by the Petitioner. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin King v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board
Employment of a ShelbyCountyDeputy Sheriff was terminated and the decision was upheld by the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. The employee filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The administrative record was duly filed in the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Marjorie Louise Brevard, Decedent, W. Terry Barlowe, Proponent-Appellant, v. Dorothy Brevard and The Estate of John Brevard, Contestants-Appellees
The Trial Court granted contestants of a Will summary judgment, voiding the Will. On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Louise Spann et al. v. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a credit and charge card issuer and two cardholders regarding allegedly unauthorized charges to their accounts by entities affiliated with the issuer. The cardholders filed a class action complaint in the Circuit Court for Williamson County asserting that the practice of charging them for goods and services they did not agree to purchase constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice prohibited by various state consumer protection laws and gave rise to causes of action for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The issuer and its affiliates filed a motion to compel separate arbitrations against each cardholder in accordance with the class arbitration waiver clause of the arbitration provision in the cardmember agreements. The cardholders conceded that they were required to arbitrate their claims but asked the trial court to strike the class arbitration waiver clause as unconscionable. Siding with the cardholders, the trial court struck the class arbitration waiver clause and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The issuer and its affiliates appealed. We have concluded that the trial court did not err by granting the motion to compel arbitration. However, we have also concluded that the trial court erred by finding the class arbitration waiver clause unconscionable under Utah law. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
