In the Matter of: J.J.D., O.J.S., A.L.S. and C.M.S.
Because of questions regarding the trial court's denial of appointed counsel in this proceeding that resulted in the termination of parental rights, the Department of Children's Services has acknowledged that the trial court's judgment must be vacated. We agree. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: P.M.
Father appeals termination of his parental rights. Father conceded and the juvenile court found that grounds exist for termination of Father's parental rights. The juvenile court also found that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. Father appeals the finding that termination was in the child's best interest. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Waggoner Motors, Inc., v. Waverly Church of Christ
This appeal involves an automobile dealer whose vehicles were damaged by paint overspray from a church's construction project on adjacent property. The dealer filed suit against the church in the Circuit Court for Humphreys County seeking damages for the cost of cleaning the vehicles and lost profits. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the church had not properly supervised the painting and that the paint overspray had damaged the automobile dealer. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the dealership $344,778 in damages and $11,170 in discretionary costs. On appeal, the church takes issue with the trial court's decisions regarding liability, damages, and discretionary costs. The dealer also takes issue with the damages award. The dealer's evidence regarding its lost profits is too speculative to support the trial court's judgment. However, we have determined that the evidence supports a judgment for $85,692. We have also determined that the trial court erred with regard to a portion of the discretionary costs. Accordingly, we reduce the dealer's damages to $85,692.00 and modify the award for discretionary costs to $8,501.25. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Denton, et al., v. John Hahn, et al.
This appeal involves a tenant who was injured when she slipped on the metal threshold of a rented condominium unit. The tenant and her husband filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against both the owner of the condominium unit and the homeowners’ association. The trial court granted the condominium owner’s and the homeowners’ association’s motions for summary judgment, and the tenant and her husband have appealed. We have determined that the owner of the condominium unit was not responsible for the maintenance and repair of the metal threshold because it was part of the condominium’s common elements. While the homeowners’ association had a duty to maintain the threshold in a reasonably safe condition, we have determined that the association is not liable to the tenant and her husband as a matter of law because they failed to present evidence that the association had actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused the tenant’s fall. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Denton, et al., v. John Hahn, et al. - Concurring
I agree with the analysis and conclusion of the majority on the issue of responsibility for the threshold. I also concur in the result reached in this case because the tenants, the Dentons, unquestionably had knowledge of the defective condition of the threshold that was superior to that of the association. I write separately, however, because I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of the appropriateness of summary judgment on the notice issue.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Cora Veal
The Monroe County Senior Citizens Center (“the Center”) – a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation – filed a claim against the Estate of Cora Veal (“the Estate”). The Center alleges that Cora Veal (“Mrs. Veal”) personally promised to pay for repairs to the Center’s roof, but that she failed to completely honor her promise prior to her death at the age of 92 on September 16, 2002. The trial court denied the Center’s claim. The Center appeals, claiming the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-203 (2000), the so-called Tennessee Dead Man’s Statute (“the Statute”). We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Cora Veal - Dissenting
I disagree with the majority’s treatment of the deceased’s statements reflected in the minutes of the corporation. As the majority’s reasoning goes the statements of the deceased contained in the minutes were to the corporation, i.e., she was talking to the corporation. Therefore “the corporation is barred from testifying regarding Ms. Veal’s statements.”1 |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Louise Moor Weissfeld v. Steven Curtis Weissfeld
This appeal arises from a post-divorce case in which the trial court found the Appellant to be in both criminal and civil contempt for her failure to comply with the court's order respecting co-parenting time and division of property. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its finding of criminal contempt because she was not provided adequate notice under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42(b). The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees to opposing counsel. We reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it decrees the Appellant to be in criminal contempt and we modify the trial court's order which awards attorney's fees to opposing counsel. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mary E. Fossett, et al., v. Dorothy Gray, et al.
Numerous heirs to property in Fayette County sought to sell two parcels of land for partition. Defendants/Appellees opposed the partition of one of the tracts. The trial court ordered that both tracts be sold for partition by auction, which was held on September 30, 2000. During the pendency of the partition suit, an investor bought the fractional interests in the property from numerous heirs, and intervened as a defendant in the case. The interest of the intervening defendant was foreclosed upon by the individual who had loaned him funds to purchase the fractional interests in the land. After the foreclosure, first intervening defendant brought a cross-claim against second intervening defendant/appellant. The trial court entered a judgment against second intervening defendant for the amount of overbid at foreclosure, $150,000. Second intervening defendant/appellant appeals and also appeals the final judgment in the partition case. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Walker, et al., v. Michael S. Mullins, et al.
This appeal is from the chancellor’s decision in a property line dispute. In the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, we affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
First Tennessee Bank National Association v. Bad Toys, Inc., et al.
First Tennessee Bank National Association ("the Bank") sued Bad Toys, Inc. and Larry N. Lunan on a note that allegedly was "fully mature, owing and unpaid." The note had been cross collateralized with two other notes payable to the Bank. The three notes and the attendant guaranty agreements and security agreements were executed either by Bad Toys, Inc., Larry N. Lunan, or Susan H. Lunan ("Defendants" or as appropriate "the Lunans"). In addition to other collateral, shares of stock were pledged as collateral for the notes. Bad Toys, Inc. and Larry N. Lunan answered the complaint and filed a counter-complaint in which Susan H. Lunan joined as a counter-plaintiff. The counter-complaint alleged, in part, that the Bank had breached its fiduciary duty to the Lunans by failing to sell the pledged stock and that the Bank either had been grossly negligent or had intentionally caused harm to Defendants by refusing to sell the stock. The Bank filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. Defendants opposed by filing the Lunans' affidavit claiming that the Bank had agreed to sell the shares of stock as soon as they were pledged, even though the Lunans were forbidden by an agreement with other shareholders from selling the stock themselves, and that the Bank failed to sell the shares of stock as it had agreed to do. The Trial Court held the Lunans' affidavit should be stricken, in part, and granted the Bank summary judgment. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin Pressnell v. Steve Hixon
This case essentially involves a dispute between the owners of adjoining properties in Grainger County. Specifically, the dispute focuses on (1) the ownership of a private road ("the disputed private road"); (2) the easement rights, if any, of the plaintiff Benjamin S. Pressnell with respect to a right-of-way over the property of the defendants Steve Hixon and wife, Betty Hixon; and (3) damages allegedly sustained by Pressnell and another plaintiff by virtue of the Hixons' interference with Pressnell's right to use the disputed private road and the easement. The trial court, following a bench trial, found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Karen B. Golightly v. Gary Kevin Golightly
This case involves a child custody dispute between the parents of two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the parties an absolute divorce and designated the mother as the primary residential parent. In addition, the court below awarded the parties equal parenting time and provided for an alternating visitation schedule in the Permanent Parenting Plan. The mother subsequently filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider the custody arrangement, which the trial court denied. The mother filed this appeal contesting the determination of custody by the Circuit Court of Shelby County. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Opal J. Brock v. Meigs County, Tennessee
Plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall in the court house and sued the County for maintaining a dangerous stairway. Following trial, the Court entered a Judgment for defendant. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy King (Graham) v. Timothy King
The trial court denied Mother's petition to change custody of the parties' minor children from Father to Mother. We affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Marie Weninger v. Jerry Craig Weninger
This appeal arises from a divorce action. The trial court awarded primary residential custody to mother and standard visitation to father. We affirm. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
Joann Potts, et al., v. Walter Ansel Rogers, Jr., et al.
In 1987 six (6) siblings acquired by intestate succession, a 115-acre tract, mostly flood plain unimproved land bordering North Chickamauga Creek near Hixson, Tennessee. Five (5) of the owners filed a partition action against their brother whose residence adjoined an upland portion of the 115 acres that was not subject to flooding. A consent judgment was entered in 1998 that the entire acreage would be sold and the net proceeds divided equally among the six (6) owners. But the consent judgment also provided that if no offer to purchase for $1,734,150.00 was received, the property would not be sold without unanimous consent or upon further order of the court. Four years later the North Chickamauga Creek Conservancy offered $800,000.00 which was accepted by the plaintiffs, and disdained by the defendant, who apparently wanted the upland tract of 19 acres adjoining his residence as his partitioned share. The court ordered the property sold for partition. We modify as to the real estate commission and affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Yvonne Foster v. Mollis Wilson, et al.
This case arises out of an automobile accident. Appellant appeals from a Judgment entered on a jury verdict. The jury found the two Defendants to each be 50% at fault and Plaintiff to be 0% at fault. The jury awarded $0 damages to the Plaintiff. We find that the trial court did not err in its duty as thirteenth juror and that there is material evidence to support the verdict. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
One Commerce Square, LLC v. Ausa Life Insurance Company, Inc.
Appellant purchaser of commercial building sued appellee seller to recover payment of a tenant improvement allowance made by the appellee to a tenant pursuant to a lease agreement assigned to the purchaser as part of the transaction. The trial court granted appellee seller summary judgment based upon a construction of the terms of the assignment transferring the lease to the purchaser. Appellant purchaser appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Woodrow Jerry Hawkins v. Case Management, Incorporated, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of Defendants/Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Under T.C.A. §40-38-108, the trial court found that Defendants/Appellees were immune from prosecution for their alleged failure to properly inform Plaintiff/Appellant of his possible right to recover from the Tennessee Criminal Injury Compensation Fund. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., and its Insured, Louella McNutt, v. George Agagnost
A suit for property damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident resulted in an award for damages based on a finding by the Trial Court that defendant was 75% at fault for the accident. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel, Ashley Mitchell v. Patrick D. Armstrong
This is a Title IV child support case. The mother established paternity against the father in juvenile court, and the father was ordered to pay child support. Prior to establishing the father’s paternity, the mother had intermittently received public assistance. Consequently, the father was to send the child support payments to the State’s collection and disbursement unit, pursuant to Title IV, chapter D of the Social Security Act. The father failed to pay the required child support. The State then intervened by filing a petition for contempt against the father. In the contempt hearing, the mother asked that the father’s child support obligation be terminated. The trial court suspended the father’s obligation to pay current child support in a set amount through the State disbursement unit, with the understanding that the father would pay child support in an undetermined amount directly to the mother, pursuant to an unwritten private agreement between the mother and the father. The father was required to make payments to the State on his past arrearages. The State appealed. We reverse and remand, holding that the trial court was required to have the child support payments, in a set amount that comports with the child support guidelines, sent to the State collection and disbursement unit, and remand for modification of the amount paid on the father’s arrearages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Silsbe v. Houston Levee Industrial Park, L.L.C.
This is a contract case. On December 21, 2001, the parties entered into a contract granting the plaintiff an option to purchase real property. The plaintiff was required to exercise his option by 5:00 p.m., January 21, 2002, either by delivering written notice by that date to the defendant corporation, or by mailing written notification, postmarked no later than January 21, 2002. At the time the contract was executed, the parties were unaware that January 21 was a national holiday recognizing Martin Luther King, Jr. On January 21, 2002, the plaintiff attempted to hand-deliver written notification of his intent to exercise the option, found no one at the defendant’s office at the time and mistakenly assumed the office was closed because of the holiday. On January 22, the plaintiff hand-delivered written notice to the defendant. The defendant maintained that the option had expired. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the January 22 notice was timely and that the defendant was obligated to sell him the property pursuant to the option contract. After a trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant, finding that the option had expired. The plaintiff appeals, arguing impossibility of performance and mutual mistake. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the doctrines of impossibility of performance and mutuality of mistake are not applicable. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Darrell Taylor v. Allstate Insurance Company
This is an action to collect on a homeowner’s insurance policy. The roof and attic of the plaintiff’s home sustained about $9,800 in damages. The plaintiff filed a claim on the homeowner’s insurance policy he had purchased from the defendant insurance company. The claim was denied. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit to recover the insurance proceeds. After the plaintiff presented his proof, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the insurance company. The plaintiff now appeals. Based on the sparse record on appeal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of J.D. Davis, Deceased
The probate court awarded summary judgment to Defendants/Appellees upon determining that, under Florida law, the antenuptial agreement entered into by Plaintiff/Appellant and Deceased was valid and enforceable. On appeal, Plaintiff/Appellant argues that the agreement is not enforceable as a violation of Tennessee public policy and by reason of duress. We reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
