Jenkins Subway vs. Lynn Jones
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Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Jan Cagle vs. Steve Cagle
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Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Love vs. Shelby Co.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | ||
Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sommerville vs. Sommerville
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Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Dept. of Human Services vs. Fineout
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Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Jean Bradford, v. James William Anderson and Myra Alea, In Re: Rachel Anderson, D/O/B 10/20/1990
This is a custody dispute between the child's father and the child's maternal grandmother, who was nominated as the custodian in the will of the child's mother. The Circuit Court of Coffee County awarded custody to the father and his mother. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Blick vs. Kent
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Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Barnett vs. Barnett
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Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Baltz vs. Knight
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Maury | Court of Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | ||
Deborah H. Steele v. Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc., and David Twombley - Concurring
The plaintiff, Deborah H. Steele (“Steele”), brought this action against her former employer, Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc. (“Superior”), and her former supervisor, David Twombley (“Twombley”)1, alleging that she was the victim of, among other things, sexual harassment, outrageous conduct, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After various other claims were dismissed by the trial court2, the case proceeded to trial before a jury on Steele’s claim of sexual harassment against both Superior and Twombley under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”), and her claim of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Twombley alone. The jury found in favor of Steele on all of the remaining theories of recovery and awarded her $1.2 million in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded Steele attorney’s fees and costs against both defendants. After Steele accepted a remittitur that eliminated the punitive damages award and reduced the compensatory damages award to $850,000, both Superior and Twombley appealed, raising in substance the following issues for our consideration: 1. Did the trial court err in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from witnesses who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question? 2. Did Steele’s counsel make improper and prejudicial statements during closing argument, thus warranting a new trial?
6. Did the trial court err in not suggesting a further remittitur of the jury’s verdict?
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Crowder, M.D., v. Brent D. Laing, M.D. and John D. Green, M.D., David Dobyns, First Medical Group and Healthcare Consultants, Inc., et al.
We granted the Rule 9, T.R.A.P., application of the appellant, Brent D. Laing, M.D. (“Laing”), in order to review the propriety of the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend his answer filed in litigation instituted against him and others by the appellee, Brenda J. Crowder, M.D. (“Crowder”). In the same order, we consolidated that interlocutory appeal with the appeal of Laing’s separate suit against Crowder, which latter appeal is before us as of right. See Rule 3(a), T.R.A.P. The claims asserted by Laing in the second suit are identical to those in the counterclaim which Laing attempted to pursue, albeit unsuccessfully, in the earlier litigation. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend in the first suit. We dismiss, as moot, the appeal of Laing’s subsequent suit against Crowder. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Robertson v. Lori Vanhooser Robertson - Concurring
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Lori Vanhooser Robertson (“Wife”) a divorce on the ground set forth at T.C.A. § 36-4-101(3)1; awarded the parties joint custody of their 16-year-old son; ordered Gary Wayne Robertson (“Husband”) to pay Wife child support of $387 per month plus 21% of part of Husband’s future increases in net income; awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony of $250 per month for 12 months, beginning with the month of October, 1997; divided the parties’ property and debts; denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees; and made other decrees not relevant to a resolution of the issues now before us. Wife appealed, raising issues that present the following questions for our review. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy P. McManamay v. Charles T. McManamay
In this divorce case, the defendant husband has appealed from a decree awarding the plaintiff a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences and dividing the marital estate. The husband has presented the issues in the following form: |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Lucy L. Bond v. Belle Meade Fund Partners, L.P., et al. - Concurring
The plaintiff sued for injury suffered when she stepped into a hole in the asphalt surface of a parking lot provided for customers of Kroger Company. Kroger was dismissed by nonsuit, and the remaining defendants were dismissed by summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and presented the following issue: I. Whether a genuine issue of material fact has been raised by the plaintiff/appellant, so as to warrant this cause to be tried on its merits. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Si J. Williams v. Mary C. Williams
I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate opinion to clarify my understanding of the significance of the portion of the decision dealing with the need of the parties’ daughter for continuing support past her eighteenth birthday. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Si J. Williams, v. Mary C. Williams
In this divorce case, Mary C. Williams, hereafter “wife” has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court awarding her a divorce from Si J. Williams, hereafter “husband,” custody, child support, alimony, insurance, fees and division of property. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Si J. Williams, v. Mary C. Williams - Concurring
I concur with the results of this opinion. However, I am filing this separate |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dan W. Wilkins v. Dodson, Parker, Shipley, Behm and Seaborg et al.
This is a legal malpractice case. The malpractice action arose out of a lender liability lawsuit that was dismissed by the trial court because it had not been filed within the limitations period. Dismissal of the underlying lawsuit was affirmed on appeal by the Middle Section of this Court. Wilkins v. Third National Bank in Nashville, 884 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. App. 1994), cert. denied, (Sept. 26, 1994). While not in the record before us, the facts of the underlying lawsuit contained in the aforementioned decision of the Middle Section will be helpful in understanding the facts of this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lanny McCormack, individually and as partner of McCormack Farms v. Zollie McCormack
Plaintiff Lanny McCormack appeals the final judgment entered by the trial court in this dissolution of partnership case. In its final judgment, the trial court ordered Defendant/Appellee Zollie McCormack to pay Lanny McCormack $137,453 for all of the latter’s right, title, and interest in the McCormack Farms partnership. On appeal, Lanny McCormack has raised only one issue for this court’s review: whether the trial court, which previously had adopted a special master’s report, erred when it ruled that Lanny’s interest in the partnership would be resolved in a manner which was not one of three options set forth in the special master’s report. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie Cook, et al., v. Archie Glen Edwards, and wife Martha Sue Edwards
The Hickman County Road Superintendent filed a declaratory judgment action to ascertain if an old cemetery road across the defendants’ property was a public road. The Chancery Court of Hickman County ruled that the road was not a public road but that the defendants’ property was subject to an easement created in a deed in their chain of title. Since the court granted relief that no one had sought, to individuals not parties to the action, we reverse. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Yong Mun Chong Meadows v. Tommy C. Meadows
The trial court granted the parties a divorce, divided the marital property, and awarded the wife permanent alimony. On appeal, the husband contends that the court should have adjusted the property settlement to take the wife’s post-separation dissipation of marital assets into account, and that it should have placed some limitations on the alimony award. We agree, and we modify the decree to incorporate the necessary changes. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |