In Re Epik W. Et Al.
The present appeal originates out of a Juvenile Court dependency and neglect proceeding. During the pendency of the case in the Juvenile Court, the Nenana Native Association filed a notice of intervention and averred that the two children at issue in this appeal are “Indian Children” under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Nenana Native Association requested that the Juvenile Court enter an order acknowledging its status as these children’s tribe, and the Juvenile Court subsequently did so. Although the Nenana Native Association was allowed to intervene as a party in the case, the Juvenile Court later entered an order denying a request that the case be transferred to a tribal court. An appeal was thereafter pursued in the Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court, considering the matter de novo under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(a), also entered an order denying transfer. Although the Nenana Native Association now pursues an appeal of the Circuit Court’s order in this Court, we conclude that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal from the Juvenile Court. Accordingly, we vacate the Circuit Court’s judgment and remand the case back to the Circuit Court with instructions that it remand the matter back to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Destiney J. Et Al.
In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his three children. The trial court found that two grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Mejia v. Samina Wazir
A homeowner appeals from a jury verdict in a breach of contract action. The homeowner complains of errors in the conduct of the trial, including the exclusion of key evidence. Because the homeowner did not present these issues to the trial court in a motion for a new trial, the issues are waived. And we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cinda Haddon v. Ladarius Vanlier et al.
A driver was injured in a car accident with an uninsured motorist and filed a negligence suit against the uninsured motorist. The driver served her uninsured motorist insurance carrier with notice of the lawsuit. After the driver could not obtain service of process on the uninsured motorist, the case proceeded against the insurance carrier. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the driver. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, awarding damages to the driver. The trial court denied the driver’s post-trial motion for prejudgment interest based upon its determination that the suit was a personal injury action and that, therefore, the court could not award prejudgment interest. We have concluded that the trial court erred in classifying the claim against the insurance carrier as a personal injury action. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order denying prejudgment interest and remand for a determination of the proper amount of prejudgment interest. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. Jacqueline Hall Johnson
Before taking his own life, the Defendant’s husband shot and killed another individual, resulting in a civil suit brought by the victim’s family. An insurance company with whom the husband had a policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Defendant’s husband’s actions were not covered by the insurance he had obtained. A sheriff’s deputy tried to serve process. The Defendant, however, was not home, and the deputy left a contact card. The Defendant called the deputy, and, after discussion, she instructed the deputy to leave the documents with a particular individual at her home. The deputy followed these instructions. The Defendant did not respond to the suit and a default was entered. Months later, the Defendant, alleging the deputy failed to effectuate valid service of process, sought to have the default set aside. The trial court disagreed and declined to set aside the default. The Defendant then asked the trial court to alter its order, asserting for the first time that she was not a proper party to the Company’s suit. The trial court declined. The Defendant appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kalos, LLC v. White House Village, LLC et al.
The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 motion to dismiss Appellant’s lawsuit for unjust enrichment because Appellant did not exhaust its remedies in contract. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Shacrysta B. Et Al.
This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until July 16, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James L. Davidson et al v. Jeremy Howard Johnson et al.
Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and breach of contract to enforce a purchase and sale agreement, which was allegedly entered by and between Appellants and Appellees. In their answer, Appellees asserted, as an affirmative defense, that Appellants had no standing to enforce the contract because they were not parties to it. On Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Appellants were not parties to the contract and had no standing to bring an action to enforce it. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nicholai L. Et Al.
A putative father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a child. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of several statutory grounds for termination. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Following thorough review, we conclude that not all grounds for termination were supported by clear and convincing evidence. Still, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Elmore v. Travis Mills Et Al.
Lonnie Elmore (“Decedent”) died on July 5, 2020, a few weeks after being treated by Travis Mills, CRNA, (“Mills”) an employee of Lakeway Regional Anesthesia Services, PLLC (“Lakeway”) (collectively “Defendants”) and Angelo J. Sorce, M.D., (“Sorce”), an employee of Tennessee Valley Orthopaedics, LLC (“TVO”).1 On July 2, 2021, Robert Elmore, as Executor of the Estate of Lonnie Elmore, (“Plaintiff”) sent pre-suit notice to Defendants. Relying on the 120-day extension provided for by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-121(c), Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging wrongful death on November 1, 2021, in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), claiming that the accrual of Plaintiff’s cause of action arose no later than June 21, 2020, and Plaintiff, accordingly, provided pre-suit notice past the one-year statute of limitations, rendering his complaint untimely. The Trial Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. This interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, followed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Abraham Anderson v. Alice Musick Et Al.
The Plaintiff sought specific performance related to a real estate transaction. The trial court denied relief, concluding that the series of papers introduced by the Plaintiff as a purported real estate contract between the parties did not constitute a valid contract. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that specific performance was inappropriate because the court could not discern the terms of the purported contract. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Rachel Cayson v. Patrick Cayson
In this divorce, the husband claims the trial court erred in its classification of certain separate property and valuation of certain marital property. The trial court found that the equity held in the marital home attributable to the sale of property owned by the wife prior to the marriage had been transmuted into marital property, but then treated that property as separate despite its initial finding due to what it believed the wife’s intent would have been under an alternative set of circumstances. The husband argues this was improper. The trial court also valued certain marital property, including the home and Wife’s 401(k) retirement account, as of several years prior to the divorce proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the divorce proceedings had been delayed by the husband’s criminal proceedings and subsequent incarceration arising from his theft of funds from the wife during the marriage. Husband filed this appeal. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Lakeway Real Estate2, LLC v. ERA Franchise Systems, LLC
This appeal arises out of a contract dispute between Lakeway Real Estate2, LLC f/k/a Lakeway Real Estate, LLC (“Lakeway”), and ERA Franchise Systems, LLC f/k/a ERA Franchise Systems, Inc. (“ERA”). Lakeway filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (the “trial court”) seeking declaratory relief and a ruling that a noncompete provision within a Franchise Agreement (the “Agreement”) is unenforceable as a matter of law. ERA moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the Venue and Jurisdiction clause (the “Clause”) of the Agreement makes the trial court an improper venue. The trial court granted ERA’s motion to dismiss. Because the Clause, when read in context with no disproportionate emphasis on one portion, provides permissive, but not mandatory, jurisdiction and venue in New Jersey, we reverse. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Dickerson v. United Medical Transportation, LLC, et al.
After suffering an injury, patient alleged that in-patient facility was negligent in failing to inform medical transportation company of his physical limitations prior to his discharge from the facility. In response to the facility’s summary judgment motion, patient relied on the testimony of an “expert in passenger ground transportation.” The trial court found that issues of fact remained as to patient’s ambulation needs, but granted summary judgment as to standard of care and breach because patient’s expert was not competent to testify under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, and the common knowledge exception did not apply. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Gersper v. Jonathan Turner
This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101 to -110, challenging the denial of the petition to dismiss all three claims asserted by the plaintiff. After the defendant filed his TPPA petition, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed two of his three claims, leaving only his claim for malicious prosecution. While the TPPA petitioner sought to adjudicate all three claims under the TPPA, the trial court ruled that the only remaining issue was whether the plaintiff “has properly plead a claim for malicious prosecution and whether this action should be dismissed pursuant to TPPA.” Following a hearing limited to the malicious prosecution claim, the trial court denied the petition to dismiss without setting forth the reasons for its decision. On appeal, the TPPA petitioner contends he was wrongfully deprived of a decision on his petition concerning the two claims the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his TPPA petition to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. Relying on the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling in Flade v. City of Shelbyville, ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736, at *5 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024), we affirm the trial court’s determination that the TPPA petitioner was not entitled to a decision on the two voluntarily dismissed claims. As for the trial court’s denial of the petition to dismiss the remaining claim, malicious prosecution, we have determined that the TPPA petitioner established that the TPPA applies to the claim presented, which shifted to the plaintiff the burden to establish “a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in the legal action.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105. We have also determined that the plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim, that the proceeding brought against him by the defendant “terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” See Mynatt v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, Chapter 39, 669 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2023). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to not adjudicate the first two claims after they were voluntarily dismissed but reverse the trial court’s decision denying the TPPA petition to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim and remand with instructions to dismiss that claim. Further, the TPPA states that, “[i]f the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under this chapter, the court shall award to the petitioning party . . . [c]ourt costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, discretionary costs, and other expenses incurred in filing and prevailing upon the petition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-107(a), (a)(1). Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the trial court to make the appropriate award as it pertains to the costs and fees incurred in the trial court and on appeal that pertain to the TPPA petitioner’s efforts to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roxana Bianca Jordan v. Thomas Kerry Jordan
A pro se litigant sought to appeal the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion. She did not follow the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2.03. Therefore, we dismiss the case. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Foothills Land Conservancy v. Creekside Estates Partnership Et Al.
This case involves dueling declaratory judgment actions arising out of a deed of conservation easement dated December 31, 2007, encumbering property located within the Town of Farragut in Knox County. The trial court found in favor of Foothills Land Conservancy and awarded the nonprofit its damages, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lorenzo C. White, et al. v. Carolyn Fields Hayes, et al.
This appeal concerns the estate of Dr. Hillery W. Key (“Dr. Key”), who died testate in 1912. These proceedings began in 1998 in the Chancery Court for Tipton County (“the Trial Court”). The parties are descendants of Dr. Key. Odessa Rose and Marilyn Locke (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) advocate a per capita distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. Carolyn Fields Hayes and Frederick Fields (“Hayes Defendants,” collectively) and Larry Murrell, Jr., Joyce A. Carter, Dorethea McIntyre, and Lynnie Higgs (“Murrell Defendants,” collectively) (“Defendants,” all defendants together) assert that this Court, in a 2005 opinion, already decided upon a per stirpes distribution. The parties reached an agreement on the record in open court ostensibly ending this long-running matter, but Plaintiffs have appealed anyway. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. We hold, inter alia, that Plaintiffs are bound by the agreement announced in court whereby the parties waived their right to appeal. We hold further that the law of the case doctrine prevents Plaintiffs from relitigating the distribution of Dr. Key’s estate. We affirm. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied as moot. We find this appeal frivolous, and remand for the Trial Court to award Defendants reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, to be paid by Plaintiffs rather than from the common fund in this case. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mitchell C.
The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to a minor child based on severe abuse. The trial court also concluded that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mamadou Dian Diallo v. Aminata Cherif Diallo
This is an appeal of a final divorce decree brought by a husband acting pro se. Because the husband’s brief is deficient, we determine that he has waived consideration of any issues. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Charles C. Rowe
The Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) granted the petition of Janice Peters-Rowe (“Petitioner”) for a conservatorship over her husband, Charles Rowe (“Respondent”). Respondent’s daughter from a previous marriage, Dawn Rowe (“Daughter”), filed an intervening petition. Daughter claimed that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent had lived his entire life in New York until recently and that Respondent had not established residency in Tennessee. The Trial Court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter; that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was valid, giving Petitioner priority for appointment as conservator; and that it was in Respondent’s best interest that Petitioner be appointed as his conservator. Daughter appealed. Given that Respondent did not have the mental capacity to change his domicile at the time of his arrival in Tennessee, we conclude that the Trial Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and accordingly vacate the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Bank National Association v. Mark A. Searcy
A bank obtained a money judgment in South Carolina in 2010. The judgment debtor moved to North Carolina, and the bank domesticated the South Carolina judgment in North Carolina, a state that treats enrolled judgments as new North Carolina judgments. The judgment debtor moved to Tennessee, and in 2023, the bank filed a petition to enroll the North Carolina judgment in Tennessee. The judgment debtor objected, arguing that the original South Carolina judgment had expired. The bank responded that it was not seeking to enroll the South Carolina judgment, but instead the North Carolina judgment. The trial court enrolled the North Carolina judgment. The judgment debtor appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Marina Kotova v. Thomas Kevin True
This is an appeal from a final order entered on June 6, 2024. According to the appellant, the notice of appeal was mailed to this Court on July 3, 2024, but the notice never arrived at the Appellate Court Clerk’s Office. The appellant provided a tracking number that was allegedly used to mail the notice of appeal, but the tracking information does not demonstrate that the notice was sent via certified mail pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 20 during the thirty-day appeal period. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jordan L. Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the children by willful failure to make reasonable payments toward the support of the children and ruled that it was in the children’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the ground of abandonment by failure to support and that clear and convincing evidence exists to support that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Geri McBride, Individually and D/B/A The Real Estate Shop v. Cynthia H. Allison
Geri McBride, individually and d/b/a The Real Estate Shop (“Buyer”), sued Cynthia H. Allison (“Seller”) for breach of contract with respect to a real estate purchase and sale agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Seller had breached the agreement and granted Buyer specific performance but denied Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. Seller filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for a new trial. The trial court denied Seller’s post-judgment motion, and Seller appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s grant of specific performance to the Buyer and reverse the trial court’s denial of Buyer’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Court of Appeals |
