In Re Logan F.
This appeal concerns a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination existed: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) incarceration under a ten-year sentence; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bentley E.
This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Appellant/Father appeals the |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bentley E. - Dissent
The Majority Opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding clear and |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Scott v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
The Tennessee Department of Transportation terminated a preferred service employee. Following the Step I and Step II appeals, the Board of Appeals upheld the termination. The employee petitioned for judicial review in the trial court. The trial court initially affirmed the Board of Appeals’ decision. The trial court then granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals. We reverse the trial court’s order. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al. (Dissenting)
I agree with the majority that Mr. DiNovo failed to cite the record in the argument section of his brief in violation of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7), which requires appropriate references to the record in the argument section itself. I also agree with the majority that violations of Rule 27 may result in the dismissal of an appeal. Where I respectfully divide from my colleagues is that I do not agree that effectively dismissing Mr. DiNovo’s appeal is the appropriate response to the violation of Rule 27 under the circumstances of this case. I would instead consider Mr. DiNovo’s appeal on the merits; accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Craig Charles Et Al. v. Raymond Keith McCrary Et Al.
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him liable for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. We affirm the jury verdict, but reverse, in part, the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under the parties’ contract. We also award the plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code section 27 1-122. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al.
The Appellant previously entered into a workers’ compensation settlement agreement with the Appellee herein, Southern Energy Company, Inc., following serious injuries he received in an incident that had occurred at the latter’s biodiesel plant. Years later, the Appellant also attempted to recover against the Appellee in tort for the incident in the Davidson County Circuit Court. After the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee, the Appellant appealed to this Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Vitellaro v. Donna Goodall
The Plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling through a plastic, debris-covered skylight embedded in the roof of the Defendant’s shop building. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant homeowner, alleging that the debris-covered skylight constituted a dangerous condition and that the Defendant failed to warn of its existence prior to the accident. After the Plaintiff did not call the Defendant as a witness and rested his case in chief, the Defendant sought a directed verdict, arguing that the Plaintiff could not establish that the Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition. The trial court agreed and granted the Defendant’s motion. Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict. We remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tad F.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Tori Shannon (Barnes) Cole v. Skin RN Aesthetics, LLC Et Al.
An employer called the police after finding company property in an employee’s purse. The employee was arrested and charged with felony theft of property. She was later acquitted. After the acquittal, the employee sued her former employer for malicious prosecution. A jury found the employer liable for malicious continuation of the criminal proceedings. Because there is material evidence in the record to support the jury verdict, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Angel Marie White v. Jennifer C. Goodfred, D.O. ET AL.
This appeal specifically concerns health care liability claims arising from medical treatment that occurred in 2011 and 2012. After complaints were filed in 2019, the defendants at issue in this appeal sought to have the claims related to the 2011 and 2012 treatment dismissed. The trial court thereafter entered an order dismissing such claims, holding that they were barred by the three-year statute of repose. Although the plaintiff now appeals, her appellate brief is significantly noncompliant with applicable briefing requirements. In light of these briefing deficiencies, we hold that the plaintiff has waived any issues raised and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Silva F.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding either that a ground for termination was established or that termination is in the child’s best interest. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie M. Cooper v. Bradley Cooper
In this divorce action, the trial court, inter alia, denied Husband any contact with the parties’ children until he follows all recommendations from a complete psychiatric evaluation and granted Wife a lifetime restraining order. Husband now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision to limit Husband’s parenting time pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We vacate the lifetime restraining order and remand for the trial court to enter a more specific order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.02. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Church of Christ, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Central Church of Christ v. Amy Grant Gill and Andrew M. Burton, as co-administrators of the Estate of A.M. Burton, et al.
This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by a church. The church had purchased property in 1925 pursuant to a deed providing that if the property ceased to be used for the purposes and objects described in the deed, it would “revert” to the estate of an individual who was then serving as a trustee of the church. In 2019, an attorney informed the church that he represented several individuals who were heirs of said trustee and were concerned that the property was not being used in a manner consistent with the deed. Thus, the church filed the instant complaint and sought a declaration that the restriction in the deed was no longer valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, it had not violated the restriction by utilizing the property in a manner inconsistent with the deed. The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issues surrounding the validity of the deed restriction. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the restriction remained enforceable. Thus, the trial court noted that the remaining issue to be decided was whether the church had adhered to the applicable restriction. The church filed a motion asking the trial court to either certify its partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 or grant it permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Before this motion was heard, however, an agreed order was entered certifying the trial court’s partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02. The church appealed. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mazahir Hamadani v. Meshreky Meshreky
A landlord obtained a judgment from a General Sessions Court against his tenant for back rent and other damages. The tenant appealed, and the Circuit Court reduced the damages award. The landlord appeals to this court. The landlord, who is pro se, disregards the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in his filings. His filings render his argument indiscernible. The landlord also failed to provide a record that fully and accurately depicts the underlying proceedings. Because the landlord’s deviations from the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this court from providing meaningful appellate review, we dismiss his appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Viles Motors, LLC v. Shawna M. Chance
This is an appeal from a jury verdict wherein the jury found that the defendant had met the burden to prove her |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Susan Ballard ET AL. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty CO.
This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim filed by an insured in relation to a homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court initially denied, having determined that there were issues of material fact in dispute. Upon the filing of a renewed motion for summary judgment accompanied by two affidavits from an employee of the insurer that offered interpretations of the evidence in dispute, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion, determining that the affidavits resolved the factual disputes. Because we conclude that there are disputed issues of material fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Henry's Florist, Inc. v. Heather R. Knott
This case involves a disputed easement. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that an easement existed in its favor. Appellant filed a counter complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that no easement existed and requesting an injunction prohibiting Appellee from using the disputed easement. On Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that an easement existed in favor of Appellee, and it denied the relief Appellant sought. Thereafter, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s counter complaint. We agree that an easement exists, and we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. Because the summary judgment order granted relief in Appellee’s favor, Appellant’s request for relief in the counter complaint was denied on the merits, rendering the counter complaint moot. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order on the motion to dismiss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Alyssia Arnold et al. v. Jay Witt
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Alyssia Arnold and Donavan Levenhagen (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ half-siblings. The respondent moved to dismiss Appellants’ petition for visitation due to a lack of standing. The Lincoln County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted the motion to dismiss. Appellants appealed to the Lincoln County Circuit Court (“circuit court”), which also granted a motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Moye Jones et al. v. Cathleen M. Craddock
This auto accident case involves an insurer’s claim that its limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage should be offset due to the availability of payable workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bentley R.
The Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of River M. (“Mother”) to her son, Bentley R. (“the Child”). Mother appeals, challenging the Trial Court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Linda R. Kerley v. George Olin Kerley
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce in which the trial court determined that the assets accumulated |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Brittney C. Shedd v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for judicial review. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
