Bobby MacBryan Green v. Michael John May Et Al.
The issues in the former underlying action and the present controversy pertain to an easement dispute that arose from a joint driveway agreement. A final judgment in the underlying action, titled “Consent Agreement and Order” (hereinafter “the Consent Order”), was entered in July 2013, from which there was no appeal. The final judgment was also duly recorded in the office of the Washington County Register of Deeds on August 5, 2013. The only parties to the former action were the plaintiff, Bobby MacBryan Green (“Mr. Green”), and the defendant, Michael John May (“Mr. May”). In 2021, Daniel Anthony (“Mr. Anthony”) purchased the property previously owned by Mr. May. In December 2023, Mr. Green obtained and filed an order of extension with the Washington County Circuit Court to extend the judgment entered in 2013. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Green filed a motion to show cause alleging that Mr. Anthony had violated the Consent Order and personally handed the motion to Mr. Anthony. One week later, Mr. Green filed a motion for joinder of Mr. Anthony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which was also hand delivered to Mr. Anthony. Mr. Anthony’s counsel made a limited appearance opposing the relief sought on multiple grounds. Following a hearing on Mr. Green’s motions, the trial court found that Mr. Anthony was not a proper or feasible party capable of being joined in the former 2013 action. Based on this finding, the court denied Mr. Green’s motion for joinder and dismissed the show cause motion as moot. Mr. Green appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. In his brief, Mr. Anthony asks this court to award him the attorney’s fees and expenses he incurred in defending this appeal, contending that the appeal is frivolous. Finding that the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, frivolous, we remand this matter to the trial court to award Mr. Anthony his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Remmia Radhakrishnan Sukapurath v. Sajeesh Kumar Kamala Raghavan
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Metric D.
The juvenile court terminated a mother’s and a father’s parental rights. The mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination of her parental rights existed and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father asserts that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights because his due process rights were violated. Because the juvenile court erred in allowing the father’s attorney to withdraw from representation, we vacate the court’s termination of his parental rights on all grounds and remand for a new trial. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Garner v. State of Tennessee, and its agency, Tennessee Department of Correction
The plaintiff in this case sued the State of Tennessee, Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that it refused to hire her for employment solely on the basis of her disability. The complaint asserted a single claim -- for violation of the Tennessee Disability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-50-103, et seq. During the three years of litigation that followed, the plaintiff’s TDA claim survived a motion for summary judgment and was eventually tried before a jury over the course of five days. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but awarded her only $10,000 for lost wages and $5,000 for compensatory damages. The plaintiff’s counsel then sought an award of attorney fees of nearly $700,000. The Department challenged the reasonableness of the fees. After a hearing, the trial court found the requested amount was excessive and reduced it, but only by twenty-five percent, awarding counsel $511,620. Due to the lack of findings regarding the factors applicable to such decisions, we vacate the award and remand for entry of an order analyzing the relevant factors. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Erdman v. Mark Erdman
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees to wife following a long-term marriage. Upon our review of the record transmitted on appeal, and for the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees and remand those matters for reconsideration. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Julius Summerrow v. Cara C. Welsh
This is a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident on a road encircling a Chattanooga mall. The case was heard before a jury, which concluded that the defendant was not at fault. The plaintiff appeals. Having determined that there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nucsafe, Inc. Et Al. v. Stephen Farber Et Al.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment wherein the trial court found that the plaintiff corporations were barred, based on a prior lawsuit between the same parties, from litigating their claim that a promissory note had been procured by fraudulent inducement. The defendants in the instant case, who were the plaintiffs in the prior action, had successfully moved for summary judgment in that prior action concerning the enforcement of a promissory note against the corporations, which were the defendants in the prior action. In that action, the trial court found that the corporations had waived their fraud defense b cause they had neither pled fraud as an affirmative defense in their answer nor requested permission to amend their answer. The trial court ultimately held that the promissory note was enforceable and entered judgment against the corporations. On appeal in the prior action, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, including its ruling that the defense of fraud had been waived. In the present action, the corporations—now plaintiffs—sought to repudiate the same promissory note, alleging that it was induced by fraud. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff corporations have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Shawn Harvey v. Amy Elizabeth Harvey
This case involves a post-divorce petition for criminal contempt filed by the husband against the wife for alleged violations of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court determined that the husband had not met his burden of proof to establish criminal contempt. The husband timely appealed to this Court. Because the husband’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe v. Jane Roe
This appeal arises out of the partial denial of a Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”) petition filed by the Appellant/Defendant, Jane Roe (“Roe”). This case was previously before this Court after Roe appealed the trial court’s determination that the TPPA was not applicable to the claims of Appellee/Plaintiff, John Doe (“Doe”). In the first appeal, this Court found that Roe’s filing of a Title IX complaint fell within the scope of the TPPA and remanded the case back to the trial court. On remand, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Roe’s TPPA petition. Roe now appeals the trial court’s partial denial on remand. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy N. Miller v. Casi A. Miller
A divorced father retired from the military. Afterward, he received only disability pay due to service-related injuries. The mother sought to hA divorced father retired from the military. Afterward, he received only disability pay due to service-related injuries. The mother sought to hold him in contempt, claiming she was denied a percentage of his military retirement benefits. The father denied her allegations and petitioned to modify child support. He argued that his disability pay could not be counted as income for child support purposes because federal law preempted the provision of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines governing military disability benefits. The trial court concluded that the father’s disability pay counted as income for child support. On appeal, the father reiterates his preemption argument. Because he failed to provide timely notice of his constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, we consider the preemption issue waived. old him in contempt, claiming she was denied a percentage of his military retirement benefits. The father denied her allegations and petitioned to modify child support. He argued that his disability pay could not be counted as income for child support purposes because federal law preempted the provision of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines governing military disability benefits. The trial court concluded that the father’s disability pay counted as income for child support. On appeal, the father reiterates his preemption argument. Because he failed to provide timely notice of his constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, we consider the preemption issue waived. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Nancy Strong et al.
The Petitioner sought recusal of the trial court judge. The trial court denied the motion. The Petitioner appeals to this court. Because the petition on appeal was not filed within twenty-one days of the entry of the order, we dismiss the appeal as untimely. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Nancy Strong et al.
The Petitioner sought recusal of the trial court judge. The trial court denied the motion. The Petitioner appeals to this court. Because the petition on appeal was not filed within twenty-one days of the entry of the order, we dismiss the appeal as untimely. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Bennett v. Tennessee Department of Human Services
This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Department of Human Services denying a recertification application for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits to a one-person household based upon the determination that the household’s income exceeded the eligibility requirements. After the petitioner questioned the finding, the trial court affirmed the decision of the agency and dismissed the petition for judicial review. Upon our review of the record, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This second recusal appeal in the underlying conservatorship case is currently before this Court on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. This Court had issued an opinion vacating, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, three orders entered by the trial court, including the trial court’s order denying the second motion to recuse that is the subject of this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that (1) the stay imposed by this Court during pendency of the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case and (2) the proponents of the stay had waived any argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Accordingly, the second recusal motion is again before this Court. Upon thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the second motion to recuse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
SH Nashville, LLC Et Al. v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC
This appeal arises out of a contract for the sale of a hotel property near the Nashville airport. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion finding that recusal is not justified in this case. Like Judge Armstrong, I believe that the majority “fails to consider the cumulative effects of the trial court’s actions, and wholly fails to consider the fact that the ultimate result of these actions is usurpation of the autonomous decisions Ms. Malone made for her own care when she was competent to do so.” Malone v. Malone, No. W2023- 00843-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 8457951, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Armstrong, J., dissenting). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ron Jobe Et Al. v. Erie Insurance Exchange
This is a dispute over homeowner’s insurance coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insuror, finding that the insureds made a misrepresentation on their application for insurance which voided the policy pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-103. Because whether the insureds made a misrepresentation is a question of fact for the jury in this case, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Kathy Garbus v. Lazaro Ramos
This appeal arises from an order establishing the amount of retroactive child support owed by the father for the care of two of his children. The father challenges the trial court’s decision to impute income to him for the purposes of instituting that order. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Gordon Fox v. Robert Gordon
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lynell S.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Charles S.(“Father”) to his minor son, Lynell S. (“the Child”). Father pled guilty to aggravated assault on the Child’s mother. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child on grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Father appeals, arguing among other things that he addressed his domestic violence issues by taking certain classes, even though he assaulted Mother after having taken these classes. We find that all three grounds found for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Angelia Juanita Carter (Stroud) v. Troy Stroud
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lilah G.
In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court determined that (1) the father had abandoned his child by willfully failing to pay child support and (2) termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed, contending that his failure to pay child support was not willful because the mother intentionally blocked his access to the child and because he was actively seeking visitation rights with the child in two separate juvenile court actions when the petition for termination was filed. The father also argues that the trial court did not properly evaluate and weigh the evidence in its analysis of the best interest factors. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Derek S. ET AL.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights with respect to her two children. The trial court concluded that three grounds for termination were established, and thereafter, it determined that it was in the best interests of the children for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the establishment of three grounds for termination as well as the finding that termination was in the best interests of both children, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ryan B.
The Juvenile Court for Franklin County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Chasity R. (“Mother”) to her son, Ryan B. (“the Child”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Hamid Houbbadi v. Chase T. Smith
While incarcerated for first-degree murder, Appellant filed suit against Appellee, an attorney who represented Appellant during his criminal trial, for legal malpractice. Shortly after filing the complaint, Appellant filed a motion to appear for hearings by video. The trial court did not rule on the motion to appear by video and proceeded to enter several orders on other motions on the pleadings only, including an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to address Appellant’s motion to appear by video, we vacate specific orders of the trial court in their entirety, including the final order dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider Appellant’s motion to appear by video. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
