SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Rodney R. Hardin v. Royal & Sunalliance Insurance
E2001-02622-SC-WCM-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

We granted the plaintiff's motion for review as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e) (1999 & Supp. 2002) to determine whether a trial court may reconsider an award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999) when an employee resigns and, if so, under what circumstances may the prior award be increased. After receiving a workers' compensation award and returning to his pre-injury employment, Rodney R. Hardin voluntarily resigned. Thereafter, he filed a motion requesting that the trial court reconsider his award. The trial court granted this motion and increased the plaintiff's award by 15%. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel held that, while a trial court may reconsider a previous workers' compensation award when the employee resigns, it may increase the award only if the resignation was reasonably related to the injury. The Panel found that Hardin's resignation was not reasonably related to his injury and, therefore, reversed the trial court's increase of the award. We agree with the Panel's reasoning and its conclusion.

Linda J. Corum v. Holston Health & Rehabilitation Center, et al.
E2001-02074-SC-WCM-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon J. Bell

We granted the employer's motion for full court review in this case in order to decide whether the failure to file the statistical data ("SD1") form contemporaneously with the order of final judgment, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-244(b) (1999), affects the finality of that judgment. After a thorough review of the record and careful consideration of relevant authorities, we have determined that the failure to file the SD1 form contemporaneously with the order of final judgment does not affect the finality of the judgment. Accordingly, we agree with the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in its dismissal of the appeal as untimely because as it was not filed within the time prescribed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Dee Ann Gallaher v. Curtis J. Elam
E2000-02719-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carey E. Garrett

In this appeal, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that chapter 1240-2-4-.03(4) of the Guidelines violates the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. We granted permission to appeal. After careful consideration, we conclude that: (1) chapter 1240-2-4-.03(4) of the Guidelines, which prohibits consideration of non-court-ordered child support in calculating child support, and chapter 1240-2-4-.03(2) of the Guidelines, which requires consideration only of the obligor's income in calculating child support, do not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of either the United States or Tennessee Constitutions; and (2) the promulgation of the Guidelines does not constitute an impermissible delegation of rulemaking authority by the General Assembly to the Department of Human Services. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Harold L. Green
E2000-00616-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

We granted Harold L. Green's application pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the duration of the trial court's authority to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. On October 8, 1999, Green pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant and was, thereafter, sentenced by the Criminal Court of Anderson County. On November 5, 1999, Green filed a motion to withdraw the previously entered guilty plea; the trial court granted the motion. The State appealed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. After granting the State's request for appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. We find that the trial court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion to withdraw the guilty plea continued for thirty days after the plea was entered. Accordingly, we reinstate the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for any further proceedings that may be appropriate.

Susan Green v. Leon Moore
M2002-00889-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Lee Davies
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the thirty (30)-day notice of appeal period, articulated in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) ("Rule 4(a)"), began to run when the appellees filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the final claim between all parties in this action, or when the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all parties in this action had been adjudicated. The Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day period commenced on the date the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal and concluded that the appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the thirty-day notice of appeal period commenced on the date that the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all the parties had been adjudicated. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the intermediate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Lee Elkins
E2001-01245-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Ricky Harris v. State
E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Ricky Harris v. State
E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Ricky Harris v. State
E1999-02771-SC-R11-PC

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Maylene E. Ledbetter v. Bryan K. Ledbetter
E2004-00239-SC-S09-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
In this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether the trial court had the authority to enforce a mediated marital dissolution agreement when one of the parties repudiated its terms prior to court approval. Here, the parties, Maylene and Bryan Ledbetter, reached, through mediation, a marital dissolution agreement pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31. Shortly after the mediation, and prior to presentation for court approval, Mr. Ledbetter repudiated the agreement. Mrs. Ledbetter then filed a motion to enforce the terms of the agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Mrs. Ledbetter's motion, ruling that the oral agreement reached in mediation was not binding and enforceable against the parties. After a thorough review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that because Mr. Ledbetter repudiated the terms of the agreement prior to its presentation to the court, the trial court lacked authority to enter a judgment on the agreement. Further, because the agreement had not been reduced to writing and signed by the parties, it is not an enforceable contract. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy Burroughs v. Robert W. Magee
W2001-00238-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Judy Burroughs v. Robert W. Magee
W2001-00238-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Judy Burroughs v. Robert W. Magee
W2001-00238-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

State v. Christopher M. Flake
W2001-00568-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman

State v. Christopher M. Flake
W2001-00568-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman

State v. Christopher M. Flake
W2001-00568-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman

State v. Robert Tait
W2001-02157-SC-R11-CD

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
We granted this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether, in a prosecution commenced by an arrest warrant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, the resulting indictment may charge the defendant for offenses that can be inferred from the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant charged the appellant, Robert Tait, with driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and the grand jury indicted him for that offense (count one) and for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more (count two). The trial court dismissed the second count, finding that it described a new and additional charge and was, therefore, barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations because its prosecution had been commenced more than one year after the conduct occurred. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding that the second count merely constituted an alternative theory for conviction and did not charge an offense distinct from that for which the appellant was initially charged. After reviewing the record and controlling legal authority, we hold that the language of the warrant sufficiently tolled the limitations period for count two. Therefore, we affirm the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Gdongalay P. Berry
M2001-02023-CCA-R3-DD

Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr

[Deleted: Introductory Paragraph]

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed.

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L.  SMITH and JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.
 

Sam Thomas Burnett v. Board of Professoinal Responsibility
M2002-01281-SC-R3-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: J. S. Daniel
This appeal involves the petition of Sam Thomas Burnett for reinstatement to the practice of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 19. The sole issue on appeal is whether the petitioner has the competency and learning in law required to practice law in this State. Both the hearing committee and the trial court found the petitioner to be morally fit to practice law in this State and determined that his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive to the public interest. The Board has not challenged these findings on appeal. Petitioner argues that the Chancery Court erred by conditioning the reinstatement of his license to practice law upon successful completion of the Tennessee bar examination. The Board of Professional Responsibility ("Board") responds that the Chancery Court properly applied Board of Professional Responsibility v. Davis, 696 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1985), which requires successful completion of the essay portion of the Tennessee bar examination as a condition of reinstatement in cases, such as this one, where the petitioner has not practiced law for a period of ten years. We are constrained to disagree. While Davis created a presumption that generally requires successful completion of the essay portion of the bar examination for persons seeking reinstatement who have not practiced law for ten years or more, this presumption may be overcome with clear and convincing proof that the petitioner has taken specific steps during the course of the suspension to maintain competency and knowledge of Tennessee law. The petitioner has offered evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Specifically, the record reflects that the petitioner obtained the required number of continuing legal education courses throughout his suspension, that he reviewed the advance sheets reporting Tennessee appellate decisions throughout his suspension, that he worked in law-related fields throughout his suspension, both while incarcerated and after his release, that following his release from prison he assisted two of his children in their law school studies and in their preparations for the bar examination, and that he discusses legal issues and legal developments on a regular basis with his children and other attorneys and also on a radio talk show in Nashville. We hold that the petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence of his "competency and learning in law" which overcomes the presumption requiring successful completion of the essay portion of the Tennessee bar examination as a condition to reinstatement. Having satisfied the criteria, the petitioner is reinstated without condition. The judgment of the Chancery Court granting the petition for reinstatement therefore is affirmed as modified.

William Roger Shelton v. ADS Environmental Services, et al
M2002-00186-SC-R9-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This workers' compensation case is before this court on interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted interlocutory appeal in this case, as well as in the companion case of McCall v. National Health Corp., to determine whether the trial court has the authority to initiate temporary workers' compensation benefits prior to trial. In accordance with the reasoning and holding in McCall, we find that the trial court has this authority.

Charlotte McCall v. National Health
M2001-03166-SC-R9-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
We granted interlocutory appeal in this workers' compensation case, and in the companion case of Shelton v. ADS Environmental Services, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. These cases present the following issues: whether the trial court has the authority to initiate temporary benefits pre-trial and, assuming the trial court has this authority, whether it must hold a full evidentiary hearing prior to initiating temporary benefits. After careful examination of the workers' compensation statutes and the applicable case law, we hold that the trial court has the power to initiate temporary workers' compensation benefits prior to trial and that it may do so without first holding a full evidentiary hearing.

Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing v. Commissioner of Revenue
M2000-03091-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Claudia C. Bonnyman
In this use tax case, we address the issue of whether or not the plaintiff should receive a credit under Tennessee law for sales tax it paid to the State of Alabama on the purchase of photocompositions used in printing telephone directories that were later distributed in Tennessee. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-203(a) (1998), a use tax is levied at the rate of six percent (6%) of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state; provided, that there shall be no duplication of the tax. (Emphasis added). To avoid duplication of the tax, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-507(a) (1998) provides a credit for like taxes paid to other states on tangible personal property. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that the plaintiff was not owed a credit for sales tax paid to Alabama for the photocompositions, since there was no "like tax" paid on the telephone directories. We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to a credit because the cost of the photocompositions on which the Alabama sales tax was paid is included in the cost of the directories on which Tennessee is seeking to impose a use tax. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and grant summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Lindsay Taylor et al v. Al Beard et al
W2001-00347-SC-R11-CV

Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

We granted review to determine whether Tennessee should adopt a cause of action allowing a child to recover for loss of parental consortium due to an injury to the child's parent. The trial court dismissed the claims for loss of parental consortium after finding that no such cause of action exists. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that this Court should not adopt a common law cause of action for loss of parental consortium in personal injury cases and that the issue of whether to create such a cause of action is a matter of legislative discretion. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment.