Tennessee Industrial Machinery Company, Inc. v. Accuride Corporation
M2002-01844-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James T. Hamilton

This appeal involves the lower court's award of a garnishment judgment against Accuride Corporation, as well as its subsequent denial of Accuride's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the lower court and remand for further proceedings.

James L. West v. Frank Luna
M2002-02734-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Lee Russell

This appeal is the second in a 24 year long dispute over a proposed raceway in Lincoln County. After hearing additional proof as this Court required in West v. Luna, No. 01A01-9707-CH-00281, 1998 WL 467106 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998), the trial court entered a new injunction prohibiting the defendant Luna from operating a race track on Old Boonshill Road in Lincoln County. In this appeal, Mr. Luna challenges the trial court's injunction as noncompliant with our decision in the first appeal, and in imposing a noise limitation effectively making the race track a nuisance per se. We affirm the trial court.

Juanita Boling, Appellee v. Sak's Incorporated A/K/A Hecht's
M2003-00195-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Lee Davies, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues presented pertain to a 71 year old employee of Sak's Incorporated who sustained two separate injuries. The employee and Sak's settled the first case, involving injuries to the left shoulder, for the maximum benefits stating in the settlement that the employee was "1% permanently partially disabled." The matter on appeal involves an injury to the back that occurred within one month of the prior injury. The trial court found the employee permanently and totally disabled from her back injury and awarded her the maximum benefits. Moreover, the trial court construed the prior order as a finding of 1% permanent total disability to the body as a whole and held the appellant, Second Injury Fund of the Department of Labor, liable for the entire award for the back injury. For reasons stated herein, the panel affirms the judgment of the trial court as modified. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. Frank G. Clement, Jr., Sp. J., delivered the opinion, in which Frank F. Drowota III, C.J., and Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J., joined. J. Frank Thomas, Leitner, Williams, Dooley & Napolitan, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for appellant, Sak's Incorporated. Paul G. Summers and E. Blaine Sprouse, Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for appellant, Second Injury Fund. Daniel C. Todd, Todd and Floyd, PLC, Nashville, TN, for appellee, Juanita Boling. Memorandum Opinion Juanita Boling (Boling), the employee-appellee, began working at Sak's department store in 1993. Boling was 71 years old in January and February, 21 when she sustained two injuries while working at Sak's. On January 31, 21, Ms. Boling injured her left shoulder. She received medical treatment and returned to work while still under the care of a physician. Less than one month later, on February 27, 21, she injured her back. Ms. Boling underwent surgery for the shoulder injury in April of 21. She did not have surgery on her back. Ms. Boling brought claims against her employer and the workers' compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, for both injuries. Initially, she filed two civil actions against Sak's and Liberty Mutual, one action for each respective injury. Ms. Boling later filed a third action, this one against the Second Injury Fund (the "Fund").1 Moreover, the defendants added the Fund as a third party defendant, seeking indemnification or contribution for any benefits Ms. Boling may receive in excess of the maximum benefits of 26 weeks. In February of 22, Sak's and Liberty Mutual settled the claim for Ms. Boling's shoulder injury for the maximum benefits available to an employee over the age of 6 years, being 26 weeks of compensation.2 In the agreed order settling the claim for the right shoulder, the parties stated that the award to Ms. Boling of two hundred sixty (26) weeks of benefits was "essentially equivalent to one hundred percent (1%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole." The parties did not settle the claim for Ms. Boling's back injury. The trial court consolidated the two remaining actions, the one concerning the back injury with the plaintiff's action against the Fund. This appeal arises from the two consolidated actions. The case that was settled is not before us; however, the terms of the settlement are relevant to the issues before us and are discussed. The claim for the back injury went to trial in October of 22. The trial court found that Ms. Boling was rendered permanently and totally disabled from her back injuries and awarded Ms. 1Ms. Boling initially filed two complaints for her injuries on October 22, 21, against her employer, Sak's Incorporated, a/k/a Hechts, and its insurance carrier Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, being docket numbers 28318 and 2832. Sak's and Liberty Mutual filed an Answer on November 3, 21. On February 27, 22, Ms. Boling filed a third civil action, this one against the Second Injury Fund, being docket number 28582. Also on February 27, 22, Sak's and Liberty Mutual filed a motion to add the Second Injury Fund as a third party defendant in docket number 28318. Before the trial for Ms. Boling's back injury in docket number 28318, Boling, Sak's and Liberty Mutual settled the claim concerning the left shoulder in docket number 2832. The settlement for the shoulder injury was subsequently deemed by the trial judge to constitute a settlement for 1% permanent total injury to the body as a whole. 2Workers' compensation awards to persons over the age of 6 are capped at 26 weeks. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(A)(I). Boling was 71 years old at the time of her injuries. 2

State of Tennessee v. Glen Ray Goodrum
W2001-02979-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

Defendant, Glen Ray Goodrum, was found guilty of driving a motor vehicle after having been declared an habitual motor vehicle offender, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616(a), following a jury trial in the Carroll County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced him to serve two years in the Department of Correction, and ordered that he serve a community-based alternative in Community Corrections following one year of confinement. The sentence was also ordered to be served consecutively to another sentence in an unrelated case. Defendant has listed numerous issued for review, but has only briefed a portion of the issues. He also failed to timely file his motion for new trial. In addition, the transcript of the sentencing hearing is not included in the record. This court's review is thus limited to Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and a review of the judgment regarding sentencing. After review, we affirm Defendant's conviction, but remand to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Daryl Keith Holton - Concurring/Dissenting
M2000-00766-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Charles Lee

I concur in the conclusion of the majority that Holton’s convictions should be affirmed. As to the sentence of death, however, I continue to adhere to my views expressed in a long line of dissents beginning with State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 920-25 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting), and most recently elaborated on in State v. Davidson, ___  S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting), that the  comparative proportionality review protocol currently embraced by the majority is inadequate to shield defendants from the arbitrary and  disproportionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1995 Supp.). I have repeatedly expressed my  displeasure with the current protocol since the time of its adoption in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). I believe there are three basic problems with the current proportionality analysis: (1) the proportionality test is overbroad,2 (2) the pool ofcases used for comparison is inadequate³ and (3) review is too subjective^4.  I have previously discussed, in depth, my perception that these flaws undermine the  reliability of the current proportionality protocol. See, e.g., Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 793-800 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). Accordingly, I  respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the imposition of the death penalty in this case.

State of Tennessee v. Daryl Keith Holton
M2000-00766-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Charles Lee

The defendant, Daryl Keith Holton, was convicted of four counts of first degree premeditated murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death on each conviction, finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances2 and that the aggravating circumstances so proven outweighed any and all mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant appealed, challenging both his convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences. The case was then docketed in this Court, briefs were filed, and after considering the briefs and the record, this Court entered an Order requesting that the parties address certain issues at oral argument, including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the constitutionality of the statutory insanity defense, the constitutionality of Tennessee’s capital sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and the propriety of the death sentences in light of the mandatory review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(A)-(D) (1997). After carefully and fully considering the issues in light of the record and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1); Judgments of the Trial Court and Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed
 

State of Tennessee v. Cedrick Deandre Brown
W2003-00929-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based on an unlawful stop and arrest. We conclude that the issue has been waived by the defendant’s failure to include it in his motion for a new trial. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Edward Silva v. Albert Buckley, Jr.
M2002-00045-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman

Edward Silva v. Albert Buckley, Jr.
M2002-00045-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman

Ronald E. Brown v. Balaton Power, Inc.
M2001-02770-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This case involves the issue of whether parties contracted for arbitration to be the sole method of dispute resolution with regard to contract disputes. We find the intent of the parties unclear due to an irreconcilable conflict between two sections of the contract dealing with dispute resolution. We, thus, affirm the trial court's ruling that Plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate.

State of Tennessee v. William Henry Vaughn, IV
M2002-01459-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The Defendant, William Henry Vaughan, IV, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated arson. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to twenty-five years for the arson, with the sentences to be served consecutively. In this direct appeal, the Defendant makes the following claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (3) the sequestered jury was separated; (4) the trial court erred by admitting a police officer's written report in its entirety; (5) he was deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to testify; (6) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; and (7) he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Because we find that the Defendant was deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to testify, and because the State has failed to demonstrate that the deprivation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we vacate the Defendant's convictions and remand this matter for a new trial.

Alma Neiswinter v. Mark Murray
M2002-02345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
This appeal involves modification of child custody and child support, and contempt for failure to pay the support. When the mother and the father were divorced, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent. Three years later, custody was changed to the father. Subsequently, the mother filed a petition for change of custody and for modification of her child support obligation. The State later filed a petition on behalf of the father to hold the mother in criminal contempt for failure to pay child support. After a trial on both the mother's petition for change in custody and support and the State's petition for contempt, the trial court denied the mother's petition for custody, reduced the support retroactively because one child no longer lived with the father, and granted the State's petition, holding the mother in contempt. As punishment for the contempt, the trial court sentenced the mother to forty days in prison. From that order, the mother now appeals. We affirm the trial court's determinations regarding child custody and child support. We reverse the trial court's finding of criminal contempt, finding that the mother had in fact paid all of the required child support, based on the trial court's retroactive order reducing the child support obligation.

Chauncey R. Gordon v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02619-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.

The petitioner, who pled guilty to one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief based on newly discovered evidence which allegedly showed that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest at the time he entered his pleas of guilty. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the petition.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Paul Wilson
E2003-00344-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant, Christopher Paul Wilson, pled guilty to one count of reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony, and three counts of reckless aggravated assault, Class D felonies. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of six years for the reckless vehicular homicide conviction and two years for each of the reckless aggravated assault convictions, for an effective sentence of six years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shirley Ann Borchert v. Emerson Electric Company
W2003-00111-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's findings as to permanency and extent of vocational disability. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOE H. WALKER, III, SP. J., joined. Richard L. Dunlap, Paris, Tennessee, for the appellant, Emerson Electric Company Charles L. Hicks, Camden, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shirley Ann Borchert MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Borchert, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits from her employer, Emerson, for a work related foot injury. Emerson denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 35 percent to the leg. The employer has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in- court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tenn. 1998). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). The claimant was working on the employer's production line on August 24, 1999, when a piece of sheet metal, approximately one and one-half feet long and eight or nine inches wide, fell from a table top and landed on her right leg at the ankle. The ankle and foot immediately became swollen and bruised. She was taken to the Henry County Medical Emergency Room, where she was treated and referred to Dr. Bo Griffey. Dr. Griffey treated her with antibiotics and pain medication and returned her to light duty work on September 14, 1999. He returned her to full duty on November 2,1999. She continued to have swelling, pain and stiffness in her right ankle. She continued to see other doctors with those complaints. On November 3, 2, more than a year after her injury, she visited Dr. Vince Tusa. She also saw Dr. Segal, who referred her to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. G. Blake Chandler. Dr. Chandler ordered magnetic resonance imaging, which revealed joint fusion and subcutaneous edema in the medial aspect of the injured ankle. She saw Dr. Joseph Boals, who studied her medical records, examined her and opined that she would retain some minor permanent impairment as a result of the injury. He advised her to wear an ankle brace and permanently restricted her from walking on uneven ground and from excessive stooping, squatting, standing, walking and climbing. She saw Dr. Robert Barnett, who, based on atrophy in her right calf, inability to stand on her right leg for any length of time, limited motion and a chronically swollen right ankle, estimated her permanent medical impairment to be 1 percent to the right lower extremity. She was evaluated by Dr. Amy Dunagan, who found no evidence of muscle atrophy or significant noticeable weakness. The claimant continues to have swelling in her right foot and ankle. She cannot walk or stand for long periods of time without experiencing extreme pain from her right ankle and calf. She takes Alleve to control the pain, has tenderness and limited motion in the injured joint and walks with a limp. Because she is no longer able to perform her assigned duties, she has not worked for the employer since March 14, 21. Her testimony in these respects was corroborated by other lay witnesses. The appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of Dr. Boals because there was a discrepancy between his testimony and the report of Dr. Robb Mitchell, the doctor who performed the magnetic resonance imaging test. Dr. Mitchell's report said the -2-

Willie Wooten v. Wal-Mart Stores East. Inc.,
W2002-02682-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's findings as to compensability and rate of compensation benefits. The employer also insists the trial court erred in ordering it to pay medical expenses to TennCare, and not directly to the health care providers. The employee insists the employer should have been assessed with a penalty for its failure to provide medical benefits. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the trial court's findings as to compensability and compensation rate, but should be remanded for determining TennCare's subrogation interest, if any. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part; Remanded JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOE H. WALKER, III, SP. J., joined. Jay L. Johnson, Allen, Kopet & Associates, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellants, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Keith V. Moore, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Willie Wooten MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Wooten, initiated this civil action to recover medical benefits, temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits for a back injury occurring on November 15, 1999, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the employer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. He also sought general relief. The employer denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on 6 percent to the body as a whole, with a weekly benefit rate of $317.73 per week, temporary total disability benefits at the same rate from November 15, 1999 to July 1, 2, discretionary costs and medical expenses in the sum of $12,97.25. The employer has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). On the above date, the claimant was stacking cases of juice when he suffered severe and sudden back pain and fell to the floor, while working for the employer. He reported the accident to his supervisor immediately and the store's general manager a few hours later. He was referred to Dr. Evan Murray, who treated him conservatively for two to two and one-half months, then referred him to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Davies, who diagnosed chronic low back radiculopathy and scheduled corrective surgery. Surgery was performed by Dr. Davies on May 23, 2. On August 3, 2, Dr. Davies released him to return to work with restrictions. The claimant has not returned to work. He continues to complain of pain and inability to work. He has seen a number of doctors. Dr. Parsioon, who had treated the claimant for a prior low back injury, visited briefly with him on April 26, 2. Dr. Parsioon testified that he found no evidence of a new injury as a result of the November 15, 1999 accident. However, the claimant's own testimony, the report of Dr. Davies and the testimony of Dr. Boals reflect that the accident contributed to the claimant's disability, either as the direct cause or by aggravating a pre-existing condition. The employer contends the event of November 15, 1999 was no more than a manifestation of the previous injury, which also occurred while the claimant was working for the employer and for which the claimant received no permanent disability benefits. The employer relies entirely on the testimony of Dr. Parsioon. When the medical testimony differs, the trial court must choose which view to believe. In doing so, the court is allowed, among other things, to consider the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information by other experts. Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991). Moreover, it is within the discretion of the trial court to conclude that the opinion of certain experts should be accepted over that of other experts and that it contains the more probable explanation. Hinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 675, 676-7 (Tenn. 1983). Any reasonable -2-

State of Tennessee v. Alveto Martel Higgins
W2002-02498-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant entered open guilty pleas to three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of marijuana, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court gave the defendant an effective sentence of nine years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Chysea Myranda Marney
W2002-02648-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

Following an Obion County Circuit Court jury trial, the defendant, Chysea Myranda Marney, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(1) (2003), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, id. § 39-17-425(a) (2003). The trial court sentenced her on the felony as a multiple offender to three years in the Department of Correction, and it sentenced her on the misdemeanor to eleven months, 29 days in the county jail. Now on appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence gained through the execution of a search warrant and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We disagree and affirm the lower court’s judgments.

Mario Gates, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee
W2002-02873-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for reopening his petition. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Marvin Anthony Matthews, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee and Bruce Westbrooks, Warden, West Tennessee State Penitentiary
W2003-00106-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner filed his petition in the wrong venue without providing a sufficient reason for not applying in the proper court, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

State of Tennessee v. John Wayne Britt
W2002-01923-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roger A. Page

Indicted for the February 10, 2001 first degree premeditated murder of Anthony Sims, the defendant, John Wayne Britt, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years in the Department of Correction. Now on appeal, the defendant claims that insufficient evidence supports his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Timmy Herndon, Pro Se V. Glen Turner, Warden, Paul Summers, State Attorney General, And Elizabeth Rice
W2003-00839-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon K. Blackwood

The Petitioner, Timmy Herndon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

James Oliver Ross, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee
W2003-00843-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Petitioner, James Oliver Ross, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Welister L. White, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee
W2003-00888-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner seeks review of the lower court’s dismissal of his motion in arrest of judgment. Finding that the instant petition is not proper as either a motion in arrest of judgment, petition for post-conviction relief, or application for writ of habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.

Jessie Hodges, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee
W2003-01006-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground of relief entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.