Marjorie Delapp vs. Arthur Pratt, In Re: Estate of Mary Armstrong Pratt
E2003-02213-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon J. Bell

Marjorie Delapp, Mary Sherrod, and Elsie Caton ("Plaintiffs") sued their brother, Arthur David Pratt ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant exercised undue influence over their mother, Mary Armstrong Pratt ("the Deceased") to induce the Deceased to make a will in Defendant's favor. After a jury trial, judgment was entered holding the Deceased was competent to make the will, that a confidential relationship existed between Defendant and the Deceased, and that the will was not the last will and testament of the Deceased. Defendant appeals claiming, in part, that the Trial Court erred in allowing testimony regarding his alleged racial prejudice to be introduced and in failing to grant a mistrial after reference was made to his alleged sexual misconduct. Defendant also argues there is no material evidence to support the jury's verdicts of confidential relationship and undue influence and that the Trial Court erred in denying his objection to the entry of judgment. We affirm

State of Tennessee v. Michael Brandon Mottern
E2003-00746-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of automobile burglary and one count of theft under $500. The Washington County Criminal Court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years of incarceration as a Range II multiple offender. During the same hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation from numerous prior convictions and ordered the defendant to serve an effective three-year sentence on those cases. The guilty plea cases and the revocation cases were consolidated on appeal. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) upon revoking his probation for the prior convictions, the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his original sentences in confinement; and (2) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing regarding his new convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Dennis Allen, et al., v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
W2003-00695-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This appeal raises the validity of an ordinance passed by the City of Memphis annexing a portion of Shelby County. Appellants contend that Appellees violated the Open Meetings Act when such ordinance was passed. All parties filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted Appellees’ motion. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Bowers
W2003-01203-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The defendant, Jeffery Bowers, appeals his misdemeanor speeding convictions in the Fayette County Circuit Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his request for time to obtain an attorney and, therefore, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jim Pratt v. J.W. Gibson D/B/A J.W. Gibson Co.
E2003-00114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

This appeal involves competing claims for breach of contract. J.W. Gibson d/b/a J.W. Gibson Company ("Defendant"), entered into an oral contract with Pratt Masonry Company ("Pratt Masonry") for Pratt Masonry to furnish masonry work on a house. When the work was completed, Defendant refused to pay, claiming the masonry work was so defective that all the bricks had to be removed and replaced. Pratt Masonry filed suit seeking payment for the work performed under the oral contract. Defendant counterclaimed for damages incurred in having to remove and replace the bricks. The Trial Court concluded Pratt Masonry breached the contract by performing  substandard masonry work, but Defendant failed to prove it was necessary to remove and replace all the bricks. Both parties appeal. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Samuel Warren v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company
W2003-02017-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: E. Riley Anderson, Justice
Trial Court Judge: James F. Butler, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer argues that the Chancellor erred in determining that the employee suffered a compensable injury to his right leg and in awarding lump sum benefits. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the Chancellor's finding that the employee suffered a compensable injury to his right leg, but we also conclude that the Chancellor erred in awarding the employee lump sum benefits. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part E. RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and ALLEN W. WALLACE, SR. J., joined. Kyle C. Atkins and Paul B. Conley, III, Humboldt, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Robert B. Vandiver, Jr., Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Samuel Warren. MEMORANDUM OPINION BACKGROUND On September 9, 22, in Jackson, Tennessee, the employee, Samuel Warren, was injured as he stepped out of a customer's car that he had test-driven for his employer, Dennis Mitchell Automotive. Warren filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits in the Chancery Court of Madison County, Tennessee.1 The following evidence was presented at trial. Samuel Warren, age 34, testified that he had worked as an automotive mechanic for Dennis Mitchell Automotive since February of 2. Warren's duties included maintenance and basic repairs of engines, struts, shocks, and tires. Warren was also responsible for test-driving customers' cars after repairs were made. As to how his injury occurred, Warren testified: As I stepped out of the car, I felt something -- it felt like it was under my foot or something. It felt like my foot rolled or something. I heard a loud pop, and I immediately couldn't put any weight on my foot. After notifying his employer, Warren went to the emergency room of Humboldt General Hospital in Humboldt, Tennessee. On the day after the injury, Warren's employer referred him to Convenient Care, a division of The Jackson Clinic, where he was seen by Dr. Melanie Hoppers who took x-rays, which revealed a broken foot, and placed him in a Cam walker. Warren was referred by Dr. Hoppers to Dr. Rodney Staton, a board certified podiatrist. Dr. Staton testified that he examined Warren on September 26, 22, and that he reviewed Dr. Hoppers' record and history of September 1, 22, which stated "he was getting out of a customer's car when he stepped out the wrong way and injured his right foot." Warren gave the following history to Dr. Staton: His chief complaint was he broke his foot. He stated that on September 1th, he stepped out of a customer's car while at work, heard a pop in his right foot and felt sharp pain. At that time, he went to Humboldt General Hospital, and then to Convenient Care where he was told that he had a broken fifth metatarsal and was placed in a Cam walker. Dr. Staton said that additional x-rays taken on September 26, 22, revealed that the fracture site had "widened" and that the fractured pieces were "coming apart." He performed surgery to clean the two ends of the fracture and to insert a screw in Warren's right foot that would hold the fractured bones 1 The workers' compensation claim was filed against the appellant in this case, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, which was the employer's insurance carrier. -2-

State of Tennessee v. David L. Taylor
E2003-02117-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

A Campbell County jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence, third offense. On appeal, the defendant contends the state failed to establish venue. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Richard A. Siters
E2003-02075-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

On February 28, 2002, the defendant, Richard A. Siters, pled guilty to four counts of attempted  rape, a Class C felony; one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony; and one count of attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years, suspended, and placed him on intensive supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. We disagree and affirm the revocation.

State of Tennessee v. Darian Sparks
E2003-02021-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant, Darian Nigel Sparks, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to robbery and the attempted sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, Class C felonies. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received consecutive sentences of eight years for each offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentences and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Christopher Brown v. State of Tennessee
M2003-01993-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of the "knowing" mens rea for attempted second degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Jon Brewbaker
E2003-02706-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The Defendant, Jon Brewbaker, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue on appeal is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jonathan W. Susman
E2003-02262-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

The Defendant, Jonathan W. Susman, pled guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial judge and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The question is whether there were sufficient specific and articulable facts to justify a police officer detaining the Defendant in order for him to perform field sobriety tests. We conclude that there were, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Danny Williamson
E2003-01856-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The defendant, Danny Williamson, pled guilty in the Cocke County Criminal Court to possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a two-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court held that the need for deterrence warranted the defendant's serving his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. We affirm the defendant's sentence but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment.

James Ray Bartlett v. Gail Corder, et al.
M2003-00863-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Craig Johnson

An inmate who was convicted and sentenced for passing worthless checks filed suit against six officers of the court for conspiracy, violation of his constitutional rights, and various derelictions of duty. The plaintiff asked the trial court to sanction the defendants by impeachment and/or disbarment. He also asked for $33 million in monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. We affirm.

Lani Thomas Arnold and James Davis, Administrator of the Estate of Mary Reeves Davis v. W. Terry Davis
M2003-00620-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

This case involves the interpretation of certain provisions of a Trust Instrument. The trial court found a latent ambiguity in the Instrument, allowed extrinsic evidence, and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Joe King
M2003-01869-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

The defendant, Joe King, appeals the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for theft and the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court. After review of the entire record in this cause, we conclude that the evidence amply supported the defendant's conviction. The issue of restitution is waived pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Joseph and Jean Gonzalez v. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services; In the Matter of A.J.H.
M2003-02405-SC-S09-JV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

In this interlocutory appeal, we consider whether and under what circumstances grandparents may intervene in proceedings brought to terminate the parent-child relationship. In this case, the grandparents filed a motion in the juvenile court to intervene in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The juvenile court denied the motion, and the grandparents moved for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The trial court granted the motion. Following the Court of Appeals' denial of the grandparents' application for permission to appeal, they filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court; we granted the application. After a thorough review of the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that the motion filed in juvenile court seeking intervention in the termination of parental rights case is to be analyzed under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Using this analysis, we find no error and affirm the denial of the motion to intervene.

State of Tennessee v. Hubert Nard
M2003-02294-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The defendant, in this appeal of right, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) and disorderly conduct. After a careful review of the record, we affirm both convictions. The disorderly conduct conviction is remanded for modification of judgment to conform to the statutory maximum sentence.

In the Matter of T.S.R.
W2003-01321-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kenneth A. Turner

The juvenile court entered an order declaring Appellant the father of T.S.R. and ordered child support. Appellant failed to pay child support and incurred an arrearage of $27,051.68. Appellant petitioned the court for Rule 60.02 relief from the final order and requested a blood paternity test. The DNA test indicated that Appellant was not the father. The trial court relieved Appellant of his ongoing child support but required him to pay the child support arrearage. For the following reasons, we affirm

In re: DMD & JLA
W2003-00987-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

The trial court denied Appellants’ petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights and returned physical custody of children to Mother. We reverse and remand for determination of whether termination is in the best interests of the children. We vacate the order returning physical custody to Mother.

State of Tennessee v. John Lemont Pierce,a.k.a. James Owens, a.k.a. John Lamonte Pierce
M2002-02979-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The defendant, John Lemont Pierce, indicted for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and simple assault, entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering a maximum sentence of 15 years and requiring consecutive service. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. James Ray Bartlett
M2002-01868-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Charles Lee

The defendant, James Ray Bartlett, appeals the trial court's denial of his request for credit for time served in community corrections. Because the defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the cause is dismissed.

William Houston v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00304-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway

Petitioner was convicted by a Giles County jury for several drug-related offenses and was given an effective sentence of 72 years. In his direct appeal to this Court, his conviction was affirmed, and his sentence was reduced to 46 years. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the decision of the post-conviction court and argues three issues on appeal: (1) Whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that trial counsel was effective; (2) whether the post-conviction court erred in its decision with respect to the trial judge's presence in the jury room; and (3) whether newly-discovered evidence of officer/witness's wrong doing and character mandates a new trial. We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Arthur M. Bohanan v. City of Knoxville
E2003-01306-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

The employee, a retired police officer, filed suit seeking workers' compensation benefits. He alleged that his job duties caused him to develop hypertension resulting in permanent partial disability. The employee relies on the statutory presumption of causation for law enforcement officers found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-51-201(a)(1), and concedes that if the employer has rebutted the presumption, there is insufficient evidence establishing a causal relationship between his hypertension and his employment. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude that the City of Knoxville has rebutted the statutory presumption of causation, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Dewayne Jordan
E2003-02351-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

A Rhea County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Dewayne Jordan, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of incest, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly allowed the state to amend the indictment to charge a different date of commission of the offenses; and (2) the indictment failed to inform him of the charges with sufficient particularity. We remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.