State of Tennessee v. Barry Ray Long
W2003-01198-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The Weakley County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for manufacturing not less than .5 ounce or more than 10 pounds of marijuana. The Weakley County Sheriff’s Department found the marijuana pursuant to a search of the defendant’s home based on a search warrant. The sheriff’s department received the search warrant based on information garnered in a non-consensual warrantless search of a portable shed behind the defendant’s home. Due to previous drug-related charges which were later dismissed, the portable shed had been the subject of forfeiture proceedings in 2000. The defendant made no efforts to contest the forfeiture, but the sheriff’s department also made no efforts to remove the portable shed. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search of the portable shed. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant then entered a plea of guilty and purported to reserve this certified question for appeal: Whether or not the search of the storage shed predicated on a search warrant was preceded and based upon a prior warrantless search. Because of the ambiguity of the certified question as presented, we dismiss the appeal.

David Sharp v. State of Tennessee
W2004-00044-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Nancy Herron-Miller, Commissioner

An inmate filed a claim with the Claims Commission contending negligence on the part of the Tennessee Department of Correction in miscalculating his sentence credits. The Commission dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the inmate appealed, and we affirm.

Judith Mae Harber as Trustee of Trust B for the Estate of Edwin Erwin v. Leader Federal Bank For Savings
W2003-01523-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert A. Lanier

This case involves the wrongful payment of funds by Defendant over Plaintiff’s forged signature. The lower court found that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by former Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-4-406, which places a one-year limit on certain claims by bank customers seeking to recover losses occasioned by unauthorized signatures. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

Raymon Haymon v. State of Tennessee
W2003-02535-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Moore

The petitioner, Raymon Haymon, was convicted by a jury in the Dyer County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder. Upon conviction, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that one of the witnesses at his trial had recanted his testimony. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to produce newly discovered evidence. The petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tracy Lorenzo Goodwin, alias Lawanda Carter
E2001-01978-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Honorable Stephen M. Bevil

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County which convicted the defendant, Tracy Goodwin, of two counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of criminally negligent homicide. The issues before us are whether the evidence is sufficient to uphold the convictions, whether the trial court erred in failing to sever the aggravated assault charges from the reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide charges, whether the separate convictions for felony reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, and whether the sentences were excessive. We find that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for reckless aggravated assault because as defined by the statute, reckless aggravated assault requires proof of bodily injury, and no such proof was offered at trial. We find sufficient evidence to support the remaining convictions of felony reckless endangerment and criminally negligent homicide. We further find, with respect to the remaining convictions, that the trial court did not err in failing to sever the trials, the separate convictions do not violate double jeopardy protections, and the sentencing was not excessive. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We remand the case for a new trial on charges of assault as lesserincluded offenses of aggravated assault.

In Re: Petition for Change of Name, Charles Grannis
M2003-01242-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge Mary Ashley Nichols

The trial court denied a Petition for Name Change. Among the allegations the Petitioner raises on appeal are that the master or special judge who denied his Petition was biased against him and that she was not authorized to act as a judge. We do not find sufficient evidence of bias in the record to justify reversal on that ground. We do find that the record is devoid of proper documentation of the basis of the master's authority to sit as a substitute judge. However, we need not determine whether reversal is required because of that deficiency, because we find that the trial court failed to articulate and the record fails to demonstrate any legally sufficient reason for denying the Petition. Therefore, the denial and dismissal of the Petition must be vacated.

State of Tennessee v. George Ratliff
E2003-00830-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

In 1998, the defendant, George E. Ratliff, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for raping his six-year-old daughter and was sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He subsequently filed a direct appeal and a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on the victim's recantation of her testimony. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely, and the defendant appealed. The direct appeal and the error coram nobis appeal were consolidated, and this court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, remanded the matter for a hearing, and stayed the direct appeal pending the trial court's ruling on the error coram nobis petition. See State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2002). On remand, the trial court denied the petition, and the defendant appeals. In his direct appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, in denying his request for individual voir dire of two prospective jurors, and in ruling that the amount of time that lapsed between the victim's complaint and his arrest was irrelevant. Additionally, he argues that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence and affirm the trial court's denial of the petition for writ of error coram nobis.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Laster
E2003-01412-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The appellant, Michael B. Laster, entered pleas of no contest in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to theft of property over $1,000, operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, resisting arrest, and felony failure to appear. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the appellant received an effective four year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant's request for alternative sentencing in the form of community corrections, and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stephanie Hartman v. Daryl Hartman
E2003-02380-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge James W. McKenzie

The divorce judgment approved a MDA which provided that the minor children would reside with their father in Rhea County while mother was working in Atlanta. When not working, mother had custody. Two years after the divorce, father petitioned for custody, alleging that at the time of the divorce it was contemplated that mother would return to Tennessee and share equal parenting time. Mother counter-claimed for custody. Father was awarded primary custody. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for a hearing on the comparative fitness of each parent.

State of Tennessee v. Travis Lamont Williams
E2004-00009-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant, Travis Lamont Williams, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to attempted carjacking, a Class C felony; burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony; and felony vandalism, also a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant received consecutive sentences of six years for the attempted carjacking, two years for the burglary, and one year for the vandalism, for an effective nine-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for enhanced probation and ordered that he serve his sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Western Express, Inc. v. Giovanni Orlando
M2003-01533-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in adopting the medical opinion of Dr. Richard Fishbein over the opinion of Dr. Todd Bonvallet with respect to permanent medical impairment. The employer also contends that the trial court erred in awarding 26% permanent partial disability. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (23 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed ROGER A. PAGE, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J. and RITA STOTTS, SP. J., joined. J. Bartlett Quinn, Chattanooga, Tennessee for appellant, Western Express, Inc. James S. Stephens, Manchester, Tennessee, for appellee, Giovanni Orlando. MEMORANDUM OPINION STANDARD OF REVIEW The review of the findings of the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W. 2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). This Court is not bound by the trial court's findings, but instead conducts its own independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W. 2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1981). FACTUAL BACKGROUND At the time of trial, Giovanni Orlando was thirty-four years old. He grew up and graduated from high school in Italy. After high school, he served in the Italian Army and received an honorable discharge. He then immigrated to the United States. Since coming to the United States, he has worked primarily as a truck driver. The injury in the instant case occurred in March 21. Orlando had been unloading water heaters and awakened the following morning with pain in his back. He had suffered a previous work-related injury to the same area of his back. The previous injury required surgery and Orlando received a court-approved award for permanent partial disability and future medical benefits. OPINIONS OF THE MEDICAL EXPERTS Dr. Todd Bonvallet treated Orlando for his March, 21 back injury. Following a period of conservative treatment, Dr. Bonvallet performed a surgical procedure on Orlando's back. Dr. Bonvallet, in his first deposition taken on September 6, 22, opined that at the time the employee returned to work in April, 22, he had suffered a 12% permanent partial disability to the whole person. Dr. Bonvallet gave a second deposition on December 13, 22 in which he opined that Orlando should receive a 2% permanent partial impairment rating for the second injury since he had already received 1% for the first injury to the same area. Upon cross- examination, Dr. Bonvallet agreed that an additional 1% impairment rating was appropriate and opined that Orlando had a 3% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole as a result of the second back injury. Dr. Richard Fishbein examined Orlando and opined that Orlando retained a 2% permanent partial impairment rating after the second back injury with 5% to 8% attributed to the first injury. Dr. Fishbein then arrived at a rating of 13% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole as a result of the second back injury. The trial court gave more weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Fishbein than to the opinion of Dr. Bonvallet. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court stated that, "[i]n this case the treating physician, for whatever reason, followed his own methods as to the evaluation. In a supplemental deposition, he reluctantly added an additional 1% to his original 2% medical impairment rating. On the other hand, Dr. Fishbein in considerable detail explained his conclusions regarding a 13% medical impairment rating. When comparing the explanation given by the two physicians, I conclude that

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Baron Jenkins
M2003-00974-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Roger A. Page, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5- 6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in holding that the employee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravation of his pre- existing back condition was caused by a June 23, 1999 work-related accident. The employer also argues that the trial court erred in holding that the employee had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a 4% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the same work-related accident. The employer has filed a motion requesting that this Court consider post-judgment facts. Specifically, the employer requests that this Court consider the fact that the employee returned to work for the employer during the pendency of this appeal. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we decline to consider the post- judgment facts. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (23 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed ROGER A. PAGE, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J. and RITA STOTTS, SP. J., joined. David T. Hooper, Brentwood, Tennessee for appellant, Roadway Express, Inc. Peter M. Olson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for appellee, Baron Jenkins. MEMORANDUM OPINION STANDARD OF REVIEW The review of the findings of the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W. 2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). This Court is not bound by the trial court's findings, but instead conducts its own independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W. 2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1981). FACTUAL BACKGROUND At the time of the final proceeding in the trial court, Baron Jenkins was thirty-eight years old and had a high school education. He served in the United States Marine Corps and received an honorable discharge. Since his discharge from service, his employment has consisted of working in a janitorial service, in a tile manufacturing plant, as a landscaper, as a truck delivery person, or in other labor intensive employment. Almost all of his previous employment involved heavy lifting. In June 1999, Jenkins was a "dock checker" at Roadway Express. This job required him to unload freight from trailers and load the freight onto other trailers. On June 23, 1999, Jenkins was lifting a heavy dock plate and injured himself. That evening, he complained of shortness of breath and pain in his rib cage. Jenkins expressed a fear that he might be having a heart attack. He was transported by ambulance to Southern Hills Medical Center where he was treated by Dr. David Schroeder, a board-certified emergency room physician. Dr. Schroeder's examination revealed pain in the chest wall that was treated by an injection of Demerol. Dr. Schroeder opined that Jenkins had pulled a muscle. Jenkins returned to work that evening and indicated on the Employee's Notice of Injury or Recurrence that he had chest pains and back muscle strains around his right rib cage related to pulling up a dock plate at work. On June 24, 1999, the very next day, Roadway Express denied workers' compensation benefits after determining that Jenkins had not suffered a heart attack. Approximately four days after the injury, Jenkins sought emergency treatment at Gateway Medical Center in Clarksville, complaining of a low back injury and pain in his right leg. He was treated by Dr. Stephen Kent. Dr. Kent had previously treated Jenkins on December 13, 1998 for a back injury unrelated to his employment. Jenkins was subsequently referred to Dr. Lloyd Walwyn, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, for an independent medical evaluation. Dr. Walwyn completed a Form C- 32 on

Jennifer Whitley v. Richard Whitley
M2003-00045-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Stella L. Hargrove

This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of property in a marriage of relatively short duration. Prior to marriage, the parties lived for a few months with the husband's parents before moving to a farm purchased by the husband with a down payment provided by his parents.The wife gave birth to the parties' child a few months after the move, and the parties  subsequently married. Twenty-two months later, the wife filed for divorce. Both before and during the marriage, the wife assisted the husband with his cattle farming operation as well as with improvements to the property. The trial court found the farm to be marital property under the doctrine of transmutation, assigned it a value of $100,000, and awarded it to the husband. The trial court awarded most of the farm equipment and forty-eight head of cattle to the husband as his separate property and divided the marital property between the parties, with the husband awarded the remainder of the farm machinery and all but eleven head of cattle, and the wife awarded a 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, the remaining cattle, and a cash judgment of $27,000 for her "substantial contributions to the farm and farming operation." The husband was assigned sole responsibility for the marital debt. The husband appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly classified, valued, and distributed the property. We conclude that the trial court correctly found that the farm was marital property, but erred in its valuation of the farm and in its distribution of the marital property. Accordingly, we modify the trial court's cash judgment to the wife to $11,886.50, which represents one-half of the equity in the farm at the time of the divorce and one-half of the unaccounted-for proceeds from the husband's sale of cattle in violation of an automatic injunction in the case.

Tammy Kay Joiner v. James Alden Griffith
M2003-00536-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Hestle

This appeal involves a child support and visitation dispute. Mother and Father, never married, have two minor children. The parties lived together from 1997 until March 2001, when Father was arrested for domestic assault. Father moved out of the residence. Mother filed a complaint seeking to be the primary residential parent, requested child support and arrearages and asked for temporary support and attorney fees. The juvenile court placed primary custody of the children with Mother, set visitation, and ordered Father to pay $4,000 a month in child support plus $31,586 in arrearages. Father appealed, taking issue with visitation, child support, arrearages, and the court's failure to make findings of fact regarding the alleged domestic assault. Mother appealed claiming the court erred by rejecting most of her claim for her attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's determinations concerning child support and visitation, modify the offset against the arrearage owed for child support, and reverse and remand Mother's request for attorney fees. Further, we find that the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact concerning the domestic abuse charge because the alleged domestic assault was not against a minor.

State of Tennessee v. Roger Staples
M2003-01433-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The appellant, Roger Murel Staples, was convicted by a jury of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years as a Range I, Standard Offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, his sentence, statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument, and the trial court's decision to admit evidence of activity at the appellant's residence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Joy Kennedy
M2003-01745-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

The Defendant, Joy Kennedy, was found guilty by a jury of vehicular homicide, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and reckless driving. However, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, concluding that she had established the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence. The State appealed on the ground that the trial court erred by granting the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The sole issue on appeal is whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the defense of insanity had not been established by clear and convincing evidence. We hold that no reasonable juror could have failed to find that the Defendant was legally insane at the time of the crimes. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Mary Murr Turner
E2004-00225-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The defendant, Mary Murr Turner, pled guilty to accessory after the fact, and the Cocke County trial court sentenced her to one year incarceration as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anna Miller v. Eduardo Miller
W2003-00851-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

This appeal arises from a divorce action. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; and Remanded.
 

Ronnie Gale Martin v. Deborah Elaine Kent Martin
W2003-01968-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Martha B. Brasfield

Husband filed present divorce action against Wife alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Wife answered denying the inappropriate marital conduct and subsequently counter-complained for divorce alleging adultery. Wife amended her countercomplaint to request a legal separation or in the alternative an absolute divorce. The trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce based upon its finding of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded Wife alimony by requiring Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance for three years and, thereafter, pay Wife $50.00 a month. The trial court ordered a property division and required Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of divorce, distribution of marital property and debt, and award of attorney’s fees. We affirm the award of alimony in the amount of $50.00 a month but vacate the award of health insurance and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

Carol Knittig Hazen v. John Thurston Hazen
W2003-00778-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

Wife filed the present divorce action seeking, inter alia, alimony. The trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro based upon a perceived need rather than a demonstrative need. For the following reasons, we reverse.

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth H. Laws
E2003-01463-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

Defendant, Kenneth H. Laws, was indicted by the Washington County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and acquitted of false imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barbara Ann Rodgers (Riggs) v. Charles D. Rodgers, Jr.
E2003-01902-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

Appellant filed a petition to reduce his child support obligation following his loss of employment as a mechanical engineer and his inability to find other employment. Relief was denied, notwithstanding that two children had attained their majority, and the petition was dismissed. Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Gary Baker v. Roane State Community College, et al.
M2003-01163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This case involves the timeliness of a grievance filed by Appellant, an employee of Roane State Community College. The hearing officer determined that such grievance was not filed within the limitations period. Appellant appealed this decision to the Chancery Court of Davidson County, which affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Appellant now appeals to this Court and we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Randy James
M2003-01599-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

The Defendant, Randy James, pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The issue before us is whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the fruits of a search where there were alleged false statements in the affidavit supporting the search warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joann Mallinak Glassell v. Richard Lee Glassell
E2003-01602-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon J. Bell

Joann Mallinak Glassell ("Plaintiff") was represented by attorney James M. Crain ("Crain") throughout divorce proceedings she filed against Richard Lee Glassell ("Defendant"). After a trial, the Trial Court ordered the equity from the sale of the marital residence to be divided equally between the parties. The Trial Court then applied various off-sets to the amount awarded Plaintiff, thereby reducing the net amount of Plaintiff's recovery to $0.00. The Trial Court concluded that Crain's attorney's fee lien was lower in priority to the various off-sets. Crain appeals, claiming the Trial Court improperly subordinated his attorney's fee lien to the off-sets and that his lien should be given priority. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and affirm as modified.