Edmund George Zagorski v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9711-CC-00240
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant Edmund George Zagorski has filed a petition to rehear this cause
pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39 contending that our opinion conflicts with and/or
overlooks principles of law regarding trial counsel’s duties to investigate mitigation
evidence and fully advise a defendant regarding a potential mitigation defense. We
have reviewed all of the arguments raised in the petition, and we find them to be
without merit.

State of Tennessee v. Gerald Robert Stevens, Laurie Ann Williams, and James Darren Brothers Stevens, et al.
02S01-9712-CC-00112
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

We granted this appeal to determine whether a conclusory allegation in an affidavit that information was provided by a “concerned citizen source” is sufficient to establish the presumptive reliability of the information for the issuance of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.1 There is a distinction in Tennessee law between “citizen informants” and “criminal informants” or those from the criminal milieu. Information provided by an unnamed ordinary citizen is presumed to be reliable, and the affidavit need not establish that the source is credible or that the information is reliable. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770, 74 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1983). On the other hand, where information is provided by an anonymous criminal informant, the affidavit must establish (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) the reliability of the informant or the information. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989).
 

Curtis G. Mayes v. Margaret C. Culpepper, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
03A01-9801-CH-00032
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick D. McDonald

This is an appeal from the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Through the entire procedure, including an appeal to the Chancery Court for Knox County, the appellant has been denied unemployment compensation benefits because he had been guilty of misconduct arising out of the scope and course of him employment and  T.C.A . § 50 -7-303( a ) ( 2 ) bars him from recovery of unemployment compensation benefits. We reverse the judgment of the Chancery Court and remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order awarding unemployment benefits as provided by law.

Paula Lynn Barnett vs. Robert McAlister Barnett, III - Concurring
03A01-9709-CH-00414
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Marie Williams

This is a post-divorce action to modify child support and alimony. The mother sought to increase child support, and the father sought to terminate periodic alimony payments. The trial court granted the mother’s request for an increase in child support, with a portion of the child support to be placed in an educational trust, and denied the father’s petition for modification of alimony. Both parties appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify.

Margaret McCormick, v. Donald McCormick
01A01-9801-CH-00019
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

This case concerns a dispute over the division of marital property, alimony, and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Donald F. McCormick (Husband), appeals from the Final Decree of Divorce that, inter alia, awarded Appellee, Margaret Ann McCormick (Wife), proceeds from a 1 Husband’s W-2 form from the Frigidaire Company reveals that his wages for 1996 were $94,063.26. 2 In 1996, Wife’s gross annual earnings were approximately $9,000.00. 2 401K account, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney’s fees.

Loyal Miller vs. Tennessee Board of Paroles - Concurring
01A01-9806-CH-00293
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves the fundamental fairness of the procedures used by the Tennessee Board of Paroles to revoke the parole of a person accused of committing child sexual abuse. The Board revoked the parole based solely on hearsay testimony concerning statements made by his alleged victim. The parolee filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision-making process. After the trial court denied the petition, the parolee appealed to this court. We have determined that the Board’s hearing officer acted arbitrarily and illegally by applying an incorrect standard to determine whether good cause existed for not allowing the parolee to confront or to cross-examine his only accuser.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the parolee’s petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order directing the Board either to conduct a proper parole revocation hearing forthwith or to return the parolee to parole status.

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Kimberly Norfleet v. Tommy Dobbs, Jr.
01A01-9805-CV-00228
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal involves a parent’s efforts to avoid paying child support for her two children. Approximately two years after the Circuit Court for Davidson County awarded custody of the parties’ two children to their father, the children’s mother, with the assistance of a lawyer furnished by the IV-D contractor for Davidson County, filed a petition to eliminate her child support obligation because she was unemployed and her only income was Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments. Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the mother’s petition on the ground that she was voluntarily unemployed. The mother asserts on this appeal that the trial court’s order conflicts with the child support guidelines because she will be required to use her SSI payments to pay her child support. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the mother is voluntarily unemployed and that the trial court’s order is consistent with the child support guidelines. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

Robert Leland Bryant, and wife Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant, Sandry Lynn Todd Bryant, v. James Ashley Bryant
01A01-9806-CV-00337
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Petitioners-Appellants, Robert 1 Sandra Lynn Todd Bryant, wife of Respondent and mother of the minor children involved, joined the Petitioners in the petition to terminate the Respondent’s parental rights. In the petition, she consents to the termination of her parental rights. 2 Respondent’s wife subsequently left the couple’s home in Colorado to pursue job training in Florida. Upon completion of the two month job training course in Florida, she moved to Utah while Respondent continued his military career in Colorado. 2 Leland Bryant and Linda Kay Wolfson Bryant,1 appeal the trial court’s order denying their petition to terminate the parental rights of Respondent-Appellee, James Ashley Bryant, with respect to his minor children, Megan Rae Bryant, born December 13, 1991, and Devon Michael Bryant, born December 30, 1993.

Randall Craig Cobb, v. Sharon Ruben Cobb
01A01-9803-CV-00127
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

In this case Appellant challenges the action of the trial court in denying his application for relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, holding him to be in criminal contempt of court and denying his application for modification of alimony.
 

Carl G. Berning v. State of Tennessee, Department of Corrections
01A01-9804-CH-00180
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The Tennessee Civil Service Commission upheld the termination of a veteran supervisory employee for sexual harassment, conduct unbecoming a state employee, and failure to maintain a satisfactory and harmonious working relationship with fellow employees. The Chancery Court of Davidson County affirmed the Commission’s order. On appeal the employee asserts that he was denied progressive discipline prior to termination, and that he was denied due process of law. On the strength of the proof, he also claims that his conduct does not fit the definition of “conduct unbecoming” or support a conclusion that he failed to maintain a harmonious working relationship, and that his conduct was constitutionally protected. We affirm the trial court.

Scottie Allen Yant v. Arrow Exterminators, Inc.
01A01-9801-CV-00004
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

The manager of an exterminating company brought criminal charges against the owner of a competing company for the alleged theft of a piece of equipment. The general sessions court determined that probable cause existed, but the grand jury declined to indict. The defendant in the criminal case subsequently filed suit for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment to the civil defendant. We affirm.

Charles Walton Wright v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9709-CR-00196
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant’s due process rights were violated when the lower courts dismissed his post conviction petition as timebarred by the three-year statute of limitations since the asserted violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), did not arise until after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.

Estate of Foster Hume, III, Deceased, The University of the South v. Meredith Klank
01S01-9709-PB-00182
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the probate rule of ademption by extinction applies to the specific bequest of a house, where the house is sold at foreclosure before the testator’s death and sales proceeds representing the testator’s interest are identifiable after his death.

State of Tennessee v. William Henry Barney
01S01-9802-CR-00033
Authoring Judge: Justice Aldolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The defendant, William Henry Barney, was convicted of eleven counts of rape of a child and seven counts of aggravated sexual battery. He is currently serving a total effective sentence of eighty years. Upon the Court of Criminal Appeals’s affirmance of these judgments, the defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. We granted the application in order to determine whether the language of the indictment was  sufficient under State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), and to determine whether the multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy. We conclude that the indictment is sufficient under Hill. In addition, we conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, multiple convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery are justified and do not violate the constitutional principles of due process or double jeopardy.

Robby McCurry v. Container Corp. of America, a Division of Jefferson Smurfit Corporation
03S01-9705-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The appellee, Robby McCurry, filed a second motion to rehear on December 28, 1998, petitioning this Court to reconsider our decision in the above styled case. The appellee filed this petition without first seeking permission from this Court as prescribed in Rule 39(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the motion is not well taken.

State of Tennessee v. Kristina Schindler
03S01-9804-CR-00040
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

We granted this appeal to address whether a trial court can consider prior grants of diversion or previously expunged offenses in determining a defendant's suitability for diversion. In the case now before us, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion because the defendant had previously been placed on diversion on two different occasions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's application for judicial diversion. Upon review, we hold that evidence of prior diversions may be considered in determining whether a defendant is a suitable candidate for diversion.

Robert James Watkins v. Inman Construction Corp.
02S01-9710-CH-00098
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Neal Small, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Robert James Watkins, injured his right ankle on February 2, 1995 in the course of his employment for Inman Construction Company. He was temporarily working in Oxford, Mississippi, but was employed to work in Memphis, Tennessee. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found that the plaintiff sustained a permanent partial disability of thirty-five percent to the right leg. The court also found that the plaintiff had been paid temporary total disability benefits for the period prior to October 1, 1995. The trial judge also found that the plaintiff worked sporadically on a part-time basis for the defendant from October 3, 1995 until December 29, 1995 and that plaintiff was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits through that period. The court also found that the plaintiff suffered temporary total disability from the date of the injury until November 7, 1996, excluding the periodfor temporary partial disability, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover additional temporary total compensation for the period from October 1, 1995 until November 7, 1996 except for the aforesaid period for which an award was made for temporary partial disability benefits. The court also directed the defendant to pay the medical expense incurred for treatment of plaintiff by Dr. T. E. Rizk in the sum of $85.. On this appeal, the defendant presents two issues: (1) Whether the trial court's award of temporary total disability benefits following the date of maximum medical improvement was error. (2) Whether the trial court erred in ordering the employer to pay for the medical treatment of Dr. T. E. Rizk. The defendant does not attack the portion of the judgment awarding compensation for 35 percent permanent partial disability to the leg. It is conceded that the plaintiff injured the Achilles tendon of his right ankle while working on a construction site for defendant on February 2, 1995. He was treated conservatively by Dr. Wayne Lamar until May 16, 1995 when Dr. Lamar performed surgery 2

State vs. Tiffany Betts
02C01-9709-CC-00337

State vs. Christopher Eacholes
02C01-9803-CR-00065

State vs. Tony Williams
02C01-9810-CC-00301

Scott vs. Scott
03A01-9708-CH-00305

Simmons vs. Simmons
03A01-9805-CV-00158

Slate vs. Hooper
03A01-9809-CH-00299
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

Olympia Child vs. City Maryville
03A01-9804-CV-00136

Macklin vs. Macklin
03A01-9807-CV-00232