Mitchell L. Darnall v. A+ Homecare, Inc. and James D. Smith
01A01-9807-CV-00347
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from summary judgment granted to the Defendants in a complaint asserting retaliatory discharge with the action based solely upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304.

State of Tennessee v. James Clay Romines
03C01-9804-CC-00140
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge L.T. Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, James Clay Romines, appeals as of right from a ruling of the Blount County Criminal Court revoking his probation. The defendant presents one issue for appellate review: whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to serve eleven days in jail as punishment for a second violation of probation. After a review of the record, briefs of the parties, and appropriate law, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Charles R. Brown
03C01-9806-CC-00213
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge L.T. Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The appellant, Charles R. Brown, appeals as of right from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) by a Blount County jury. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. He was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail before being placed on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-seven days. The defendant was also fined $350. In this direct appeal, the defendant presents two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury.

State of Tennessee v. Ray L. Taylor - Concurring
02S01-9809-CR-00089
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

We granted this appeal to decide whether a defendant’s credibility may be impeached by reference to a prior conviction for a “felony involving dishonesty.” We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach the defendant by asking him whether he had been convicted of any “felonies involving dishonesty.” We hold, however, that the error was harmless.¹

State of Tennessee vs. George Langford - Concurring
02S01-9806-CR-00061
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

We granted this appeal to decide whether: (1) the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated burglary and felony murder committed during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to criminal trespass. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant and that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the defendant’s convictions is affirmed.

State of Tennessee vs. Barry Waddell
01C01-9801-CR-00016
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl Blackburn

The Defendant, Barry Waddell, appeals as of right from his conviction in the Davidson County Crimina l Court. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two (2) counts of rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and two (2) counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years for each count of rape of a child and ten (10) years for each count of aggravated sexual battery, with all sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of seventy (70) years. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him to the maximum period of incarceration for his rape of a child convictions and erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. We affirm in pa rt, and reverse and modify in part.

State of Tennessee vs. Paul Carr Moss, Jr.
01C01-9803-CC-00118
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

The defendant, Paul Carr Moss, Jr., was indicted for the first degree murder of his wife, Peggy Ann Moss. He was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of twenty-five years. The defendant was fined $50,000.00.

Deborah Lorraine Brooks v. Rickey Lemar Brooks
03S01-9804-CV-00034
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Earl G. Murphy

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in their determinations of the amount of child support to be paid by the child’s father. Although both the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that the total monthly payment should be increased from four hundred dollars ($400.00) to six hundred fifty dollars ($650.00), each court reached its conclusion upon different reasons. We conclude that both courts erred and that the base amount of child support should have been $1,241.00 per month. In addition, Mr. Brooks shall pay the child's private education expenses per the parties agreement.
 

James Alford v. Bruce Hardwood Floors
02S01-9808-CH-00083
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,

Catherine Mayo v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
02S01-9807-CH-00076
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On or about August 24, 1993, the plaintiff, Catherine Mayo, was engaged in her regular employment duties as manager for Pizza Hut, when she suffered total permanent disabling injuries. An armed robber inflicted a massive shotgun blast to the plaintiff's entire abdomen. On August 11, 1997, the plaintiff filed a Petition for Approval of Final and Lump Sum Settlement under the Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court entered an order approving the final and cash lump sum settlement, awarding total permanent disability benefits at the maximum rate of recovery through age 65 pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27, and lifetime future medical expenses. However, judgment was reserved for a later determination by the trial court on the issue of the medical provision of a heated hydrotherapy pool to be installed at the plaintiff's residence. Prior to May 11, 1998, the plaintiff submitted to the trial court medical reports of two physicians in support of her request for an in-home hydrotherapy pool. On May 11, 1998, the trial court considered the merits of plaintiff's motion. On June 29, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying the request for the medical apparatus, more specifically described as the in-ground heated hydrotherapy pool. Since the plaintiff is making a most unusual request that the defendant install an in- ground hydrotherapy pool at her residence as a medical apparatus that is medically necessary, it is beneficial to set forth the underlying facts of this request. At the time of this unfortunate event, the plaintiff, age 47, was a resident of Jackson, Tennessee, but now resides in Buffalo, New York, where she has family support. The shotgun blast injured the plaintiff's chest, solar plexus, abdomen, abdominal wall, and side. Dr. Joseph Spychalski, the treating physician, found that the plaintiff sustained a complete obliteration of the anterior abdominal musculature, and that, as a consequence, she lacks the ability to efficiently sit, transfer, ambulate, bend, or lift. The plaintiff will require lifelong physical therapy to maintain her back muscles and range of motion. Due to the shotgun blast, the 2

02A01-9712-GS-00298
02A01-9712-GS-00298
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison

Planet Rock vs. Regis Ins.
02A01-9807-CV-00218
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison

Little Six Corporation vs. Ruth Johnson, Commissioner
01A01-9806-CH-00285
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Buford vs. Cunningham
01A01-9806-CH-00325
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Advanced Sales vs. Wilson Co.
01A01-9805-CH-00245
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith

State vs. Lowell Clayton Gredig, Jr.
03C01-9801-CC-00017
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

David A. Roettger v. Metro Government of Nashville & Davidson County, et al
01S01-9805-CH-00089
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carol L. Mccoy

Jenny C. Walker vs. James M. Walker
M2001-00087-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
After the parties separated, the husband borrowed a substantial amount of money to complete the renovation of marital property and to pay household expenses. The trial court divided the marital property pursuant to divorce, classifying the husband's post-separation loans as marital debt. The wife argues on appeal that the trial court erred in its classification and division of the post-separation debts. We affirm the trial court.

State vs. Joel Guilds
01C01-9804-CC-00182

State vs. Stanley Abell
02C01-9805-CR-00129
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

State vs. Stanley Abell
02C01-9805-CR-00129
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

State vs. Charles Bledsoe
02C01-9809-CC-00269

Southers vs. Southers
03A01-9802-CV-00001

Mark S. Miller vs. State
03C01-9803-CR-00108

Cox v. Hartford Accident
03S01-9706-CH-00063
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After conducting two separate hearings on this case, the trial court found that the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. The trial court further held that the insurance carrier would be liable for 75 percent of the plaintiff's disability and the Second Injury Fund would be liable for 25 percent of the plaintiff's disability. The Second Injury Fund presents the following issues for our review: I. Whether obesity is a compensable preexisting permanent physical disability to warrant recovery from the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-28(a). II. Whether the trial [court] erred in holding the Fund liable for 25% of the award. We reverse the judgment of the trial court holding the Second Injury Fund liable and dismiss the Second Injury Fund from this case. BACKGROUND ON THE FIRST HEARING At the time of the first hearing on June 14, 1994, the plaintiff was 33 years of age, stood over six feet tall, and weighed close to 4 pounds. He testified that most of his family is overweight and that he has always been a large person. The plaintiff's wife testified that her husband has lost some weight in the past but that he has always been heavy. After graduating from high school, the plaintiff's employment history included working as a small engine repairman, heavy equipment operator, carpenter, factory worker, meat processor, sewing machine operator, and tire builder. The plaintiff eventually returned to school and obtained an associate's degree in accounting from Draughon's College. Draughon's College placed the plaintiff with Monday Realty, where he worked over four years as a bookkeeper three days a week and as a maintenance worker two days a week. When the plaintiff was hired by Monday Realty, he weighed approximately 31 pounds. He testified that he had some normal limitations due to his weight and that his employer made accommodations for him in that respect. For example, the plaintiff did not have to do any roofing work or crawl under houses. 2