State of Tennessee v. Charles Cox
The defendant, Charles Cox, stands convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to 11 months, 29 days in the county jail for the misdemeanor and to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul William Perry, Sr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Paul William Perry, Sr., appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He originally pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and vandalism between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. Perry was granted an alternative sentence of four and a half years with the Corrections Management Corporation. Perry admits that he violated the terms of his sentence; however, he argues that the trial court erred by revoking the sentence and ordering confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Wesley Lacey
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Brian Wesley Lacey, of 12 counts of the rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of sexual battery. The trial court imposed sentences of 20 years for each rape of a child conviction, eight years for both aggravated sexual battery convictions, and one year for the conviction of sexual battery and ordered partially consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of 60 years’ incarceration to be served at 100 percent. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting an audio recording into evidence without first conducting a hearing outside the presence of the jury as required by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and by imposing consecutive sentences. We discern no error in the defendant’s convictions but do find that the trial court erroneously ordered the defendant to serve 100 percent of his convictions of aggravated sexual battery in counts one and nine as a “child rapist.” The case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment for those counts. The remainder of the defendant’s sentences are affirmed, and the correction of these judgments does not alter the total effective sentence. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Huedel Sparkman
A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Huedel Sparkman, of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, class B felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of 25 years’ incarceration to be served as a Range III, persistent offender, consecutively to any unserved sentence. In this appeal as of right, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lawrence D. Ralph
The Defendant, Lawrence D. Ralph, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense; DUI per se, fourth offense; driving on a revoked driver’s license, fifth offense; violation of the habitual traffic offender status; and two counts of evading arrest. The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction with the first count and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the habitual traffic offender conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years each for the DUI, fourth offense conviction; the habitual traffic offender status conviction; and the felony evading arrest conviction, to be served consecutively for an effective 12-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of DUI, fourth offense and (2) that the trial court’s sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joyce Via v. Larry Edward Oehlert, Sr.
This appeal arises out of a complaint to dissolve a partnership. The plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant, an unmarried couple, acquired real property through joint efforts. She further alleged that she contributed to the improvement of the property and an increase in its value, giving rise to a partnership for profit and a right to a distribution of the partnership’s assets following dissolution. The defendant denied that a partnership existed and counterclaimed for damages and attorney’s fees arising out of the plaintiff’s refusal to vacate the property following their break-up. At the ensuing bench trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the plaintiff’s claims. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, specifically finding that the plaintiff was unable to prove the existence of an express or implied partnership for profit between the parties. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Alexandra J.D.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of the father’s petition to be named the minor child’s primary residential parent. Finding that the father met his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the requested modification and that the change was in the child’s best interest, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Ardeshir Yavari Baigvand
Plaintiff foreclosed on defendant's property and filed suit in Sessions Court to obtain possession of the property. Defendant appealed the Judgment for possession to Circuit Court, which granted plaintiff summary judgment. Defendant has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court, awarding possession of the property to plaintiff. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Susan Wisdom v. Wellmont Health System
The trial judge ruled against defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment because there were disputed issues of material fact. The trial court authorized an interlocutory appeal, which we granted. Upon consideration of the case, we conclude, as did the trial judge, there are disputed issues of material fact, affirm the Judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Hall
The defendant, Charles Hall, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of alternate theories of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The court merged the second count into the first count and sentenced the defendant as a repeat violent offender to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the pretrial photographic identification by the victim was overly suggestive and the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing or rule on his motion to suppress the identification; (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence that a small child was present during the commission of the robbery; (3) he was dissuaded from testifying because of the comments of the prosecutor and trial court; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (5) the trial court erred in determining that he was a repeat violent offender; and (6) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Parham
The defendant, Randy Parham, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; theft of property valued at $1000 or more, a Class D felony; and domestic assault causing bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to thirty-five years at 100% for the attempted first degree murder conviction, fifteen years at 100% for the aggravated robbery conviction, six years at 35% for the theft conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction. Finding the defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for his felony convictions be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of fifty-six years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his felony convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by not merging the aggravated robbery conviction with the theft conviction and the attempted murder conviction with the assault conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing. Based on our review, we |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terence Alan Carder
The defendant, Terence Alan Carder, appeals the order entered against him by the McNairy County Circuit Court, ordering that he pay $80,000 in restitution. The defendant pled guilty to theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to two years of probation following the service of sixty days in jail. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to pay $80,000 in |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Gabriel J.M., Jeffrey Darryl Cranfield, v. Lori Jane Martin
Petitioner filed to establish his parentage of the child born to defendant, Lori Jane Martin. He asked to have his parentage established, that he share parenting time, and expressed the desire to provide child support, as well as pay half the medical expenses for the mother and child. He also asked that the child then bear his last name. In a series of motions, the mother moved to relocate to Hawaii, which the trial court denied. She then moved the Court to allow her to move to North Carolina to allow her to pursue a graduate degree. The trial court then allowed this move, and entered a series of orders relating to visitation, travel, etc. The mother appealed to this Court and we remand to the trial court because the remaining issues that the petitioner raised in his Petition have not been ruled upon by the trial court. The appeal was premature. Case remanded. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Gurshell Dhillon, MD v. State of Tennessee Health Related Boards
This appeal involves a doctor’s challenge to disciplinary charges brought against him by the Department of Health, Division of Health Related Boards. After the trial court denied the doctor’s request for a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendant from proceeding with a hearing on the disciplinary charges, the doctor filed a notice of appeal to this court. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims raised by the doctor, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joni Lynn Jennings v. Mark Allan Jennings
After Husband and Wife filed cross petitions for orders of protection, they entered Consent Injunctions restricting communications between them. Subsequently, the parties filed competing petitions for contempt, alleging violations of the Consent Injunctions. On appeal, Husband argues that the Consent Injunctions were improperly entered, and therefore, that the trial court’s criminal contempt conviction, which was based upon violations of such injunctions, cannot stand. We affirm the decision of the chancery court, and finding the appeal frivolous, we remand for a determination of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennie F. Ingraham v. Patrick Garrett Ingraham
After eighteen years of marriage, Jennie F. Ingraham (“Wife”) sued Patrick Garrett Ingraham (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment on December 7, 2009, inter alia, granting Wife a divorce and dividing the marital property. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the valuation and distribution of the marital property. Wife raises additional issues concerning the property distribution and attorney fees. We affirm as to the Trial Court’s valuation of items of marital property, the determination that the Exxon stock is Husband’s separate property, and the denial of an award to Wife of attorney’s fees. We, however, remand this case for proof on the issue of whether Husband’s combined SEP and IRA fall under the definition contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) pursuant to our Supreme Court’s Opinion in Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2009). |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Leta V. Myers v. Robert A. Myers
Leta V. Myers (“Mother”) and Robert A. Myers (“Father”) were divorced in 1999. Approximately ten years later, Father filed a petition seeking to have his child support payment reduced after the oldest of the parties’ four children became emancipated. Mother responded to the petition. Mother also filed a counter-petition seeking a modification of the parenting plan as well as to have Father found in contempt of court for willfully violating numerous provisions of the final decree. When Father failed to respond timely to the counter-petition, Mother filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion for default. Approximately three hours after the order granting the default judgment was entered, Father filed a response to the counter-petition. The trial court eventually found Father in contempt of court for numerous violations of the final decree. After Father’s motion to set aside the default judgment was denied, Father appealed challenging only the initial entry of the default judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Larry C. Thompson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Defendant, Larry C. Thompson, Jr., has appealed from the trial court’s order which denied defendant’s “Motion to Reopen and Suspend Sentence.” The sentence which defendant sought to “reopen” and suspend was entered May 10, 2004. The motion to “reopen” and suspend the sentence was not filed until over five years later in July 2009. After a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Luis Castanon v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Luis Castanon, filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301-313. Petitioner sought DNA testing of evidence in the trial resulting in his convictions for four counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary. The State filed a response in opposition to the petition, and the trial court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that Petitioner had not satisfied the statutory requirements to authorize DNA testing. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition and by failing to require the State to submit proof that “DNA evidence” no longer existed. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermario Divine Warfield
The defendant, Jermario Divine Warfield, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement, which he now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Martez Rhodes
The defendant, Michael Martez Rhodes, pursuant to a plea agreement, entered an Alford “best interest” plea of guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. The agreement provided for a four-year sentence for each conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying probation and in imposing consecutive sentences. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. However, we note the transcript shows an Alford “best-interest” guilty plea. The judgment reflects a plea of nolo contendere. We remand for a correction of the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Blaskis
In November 2006, the Putnam County grand jury indicted Appellant, Robin Blaskis, for one count of theft over $60,000. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss based upon the violation of her right to a speedy trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss was correct because the four factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), did not weigh in her favor. We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Veronica Lynn Floyd
The defendant, Veronica Lynn Floyd, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of theft of property over $10,000, Class C felonies, and one count of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. She was sentenced as a Range I offender to five years on each of the theft over $10,000 convictions, with two of the counts to be served concurrently and one count consecutively to the others, and three years on the theft over $1000 conviction, to be served consecutively to the other counts, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years. The defendant was ordered to serve nine months of her sentence in the county jail with the remaining term on community corrections. On appeal, she argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David A. Romano v. Tony Parker, Warden
The petitioner, David A. Romano, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner pled guilty to one count of Class D felony forgery, two counts of Class E felony forgery, and one count of Class A misdemeanor theft of property. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of twelve years, two six-year sentences, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the respective convictions. He was further ordered to serve the sentences in confinement. After a period, the trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to serve the balance of the sentences on probation; however, his probation was later revoked and the petitioner remainsincarcerated to date. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to allow him to serve his sentence on probation because his sentence was greater than ten years, which precluded his eligibility to receive a probationary sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is currently restrained pursuant to an illegal sentence, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Fayette County Circuit Court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raynard Hill, Sr. v. Southwest Tennessee Community College
This is an employee discharge case. Plaintiff was an at-will employee who alleged that his termination violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in his employment contract. The Tennessee Claims Commission dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals |