In Re: Matter of Kaitlyn M.W., Nathan A.W. v. Crystal D.S.P.
This is a child custody case. The mother and father were never married to each other; the child was born when both were teenagers. Under the parenting plan, the mother was designated as the primary residential parent and the father had parenting time every weekend. After the father married, disputes ensued; many were disputes between the father’s wife and the child’s mother. The father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to designate him as the child’s primary residential parent. He alleged, among other things, that the child was often tardy or absent from school, that the mother lacked stability, and that mother prevented him from exercising his parenting time. The trial court found no material change in circumstances and declined to change custody. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell Dwayne Gentry v. Jerica Renae Gentry
In this divorce case after lengthy trial, the Trial Court designated the mother as the primary residential parent, awarded the mother alimony, child support, and attorney's fees. The father appealed, asking the Trial Court be reversed on the award of primary care, and the alimony award to the mother. The mother appeals the issue of whether the father was entitled to appeal, since he had been held in contempt of court. Upon consideration of the issues, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Mills, et al. v. John H. Booth, II, et al.
On November 8, 2008, James Turlington and his wife, Altha Turlington, were killed in an automobile accident after their car tuned left in front of a vehicle being driven by John H. Booth, II (“Booth”). Initially, it was believed that the Turlington vehicle was being driven by Altha Turlington. It was determined two days later that the Turlington vehicle was being driven by James Turlington. An accident reconstructionist later concluded that while the Turlington vehicle did turn in front of the Booth vehicle, the Turlington vehicle would have had sufficient time to complete its turn without any collision taking place if Booth had not been speeding. A complaint was filed on November 10, 2009, by Altha Turlington’s daughter, Patricia Mills. The Trial Court determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the day of the accident, that the discovery rule could not be used to extend when the statute of limitations began to run, and the complaint had not been filed within the applicable one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Joe Lee v. Charles E. Ridenour, Trustee, et al.
In December of 2008, Robert Joe Lee (“Plaintiff”) sued Charles E. Ridenour, Trustee, and FSG Bank National Association (“FSG Bank”) seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment with regard to two trust deeds, and an injunction preventing FSG Bank from foreclosing on the real property named in the trust deeds. After a trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Judgment on February 25, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that the trust deeds created a valid enforceable lien on the named real property, and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Saundra Kay (Pace) Mason v. James E. Mason
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage, with one minor child born of the marriage. The wife was designated as the primary residential parent, and the husband was required to pay alimony and child support. The wife appeals the amount of child support, the alimony award, and the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees. The husband argues that he was entitled to relief from his pendente lite child support payments while he was out of work recovering from several surgeries. We reverse the trial court’s holding on the husband’s pendente lite child support, affirm the remainder of the trial court’s holding, and remand. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Marcus Welcome v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Marcus Welcome, was convicted by a Knox County jury of criminal responsibility for aggravated robbery. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in confinement. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Welcome, 280 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Wayne Robinson
Appellant, Terry Wayne Robinson, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI seventh offense. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of DUI. Appellant pled guilty to DUI, seventh offense. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Appellant to four years as a Range II, multiple offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed. Appellant argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for DUI. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Chandler Daniels
Appellant William Chandler Daniels pled guilty to a charge of theft of property valued at more than $10,000. The plea agreement stipulated that Appellant’s sentence was to be three years, with the manner of service and restitution to be determined by the court. The completed judgment form indicates that Appellant was sentenced to serve his three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It also provides that “[r]estitution is reserved pending a hearing.” At a subsequent hearing, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $2,000 in restitution. In this appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s authority to order restitution in combination with a custodial sentence as well as the court’s evaluation of the appropriate amount of restitution. We conclude that the trial court was permitted to order restitution; however it did not consider Appellant’s ability to pay or specify the time or amount of payment. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clarence D. Hayes
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of first degree felony murder, and he received a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he arguesthat (1) the trial court denied his right to counsel at his motion for new trial hearing; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing a lay witness to provide expert testimony. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dawn Ann Davis (Goodwin) v. Daniel Pace Goodwin
In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of marital property. She asserts that the parties’ marital residence is her separate property and that the trial court erred in awarding Husband a share of the net proceeds following its court-ordered sale. Wife contends that she purchased the property during the marriage with her separate, premarital funds, that it was titled and financed in her name only, and that she paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the property. We agree that the trial court erred and conclude that the marital residence is Wife’s separate property. However, because the property increased in value during the marriage, we remand to the trial court to determine whether Husband substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation. Reversed and Remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Estate of Curtis Rinda, Terry Abernathy, Administrator
Appellant, the Estate of the Decedent herein, appeals the Chancery Court of McNairy County’s denial of the Estate’s exception to a claim for Decedent’s funeral expenses. Decedent’s brother, the Appellee herein, held a power of attorney for his father (who is also Decedent’s father). Appellee exercised the power of attorney to arrange Decedent’s funeral and to pay for that funeral with the father’s funds. The claim, which was filed in Appellee’s name only, was excepted by the Estate, on grounds that Appellee had no standing to file the claim because he did not, in fact, pay the funeral expenses. The trial court allowed the claim, but held that it was payable to the father. The Estate appeals. We find that the existence and amount of the claim are supported by the record, and that Appellee’s power of attorney authorized him : (1) to bind the father to the funeral contract, (2) to pay the funeral expenses from the father’s funds, and (3) to file a claim against the Estate, on behalf of the father, to recoup those expenses from the Estate. The decision reached by the trial court is affirmed. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron T. James v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Aaron T. James, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and resulting sixty-year sentence. He contends that the trial court committed plain error by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the need for unanimity as to the theory of guilt, (2) failing to require the State to elect a theory of guilt, and (3) failing to correct the prosecutor’s misstatement of law during closing argument. He also contends that (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to or request corrections for the first three issues and (5) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise these issues on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony C. Brown v. Tennessee Department of Safety
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Commissioner of the Department of Safety to challenge the seizure of his Chevrolet Suburban incident to his arrest for drug related charges and the subsequent forfeiture of his vehicle. An Administrative Judge issued an initial order, finding the Department had carried its burden of proof and established that Petitioner’s vehicle was being used to facilitate the sale of illicit drugs and ordering that Petitioner’s vehicle be forfeited. The Commissioner’s designee affirmed the forfeiture. Petitioner then filed a petition for judicial review with the Davidson County Chancery Court which affirmed the forfeiture by the Department. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr., and wife, Linda Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.
Plaintiffs initially filed suit against Royal Group, among others. In its answer, Royal Group alleged the comparative fault of Aaron Rents, Inc. Because the one-year statute of limitations had run, Plaintiffs utilized Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119’s ninetyday window to amend their complaint to add Aaron Rents as a defendant. However, in its answer, Aaron Rents then identified Fulmarque, Inc. as a comparative tortfeasor. Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to add Fulmarque as a defendant, but summary judgment was granted to Fulmarque based upon the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119 authorizes successive ninety-day windows in which additional defendants may be named. We are asked to interpret whether the term “applicable statute of limitations” as used in the statute, and appearing in the phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations,” refers only to the one-year limitation period for personal injury or to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. We find that the term does not simply refer to the one year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. Therefore, because Aaron Rents was “named in an a amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque. Bearing these principles in mind, we find that the term “applicable statute of limitations” as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, and appearing in the phrase “or named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitation,” does not refer simply to the one-year limitation period for personal injury, but also to the limitation period as extended by the ninety-day window. As such, because Aaron Rents was “named in an amended complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations[,]” and because Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name Fulmarque within ninety days from Aaron Rents’ identification of Fulmarque in its answer, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Fulmarque based upon a running of the statute of limitations. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed, and this cause remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John F. Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks reversal of trial court’s affirmance of disciplinary board proceeding finding inmate guilty of solicitation of staff in violation of Tennessee Department of Correction policy and grant of judgment on the record to the Tennessee Department of Corrections. Petitioner asserts that the decision of the disciplinary board was unsupported by material evidence and was procedurally defective. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Cooper, Individually and of Behalf of the Heirs at Law of Leslie Phillipsen v. Thomas N. Tabb, M.D., Individually, Thomas N. Tabb, P.C., and Perinatal Associates, P.C.
This medical malpractice case involves the reconsideration of an order granting a new trial. The patient, in her second trimester of pregnancy, presented at the hospital with abdominal pain and bleeding. Her treating physician consulted with a maternal-fetal specialist physician. The patient suffered a placental abruption, and the fetus died in utero. Later that day, the patient developed a blood-clotting disorder. She died that evening. The patient’s husband filed this lawsuit against the treating physician, the hospital and its employees, and the maternal-fetal specialist physician. A settlement was reached with all of the defendants except for the maternal-fetal specialist, and a jury trial was held as to only the specialist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant specialist. The trial court granted the plaintiff husband’s motion for a new trial. Three years later, the defendant specialist filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its order granting a new trial. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion and reinstated the jury verdict. The plaintiff husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider its initial order, and that the trial judge’s remarks, taken as a whole, indicate he was not satisfied with the jury verdict. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timotheus Lamar Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timotheus Lamar Johnson, pled guilty to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery in exchange for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Don Siddall
The Defendant, Don Siddall, was found guilty in a bench trial by the Hamilton County Criminal Court of two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-13-302 (2010). He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement, suspended after time served. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficientto support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victims to be exempt from the rule of sequestration. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin E. Shepard
The defendant, Kevin E. Shepard, was convicted after a bench trial of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to two years, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Lee Williams
Appellant, Kevin Lee Williams, pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County General Sessions Court to two counts of domestic assault. The general sessions court sentenced Appellant to two concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Appellant subsequently appealed his plea to the Montgomery County Circuit Court arguing that his plea was entered involuntarily. The circuit court held a hearing, but the hearing was limited to the issue of sentencing. Appellant appeals from the circuit court’s refusal to consider whether his plea was entered voluntarily based upon provisions set out in Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because we have determined that Rule 37 does not apply to proceedings in general sessions courts, we affirm the circuit court’s determination with regard to limiting the hearing to an appeal of the imposed sentence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Dewayne Jordan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony D. Jordan, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David M. Olvera v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, David M. Olvera, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2), -403(b). This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Olvera, No. M2004-02090-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 3262932 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 2, 2005), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. May 1, 2006). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arturo Jaimes-Garcia
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Arturo Jaimes-Garcia, of multiple drug offenses relating to three different drug sales, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the Drug-Free School Zone statute is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case; (3) the trial court improperly enhanced his punishment because the State did not give him adequate notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (5) three of the Judgment of Conviction forms contain errors. The State contends that this appeal should be dismissed because the Defendant’s amended motion for new trial was not timely filed, and he failed to file a timely notice of appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly permitted the Defendant to file an amended motion for new trial. Therefore, we review the issue properly preserved by his original motion for new trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain all of his convictions. We conclude, however, that two of those convictions violate his double jeopardy protections. Those convictions are, therefore, merged or dismissed in accordance with the reasoning below. Further, we have reviewed forplain error the issues the Defendant failed to properly preserve but hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of those issues. This case is remanded for the entry of corrected judgments in accordance with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Anthony McNack
The Defendant, Mark Anthony McNack, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community correction sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in calculating his credit for time served. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence but conclude that the Defendant is entitled to credit for time served until the violation warrant was issued. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for the correction of the judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lance Sandifer, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Tornita Crenshaw, & Glenard Thorne
Based upon events on November 7, 2006, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellants, Tornita Crenshaw, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Lance Sandifer, and Cortez Thorne for two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. In addition, Appellants Crenshaw, Cunningham, and Thorne were indicted for two counts of facilitation to commit aggravated rape; Appellants Crenshaw and Cunningham were indicted for two counts of coercion of a witness; and Appellant Sandifer was indicted for four counts of aggravated rape. Appellants were tried jointly in August 2008. Appellants were convicted of the following crimes: Appellant Crenshaw – one count of robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of coercion of a witness; Appellant Cunningham – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of coercion of a witness; Appellant Thorne – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; Appellant Sandifer – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, four counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Appellants to the following effective sentences: Appellant Crenshaw – twenty-three years; Appellant Cunningham – fifty-two years; Appellant Thorne – fifty-two years; Appellant Sandifer – onehundred and eight years. Appellants now argue several issues on appeal. These issues include: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions (all Appellants); (2) that the trial court erred in not apply mitigating factors, applying enhancement factors, the weight given to the factors and imposing consecutive sentences (all Appellants); (3) that the trial court failed to merge the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions into either aggravated robbery or aggravated rape convictions (Appellants Sandifer, Thorne, and Cunningham); (4) that the trial court failed to grant Appellants’ motions for severance (Appellants Thorne and Cunningham); (5) that the trial court failed to merge Appellant Sandifer’s four convictions for aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape as one single act of rape; (6) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant Thorne’s motion in limine to exclude the victims from the courtroom; and (7) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant Thorne’s motion to require the State to elect the facts upon which it was relying for the two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Appellants’ issues do not require either the reversal of any of their convictions or an adjustment to their sentences. For this reason, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |