Charles Montague v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
M2010-01653-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The Petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

John Gallon, et al. v. Harry Elberson, et al.
M2009-01667-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

The plaintiff home buyers filed suit against two home inspectors and a home inspection company after discovering defects in the home that were not mentioned in the inspection report. The court found that the defendants were negligent and granted the plaintiffs a judgment for damages against the home inspectors and the inspection company, individually, jointly and severally. The defendants argue on appeal that the judgment was not supported by the evidence and that in holding them individually liable, the court pierced the corporate veil without the proof of the extraordinary circumstances normally required for a court to do so. We affirm the finding of liability and the judgment for damages, but we vacate the judgment as to one of the individual defendants, because the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that he was in partnership with the other individual defendant.

Jessica Hooper McQuade (now Burnett) v. Michael Vincent McQuade
M2010-00069-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. McMillan

This is a divorce appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction. The parties, the parents of one minor child, resided in Tennessee when divorce proceedings were initiated in the Tennessee trial court. The trial court entered a pendente lite order designating the father as the child's primary residential parent and setting the mother's child support obligation. Before the trial, a special master made a recommendation on the mother's child support obligation. In May 2008, after a trial, the Tennessee trial court entered an order declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as primary residential parent, but did not rule on child support. By the time of the divorce order, both parties had moved to Kentucky. Almost immediately afterward, the mother filed an objection regarding the amount of her child support obligation, and the Tennessee trial court entered an order temporarily modifying her child support. In February 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. The Tennessee trial court conducted a hearing on the mother's objection to the amount of child support and her petition to modify the designation of primary residential parent. It declined to change the designation of primary residential parent, and also held that the mother owed no back child support arrearage. Both parties appeal. We hold that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Tennessee trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's petition to change the designation of primary residential parent. We also hold that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the mother's request for modification of child support. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's orders modifying the parenting plan and modifying child support.

In Re: Jack H. L. B-K.
M2010-00561-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Denise Andre

Father appeals the trial court's decision to allow Mother to relocate to California with the parties' minor child. Mother and Father lived separately in California when their only child was born. Mother moved with the minor child to Tennessee in April 2008; Father also moved to Tennessee to be near the child. A year later, Father filed a Petition to Register a Foreign Decree and Modify and Enforce Visitation in the Williamson County Juvenile Court. In June 2009, Mother notified Father she intended to return to California with their child and sought court permission to do so. When the juvenile court referee denied the relocation, Mother sought a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge. Following a full hearing, the juvenile court judge granted Mother's request to relocate finding that Father, who did not have substantially equal parenting time, failed to carry his burden under the parental relocation statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-108(d)(1). We affirm the trial court's findings that Father did not prove that Mother's move is not for a reasonable purpose, poses a specific or serious threat of harm to the child, or is vindictive. We also affirm the trial court's decision denying Mother's request for attorney's fees and deny her request for attorney's fees on appeal.

In the matter of: Amber M. S. and Stefanie L. S.
M2010-00873-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr., J.
Trial Court Judge: Barry Tatum, Judge
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two oldest children. The children were first removed in 1998. Mother briefly regained custody in 2001 only to have the children removed again when Mother's aunt successfully petitioned for custody. Mother moved to Arizona in 2001 and has had very little contact with the children since that time. When the aunt became unable to care for the children, they were placed in the custody of DCS and have resided with foster families ever since. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents and Father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights on March 9, 2009. Following a trial in February 2010, the trial court granted DCS's petition on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, abandonment by willful failure to support, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and upon the finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. We affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights.

State of Tennessee v. Duantez Cornell Jenkins
M2009-00788-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

Defendant, Duantez Cornell Jenkins, was indicted for possession, within a school zone, and with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. In the same indictment, Robert Lee Archibald, Jr. (Archibald), was indicted for the same offense, in addition to two other charges. All charges were the result of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized which forms the basis of the charges against him. The trial court entered an order granting the motion and dismissed the charges against defendant. The State appeals. Based upon the record and briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Mary Cathleena Blindt
M2010-00180-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell, Judge

A Bedford County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Mary Cathleena Blindt, for three counts of prescription fraud, two counts of forgery, and one count each of theft, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, and failure to appear. Following guilty pleas and a sentencing hearing, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing, ordered consecutive sentencing, and imposed the maximum sentence within the range for three of the defendant's convictions. The defendant also correctly notes an error on the judgment forms. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments in part and remand the case for correction of an error on one of the judgment forms.

Robert J. Skillen v. State of Tennessee
M2010-01398-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The Petitioner, Robert J. Skillen, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rokisha Lashia Alderson v. State of Tennessee
M2010-00896-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

The Petitioner, Rokisha Lashia Alderson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, she argues that the statute of limitations was tolled because she was misled by prison officials about her minority status. After our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the petition.

State of Tennessee v. Steven Cornell Gray
W2009-01611-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The defendant, Steven Cornell Gray, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but upon our review of the case, we affirm this conviction.

Henry Johnson v. Tony Parker, Warden
W2010-00563-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Lee Moore, Jr.

The pro se petitioner, Henry Johnson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. He was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated burglary and was sentenced to life imprisonment on August 19, 2009. On appeal, he argues that: the indictment against him was defective; the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or appointment of counsel; and he was subject to double jeopardy as a result of the indictment. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Matthew R. Hakoda v. State of Tennessee
M2009-01152-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve Dozier

Petitioner, Matthew R. Hakoda, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Debra M. Barkes, et al. v. River Park Hospital, Inc.
M2006-01214-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry B. Stanley, Jr.

River Park Hospital has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider its opinion filed on October 20, 2010. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and appellate briefs, from all of which we conclude that our opinion addressed and considered all issues raised by River Park in its appeal. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is respectfully denied and the costs of this petition are taxed to River Park Hospital, Inc., d/b/a River Park Hospital, for which execution may issue if necessary.

Shemain Sherille Riley, et al. v. Edith Swift
M2009-01717-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Jane McClendon

The General Sessions Court awarded the plaintiffs an $8,500 judgment for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. The pro se defendant attempted to appeal the judgment to the Circuit Court, but failed to have the case docketed within 45 days after filing the notice of appeal, as is required by Davidson County Local Rule 20(b). The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of untimeliness and to enforce the order of the General Sessions Court. The defendant did not respond to the motion, nor did she appear for the motion hearing. The Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and made the judgment of the General Sessions Court the judgment of the Circuit Court. The defendant then retained counsel, who filed a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment eight months after it was rendered. The Circuit Court denied the motion. We affirm.

Fieldstone Farms Homeowners Association, et al. v. Cavender Enterprises, LLC
M2010-00233-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The trial court found that a parcel designated as a recreational facility in a planned unit development was a "lot" under the terms of the governing declarations such that it could not be subdivided or subjected to a revised use. Under the original declaration, the recreational parcel was expressly excluded within the definition of lot but the later supplemented declaration omits the exclusion. Finding that according to its terms the Supplementary Declaration could not conflict with the original declaration, we find the parcel was not included within the definition of lot. Consequently, it is not subject to the restrictions placed on lots. As there is no prohibition to subdivision or conversion to residential use in the documents governing the parcel, then the parcel may be subdivided and converted to residential use. Accordingly, the trial court is reversed.

Chris Lawrence vs. Leigh Ann Lawrence
E2010-00395-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dale C. Workman

Leigh Ann Lawrence ("Mother") secretly tape recorded her 2 1/2-year-old daughter's telephone conversation with the child's father, Chris Lawrence ("Father"), during the course of a divorce and custody dispute. After the divorce was concluded, Father filed a complaint against Mother seeking damages for, among other things, wiretapping in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _39-13-601 (2006). Father filed a motion for partial summary judgment which the trial court denied upon finding that "[n]o set of facts would create liability under _39-13-601 et seq. for [Mother's] interception of [Father's] communication with his daughter." The court then entered partial summary judgment in favor of Mother and certified the judgment as final. Father appeals. We affirm.

New South Federal Savings Bank vs. Brenda Pugh
E2009-02150-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge David R. Duggan

This is an appeal of two unlawful detainer actions consolidated below. New South Federal Savings Bank ("New South") filed separate detainer warrants against Brenda Pugh seeking possession of two non-adjacent properties conveyed to New South at a foreclosure sale instituted after Pugh defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust on the 1 properties. The general sessions court dismissed the actions. On appeal, the trial court rejected Pugh's challenge to the foreclosure. The court held in favor of New South and ordered that it be restored to possession of the properties. Pugh appeals. We affirm.

James R. Smith v. State of Tennessee
M2009-02077-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Patterson

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, James R. Smith, was convicted of one count of rape, a Class B felony, one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and one count of attempted false imprisonment, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-12-107(a), -13- 302(b), -13-503(b), -13-505(c). This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. James R. Smith, No. M2005-00615-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 264468 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Jan. 31, 2006), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. May 1, 2006). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because his rights to due process and a fair and impartial jury were violated when five jurors ate lunch at the same table as the court clerk and two potential State witnesses. He also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he (1) did not file any pretrial motions besides a request for discovery; (2) should have asked the trial court to declare a mistrial when he learned about the lunch incident; (3) failed to ask the jurors what they talked about at lunch; and (4) failed to raise the lunch incident in his direct appeal. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

State of Tennessee v. Brandon D. Thomas
M2009-00464-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Thomas T. Woodall, J.
Trial Court Judge: Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge
Appellant, Brandon D. Thomas, appeals his conviction for simple possession of marijuana after a jury trial in Warren County. Appellant received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the conviction. On appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Dawn Brown, et al. vs. Tennessee Title Loans, Inc.
E2008-01758-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jacqueline E. Bolton

We granted this interlocutory appeal to answer a single question of first impression: whether the Tennessee Title Pledge Act, Tenn. Code Ann. __ 45-15-101 to -120 (2000), permits a private right of action on behalf of pledgors against title pledge lenders who allegedly charged excessive interest and prohibited fees. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Title Pledge Act allegations for failure to state a claim, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the Title Pledge Act does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Joann Davis v. Harwell Enterprises
M2009-02145-WC-R9-WC
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert L. Holloway

This appeal involves the application of the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-203(g (2)(B) (2008) to a suit for workers' compensation benefits. An employee who sustained a compensable injury and who received authorized medical treatment filed a civil action in the Chancery Court for Giles County more than one year after the last payment of medical benefits. Her employer filed a "special motion to dismiss" on the ground that the suit was time-barred. The trial court, relying on the discovery rule, denied the motion on the ground that the limitations period did not begin to run until the employee's attorney received a letter from her treating physician stating [*2] that her injury was work-related. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the employer permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and referred the appeal to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51 for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We have determined that the statute of limitations bars the  employee's complaint and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts vs. James Kevin Roberts
E2009-02350-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

On appeal, James Kevin Roberts ("Husband") challenges the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to allow his fifth attorney time to prepare for trial, the trial court's refusal to exclude an expert witness called by Monya Jill Rayanne Roberts ("Wife"), the division of the marital estate, the amount of child support and the award of discretionary costs to Wife. Wife challenges the trial court's denial of her request for "supplemental" attorney's fees. We affirm.

Tom Agnew vs. Meritan, et al
E2010-00527-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

In this matter, the plaintiff appeals the decision of the Board of Review of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that he is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-301, as a result of his failure to establish that he had covered wages not provided by an unemployment workrelief program financed by a federal agency under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-7-207(c)(5)(G). The trial court upheld the decision of the Board of Review. We affirm.

Richard L. Holllow, Trustee, et al vs. Michael L. Ingram, et al
E2010-00683-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

The parties, owners of a tract of land, ultimately agreed to the sale of the property by a Special Master appointed by the Court. The sale was held and the Master ultimately reported the purchase and asked that the sale be confirmed. Before the Court acted on the Master's Report, the plaintiff moved for a dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 41, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed the case. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court was required to act on the Master's Report before entertaining any motion to dismiss the case, and reinstate the action and remand for further proceedings.

In Re Estate of Billy Joe Walls
E2010-00758-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William E. Lantrip

This appeal arises out of a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Upon the death of the testator, Billy Joe Walls, wills executed by him were submitted for probate in different states. Patricia Pemberton was appointed personal representative under a 2009 will admitted to probate in the trial court. Barbara Brown is the appointed personal representative under a 2007 will admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama. Brown initiated these proceedings by filing a complaint in the trial court 1 to contest the will submitted by Pemberton. Subsequently, Brown sought summary judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, Brown moved to transfer the case to Alabama under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court dismissed Pemberton's petition on both grounds. She appeals. We affirm.