In Re Lindsey N.L.
In this child support matter, the mother filed a motion for contempt after the father failed to pay the minor child’s medical bills and insurance expenses as ordered by the trial court. After being found by the trial court to be in contempt, the father requested a new trial or an amendment of the judgment. The trial court denied the request and the father appealed from that order. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of the mother, moved to dismiss the appeal, asserting that it was prematurely filed. Upon our review of the record, we find that the father has appealed from an order that does not resolve all the claims against him. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
William (Bob) Simerly, et al vs City of Elizabethton
William (Bob) Simerly and Lewis Honeycutt (collectively “the Retirees”), along with numerous other former employees of the Elizabethton Electric System (“the EES”) brought this civil action against the City of Elizabethton (“the City”) to recover the value of certain EES benefits claimed to be owed them and wrongfully withheld by the City. After the City agreed to reduce its claims and counterclaims along with all the former employees taking voluntary dismissals, with the exception of Mr. Simerly and Mr. Honeycutt, both parties jointly filed a motion for partial summary judgment whereby the trial court was asked to rule on the legal validity of the underlying contracts upon stipulation by the parties of a number of exhibits and facts. The trial court granted the Retirees partial summary judgment, finding the underlying contracts to be legally valid, and the benefits promised thereunder to still be in force. The trial court’s partial judgment reserved the issue of the amount of the Retirees’ damages for a later hearing. The City then filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s ruling before the hearing on the damages could be scheduled. The Retirees moved in this court to dismiss the appeal on the basis of lack of finality of the trial court’s partial judgment. We denied the Retirees’ motion without prejudice. We reverse the ruling of the trial court on the partial summary judgment. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Convervatorship of Goldie Childs
Two of the daughters of an eighty-two year old woman filed a petition to be named as their mother’s Conservator. The trial court found that the mother did indeed need a Conservator, but because of family disagreements it appointed a third party to perform that role. Seven months later, the same daughters filed a petition to remove the incumbent Conservator and to be named as Co-Conservators to replace her. The mother died after proceedings on the second petition began, but before the trial court could rule on its merits. The Conservator subsequently moved the court for payment of her fees. The court found that some of those fees were incurred as a direct result of the uncooperative acts of the two daughters. Since the decedent’s estate was indigent, the court entered two money judgments for costs against the daughters. We reverse the judgment that was assessed against one of the daughters for failing to return her mother to the nursing home in a timely way, because although her actions led to additional costs, no legal basis for the judgment appears in the record. We vacate the judgment based on the unsuccessful petition to remove the conservator and we remand the case for further proceedings, because although Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114 does allow an assessment of costs against such petitioners, it is unclear how much of the court’s judgment falls within the parameters of that statute. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy D. Partee v. Jaime Vasquez, M.D.
A woman who suffered prolonged bleeding, pain and disabling injury after gynecological surgery filed a pro se malpractice suit against the doctor who performed the surgery. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by an affidavit in which he testified that in his treatment of the plaintiff he complied at all times with the relevant standard of acceptable professional practice. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, she was unable to find an expert witness to controvert that affidavit. The trial court granted the plaintiff several continuances to give her the opportunity to procure representation and expert testimony, but when she was unable to do so, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Claude Ramsey, Mayor of Hamilton County, Tenn., et al. v. Tenn. Department of Human Services et al.
The Hamilton County mayor and members of the county commission filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Human Services seeking judicial review of an administrative decision holding that the county penal farm’s commissary and vending machines and the vending facilities at another county building were subject to DHS’s statutory priority regarding blind vendors. The chancellor affirmed the administrative decision, and we affirm the chancellor’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael B. Woods v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority Board of Commissioners
The petitioner, a former property manager for the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency, was fired amid allegations that he had sexually harassed tenants and neglected his official duties by failing to properly prepare monthly reports. He appealed the termination of his employment to the Board of Commissioners of MDHA. The Board appointed a hearing officer who conducted a two-day hearing, following which the hearing officer found that the proof was insufficient to support a finding of sexual harassment and recommended that Petitioner be reinstated but demoted due to his failure to provide the required monthly reports. The Board subsequently rejected the recommendation and affirmed Petitioner’s termination based on the risk of future negligent retention sexual harassment suits and the fact he was an at-will employee who could be fired without cause. Petitioner then filed this petition for a common law writ of certiorari, contending MDHA acted arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally because it did not have just cause to fire him and because the decision to terminate him was due to his refusal to waive his right to appeal. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally because Petitioner was an employee-at-will who could be fired without just cause. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William A. Hawkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William A. Hawkins, aggrieved by his Sullivan County jury conviction of premeditated first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his conviction was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Following the appointment of counsel, amendment of the petition, and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying him relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Frederic Taylor
The appellant, Mark Frederic Taylor, was convicted of two counts of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and one count of fraudulently obtaining benefits for medical assistance, and he received a total effective sentence of fourteen years, eight years of which was to be served on probation. Subsequently, the trial court found that the appellant violated his probationary sentence by receiving new convictions. Therefore, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contests the revocation and the imposition of an incarcerative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James G. McCreery, Jr.
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, James G. McCreery, Jr., of use of a weapon during a felony, felony reckless endangerment, criminal trespass, and two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a three-year suspended sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to self-defense. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lynn Harvey
Appellant, Gary Lynn Harvey, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101 & 39-17-305. The trial court sentenced Appellant to elevenmonths, twenty-nine days on probation for the assault conviction and to thirty days on probation for the disorderly conduct conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge because the presentment was insufficient; (2) refusing to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge because section 39-17-305(b) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) finding the evidence sufficient to support his conviction for disorderly conduct; (4) finding the evidence sufficient to support his conviction for assault; (5) not declaring a mistrial due to an officer’s conduct during jury deliberations; (6) not finding prosecutorial misconduct after Appellant was charged with assaulting an officer who denied being assaulted; (7) not declaring a mistrial following the discharge of a juror during deliberations and the recall of an alternate juror who had already been discharged; (8) not providing Appellant with a written copy of the jury instructions before his closing argument; (9) incorrectly charging the jury on reasonable doubt; (10) incorrectly charging the jury on self-defense; (11) incorrectly charging the jury on lawful resistance; (12) denying him the right to present a complete defense by erroneously excluding newspaper articles as hearsay evidence; (13) violating his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; (14) improperly conducting voir dire; (15) denying him the right to present a complete defense by erroneously excluding witness testimony and by granting the State’s motion to quash subpoenas against the Knoxville Sheriff and two chief deputy sheriffs; (16) refusing to grant a change of venue; and (17) denying his right to a speedy trial by delaying in ruling on his motion for new trial. Because Appellant was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial when the trial court substituted a discharged alternate juror for a disqualified original juror during deliberations, we reverse the judgments and remand the case for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James M. Flinn v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, James M. Flinn, appeals from the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se “Motion for Preliminary Examination or Probable Cause Hearing” and his pro se “Motion to Suppress and Return Items Seized Pursuant to Search Warrant and Warrantless Searches.” On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions because (1) he was entitled to a preliminary hearing in the Roane County Criminal Court to determine if police had probable cause to detain him and (2) the Roane County Criminal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over his motion to suppress and return property obtained during the search of his home. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael T. Henderson v. State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order granting the petitioner, Michael T. Henderson, partial habeas corpus relief from his Knox County convictions of burglary and larceny. Also on appeal, the petitioner argues in his brief that the habeas corpus court erred in denying a portion of his claims. Following our review we reverse the partial award of habeas corpus relief and affirm the denial of the remaining habeas corpus claims. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael T. Henderson v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the opinion’s conclusion that because the Petitioner’s grand larceny and burglary sentences had been served, the Petitioner was not “in custody” on them, thereby barring habeas corpus relief. I believe they were part of consecutive sentences that were to be treated in the aggregate, allowing for habeas corpus relief from any judgment that was void. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Greenbank, f/k/a Greene County Bank v. Barbara J. Thompson, et al.
Bank provided a loan to Borrowers for the purchase of real property and construction of a log cabin home. After Borrowers defaulted on the loan, Bank sold the property at a foreclosure sale. Bank then initiated a lawsuit alleging conversion, negligent business representation, and promissory fraud. Bank also sought a deficiency judgment for the difference in the amount owed on the loan and the foreclosure sale price. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded a judgment for $61,782.12 and a deficiency judgment for $300,644.92 in favor of Bank. Borrowers appeal. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bevin H.
This is a case regarding the custody of a minor female child, Bevin H. (DOB: Dec. 19, 2001) (“the Child”). The Child was born to Randy H. (“Father”) and his wife. Tragically, the Child’s mother died two days after the Child was born. Shortly thereafter, the Child’s paternal aunt, Rhonda H. (“Aunt”) and her husband, became the Child’s primary caregivers. Aunt sought custody, alleging that the Child was dependent and neglected in Father’s care. During the pendency of the custody case, the Child was taken into state custody based on evidence that she had been sexually molested. The Child was released to Father and Aunt under an agreed shared parenting plan before the parties filed competing custody petitions. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted Aunt custody of the Child upon finding that the Child faced a risk of substantial harm if left in Father’s custody. Father was granted supervised visitation with the Child. Father appealed to the trial court. In a two-sentence decision, with no findings of fact, the trial court reversed and placed full custody of the Child with Father. Aunt appeals. We reverse. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship for WilIiam J. Allen
In this conservatorship action, we granted the application of Jay R. Slobey, James A. Freeman, III and Megan E. Livingstone, all attorneys, for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal seeking relief with respect to two interlocutory orders of the trial court. The orders are: (1) one prohibiting attorneys with the law firm of James A. Freeman & Associates, P.C. from representing William J. Allen (“the Ward”); and (2) another appointing attorney David L. Robbins as “Attorney ad Litem” but requiring him to perform duties “pursuant to T.C.A.§34-1-107,” a statute dealing with guardians ad litem. After this appeal was granted, the trial court entered an order purporting to “amend its order . . . which appoints David L. Robbins to serve as Attorney ad Litem pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-107 . . . to reflect that David L. Robbins is to serve . . . pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-125,” a statute pertaining to attorneys ad litem. The court’s amending order is also being challenged. We (a) affirm the order prohibiting the representation of the Ward by attorneys from the law firm of James A. Freeman & Associates P.C., and (b) vacate the order appointing Mr. Robbins and the later order purporting to amend the order of appointment. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah B., et al.
Eric B. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights with respect to his two minor children. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) petitioned to terminate Father’s rights based upon allegations of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. Following a hearing, which Father failed to attend, the trial court granted the petition upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that all of the alleged grounds were established and that termination was in the best interest of the children. On appeal, Father asserts that his due process rights were violated. He also challenges the weight of the evidence supporting the court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. We reject both challenges. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lindsay R.
This is an action to establish paternity and set child support filed by the State of Tennessee on behalf of Rochelle L. (“Mother”), the mother of a child born August 6, 1988. The putative father is James G. (“Father”). The trial court held Father liable for back child support of $123,334 by a default judgment entered September 3, 2008. Father filed a postjudgment motion challenging the judgment for lack of service of process. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that Father had “notice” of the action. As a consequence of this finding, the court held that the judgment was valid pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(5)(2010). Father appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
William E. Jarvis v. State of Tennessee, ex rel, Janice L. Bane
Father previously convicted of contempt for failure to pay child support appeals the dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. Finding that the petition does not allege facts sufficient to support the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Watson v. Beazer Watson
This is a divorce action filed by Sherry Watson (“Wife”) against Beazer Watson (“Husband”). Following a bench trial, the court granted the parties a divorce based on stipulated grounds. It also classified and distributed substantial property, some as separate and the rest as marital. Wife secured new counsel and filed motions, with supporting exhibits, challenging the classification and division of property. The motions purport to be pursuant to, respectively, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60.02. The trial court denied the motions. Wife appeals the denial of her motions. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Clifton Douglas v. Joe Easterling, Warden
The Petitioner, Clifton Douglas, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the State failed to provide proper notice of its intention to seek enhanced punishment as required by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-202(a). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rickey Clyde Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rickey Clyde Taylor, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and received an effective 28-year sentence for the convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner alleges that as a result of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David A. Ferrell v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, David A. Ferrell, was convicted of failure to display a license, violation of the seatbelt law, and two violations of the vehicle registration law. He was ordered to serve thirty days in jail and pay a fifty-dollar fine. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition citing the petition’s untimeliness. The Petitioner appeals, contending the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis R. Shaw
Following a jury trial in Putnam County, Defendant, Dennis Russell Shaw, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, second offense or subsequent offense, violation of the registration law, and violation of the financial responsibility law. He has appealed only the driving on revoked license conviction, arguing that his conviction was improperly enhanced beyond a first offense. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darren Perry and Mechelle Perry v. All Unknown Parties Having Any Interest in the Property Known as the Mathis Cemetery et al.
This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the use of property as a burial ground. The plaintiffs purchased property in which an abandoned cemetery was situated. They filed this complaint for court approval to terminate the use of the property as a burial ground and remove and reinter the remains to another cemetery, pursuant to Tennessee statutes. An attorney ad litem was appointed to represent unknown parties with an interest in the abandoned cemetery. The attorney ad litem investigated and did not oppose the relief sought. The plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals |