Tennessee Independent Colleges & Universities Association Benefit Consortium, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce & Insurance, et al.
In this appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, taxpayer, a self-funded multiple employer welfare arrangement, seeks a refund of taxes paid under protest, asserting that the tax was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and that the tax is uncertain and ambiguous. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Bob Fannon, Individually and as a City Councilman for the City of LaFollette v. City of LaFollotte, et al.
An elected council member of the City of LaFollette filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that three other members of the council had violated the terms of the Open Meetings Act in the process of adopting a resolution to increase the pay of various city employees. The trial court, after a hearing, granted a temporary restraining order, restricting implementation of the pay raises until the City complied with the procedural requirements of the City Charter. The order did not address the Open Meetings Act allegations. At a subsequent meeting, the Council, apparently in accordance with the requisite guidelines, approved the pay raises. After the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and then a motion seeking attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court dismissed the Open Meetings Act claim as moot, but awarded fees and costs to the council member who had initiated the suit. The order did not address a challenge by the City to the council member’s standing to sue. On direct appeal by the City, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the council member had standing as a taxpayer, rather than in his official capacity, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Because the litigation involves issues of public interest, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that the council member had no standing to sue as a council member or a taxpayer, but that he did have standing based upon his allegations of an Open Meetings Act violation. As the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of discretionary costs, but not attorney’s fees. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
Bob Fannon v. City of LaFollette et al. - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Fannon has standing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-106(a) (2002) to seek judicial relief from his colleagues’ violation of the Sunshine Law [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-44-101 to -111 (2002 & Supp. 2010)]. I also agree that Mr. Fannon was the prevailing party in the proceedings below and that he was entitled to recover discretionary fees under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) but not attorney’s fees. I am constrained to prepare this separate opinion because, unlike the Court, I have concluded that Mr. Fannon’s status as a public official provides an independently sufficient basis to confer standing on him to challenge the conduct of his fellow members of the LaFollette City Council. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
Daniel Lee Draper v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Daniel Lee Draper, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the court should have appointed counsel and afforded him an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Lee Draper v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I concur with the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with the majority view of the timeliness of the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. I do not believe the Petitioner’s mistaken filing of a second post-conviction petition, not provided by law, tolled the time within which a coram nobis petition was to be filed. The Petitioner’s ignorance of the proper action to take does not warrant a due process tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deana Elizabeth Church v. Thomas Neal Church
This appeal involves post-divorce modification of alimony. When the husband and wife were originally divorced, the husband was ordered to pay alimony in futuro. At the time of the divorce, the wife was undergoing treatment for a life-threatening illness. After the divorce, the wife’s treatment resulted in a dramatic improvement in her health. Meanwhile, the husband lost his job and ultimately found employment at a reduced level of compensation. Citing his decreased income and the wife’s improved circumstances, the husband sought modification or termination of his alimony obligation. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, but nevertheless denied the husband’s petition to modify. The husband appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Sepal Flogene Boren Emberton, Deceased
This is an appeal from the probate court’s award of $66,107.14 to Decedent’s Estate for the value of property Decedent’s husband did not return to the Estate following her death. The Administrators of the Estate appeal the court’s failure to award the Estate the value of certain jewelry the husband allegedly converted. The husband appeals the court’s valuation of the property he failed to return to the Estate. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Shorty
The Defendant-Appellee, Melvin Shorty was convicted by a Shelby County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. Several months prior to trial the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment listing two of Shorty’s prior Tennessee felony convictions. The day before sentencing, the State amended their notice to seek enhanced punishment by adding two prior Wisconsin felony convictions. The trial court determined that the amended notice failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202, and sentenced Shorty as a Range I, standard offender to four years in a workhouse. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Shorty as a Range I, standard offender, rather than a Range II, multiple offender because the original notice was sufficient to alert Shorty that they intended to seek enhanced punishment, and that Shorty has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the amended notice. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Shermaine Lillard
Defendant, Phillip Shermaine Lillard, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in not charging the jury concerning his prior criminal convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court v. F. Chris Cawood
Disciplinary Counsel of the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against attorney F. Chris Cawood for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct. After Disciplinary Counsel’s presentation of evidence, the Hearing Panel dismissed the petition. The Board of Professional Responsibility appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the Hearing Panel’s dismissal. The Board appealed the decision of the chancery court to this Court. We hold that the Board of Professional Responsibility’s petition for certiorari failed to meet the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 and that the chancery court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
James William Taylor, A/K/A Lutfi Shafq Talal v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James William Taylor, also known as Lutfi Shafq Talal, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of felony murder, robbery, and second degree burglary. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of life, fifteen years, and fifteen years for the respective convictions. In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for nunc pro tunc to consolidate prior offenses. Because such an order is not subject to an appeal as of right under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the petitioner’s appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Clilon Bates
A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, David Clilon Bates, of aggravated rape and assault, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Waylon Hanson
Defendant, William Waylon Hanson, was indicted for one count of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, Tenn. Code Ann. section 55-10-616. Defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge and was sentenced by agreement to serve two years to be suspended on probation after 90 days. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether Defendant could have been convicted of driving in violation of the Act more than three years after the order was entered declaring him to be an habitual offender. After reviewing the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Bell, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “motion” for post-conviction relief. The State has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record demonstrates that the “motion” was filed outside the statute of limitations applicable to petitions for post-conviction relief, we grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson - Order
The matter before this Court arises from a petition to relocate filed by Elizabeth Leanne Hudson (“Mother”) following her divorce from Larson Douglas Hudson (“Father”) and the appeal from the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008, granting the petition and awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. We granted Father permission to appeal and scheduled the appeal for argument. Mother requests that Father’s appeal be dismissed as moot. For the reasons stated below, we grant Mother’s request. In addition, we vacate the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Michael Sanford v. Waugh & Company, Inc. et al.
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether an individual creditor of an insolvent corporation may bring a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporate directors and officers. We hold that a creditor of an insolvent corporation may not bring a direct claim, only a derivative claim, against officers and directors for breach of the fiduciary duties they owe to the corporation. We adopt the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme Court in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), observing that corporate creditors are adequately protected by existing law, and that recognizing a new direct cause of action is unnecessary and would impede corporate governance. We further hold that the trial court properly excluded evidence of conspiracy to interfere with contract and dismissed the claim for punitive damages. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Daniel Livingston v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Daniel Livingston, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The petitioner entered a guilty plea to one count of facilitation of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class D felony, in exchange for a six-year sentence, to be served as a Range I, standard offender at thirty percent. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to a sentence imposed following a parole violation. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is illegal. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latisha Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Latisha Jones, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. She was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, both Class A felonies. She was sentenced to life for the murder conviction and to twenty-three years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences set to run consecutively. On appeal, she argues that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief by the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. David Mills, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Renea Smith
Appellant, Lisa Renea Smith, was engaged in a custody dispute over her daughter but allowed to visit her pursuant to a Knox County Juvenile Court order. After one such visit, she refused to return her child and instead took her to Atlanta. The juvenile court held a hearing and found Appellant in contempt for violating the visitation order. Appellant was later indicted in the instant case for violating the custodial interference statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-306. After an unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy protections, she pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor but preserved the double jeopardy issue for appeal. Upon review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Sutherland v. Cherry Lindamood et al.
An inmate filed suit, claiming that he was discriminated against in job assignments and that his First Amendment rights were violated in that he was retaliated against for making complaints. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Sabaski et al. v. Wilson County Board of Education et al.
Parents of disabled child sued county board of education and several employees for assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent failure to train employees. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). We conclude that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to the plaintiffs’ state law claims. We further conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a valid claim for negligent failure to train because the IDEA provides the exclusive remedy for such claims, but their claims for assault and battery and false imprisonment are not precluded by the IDEA. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Ann Barnett v. Elite Sports Medicine, et al.
In this case, we are asked to decide whether an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which became effective July 1, 2009, and requires the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to file a certificate of good faith at the time of filing suit, was properly applied to an action initiated prior to the effective date of the amendment, voluntarily dismissed and refiled after the effective date. We also consider whether the requirement that the plaintiff file a certificate of good faith applies to an action for medical battery. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Soles4Souls, Inc. v. Donelson Cedarstone Associates, LP et al.
In a landlord-tenant dispute, the tenant plaintiff claims that before the parties entered into a lease for commercial property, the landlord defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses that the plaintiff was expected to pay as part of its rent pursuant to the lease terms. The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its claims for fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We find that the defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses after entering into the initial lease with the plaintiff but before entering into an agreement for expansion space. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court on the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and violation of the TCPA and remand for determination of an appropriate remedy for damage the plaintiff suffered after agreeing to lease the expansion space. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Sue Farley v. Ricky Farley
Wife filed a complaint for divorce. Husband did not file an answer. Wife sought and received a default judgment. Husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment based on excusable neglect as a result of depression. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals |