State of Tennessee v. Terry Phelps
The defendant, a convicted violent sexual offender, was released on parole in 2006. He registered pursuant to the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 20041 (“the Registration Act”), listing a primary address in Bedford County and a secondary address in Rutherford County. He was subsequently arrested in Lincoln County and charged with violating the Registration Act. Defendant tendered an “open” guilty plea but moved to withdraw his plea prior to being sentenced. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the defendant had “merely had a change of heart” and denied the motion. The trial court later sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision on his motion to withdraw plea and his sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to apply the correct analysis in determining whether the defendant had established a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea. We further hold that Defendant established sufficient grounds for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are reversed, the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is granted, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Curtis Adkins
The Defendant, Jimmy Curtis Adkins, was found guilty by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a class D felony, and initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-433, -435 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ and fourteen years’ confinement, respectively, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the Defendant’s convictions in Georgia. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred during sentencing by considering prior convictions that were not proven by certified copies of the convictions and by considering enhancement factors that were not submitted to the jury. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeff Carter
The Defendant, Jeff Carter, was charged with one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years old, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(b). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the doctrine of election to offer proof of prior bad acts, after the State had provided a bill of particulars describing one particular incident and repeatedly said that it intended on electing that incident; (2) the trial court did not follow the procedures mandated in Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about prior bad acts that occurred outside the time frame of the indictment; (4) the evidence at trial was insufficient because there was no evidence offered to support the time frame stated in the indictment; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed three witnesses to testify that the Defendant had confessed to them, without finding whether the alleged confessions pertained to the charged crime or prior bad acts; and (6) the trial court’s failure to give a specific unanimity instruction was reversible error. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did commit reversible error when it allowed testimony of other bad acts and three irrelevant admissions of guilt that the Defendant allegedly made. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Scott Reynolds
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Scott Reynolds, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excluded evidence from Karla Teutsch, whom he alleges was a legitimate suspect in this murder investigation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a statement by the victim as an excited utterance; (4) a question by a juror pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1 violated his right to an impartial jury and that such questioning is unconstitutional; (5) the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with a curative instruction about people crying in the courtroom during the trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zula Gray v. Joe Bednarz, Jr.
Plaintiff appeals a jury’s determination that she was 60 percent at fault for the injuries she sustained. We find there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we affirm the judgment entered in accordance with the jury’s findings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Brown, An Incompetent, by and through next friend Angela Anderson v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, who was not placed on fall observations until after his fall, suffered a fall while under the care of the Western Mental Health Institute. A CAT scan performed three days after the fall revealed no hemorrhaging, however, a repeat scan performed approximately one month later revealed a subdural hematoma for which Appellant subsequently underwent two surgeries. Appellant, by and through his next friend, filed suit against the State in the Claims Commission alleging medical negligence. Following a trial, the Claims Commission found that a Western nurse breached the standard of care in completing the initial fall risk assessment, but that Appellant had failed to prove that such breach was a proximate cause of his fall. Additionally, the Commission found that Appellant had failed to prove that Western’s failure to later place Appellant on fall observations was a proximate cause of his fall. Finally, the Commission found that Appellant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Western’s failure to order repeat brain imaging prior to January 26, 2006, was a breach of the standard of care. We affirm the judgment of the Commission. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Charles A. Trost, Commissioner of Revenue
This appeal involves a corporation’s liability for the payment of use tax following its purchase of a business jet. After it received an assessment from the Tennessee Department of Revenue for over $700,000, the corporation paid the tax and filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a refund on the ground that it qualified for the sale for resale exemption under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(a) (28)(A) (Supp. 2004) because it had leased the aircraft to another corporation. Both the corporation and the Department filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the corporation’s motion for summary judgment, and the Department appealed. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed the trial court. CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Chumley, No. M2008-01679-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1492230 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2009). We granted the Department’s application for permission to appeal. We have now determined that neither party is entitled to a summary judgment because material disputes exist regarding the factual inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the facts. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Aaron Williams v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Aaron Williams, pled guilty to four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: (1) his conviction was based on a coerced confession; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve Wallace v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Steve Wallace, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his 1986 convictions for second degree burglary and aggravated assault. The Petitioner alleged, among other things, that his judgments of conviction were void because ineffective assistance of trial counsel led him to enter a guilty plea which was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief and, furthermore, that he did not state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Perdido Cook v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Perdido Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After being convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, he was sentenced to an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate and prepare for his case. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John N. Moffitt
The pro se defendant, John N. Moffitt, was convicted of one count of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after seven days of incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it allowed an officer to commit perjury and in refusing the defendant’s request to play the surveillance disc from the hospital. He also argues that it was error for the State laboratory to destroy his blood sample before he filed a motion for independent testing. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cheryl Brown Giggers, et al. v. Memphis Housing Authority, et al.
This is the second appeal of this wrongful death action, arising from a fatal shooting of a tenant at a Memphis public housing property. This Court granted Appellant, Memphis Housing Authority’s, Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal to address the trial court’s denial of summary judgment in favor of the Appellant. Finding that Appellees’ “failure to evict” claim is preempted by 47 U.S.C. §1437, and that Appellant retains its sovereign immunity under the discretionary function exception to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, we reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of Jeffrey T., et al.
In April of 2008, Lowell Shelton and Stella Shelton (“the Sheltons”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey T. (“Father”) and Lisa T. (“Mother”) to the minor children, Jeffrey T. and Justin T. (“the Children”), and to adopt the Children. After a trial, the trial court entered an order on May 7, 2010, that, inter alia, terminated the parental rights of Father to the Children, and granted the adoption of the Children by the Sheltons. Father appeals to this Court raising issues regarding res judicata, whether the trial court erred in not requiring a home study, and whether the final order of adoption conformed to the statute, among others. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Kentavious M. (d.o.b. 03/29/2007), A Minor Child Under Eighteen (18) years of age
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans, and mental incompetence. The mother appeals, arguing that the Department of Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child, the requirements of her permanency plans were not reasonable and related to the conditions that required her child’s removal, and the alleged failure to appoint her a guardian ad litem in the prior dependency and neglect proceedings precluded termination of her parental rights for persistence of conditions. Finding no error in the decision of the trial court, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karim Skaan v. Federal Express Corporation, Inc.
Plaintiff/Appellant filed an action alleging breach of contract and retaliatory discharge. Defendant moved for summary judgment on both claims, and asserted the action was barred by a contractual limitations provision in the application for employment. The trial court awarded summary judgment to defendant with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim, and denied summary judgment with respect to defendant’s assertion that the matter was time-barred. Plaintiff appealed. We dismiss this appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment where the trial court has not entered an order adjudicating or otherwise disposing of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, and plaintiff has failed to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Montgomery Koons
The Defendant, Montgomery Koons, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-506(c) (2010). He was sentenced to four years each for the first count and second count as a Range I standard offender and six years for the third count as a Range II standard offender, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the defendant to serve one year of incarceration and five years of probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court denied his due process right of compulsory process when it quashed his subpoena for the minor victim to testify at the sentencing hearing, (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by declining to recuse himself from the sentencing hearing, (3) the trial court erred by denying his application for diversion based on an erroneous application for certification of eligibility, (4) the trial court erred by denying him full probation, and (5) the trial court erred by entering a Probation Order for six years of probation after one year of incarceration. Because the defendant was denied his due process right to compulsory process at the sentencing hearing and because the denial of judicial diversion was based on an inadvertently submitted preliminary draft of the application, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new hearing, at which the trial court shall consider judicial diversion and if diversion is denied, the manner of service of the defendant’s sentences. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommie Hampton v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
Plaintiff was injured when Defendant Madden drove his vehicle at a high speed and in the wrong direction on an exit ramp of I-40/240 and collided head-on with plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Defendant Madden and against the City of Memphis pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. In his complaint, plaintiff asserted Memphis City police negligently pursued Defendant Madden, and that this negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court found plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by the acts of Defendant Madden and entered judgment in favor of the City of Memphis. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Darrell Wayne Bumpas v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darrell Wayne Bumpas, pled guilty to robbery and resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin M. Frierson
A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kevin M. Frierson, for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, which was discovered on the Defendant’s person and seized by a police officer who had stopped a vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of a schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of the Defendant was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs Deandre Marcellus Howard
The defendant, Deandre Marcellus Howard, pleaded guilty to a single count of voluntarymanslaughter and received an agreed term of three years’ probation to be served pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him some 18 months of pretrial jail credit. For the procedural reasons explained more fully below, the appeal is dismissed. |
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State of Tennessee v. Derrick Sloan Taylor
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Derrick Sloan Taylor, of attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence about him firing a gun on another occasion; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Samuel Jacob Webb
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Jacob Webb, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he understood that he would be placed on parole for his eight-year sentence and returned to federal custody to serve his federal sentence for another charge. The trial court denied relief after a hearing, and the Defendant now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Earl Wade v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lawrence Earl Wade, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner agreed to a sentence of fifteen years for the robbery charge and to a life sentence for the murder charge. On appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate his mental history and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Matthew Jackson, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily denying his petition, specifically contending that his sentence is void and illegal pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower’s court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Lake County Circuit Court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Lynn Hill v. State of Tennessee
On August 18, 2008, the petitioner, Ricky Lynn Hill, pled guilty to DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, and attempted tampering with evidence; he also pled nolo contendere to vehicular assault. After holding that the petitioner could not be convicted of DUI for double jeopardy reasons, the circuit court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of five years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner now appeals the judgment of the Chester County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the judgment denying habeas corpus relief. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals |