State of Tennessee v. John David McDaniel
W2008-00008-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The defendant, John David McDaniel, was convicted of three counts of fraudulently obtaining a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of felony evading arrest, one count of misdemeanor evading arrest, and one count of theft of property with a value of less than $500. The defendant  was sentenced to four years for his convictions for fraudulently obtaining a Schedule II controlled substance and felony evading arrest. He received a sentence of 11 months and 29 days for his convictions for misdemeanor evading arrest and theft of property with a value of less than $500. The defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied after a hearing before the trial court. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range for his convictions. In response, the state argues that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s appeal. The state further argues that the sentencing determination made by the trial court was not in error. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Obion Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. John David McDaniel
W2008-00008-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The defendant, John David McDaniel, was convicted of three counts of fraudulently obtaining a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of felony evading arrest, one count of misdemeanor evading arrest, and one count of theft of property with a value of less than $500. The defendant  was sentenced to four years for his convictions for fraudulently obtaining a Schedule II controlled substance and felony evading arrest. He received a sentence of 11 months and 29 days for his convictions for misdemeanor evading arrest and theft of property with a value of less than $500. The defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied after a hearing before the trial court. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The defendant argues on appeal that the trial court  erred by sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range for his convictions.  In response, the state argues that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s appeal. The state further argues that the sentencing determination made by the trial court was not in error. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Obion Court of Criminal Appeals

Carl Anderson, Ed Howell Anderson, and Gary Anderson, v. U.S.A. Truck, Inc., an Arkansas Corporation and Lonzie E. Neal
W2006-01967-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

This is a vehicular accident case. The three plaintiffs, a father and two grown sons, were riding in a truck pulling a trailer. An 18-wheeler driven by the individual defendant rear-ended the plaintiffs. In the days after the accident, all three plaintiffs sought medical treatment for back and neck pain. They filed this lawsuit against the defendants for injuries sustained in the accident. In the jury trial, after the close of the plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the issue of punitive damages. At the conclusion of the six-day trial, the jury awarded two of the plaintiffs $10,000 each in damages and awarded the other plaintiff $200,000. Fault for the accident was apportioned 70% to the defendant and 30% to the driver of the plaintiffs’ truck, so the plaintiffs’ awards were reduced by 30%. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to for additur or for a new trial. The plaintiffs now appeal, claiming that the issue of punitive damages should have been presented to the jury, that the amount of the jury’s awards were de minimus and outside the realm of reasonableness, and that there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm, finding inter alia that the trial court did not err in directing a verdict on the issue of punitive damages, and that material evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.
 

Henderson Court of Appeals

In Re: C.M.C. Michelle Marie Chaffin v. Cheryl Leathers et al.
M2008-00329-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Betty Adams Green

Mother of minor child appeals a juvenile court order rejecting her challenge to the validity of a 2004 order awarding custody of the child to maternal grandparents. Mother argues that the 2004 order is void because she did not receive notice of the proceedings and the order does not contain necessary findings. Mother further argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to give her a full hearing. We have determined that the appealed order arose out of dependency and neglect proceedings and, therefore, must be appealed to the circuit court.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Allied Business Brokers, Inc. v. Abed Amro, et al. - Memorandum Opinion
W2008-00320-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This is the second appearance of the dispute between these parties in this Court. This lawsuit has its genesis in a 1995 general sessions court action wherein Plaintiff/Appellee Allied Business Brokers, Inc. (“Allied’) sought damages for breach of contract. The facts and procedural history of the breach of contract action are recited in Allied Business Brokers, Inc. v. Abraham Musa, et al., No. W1999-00378-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 33191373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000) (perm. app. denied May 14, 2001), and we find it unnecessary to repeat them here. In Allied Business, we held Defendant Abed Amro (Mr. Amro) was bound by the terms of a brokerage contract that he had signed on behalf of his friend, Defendant Abraham Musa. We remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment in favor of Allied. Id. at *4. In the meantime, in 1997 Mr. Amro conveyed certain real property to his wife, Nida Amro (Ms. Amro).
In August 2005, Allied filed a complaint styled “Complaint to set aside fraudulent conveyance and to impose a constructive trust” against Mr. Amro and Ms. Amro (“the Amros”) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County. In its complaint, Allied alleged that it was a judgment creditor and that the 1997 conveyance was fraudulent. Allied prayed that the conveyance be set aside and for the imposition of a constructive trust and/or equitable lien in the amount of $17,346.00, plus interest in the amount of $10,407.60. The Amros moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations under Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-3-310. In October 2007, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Allied setting aside the conveyance as fraudulent. Following denial of the Amros’ motions to reconsider, the trial court entered its last judgment in the matter in January 2008.2 This appeal ensued.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee ex rel Claude Cain, et al v. City of Chuch Hill, Tennessee
E2007-00700-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kindall T. Lawson

 

The State of Tennessee, proceeding on relation of six individuals and one entity (who, for ease of reference, will collectively be referred to as “the plaintiffs”), sought mandamus in 2002 to force the City of Church Hill (“the City”) to extend a sewer line to the individuals’ homes. The individuals are residents of a neighborhood in Hawkins County that was annexed by the City in 1988. They claim that the City failed to adhere to the plan of services adopted as part of the annexation process, and that the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to mandamus under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-108 (2005). The plan of services adopted in 1988 states that “[a] sanitary sewer system will be provided as soon as economically feasible.” The trial court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, finding that the long delay in installing a sewer system, which continued at the time of trial, was unreasonable, and that there were no disputed issues of material fact preventing the court from granting mandamus under § 6-51-108. However, the court ordered a trial on the issue of how quickly the City could reasonably install the sewer line. At the conclusion of this limited-purpose trial, the court ordered the City to extend sewer service to the plaintiffs within 16 months. The City appeals. We vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Hawkins Court of Appeals

Lisa Dawn Haines Huddleston v. Lee Alan Haines
E2008-00232-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

In this custody dispute between parents, the Trial Judge awarded the mother attorney’s fees against the father. On appeal, we affirm.

Blount Court of Appeals

William Burse And Wife, June Burse v. Frank W. Hicks, III, et al.
W2007-02848-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn L. Peeples

This is a negligence action. Burse filed a complaint against Appellant alleging that Appellant had negligently injured him in an automobile accident. Appellant answered the complaint, in part, by alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence of Appellee. At the time of the accident, Appellee and Burse were standing next to each other while preparing for a Christmas parade. Appellee moved for summary judgment alleging that he owed no duty to Burse and that he was not the cause of the accident. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment.

Haywood Court of Appeals

C.S. v. The Diocese of Nashville
M2007-02076-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

This case arose from the sexual abuse of a minor by a Catholic priest. The plaintiff, the victim, claimed the defendant, the priest’s employer, knew of and concealed the priest’s propensity to commit sex crimes against adolescent boys. Approximately thirty (30) years after the abuse, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that such actions constituted outrageous conduct and negligence by the defendant leading to the plaintiff’s abuse. The defendant moved for dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the statute of limitations bars such actions brought more than one year after the minor reaches the age of majority. The plaintiff argued the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of plaintiff’s cause of action tolled the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to discover his cause of action against the defendant before the statute of limitations expired. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Christina R. Britt, et al. v. Maury County Board of Education, et al.
M2006-01921-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The trial court granted the Board of Education’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing a cheerleader’s two claims for personal injury under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. We affirm the judgment as to the claim that the Board negligently hired the sponsor of the cheerleading squad. Finding, however, that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the cheerleading squad sponsor’s negligence, we reverse that portion  of the judgment.

Maury Court of Appeals

Michael Lee v. State of Tennessee
M2007-01665-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The petitioner, Michael Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Williamson County from his convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued over $1000 for which he was sentenced to fifteen years and twelve years, respectively, to be served consecutively for a total of twenty-seven years. The petitioner claims the trial court erred in concluding he was provided the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Georgia-Pacific LLC, et al. v. Swift Transportation Corporation
W2008-00344-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This appeal involves the indemnity and insurance provisions of a contract, which must be interpreted according to Georgia law. The trial court found that the defendant had no duty to indemnify or insure the plaintiff for a claim based on the plaintiff’s own negligence. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Cindy Goodson Harvey, et al. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, et al.
E2007-02152-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

Ronald W. Harvey, Jr., was involved in an automobile accident while driving a 1999 Dodge Caravan in the course of his employment with B&W Wholesalers. At the time of the accident, Mr. Harvey and his wife, Cindy Goodson Harvey (collectively “the Harveys”), had an automobile insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Insurance Company”) that listed the Caravan as the covered vehicle. However, the policy included an exclusion for any vehicle “[w]hile used in employment by any person whose primary duties are the delivery of products or services[.]” Insurance Company refused to defend the Harveys in a lawsuit regarding the accident, claiming that the exclusion applies. The Harveys sought a declaratory judgment that the accident was covered by the policy. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the case and declared that the exclusion applied. The Harveys appeal, arguing that “delivery of products or services” was not among Mr. Harvey’s “primary duties,” and that, in any event, Insurance Company should be estopped from denying coverage because it knew how Mr. Harvey intended to use the van and provided coverage anyway. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Randy George Rogers
E2007-02535-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Riley Anderson

The Trial Court held defendant in contempt. On appeal, we affirm.

McMinn Court of Appeals

Lisa Marie Walls Altman v. Benjamin Altman
E2008-00081-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

The Trial Judge awarded the wife a divorce in this case and ordered the husband to pay periodic alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 a month. The husband has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, as modified.

Washington Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Fredrick Milan
W2006-02606-CCA-MR3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Fredrick Milan, of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life and five years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by consolidating the offenses; (2) the trial court improperly admitted the victim’s prior statement into evidence under the hearsay rule’s forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6); (3) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the 9-1-1 tape of an eyewitness to the victim’s murder; (4) the trial court erred by admitting an autopsy photograph into evidence; (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s murder conviction; and (6) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing and by assessing a five-hundred-dollar fine for the aggravated assault conviction. The State contends that the evidence is sufficient to support the murder conviction and that the trial court properly ordering consecutive sentencing. However, the State acknowledges that the trial court improperly fined the appellant. Regarding the appellant’s remaining issues, the State contends that the appellant waived them because he failed to include them in his motion for new trial and that he is not entitled to plain error relief. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the murder conviction and that consecutive sentencing is proper in this case. Nevertheless, we also conclude that the trial court committed plain error as to the aggravated assault conviction by consolidating the appellant’s indictments for trial and that the trial court erred by imposing the appellant’s fine. Therefore, the appellant’s murder conviction is affirmed but his aggravated assault conviction and resulting fine are reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Sara K. Ruder v. Joseph R. Ruder
W2007-01222-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

This is a divorce case involving the interpretation of a Prenuptial Agreement. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision to reimburse certain expenditures made by Wife as “improvements” to the marital home. Wife/Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Finding no error, we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Michael Limbaugh v. Mueller Refrigeration Co., Inc.
M2007-00999-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained a compensable injury. He subsequently developed a condition known as “winging” of the scapula.  Two treating doctors testified that the AMA Guides did not provide for assigning impairment for this condition. An evaluating physician agreed that the AMA Guides did not cover the condition, but assigned 10% permanent impairment to the body as a whole, based upon his experience and judgment. The trial court awarded 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.  Employer has appealed, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

Trousdale Workers Compensation Panel

Lisa Miller, et al. v. M & R Constructors, Inc. a/k/a Millwrights & Riggers
M2007-01945-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Allen W. Wallace
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Wooten

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is a suit to recover workers’ compensation death benefits. Employer denied that Decedent’s cardiac arrest was caused by his employment. The trial court found the death to be work-related, and awarded benefits to the survivors. On appeal, Employer contends that the evidence preponderates against that finding.  We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

Smith Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee v. Starbrough Jones
W2006-02230-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Starbrough Jones, of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, and the appellant received sentences of life, twenty-one years, and nine years, respectively. The trial court ordered that the appellant serve the twenty-one-year and nine-year sentences concurrently with each other but consecutively to the life sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing unreliable hearsay testimony into evidence in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and (3) consecutive sentencing is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Mario Lester
W2007-01447-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

The defendant, Mario Lester, was convicted of one count of burglary of a building (Class D felony) and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred in denying community corrections.  After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Robert Edwards v. Saturn Corporation
M2007-01955-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that: (1) under Building Materials Corp. v. Britt, Employee’s date of injury was his last day worked before having shoulder surgery, December 15, 2005; (2) Employee’s meaningful return to work was not frustrated by a plant-wide lay-off; and (3) Employee’s permanent partial disability award should be capped at 1.5 times the medical impairment rating. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Maury Workers Compensation Panel

Jennifer Kelly v. Dollar General Corporation
W2007-01105-SC-WCM-WC
Authoring Judge: Donald P. Harris, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 27) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee had separate claims for carpal tunnel syndrome and a back injury. The trial court awarded 3% permanent partial disability for the carpal tunnel injury but dismissed the back claim. Both sides have appealed. The employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee sustained her burden of proof as to causation of the carpal tunnel syndrome. The employee contends that the trial court erred in finding that she had failed to sustain her burden of proof as to permanent disability arising from her back injury. We affirm the judgment concerning the carpal tunnel claim, reverse the judgment concerning the back claim, and remand the case to the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (Supp. 27) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded DONALD P. HARRIS, SR. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and ALLEN M. WALLACE, SR. J., joined. Gregory D. Jordan and W. Paul Whitt, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dollar General Corporation. Steve Taylor, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jennifer Kelly. MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This is the second appeal in this case. Jennifer Kelly alleged that she sustained both carpal tunnel syndrome and a back injury as a result of her employment with Dollar General Corporation. Previously, the trial court had entered summary judgment for Dollar General on the back claim, based upon the statute of limitations. The trial court had dismissed the carpal tunnel syndrome claim after a trial on the merits, finding that Ms. Kelly had not provided timely notice of her injury. Kelly v. Dollar General Corp., Nos. W25-1891-SC-WCM-CV & W25-1174-SC-WCM-CV, 26 WL 2924815 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Sept. 25, 26). The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed both of these determinations and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at *6. After remand, the cases were tried together in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, resulting in the judgments which are the subject of this appeal. Ms. Kelly began working for Dollar General in 2. She was hired as a "third key manager" of one of Dollar General's stores, which meant that she ran the store during her shift. She later became assistant manager and then manager at the store. Her responsibilities included operating a cash register, loading and unloading trucks, stocking shelves, managing the schedules of other employees, tabulating sales information, and completing reports. Her back injury occurred in January or February of 21, when she fell while assembling a conveyor that was to be used to unload a truck. When she fell, the conveyor fell on her. Ms. Kelly testified that she was the assistant store manager at the time and reported the incident to the store manager, Annette Ross. Ms. Ross did not testify. Ms. Kelly did not request that Dollar General provide her with medical treatment at that time. On February 21, 21, she, without notice to Dollar General, consulted Dr. Mike Lemonds, who later became her primary care physician. She complained of low back pain and told him she had hurt her back. Dr. Lemonds failed to note and could not recall if she told him "where or when or how." Dr. Lemonds prescribed conservative treatment. She returned to him on several occasions over the following weeks. He ordered a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") study, which was performed on March 2, 21, and showed a herniated disc at the L5-S1 level and degenerative changes at other levels of her spine. Ms. Kelly continued to have symptoms, and Dr. Lemonds continued to provide conservative treatment over the next two years. Ms. Kelly's back pain periodically worsened during that time. Beginning in April or May of 21, Ms. Kelly began to experience numbness, tingling, and burning in her hands. She advised Dr. Lemonds of these symptoms on May 21, 21. When the symptoms continued to worsen in the latter part of 22, Dr. Lemonds suggested that a nerve conduction study be performed. This test was positive for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Ms. Kelly continued to work for Dollar General until November 23. At that time, she was terminated for violation of a company policy concerning employee check cashing. Ms. Kelly was referred by her attorney to Dr. Tewfik Rizk, an orthopaedic surgeon, in April 24. Dr. Rizk evaluated her low back pain and diagnosed nerve root irritation at L5-S1 with radiculopathy. In October 24, Dr. Rizk ordered a nerve conduction study of Ms. Kelly's lower extremities. This test confirmed his diagnosis. Based upon the history given to him, Dr. Rizk was of the opinion that the most likely cause of this injury was her fall at work in 21. He assigned a permanent impairment of 12% to the body as a whole. Dr. Rizk testified that Ms. Kelly "should not be involved in any kind of activity which necessitates repetitive back movement such as pushing, -2- ****** Document Outline ****** * Page_1 * Page_2 * Page_3 * Page_4 * Page_5 * Page_6 * Page_7 * Page_8

Shelby Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee v. Isedore Lamont Parks
W2007-02907-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The defendant, Isedore Lamont Parks, was convicted of simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail at seventy-five percent release eligibility, to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Dennis Pylant v. State of Tennessee
M2005-02721-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Burch

We accepted this appeal to determine whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner Dennis Pylant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In 2001, a jury convicted Petitioner of the first degree felony murder of two-year-old S.J.D. in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and this Court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. At the hearing, Petitioner adduced testimony about self-incriminating statements made by the victim’s mother but which trial counsel did not present to the jury at trial. The post-conviction court struck this testimony as hearsay and denied Petitioner’s claim for relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court. We hold that the post-conviction court erred in striking the proffered testimony as hearsay. We also hold that, because the post-conviction court made no credibility findings with respect to the proffered witnesses, we are unable to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment in this case and remand for a new post-conviction hearing.

Cheatham Supreme Court