Catherine Smith v. Sally Brittingham Smith and John Michael Charles Smith
This is an appeal from an order joining a third party in a divorce action. During the husband and wife’s marriage, husband’s mother gave the couple a substantial amount of money. The wife filed for a divorce in circuit court. Soon after, the husband’s mother filed a lawsuit in chancery court against the husband and wife, alleging breach of an agreement to repay the funds and to grant her a security interest in the marital home. Simultaneously, she filed a lien lis pendens on the marital home. The marital home was sold, and the chancery court transferred the husband’s mother’s lien lis pendens to the proceeds of the sale. The husband allowed a default judgment to be taken against him in his mother’s chancery court lawsuit. Subsequently, the circuit court granted the wife’s motion to join the husband’s mother in the divorce proceedings as a necessary party. Thereafter, the chancery court case was transferred to the circuit court. The circuit court held a trial on the merits; it found no agreement by the wife to repay the monies given to the couple by the husband’s mother, and dismissed her claim against the wife. The husband’s mother was awarded damages against the husband for the full amount of the money loaned, to be paid out of his share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The circuit court’s distribution of the martial estate, however, effectively eliminated his share of the proceeds. The husband’s mother appeals, arguing that she was improperly joined in the divorce action, and that the circuit court did not give proper effect to her lien lis pendens against the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. On appeal, we affirm, finding that the joinder was proper and finding no error in the application of the lien against the husband’s share of the proceeds. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Smith v. Sally Brittingham Smith and John Michael Charles Smith - Order
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Universal Outdoor, Inc., et al. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
The Tennessee Department of Transportation ordered the removal of a long-existing billboard to permit the expansion of a highway right-of-way. The billboard’s owner removed the sign and reinstalled it on another part of its leasehold, within 30 feet of its original location. The Department refused to renew the permit for the sign or to issue a new permit because its new location did not comply with the requirements of The Billboard Regulation and Control Act of 1972. The owner challenged that decision at an administrative hearing, arguing that it was entitled to maintain the nonconforming billboard at its new location under the “grandfathering” clause of the zoning statute. The administrative law judge disagreed and ordered the billboard’s removal. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge. We affirm the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.N.F. (d/o/b 10/24/99), a Child Under Eighteen Years of Age
This opinion involves two consolidated appeals. The first case involves post-divorce petitions to modify a parenting plan, filed by the husband and the wife, regarding custody of two children. The second case was filed by the wife and a third party, seeking to establish the third party’s parentage of one of the two children. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision in the custody case as modified, and we affirm the trial court’s decision in the paternity case. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer McClain Swan v. Frank Edward Swan
Jennifer McClain Swan (“Mother”) and Frank Edward Swan (“Father”) were divorced in March of 2006 in Knox County Chancery Court (“Chancery Court”). The parties have two minor children born of the marriage (“the Children”). In October of 2006, Mother obtained first an Ex Parte Order of Protection against Father and then a Bridging Ex Parte Order of Protection from the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County (“Circuit Court”). Over the next few months, Mother filed multiple petitions for contempt alleging that Father had violated the Order of Protection. After a hearing, the Circuit Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Father had violated the Bridging Order of Protection a total of forty-four times, that Father would serve time in the Knox County Penal Farm, that Mother had a no-contact Order of Protection against Father for ten years, and that Mother would be allowed to relocate outside the state of Tennessee without having to reveal her address to Father. The Circuit Court also entered a modification of the Chancery Court’s Permanent Parenting Plan that, inter alia, named Mother the primary residential parent and provided that Father would have co-parenting time with the Children only upon the recommendation and approval of Father’s psychologist, the Children’s psychologist, the Guardian Ad Litem, and the Court. Father appeals to this Court. We vacate the Permanent Parenting Plan entered by the Circuit Court and affirm the remainder of the Order of Protection.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Velma Lynn Saunders Manuel v. Davidson Transit
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Velma Lynn Saunders Manuel, was injured in an automobile accident which occurred as she was returning to her home from receiving medical treatment for a compensable work injury. She sought benefits for the additional injury. Her employer, Davidson Transit Organization, denied the claim. The trial court ruled that the additional injury arose from and in the course of the employment, and awarded 28% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by finding the injury to be compensable. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Deborah Jenkins et. al. v. Southland Capital Corporation, Southland Equity Corporation, Terry Lynch and Bradford Farms LLC
This is a consolidated wrongful death and personal injury case. In May 2002, three young boys walking beside the road were struck by a drunken driver in a residential subdivision. Two were killed, the third severely injured. The plaintiffs sued the developers of the subdivision, arguing that the absence of sidewalks in the area where the boys were walking was a cause of the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the developers on grounds that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was time-barred under the four-year statute of repose for improvements to real property, T.C.A. § 28-3-202. We agree with the trial court that the improvements to the real property on which the accident occurred were substantially completed more than four years prior to the filing of the lawsuits under the statutory definition at T.C.A. § 28-3-201(2), and therefore affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis Morris v. Amsouth Bank
This appeal involves forged endorsements on a check. The appellant had two checking accounts at the defendant bank. The appellant forged endorsements on a check, deposited the check into his account at the bank, and then removed the proceeds from his bank account. The bank later determined that the endorsements on the check were forged and debited the appellant’s other account in the amount of the fraudulently endorsed check. The appellant filed a lawsuit against the bank, and the bank counterclaimed for the amount of the check on which the appellant forged the endorsements. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted a statement of undisputed material facts in support of the motion. The appellant did not respond to the bank’s statement of undisputed material facts. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, and the appellant appeals. We affirm and remand the case to the trial court for determination of damages against the appellant for a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vickie Robnett v. Edward H. Tenison, Jr.
The issue is whether a court-ordered easement by necessity for ingress and egress to landlocked property may be terminated on the ground it is no longer necessary because the landlocked owner has an express easement through which that owner has reasonable, although not as desirable, ingress and egress. The trial court denied the petition to terminate the easement by necessity upon a finding it would place an undue burden on the landlocked property owner to have it terminated. We have determined the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, that of undue burden, to deny the petition to terminate the easement at issue. Easements by necessity are dependent on the necessity that created them; therefore, a way of necessity continues only as long as a necessity for its use continues. The fact that the way of necessity would be the most convenient does not prevent its extinguishment when it ceases to be absolutely necessary. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, et al. v. Good Times, Ltd., et al.
The State of Tennessee (“State”) sued Good Times, Ltd. (“Good Times”) 1 and others with regard to real property deeded to the State by Good Times after the State was sued for inverse condemnation by Good Times’ lessee, Pun Wun Chan d/b/a #1 China Buffet (“China Buffet”). The State claimed that it was entitled to indemnity from Good Times in the inverse condemnation action under its warranty deed. The Trial Court consolidated the State’s case against Good Times with the inverse condemnation action and then bifurcated the trial. The inverse condemnation case was tried before a jury and China Buffet was awarded a judgment against the State. The Trial Court then granted summary judgment to Good Times in the State’s case against Good Times and dismissed the State’s case. The State appeals to this Court. We vacate the grant of summary judgment to Good Times, grant the State summary judgment against Good Times, and remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of the amount of damages, and for further proceedings as necessary with regard to all other parties and claims. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralph Lester Nelson
The Defendant, Ralph Lester Nelson, pled guilty to one count of violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order, a Class E felony; one count of driving without a seatbelt, a Class C misdemeanor; and one count of driving without proof of financial responsibility, a Class E misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to an effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not grant him alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick Bertrand, a citizen and resident of Benton County, Tennessee v. The Regional Medical Center At Memphis, A Tennessee Corporation
This appeal arises from an October 2003 medical malpractice action filed against The Regional Medical Center at Memphis (“the Med”) and several physicians. Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited his action and re-filed it within the one-year period provided by the savings statute codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-105. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Med upon determining Plaintiff could not rely on the savings statute where the General Assembly had amended the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”), bringing the Med within the scope of the GTLA as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-101 (2007 Supp.), et seq. The amendment became effective July 1, 2003. On November 26, 2007, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the Med pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Maxwell Medical, Inc., Successor in Interest to Max Well Medical, LLC v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
The Clerk and Master, a substitute Judge, granted defendant summary judgment in this case, and plaintiff appealed. The record reveals that the substitute Judge was not designated in accordance with the statutes and case decisions, and we therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand to the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Tyson Lee Day - Dissenting
The State of Tennessee filed its Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application in this case to determine whether Tennessee recognizes the “community caretaking” exception to the requirement that police officers have at least reasonable suspicion when they make a traffic stop. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that we cannot address this question because it is beyond the scope of the legal issue certified to this Court in accordance with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). Rather than dismissing the appeal as being improvidently granted, the Court has decided to determine whether, under the essentially undisputed facts, Officer Jeff Tarkington acted reasonably when he stopped Tyson Lee Day’s automobile on May 16, 2004. The Court has decided that Officer Tarkington did not act reasonably. I cannot concur with this conclusion. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Tyson Lee Day
After unsuccessfully moving to suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop that led to his arrest, the defendant, Tyson Lee Day, pleaded guilty to third offense driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. The plea agreement provided for reservation of a certified question of law regarding whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that at the time the officer initiated the traffic stop, he lacked reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and, because the question was dispositive, dismissed the case. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider the question of whether the community caretaking rationale for traffic stops justified the stop in this case. After carefully examining the certified question, however, we conclude that the community caretaking issue was not included within the scope of the question reserved for review. Accordingly, our review extends solely to the issue preserved, i.e., whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. We conclude that the facts do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Sanders v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.
This is a premises liability case. Appellant sued Appellee for injuries sustained in a fall on an icy parking lot that was maintained by Appellee. The material facts of the case are undisputed and, on principles of comparative fault, the trial court determined that Appellant was at least 50% liable for the injuries he sustained in that Appellant (1) ignored the open and obvious danger when he undertook to walk inside the bank, (2) decided not to use the drive-through window in order to avoid traversing the ice, and (3) undertook a risk that a reasonable person would have avoided. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Rode Oil Company, Inc. and Long Outdoor Advertisign v. Lamar Advertising Company (Formerly Outdoor Communication, Inc.)
At its core, this appeal presents a dispute over whether two parties had entered into an enforceable agreement for the lease of land to be used for the placement of a roadside billboard. The trial court held that there existed only an offer from the property owner which was revocable and that therefore the property owner could freely lease the same property to a third party. During the pendency of this litigation in the trial court, which took many years, a series of corporate asset transfers and acquisitions occurred—the result of which raises the question of whether the same party is in fact now on both sides of this suit. The court below held that a live controversy still exists, and it subsequently proceeded to set damages. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court erred in its initial decision regarding the existence of a binding lease agreement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Dwayne Edwards v. State of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden - Dissenting
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner has failed to establish grounds for habeas corpus relief. Although the majority has performed an admirable analysis of the present cases on the subject, I am of the opinion that the various principles derived from these opinions are in conflict and, absent a reconciliation, the Petitioner is entitled to relief. Because the record of the proceedings demonstrates that after the jury verdict, the trial court directly contravened statute by imposing a Range III, persistent offender sentence, I would grant habeas corpus relief and remand to the sentencing court for the imposition of a Range II sentence. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Michael Dwayne Edwards v. State of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden
We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in remanding this habeas corpus case to the trial court for a hearing on Michael Dwayne Edward’s claim that his sentence is illegal. After careful consideration we conclude that, even assuming the trial court erroneously classified Edwards as a persistent offender for sentencing, this non-jurisdictional error renders the judgment voidable, not void, and does not entitle Edwards to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the habeas corpus petition. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Cordelia Ream
After the appellant pled guilty to criminal contempt in the juvenile court and received a four-day sentence, she appealed to circuit court, contending that the sentence was excessive. After being unsuccessful in circuit court , she then appealed to this Court. We found that the appeal of a criminal contempt conviction should be directly to this Court and not to the circuit court. Having resolved the appeal process issue, this Court finds that the acceptance of the guilty plea below was in contravention of constitutional standards and was plain error. The criminal contempt conviction is therefore vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tamela Scott - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority as to all issues except the issue of the Defendant’s sentence. The majority opinion modifies the Defendant’s sentence from one year of confinement followed by sixteen years of probation to one year of confinement followed by eight years of probation. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tamela Scott
The defendant, Tamela T. Scott, was convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a class B felony, and three counts of vehicular assault, a class D felony. She received an effective sentence of eight years. The sentence was ordered to be served by one year in confinement and sixteen years on probation. Among the conditions of the defendant’s probation were 200 hours of community service per year, and the defendant was also prohibited from driving for eight years. The defendant appeals the judgments, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony of “retrograde extrapolation” related to the defendant’s blood alcohol level; (3) the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding blood alcohol; and (4) the trial court erred in determining the conditions of her community service, the length of her probation, and that her driving privileges will be revoked for eight years. We affirm the judgments for the three counts of vehicular assault. We affirm the conviction of vehicular homicide by intoxication, but we modify the manner of service of the eight-year sentence to one year in confinement followed by eight years of probation. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Margaret Hudson
This is an appeal from an award of discretionary costs. The defendant owned a rental house in an historic district. She violated the historic district’s design guidelines by having vinyl siding installed on the house. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit to require the homeowner to remove the siding. The plaintiff was granted summary judgment, from which the defendant homeowner appealed. In the first appeal of this case, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed. After remand, the defendant homeowner failed to remove the siding, so the plaintiff filed a petition for contempt. After a hearing, the trial court found that the homeowner had the financial resources to have the siding removed, so it ordered the homeowner to (1) retain a contractor and (2) remove the siding. The homeowner was required to notify the court upon completion of both steps. The siding was removed. Once the house was brought into compliance, the plaintiff filed a proposed “order closing the file.” The trial court granted the motion. Within thirty days after entry of this order, the plaintiff filed a motion for an award of its discretionary costs. The homeowner opposed the motion, arguing that the plaintiff’s motion for discretionary costs was untimely, and that the order requiring compliance was the final order, not the “order closing the file.” The trial court awarded the plaintiff its discretionary costs, and the homeowner appealed. We affirm, finding that the motion for discretionary costs was timely filed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Monroe v. Jacqueline Zierden, et al.
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate, and granted Appellee reasonable attorney’s fees as provided in the contract. Appellant appeals the award of attorney’s fees; Appellee asserts error in the amount of fees awarded. We affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Walker Newman v. Wayne Woodard, et al.
This case concerns the access rights of a landowner to a section of her property divided from the rest of her land by a steep bluff. The trial court held that the landowner did not have an implied easement through her neighbor’s land to access her property at the bottom of the bluff because the there was insufficient evidence that the right-of-way preexisted severance of the properties. The trial court determined that Mrs. Newman did not have an implied easement by necessity because there was insufficient evidence that Mrs. Newman would be unable build a road down the bluff for a reasonable cost. Because the evidence does not preponderate otherwise, we affirm that Mrs. Newman does not have an implied easement or an implied easement by necessity over the right-of-way. The trial court also held that Mrs. Newman lacked a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way because she failed to prove that her use was exclusive; we affirm on the basis that Mrs. Newman failed to demonstrate that her use of the right-of-way was continuous. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals |