In Re K.E.D.M. a/k/a/ K.E.D.S
The issue presented in this parental termination case is whether it was shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. After careful review, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we reverse the judgmnet of the trial court and dismiss the petition to terminate. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Milton Carver v. Tombigbee Trucking Co.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a compensable injury. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment. |
McNairy | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Ronald Dotson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronald Dotson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that this court should remand his case to the trial court for a hearing based upon the holding in State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2007). Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern Concurring/Dissenting
I fully concur with all portions of the majority opinion except Part III(C), which discusses the defendant’s right against self-incrimination under the Tennessee Constitution. I would decline to address that issue as it is not presented by this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs. Marco M. Northern
We granted this appeal to consider whether the courts below correctly held that Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), does not bar the introduction into evidence of the defendant’s Mirandized2 videotaped confession which occurred after the defendant made an incriminating admission during a prior unwarned custodial interrogation. This Court has not previously interpreted and applied Seibert. After carefully considering the plurality opinion, the concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinions in Seibert, we conclude that the courts below correctly held that Seibert does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped confession. We further hold that this Court’s decision in State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1992), interpreting the right against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, does not bar admission of the defendant’s videotaped confession. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder but remanded for resentencing. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Mary Polite v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority Agency
Plaintiff appeals the Rule 12.02(6) dismissal of her petition for a common law writ of certiorari which sought review of her termination from the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency. Plaintiff, an at-will employee of the Agency, was terminated after an administrative hearing officer found that she had violated Agency policy. After the Agency filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the trial court determined the petition failed to state facts sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of a common law writ.ing the facts asserted in the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find the petition failed to state factual allegations sufficient to state a claim that the Board acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, and thus, it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We, therefore, affirm the Rule 12.02(6) dismissal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Blevins
The defendant, Donald Blevins, pleaded guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to a single count of reckless homicide in exchange for a two-year sentence with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing, and the defendant now appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwayne Anthony Dixon
The defendant, Dwayne Anthony Dixon, pleaded guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court in case number S51,198 to one count of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, speeding, and felony evading arrest. In case number S52,716, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to a plea agreement between the parties, the trial court imposed sentences of five years for possession of less than. 5 grams of cocaine, 11 months and 29 days for possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, 30 days for speeding, one year for felony evading arrest, and ten years for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine. The agreement provided for partially consecutive sentencing, for an effective sentence of 15 years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Hickman v. Dana Corporation
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. The injury was accepted as compensable. Before he reached maximum medical improvement, he was terminated as a result of an argument with a co-worker. He sustained a 5% impairment to each arm as a result of his work injury. The trial court awarded 30% PPD to both arms. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision, and affirm the judgment. |
Hickman | Workers Compensation Panel | |
David Joe Jackson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an aggravation of his pre-existing degenerative back condition while rising from his chair during his lunch break on Employer’s premises. The trial court found the injury was compensable and awarded 15% permanent partial disability benefits. Employer has appealed, contending that the injury did not arise from the employment. We affirm the judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Phillip Rhoads v. State of Tennessee
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Phillip Rhoads contended that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental injuries sustained in the course of his employment with the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The Claims Commission held that Rhoads’ condition was not compensable because it was the result of gradual occupational stress, rather than a sudden, identifiable event. Rhoads has appealed, arguing that the Commission erred in finding that he had not sustained a compensable injury. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
John C. Filson, et al. v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
The mortgagors filed suit, charging the mortgagee with breach of contract for failure to comply with terms of a note, deed of trust, and automatic payment service plan pursuant to which the mortgagee greed to automatically debit the mortgagors’ bank account for monthly payments. The jury found the mortgagee guilty of breach of contract and awarded damages in the amount of $250,000. The trial court remitted this damage award to $150,000. On appeal, the mortgagee argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant the mortgagee’s motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the mortgagors were guilty of the first uncured material breach of contract, by excluding evidence as a discovery sanction and by awarding the mortgagors $150,000. The mortgagors contend that the mortgagee waived all issues by not including them in its motion for new trial. After careful review, we hold that 1) the mortgagee did not waive its issues for purposes of appeal because the issues were included in the memorandum of law it incorporated in the motion for new trial; 2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence as a discovery sanction upon our finding that the mortgagee failed to explain why the excluded evidence was not timely provided to the mortgagors or to establish its importance at trial; 3) the trial court did not err in failing to grant the mortgagee’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon our finding that the mortgagee was guilty of the first uncured material breach of contract by failing to timely institute its automatic payment service plan; and 4) in compliance with the mortgagee’s request, this case is remanded for a new trial solely on the issue of damages upon our finding that the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of $150,000 is not supported by the evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Walter Cuozzo
Walter Cuozzo (“the defendant”) was found guilty of traffic violations in general sessions court. He appealed to circuit court but failed to comply with a local rule that provides “an appellant [on an appeal from general sessions court] has forty five (45) days to secure a trial date from the court.” Because of this failure, the circuit court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Coker v. County of Obion
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an injury to her shoulder in April 2005 while working for Employer. When she returned to the office, she made a statement in the presence of her supervisor and others that she had injured her shoulder. The supervisor testified that she did not hear the statement. In the following months, Employee received occasional medical treatment for the injury. In March 2006, her doctor recommended surgery. Employee gave written notice of the injury to her supervisor on the next day. Employer denied the claim based upon Employee’s failure to give notice of her injury within thirty days. The trial court found that Employee had given sufficient notice and awarded 7.5% permanent partial disability. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the claim was not barred by failure to give timely notice. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Melissa A. Grayson v. Shaw Industries, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. While at work for the Employer, the Employee’s hair was caught in machinery, which violently pulled her head into the machine. Her scalp was pulled away from her skull. She received treatment at an emergency room. In the months that followed, she had three surgical procedures to repair the wound and her scalp. She was diagnosed with post traumatic stress syndrome, developed sleep problems, anxiety and headaches. She became fearful and anxious around machinery and was ultimately discharged by her Employer. Her physicians and vocational experts and the Employer’s vocational expert agreed that when a Social Security questionnaire was considered, she was 100% disabled. Nevertheless, the Employer contends that she is not 100% disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Delores Young v. Vanderbilt University
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by basing the employee’s impairment rating on the testimony of the independent medical examiner instead of on the employee’s treating physician. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Moore & Associates, Inc. v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals
Zoning administrator denied a waiver of the Metropolitan Zoning Code’s landscape buffer requirement and the Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the administrator’s interpretation of the ordinance. Plaintiff contractor appealed to the circuit court, which determined that the zoning administrator’s interpretation of the ordinance was incorrect and granted the waiver. The Board of Zoning Appeals appealed. The trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance is affirmed, but the decision to grant the waiver is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the board for further action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Hooper v. Steven Dotson, Warden (State of Tennessee)
The Petitioner, Michael Hooper, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fred Tharpe v. Emerson Electric Company
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee and Employer entered into a court-approved settlement agreement in 1988. The agreement required Employer to continue to provide medical treatment for the injury in accordance with the workers' compensation law. Employee received treatment from time to time. Employer paid for the treatment. In June 2006, Employer requested an independent medical examination of Employee. The evaluating physician concluded that current medical treatment was not related to the original work injury. Employer thereafter declined to provide further treatment. Employee filed this action. The trial court ordered Employer to continue to provide medical treatment. Employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Henry | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sammie Lee Netters v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Sammie Lee Netters, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Harris v. Jim Worthington, Warden (State Of Tennessee)
The Petitioner, Tracey Lynn Harris, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rain Thomas Chesher v. Stephen Dotson, Warden
The petitioner, Rain Thomas Chesher, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his conviction is void, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cordaro Hughes
The defendant, Cordaro Hughes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, fifteen years at 100% for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and eight years at 30% for the attempted robbery conviction, with the trial court ordering that the sentences be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether this court should waive his untimely notice of appeal in the interests of justice; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine to suppress evidence that he initially denied any involvement in the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rapheal Love
The defendant, Rapheal Love, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Michelle Strickland v. Terry Copley
This appeal arises from post-divorce proceedings involving child support obligations. The original divorce and support orders were entered in Michigan. The mother subsequently moved to North Carolina, and the child support order was transferred to that state. The father moved to Tennessee and became delinquent in making his support payments. The mother began to receive public assistance and executed an income assignment assigning to North Carolina the right to receive the back child support owed by the father. Upon request by North Carolina, Tennessee then brought suit to enforce the North Carolina order. In the Tennessee proceedings, the trial court changed custody from the mother to the father and ordered the mother to pay the father child support. In the process, the trial court determined that the mother owed back child support to the father and then used this amount to setoff the obligation owed by the father to North Carolina. For the reasons stated herein, we determine that a setoff cannot be used to deprive North Carolina of recoupment of its public assistance. The judgment below allowing the setoff is therefore vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals |