Patsy Wicks Dawson v. Isaac Dale Dawson
After more than eighteen years of marriage, Patsy Wicks Dawson (“Wife”) sued Isaac Dale Dawson (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order, inter alia, awarding Husband a divorce and distributing the marital property. Wife appeals raising an issue regarding the distribution of the marital property. We vacate the distribution of the marital property and remand this case to the Trial Court to value items of marital property as necessary to effectuate an equitable division of marital property under the facts of this case such that Husband receives 60% and Wife receives 40%. The remainder of the Trial Court’s Final Decree of Divorce is affirmed. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Bonds
The defendant, Robert Bonds, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III offender to fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelvin Jermaine Dowell v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kelvin Jermaine Dowell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by presenting two inconsistent defense theories at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Swift
In October 2005, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Kevin Swift, on two counts |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chad Lewis Monette
Following a bench trial in the Houston County Circuit Court, the defendant, Chad Lewis Monette, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. He was subsequently sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed because aggravated sexual battery is not a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. He further challenges the admission and consideration of certain testimony and exhibits introduced as evidence at trial. Following review of the record, we conclude that aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; thus, no error occurred in the conviction. With regard to the evidentiary issues, we conclude that the defendant has waived consideration of the issues by his failure to contemporaneously object at trial, his failure to raise the issues in his motion for new trial, or his failure to cite to legal authority on appeal. Because the alleged evidentiary issues do not rise to the level of plain error, we decline review. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. McKinley Wright
The defendant, McKinley Wright, appeals as of right his Shelby County jury conviction for unlawful possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 15 grams of heroin, a Class B felony. 1The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven years as a Range I, standard offender to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence without establishing the chain of custody, that the trial court improperly admitted testimony regarding the timing of testing controlled substances recovered by Shelby County authorities, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding facilitation, that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and that all of the cumulative errors deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Ricky Pipkin, Jr.
The defendant, Charles Ricky Pipkin, Jr., pled guilty to charges of aggravated burglary and theft over $500. He also pled guilty in a separately charged case to initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver more than .5 grams. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant properly reserved several certified questions of law, challenging the legality and validity of the search warrant. Specifically, the defendant argued that the affidavit for the search warrant did not satisfy both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test and therefore failed for lack of probable cause. He further argued that information contained in the warrant was stale and insufficient. Finally, the defendant argued that if the search warrant was invalid in the first case, then any evidence and statements used against him in the second case must also be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the defendant’s convictions. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Derrick Huskins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Derrick Huskins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2006 Polk County Criminal Court conviction of felony murder. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was involuntary and was the result of the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leman Earl Russell, Jr.
The defendant, Leman Earl Russell, Jr., entered a plea of guilty, in January 2007, to three counts of selling a Schedule II controlled substance under .5 grams (Class C felony) and one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance over .5 grams with intent to sell or deliver (Class B felony), in exchange for a sentence of split confinement. For each Class C felony conviction, he was sentenced to six months in the county jail and four years on community corrections, with each sentence to be served concurrently. For the Class B felony, he was sentenced to six months in the county jail to be followed by nine years and five months on community corrections, also concurrent with the other sentences, for a total effective sentence of nine years and eleven months (six months in confinement followed by nine years and five months on community corrections). Here, the defendant appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. After review, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jack E. Thompson
The defendant, Jack E. Thompson, in this consolidated appeal, appeals from one judgment revoking his probation and another judgment sentencing him to three years to be served consecutively to the sentence for which his probation was revoked. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence to three years on his plea of guilty to burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony. After review, we affirm both judgments from the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Lee Meeks, et al.
This appeal involves the warrantless search of a motel room containing an actively operating methamphetamine laboratory. After the occupants of the room were indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine and for possessing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, they filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Coffee County seeking to suppress the evidence found in the motel room. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence and vacated the order dismissing the indictment. State v. Meeks, No. M2006-01385- CCA-R3-CO, 2007 WL 1987797 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 10, 2007). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to address more fully the principles applicable to warrantless searches of actively operating methamphetamine laboratories when the State asserts that the officers were acting to avert a serious and immediate risk of injury to themselves or others. Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, we have determined that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress and by dismissing the indictment. |
Coffee | Supreme Court | |
Amy Hatfield v. Haynes Publications, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee was struck on the back by a heavy bundle of paper. Her injury was accepted as compensable. She was examined and treated by three authorized doctors, all of whom opined she had no permanent impairment. She sought additional medical treatment, which ultimately led to surgery to repair her sacro-iliac joints. The trial court found that the surgery was related to her work injury, and awarded 50% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending that the medical evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
William Hegger v. Ford Motor Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome, which was accepted as compensable by Employer. The trial court found that Employee had sustained no vocational disability as a result of the condition, and therefore awarded 2% permanent partial disability to the arm, which was the anatomical impairment assigned by two of the three doctors to testify. The trial court also ordered that Employer was no longer required to provide medical treatment for the condition. On appeal, Employee contends that the award of permanent disability benefits is inadequate, and that the trial court erred by terminating future medical benefits. We affirm the disability award, but modify the closure of medical benefits. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Juanita I. Kirk v. St. Michael Motor Express, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Juanita Kirk, sustained a compensable injury and her claim was settled. The settlement was approved by the trial court based upon an affidavit executed by the employee. Several months later, Ms. Kirk filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the settlement on the basis of fraud, that it was approved without Ms. Kirk having personally appeared before the court, and that it did not afford to Ms. Kirk substantially the benefits to which she was entitled. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Ms. Kirk had not sustained her burden with regard to the issue of fraud and denied the motion. She has appealed from that order. Although we agree that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion on the issue of fraud, we find that there were “other reason[s] justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 60.02(5). We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for additional proceedings. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sharon Walker v. Saturn Corporation
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred in three ways: (1) by finding that she did not carry her burden of proof with respect to causation; (2) by finding, in the alternative, that she retains only a ten percent permanent partial disability; and (3) by allowing the employer to admit extrinsic evidence of specific conduct in an attempt to attack the credibility of her expert medical witness. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Maury | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In the Matter of: FLBH, FJH, JR., FH, FLHH, and FEH
This is a termination of parental rights case. By final order entered in April 2008, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Respondent/Appellant Betsy Hawkins (Mother)2 to her five children, F.L.B.H.; F.J.H., Jr.; F.H.; F.L.H.H.; and F.E.H., based on persistence of conditions. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Sometime prior to the transmission of the record to this Court, nine exhibits were misplaced in the trial court.3 Petitioner/Appellee State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“the State”) and Mother agree that the missing exhibits cannot be recreated for the purpose of review on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
Appellant, Shawn Hatcher, was involved in a shooting which resulted in the death of one victim and the serious injury of two other victims. As a result of the incident, Appellant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant immediately to a mandatory life sentence for the first degree murder convictions. Appellant filed a motion for new trial. The trial court held a joint sentencing hearing and hearing on the motion for new trial. The trial court merged the two convictions for first degree murder and sentenced Appellant to fifteen years for each attempted murder conviction to be served concurrently with each other. The trial court ordered the life sentence to be served consecutively to the fifteen-year sentence. The trial court also denied the motion for new trial and appointed new counsel at the conclusion of the hearing for sentencing and the motion for new trial. Newly-appointed counsel filed an amended motion for new trial more than thirty days after the trial court denied the original motion for new trial. The trial court held a hearing on the amended motion for new trial and denied the motion. Appellant appealed. On appeal, the State argues that this appeal is not properly before this Court. We have determined that the issues presented in the amended motion for new trial are not properly before this Court because it was not filed with thirty days from the trial court’s denial of the original motion for new trial. We have waived the timely-filing of the notice of appeal with regard to the original motion for new trial and address those issues on appeal. Therefore, the issues presented on appeal are that the evidence was insufficient to support the Appellant’s convictions, the trial court erred in allowing in photographs of the murder victim into evidence, the trial court erred in not allowing Appellant to present medical evidence of his injuries to support his theory of defense, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the special instructions Appellant presented. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Howard Jefferson Atkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Howard Jefferson Atkins, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because: (1) trial counsel failed to pursue suppression of the petitioner’s statement to police on the basis that police did not have probable cause to effectuate his arrest; and (2) appellate counsel failed to challenge the petitioner’s transfer from juvenile court on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daniel Ronald Vengrin v. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Daniel Ronald Vengrin, pled guilty to vandalism in an amount greater than $500, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the appellant to one year and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered that the appellant have no contact with the victim and pay restitution. Subsequently, the appellant was found guilty of twenty-one counts of criminal contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the no-contact order that was a condition of his plea agreement. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of 210 days for his contempt convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction “to modify or otherwise enforce the terms and conditions of the [j]udgment in [the appellant’s] case.” Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rachel Didena Summers v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy Louis Shaw
The defendant, Guy Louis Shaw, pleaded guilty to one count of driving on a revoked license (fourth offense), violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the motor vehicle light law. Subsequently, he was ordered to serve a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail for his conviction for driving on a revoked license. It is this sentence from which the defendant appeals. On appeal, the defendant argues that he should have been sentenced to probation rather than incarceration. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard Ray Fitzgerald
The defendant, Leonard Ray Fitzgerald, was convicted of two counts of sale of over .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent eight-year sentences, with seven years to be served on probation after one year in the Department of Correction. The jury assessed a $100,000 fine in each count, which the trial court imposed. On appeal, the defendant argues that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous, the fines were excessive, and he should have been sentenced as an especially mitigated offender and granted full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Almeko Chiffon Woods
On February 4, 2005, the defendant, Almeko Chiffon Woods, pled guilty to one count of forgery less than $200 and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card between $500 and $1000, both Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years probation for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently. On January 22, 2007, a probation violation report was prepared, alleging that the defendant failed to meet with her probation officer and failed to pay restitution and court costs. However, this report was not filed until February 20, 2007. On January 30, 2007, the trial court issued what the defendant considered a capias and the state considered an arrest warrant in connection with the alleged probation violation. Following a June 28, 2007 hearing, the trial court found the defendant in violation of her probation and extended her probation another year. That same day, an additional probation violation was filed with the trial court, alleging that the defendant violated her probation by being arrested for simple possession of a controlled substance and failing to report this arrest to her probation officer. In August 2007, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered her to serve a two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, arguing that because the probation violation report was not filed until February 20, 2007, her probation expired on February 4, 2007. She further argues that because the document issued by the trial court in January 2007 was not an arrest warrant, the limitations period for filing the probation violation was not tolled, and therefore the trial court’s extension and revocation of her probation were nullities because her probation expired on February 4, 2007. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the expiration of the defendant’s probation was properly tolled and that the trial court acted properly in extending and subsequently revoking the defendant’s probation. As such, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ervin D. Smith, et al. v. Paul Evans, et al.
Owners of property brought suit to terminate an ingress/egress easement across their land, contending that the necessity for the easement no longer existed. Following a trial, the Chancery Court ruled against the owners, finding that since the easement was reserved in a recorded plat, it was not an easement by necessity; consequently, the easement was not destroyed upon the sale of the dominant estate. On appeal, the owners maintain that the easement was destroyed at the end of the necessity. Finding the easement to be express, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court. Finding the appeal not to be frivolous, no attorney’s fees are awarded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Yates v. State of Tennessee, Tommy Mills, Warden
The Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals |