In Re Estate of Toni Harris
This is a breach of contract case involving a purchase and sale agreement for real property. Because the parties’ mutual mistake of law concerning ownership of the subject property negates the prima facie element of mutual assent, there is no enforceable contract. Reversed and remanded. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Leilani G.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. The chancery court found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination. The court also determined termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Terrance Woods v. State of Tennessee
Following the death of his minor child, the appellant filed suit against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission (the “Claims Commission”) asserting claims for wrongful death and for violation of his rights as a crime victim. The Claims Commission granted partial summary judgment and partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the State. The appellant appeals the judgment of the Claims Commission. Having determined that the appellant’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Michael Halliburton v. Blake Ballin, et al.
Michael Halliburton (“Halliburton”) filed a lawsuit against his former attorney, Blake Ballin (“Ballin”) and Ballin’s law firm, Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. (“Ballin Firm”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Ballin and Ballin Firm filed a motion to dismiss Halliburton’s amended complaint. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss, and Halliburton has appealed. Having reviewed the record and briefs in this case, we conclude that Halliburton presents an issue unreviewable by this Court and that Halliburton’s appellate brief, accordingly, does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory F. Heerdink v. Dawn A. Osborne, Et Al. - (Concurring Opinion)
I believe that the majority opinion accurately reflects existing law. Therefore, I concur. I write separately to express my concern that the existing law on voluntary nonsuits as outlined in this opinion allows a plaintiff to avoid sanctions for his bad actions taken before the nonsuit. In my opinion, defendant Osborne had at least an inchoate right to receive an undetermined amount of attorney’s fees based on the trial court’s order that “the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay all of each Defendant’s attorney’s fees associated with Plaintiff’s delays, including attendance at prior hearings on Motions to Withdraw, today’s hearing and all preparations for any such hearings.” The sanction was ordered. Only the amount was yet to be determined. A voluntary nonsuit should not allow Plaintiff to escape responsibility for his actions or to prevent Osborne from being properly compensated for Plaintiff’s wrongdoing. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Megan Elizabeth West Brewster v. Brandon Paul Brewster
In this post-divorce action, the father filed a petition seeking to modify the parties’ agreed permanent parenting plan based on alleged mental and emotional instability of the mother. During trial, the father sought to remove the guardian ad litem for purportedly violating her duties pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 40A; however, the trial court denied the father’s motion. The father also sought to introduce statements by the minor children indicating that the mother had told them private information regarding the parties’ divorce. Upon objection by the mother and the guardian ad litem, the trial court determined such statements to be inadmissible hearsay. The trial court ultimately entered an order on August 4, 2023, determining that modification of the parties’ permanent parenting plan was neither necessary nor in the best interest of the parties’ children despite certain changes in the parties’ circumstances. The trial court also denied the father’s motion for a restraining order against the mother, although the court found that the mother’s actions had been inappropriate. The trial court further ordered that each party would pay his or her own attorney’s fees. The father timely appealed. Upon our thorough review, we vacate the trial court’s determination concerning child support and its finding regarding the mother’s gross income. We remand for further hearing as needed and a determination of the mother’s gross income with instructions to the trial court to consider whether gifts or payment of living expenses by her family should have been included. The trial court shall then be required to recalculate child support utilizing the proper gross income amount for the mother. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. We deny the father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Keigen D.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights based on abandonment and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. After our review, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Jorge Antonio Mata Campos v. Amanda Rosa Ruiz Zeledon
In this appeal arising from a divorce action, the husband raises issues pertaining to the trial court’s classification, valuation, and distribution of marital assets, as well as the alimony award to the wife. Upon our review, we affirm the determination of the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory F. Heerdink v. Dawn A. Osborne, Et Al.
At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees after the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. This action arose when Gregory F. Heerdink (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Heerdink”) filed a complaint for a declaration of an easement by implication on adjoining property owned by defendant Dawn A. Osborne (“Osborne”) and previously owned by defendant Robert K. Garrett (“Garrett”) (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants each filed an answer but neither filed a counterclaim. More than a year later, Defendants each filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 41.02(1). In an order entered October 9, 2020, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss but ruled that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sanctions were appropriate and ordered Plaintiff to, inter alia, pay “all of each Defendant’s attorney’s fees associated with Plaintiff’s delays, including attendance at prior hearings on Motions to Withdraw, today’s hearing and all preparations for any such hearings.” The order further directed defense counsel to “Submit an Affidavit of itemized time for approval by the Court.” Five days after the entry of this order, but before either defendant filed a fee application, Plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal on November 2, 2020. Shortly thereafter, Garrett filed an application for fees, however, Osborne did not file a fee application until approximately two years later, when she filed a motion to enforce sanctions along with an attorney’s fee affidavit. Plaintiff opposed Osborne’s motion, arguing that the case had been dismissed and that, as a consequence, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to award the fees. Alternatively, Plaintiff argued that Osborne waived the right to fees due to the over two-year delay. Defendants contended that they had a “vested right” to recover their attorney’s fees, which vested right prevented Plaintiff from dismissing the case pursuant to Rule 41.01. They also relied on the precedence of Menche v. White Eagle Prop. Grp., LLC, No. W2018-01336-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 4016127 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019) to contend that the order of dismissal was not a final order because the attorney’s fees claim was pending, and that the trial court therefore retained jurisdiction to rule on the unresolved issue of attorney’s fees. The trial court agreed and awarded attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. We have determined that Defendants did not have a vested right to recover their attorney’s fees and that Menche is inapposite. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award any fees following the voluntary dismissal of the action. Accordingly, we vacate the award of fees.
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Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cedric G.
The parental rights of Cedric G., Sr. (“Father”) were terminated by the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on November 20, 2023. Father appeals. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights as to Cedric G., Jr. (“the Child”) for abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit, failure to support, and exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistence of conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Child’s best interests. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Collier Engineering Company, Inc. v. Timothy W. Martin
An employer sought to enforce restrictive covenants against a former employee. In response, the former employee filed a counterclaim for retaliatory discharge, and the employer moved to compel arbitration on the counterclaim. The former employee opposed the motion, arguing that the arbitration agreement was either unenforceable or inapplicable. The trial court agreed that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the counterclaim. So it denied the motion to compel. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth R. Brooks v. Whaley Construction, LLC
This is an appeal from a premises liability claim brought against a construction company. The plaintiff tripped over a cut signpost while walking along a highway in Blount County, Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant construction company caused, created, or had knowledge of the signpost and had a duty to the plaintiff. Following a motion for summary judgment by the construction company, the trial court determined that that construction company was not responsible for the signpost and thus owed the plaintiff no duty of care. The plaintiff appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Rimon Abdou v. Steven Brown et al.
This appeal arises from a civil action that was commenced and voluntarily dismissed without prejudice twice before the plaintiff refiled the same action for a third time. The defendants responded to the third filing by moving to dismiss on the ground that the third action was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Relying on the authority in Payne v. Matthews, 633 S.W.2d 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), the trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. In their brief, the defendants/appellees ask this court to award them their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this appeal, contending that the appeal is frivolous. Finding that the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, frivolous, we remand this matter to the trial court to award the defendants/appellees their reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Evans v. Robert David Derrick
Father appeals the trial court’s award of grandparent visitation to the child’s maternal grandmother. Although we affirm the trial court’s determination that an award of grandparent visitation is warranted, we vacate the visitation schedule set by the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. David W. Salyers, P.E. (Dissenting)
The parties in the present appeal duel over the question of whether, when appealing the decision of an administrative judge to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas in relation to an alleged violation of the Water Quality Control Act, a party has 15 or 30 days in which to appeal. Jamesway Construction, Inc. asserts that the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) only had 15 days to appeal, and, accordingly, that the administrative judge’s decision became final when TDEC failed to appeal within that period. TDEC insists that it had 30 days to appeal, and, accordingly, that its appeal was timely. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. David W. Salyers, P.E.
The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of its claim concerning the Water Quality Control Act (“WQCA”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 69-3-101, et seq.1 We now affirm the dismissal due to the applicable statute of limitations. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Smiledirectclub, Inc., Et Al. v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, Et Al.
This is an action for defamation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”). The plaintiffs operated a teledentistry platform dedicated to providing remote treatment for mild-to-moderate malocclusion of the teeth. The defendants published an online article and broadcast an “investigative report” that alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ customers were experiencing “painful problems” such as nerve damage, joint damage, and loss of teeth. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued these and other statements—as well as the implications derived from those statements—injured the plaintiffs’ reputation and disparaged the plaintiffs’ products, services, and business. The trial court dismissed the action under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“the TPPA”), holding that the TCPA did not apply and that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case for their defamation claims. This appeal followed. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and disregarding all countervailing evidence, we have determined that the plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence of falsity to support some of their claims but failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Defendants ask for an award of their appellate attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107, which requires an award of costs and fees “[i]f the court dismisses a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under [the TPPA].” Because we have affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the TPPA, Defendants are entitled to an award to be determined by the trial court on remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Westport Insurance Corporation et al. v. Howard Tate Sowell Wilson Leathers & Johnson, PLCC et al.
Plaintiff insurance company is the insurance carrier for an insurance agency that was sued for negligence in five Tennessee lawsuits. After the underlying lawsuits were settled, the plaintiff, in its own name and on behalf of its insured, sued the law firm that represented the insured in the lawsuits. The plaintiff asserted a direct legal malpractice claim, a legal malpractice claim as subrogee of the insured, and a negligent misrepresentation claim. The trial court dismissed all claims. In particular, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not maintain a direct legal malpractice claim against the law firm due to the lack of attorney-client relationship and that the assignment of legal malpractice claims is prohibited in Tennessee. In the alternative, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not establish the damages element of its legal malpractice claims. The trial court further ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a misrepresentation of existing or past fact. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s direct legal malpractice action. As to the remainder of the trial court’s rulings, however, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janine Halterman-Scott v. Tennessee Society of Certified Public Accountants
The Plaintiff was injured as a result of stepping into a hole in the grass on the Defendant’s property and brought a premises liability action. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendant, finding that the Plaintiff’s responses to the Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts established that the Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. On appeal, the Plaintiff asserts there is evidence from which notice could be inferred. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment. The judgment is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Buchanan Dobson Dunavant v. The William B. Dunavant, Jr. Revocable Living Trust ET AL.
At issue in this appeal is the petitioner’s attempt to recover for breach of contract of a marital dissolution agreement entered into between his parents prior to their divorce. Although the parents’ agreement had called for the petitioner’s father to create an irrevocable life insurance trust for the petitioner’s benefit, the trial court concluded that there was not an enforceable obligation regarding that subject matter and entered summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Auston Wortman, III v. Eric Shirkey
This appeal concerns whether witness testimony in the course of a parole hearing is absolutely privileged. Fred Auston Wortman, III (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner, filed a defamation lawsuit against Eric Shirkey (“Defendant”), a detective who testified at Plaintiff’s parole hearing, in the Circuit Court for Morgan County (“the Trial Court”).1 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s statements about him at the parole hearing, such as calling Plaintiff a “narcissist,” damaged his reputation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court concluded that Defendant’s statements were absolutely privileged. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that his parole hearing was administrative rather than judicial in nature, so Defendant’s statements were not protected by absolute privilege. We hold that the parole board, in considering whether to grant Plaintiff parole, was exercising a judicial function such that absolute privilege extended to testimony at the parole hearing. We hold further that Defendant’s statements were relevant and pertinent to the issues involved. Therefore, Defendant’s statements at Plaintiff’s parole hearing were absolutely privileged. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County Democratic Party ET AL. v. Greg Grant D/B/A Greater Memphis Democratic Club, Inc.
In response to a petition alleging the violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19- 116, a statute that prescribes a criminal penalty and that this Court has held does not provide for a private right of action, the trial court entered an injunction. The trial court thereafter found that the appellant was in criminal contempt of the injunction and sentenced him to ten days in the county jail. The appellant appeals, arguing, among other things, that the order that he was held in contempt of was not lawful. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the contempt judgment should be reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Leanne Wilhite v. Seth Evan Wilhite
This post-divorce action concerns the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence as specified in their marital dissolution agreement. The husband claimed a right under the MDA to, inter alia, one-half of the net proceeds, but the wife asserted that the MDA limited the husband’s equity interest to $40,000. The parties also disputed who was liable for income taxes, including interest and penalties, incurred and accruing after 2019, when the parties entered the MDA. Each party also asserted claims and entitlements to various credits and/or offsets resulting from the delay in the sale of the marital residence. The trial court held that the MDA limited the husband’s interest to $40,000. The court assessed $29,368.52 in post-divorce income taxes, including penalties and interest, against the husband. The court also ordered him to pay $20,543.10 for the wife’s attorney’s fees per the MDA’s fee-shifting provision. But the court granted the husband’s request for reimbursement for the cost of repairs to the property and awarded the husband credit for one-half of the utilities that he paid pending the sale of the property. The husband appeals, raising several issues. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s finding that the MDA limited the husband’s equity interest to $40,000. We also conclude that the MDA obligated Husband to pay for all utilities and other expenses pending the sale of the property. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Husband was entitled to a credit of one–half of those payments. Thus, we vacate the monetary awards that were based, in part, on these decisions, and remand with instructions to recalculate the parties’ respective entitlements to “the net proceeds.” We affirm the trial court in all other respects. We also find that the wife has a right to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under § 15 of the MDA and remand with instructions for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lexington Charter, LP, et al. v. FBT of Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal arises from a dispute between a partnership and its limited partners concerning the payment of attorney’s fees under the parties’ limited liability agreement. The trial court held that the attorney’s fees were payable from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership’s property, and the limited partners appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rory Mills Sullivan v. AnneMarie Culp Allen, Individually, and as Trustee for The Tommy Ray Allen and AnneMarie Culp Allen Revocable Trust ET AL.
This appeal follows the dismissal of a proceeding brought in probate court. Because we cannot discern the basis for the trial court’s decision in the two orders that are at issue, we vacate both orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
