Charles F. Holland et al. v. Cheatham County et al.
In this action filed pursuant to 42 United States Code § 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant law enforcement officers had violated one plaintiff’s constitutional rights by using excessive force when the officers shot and injured him at the scene of a “road rage” incident that did not involve the injured plaintiff. The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances because the injured plaintiff had appeared at the scene of the road rage investigation suddenly and without warning, had approached the officers rapidly, and had been armed with a rifle. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice, determining, inter alia, that the officers’ use of deadly force had been objectively reasonable. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Kayden K., by and through Alicia Kelly v. Jessica Ruffin, M.D., et al.
A minor Plaintiff, acting through his grandmother, sued several healthcare providers for injuries stemming from his birth. The Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit. The Plaintiff provided statutorily compliant pre-suit notice to each defendant within a year of dismissal but did not refile the suit for over a year after dismissal. The Plaintiff asserted this was permissible in accordance with the 120-day extension available under Tennessee’s Healthcare Liability Act. The trial court rejected this contention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, much of the parties’ respective briefing tracked the arguments before the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, __ S.W.3d __, No. M2022-00597-SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 259059 (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2025). While the suit was pending on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that the 120- day extension does not apply to the one-year deadline for refiling suit after a voluntary dismissal. This case is controlled by the Richards decision. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lanora Henry v. Jeffery W. Henry
Husband and wife divorced. In dividing the parties’ marital assets, the trial court granted Husband significantly less equity than Wife in the parties’ marital residence. In its oral ruling, the trial court also set a five-year horizon before Wife needed to sell or refinance the home. On appeal, Husband challenges both the amount of the equity in the home that he was awarded and the failure to order a quicker sale or refinancing by Wife of the marital residence. Both parties agree the trial court inadvertently failed to memorialize in its written final order a sale or refinancing requirement for the end of this five-year horizon. We remand to the trial court for modification of its order in accordance with the parties’ agreed understanding; otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s order. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Quality Motors, LLC v. Motohaven Automotive Group, LLC Et Al.
Quality Motors, LLC, a defunct used car dealership owned by Chris Yousif, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) against Ali Hussein Khalil and Motohaven Automotive Group, LLC (“Motohaven”), pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 30-101 to -111. Quality Motors claimed that Khalil had converted for his personal benefit fourteen of its cars, four of which had been sold to Motohaven. At the conclusion of Quality Motors’ proof at trial, the Trial Court granted Motohaven’s motion for directed verdict, which we construe as a motion for involuntary dismissal. At the conclusion of trial, the Trial Court found that Quality Motors had failed to meet its burden of proof against Khalil and entered a judgment dismissing Quality Motors’ case. The Trial Court granted Khalil’s and Motohaven’s respective motions for exemplary damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-30-110. Quality Motors appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jane Doe v. John David Rosdeutscher, M.D., et al.
This is the second appeal arising from a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleges the defendants engaged in tortious conduct and committed breach of contract when they filed certain medical records into the record of a separate healthcare liability lawsuit. The plaintiff is the same in both cases as are two of the defendants. The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted, and sanctions were imposed against the plaintiff’s attorney. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and we affirmed. We also deemed the appeal to be frivolous and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees and costs incurred litigating the appeal. Upon remand, the trial court calculated the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred and the plaintiffs subsequently filed this appeal. Finding that our award of fees in the prior appeal became the law of the case, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Brecker v. Virginia Story et al.
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against his former attorney and her law firm, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by the affidavit of the defendant-attorney and various other documents. Just days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed an untimely response to the motion for summary judgment along with voluminous exhibits. The defendants asked the trial court to disregard the late-filed exhibits and grant them summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s response was untimely and deemed it stricken. In the absence of a response, the trial court also took the defendants’ statements of undisputed material facts as true. It then examined each of the causes of action asserted by the plaintiff and concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Janett Galloway v. Earl Scott Et Al.
In this boundary dispute, the plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment to establish the boundary line between the plaintiff's improved real property and the defendants' improved real property. Following a bench trial, during which the court heard expert testimony from two competing surveyors, the trial court declared the property boundary to be established according to the survey prepared by the plaintiff's expert witness. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. The plaintiff's request for attorney's fees on appeal is denied. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Barbara Jean Huff
The probate court declared a will executed on September 5, 2021, to be the decedent’s last will and testament and admitted it to probate. The beneficiary under an earlier will contested the validity of the 2021 will. In moving for summary judgment, the beneficiary argued that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to make the will. Based on the undisputed facts, the trial court agreed. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Sands v. Robert Williard, et al.
The Plaintiff, who was injured by tripping on a sidewalk, filed suit against the private property owners and city but failed to properly serve the city. In their original answer, the private property owners asserted the city’s comparative fault but not in express terms. The Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the city as a defendant. In an amended answer, the private property owners expressly asserted comparative fault against the city. The Plaintiff promptly amended her complaint to add the city as a defendant under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, which provides a plaintiff 90 days after the filing of an answer asserting comparative fault against a non-party to add that non-party as a defendant, even if doing so would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations. The city asserted this was not in accordance with the statute because the private property owners asserted comparative fault against the city in the original answer. The trial court determined that, although the original answer did raise comparative fault of the city, this did not trigger the 90-day window under the statute because the city was a party at the time. The trial court concluded that the amended answer was timely filed within 90 days of the filing of the first answer alleging comparative fault against a non-party, which was the amended answer. The city appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James A. Price
In this estate case, appellant, decedent’s son, and appellee, decedent’s partner of twenty-seven years, are the beneficiaries of decedent’s will. The will appointed the parties co-executors, and they served in this capacity for several months until disputes arose between them and this litigation ensued. In its final order, the trial court found in favor of appellee on every disputed issue. On appeal, appellant raises issues concerning the trial court’s: (1) rulings during trial; (2) final order; and (3) award of attorney’s fees to appellee. Both parties ask for an award of appellate attorney’s fees. Because the evidence does not support the attorney’s fee amount awarded to appellee, and because the trial court failed to consider the relevant reasonableness factors, we vacate this award and remand for a new determination of reasonable attorney’s fees owed to appellee. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed. We grant appellee’s request for appellate attorney’s fees, and we deny appellant’s request for same. Appellee’s request for frivolous appeal damages is denied. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Victor Hugo Hernandez v. Jodie L. Land
A father moved to set aside two court orders as absolutely void. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 60.02(3). The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jim Spangler et al. v. Mack McClung
At issue in this appeal are claims for unjust enrichment and breach of a limited liability company’s operating agreement. The plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the LLC, filed the complaint against his business partner. The complaint alleged that the defendant breached the LLC’s operating agreement by executing a promissory note to satisfy a foreclosure deficiency and by securing that note with a deed of trust on the LLC’s remaining real estate. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The court found that the promissory note was an extension or renewal of the LLC’s existing loan and that the defendant’s actions were authorized by a “written consent,” which allowed the defendant “to do any acts, including but not limited to the assignment, delivery, pledge, or hypothecation . . . of any or all assets of this LLC to secure such Loan, renewals and extensions.” Thus, the court concluded that the defendant did not breach the operating agreement. And because the parties had a valid and enforceable contract, the court determined that the plaintiff had no claim for unjust enrichment. But the court denied the defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees under the operating agreement’s fee-shifting provision. The court reasoned that the action was not “to secure enforcement” of the operating agreement, as required by the operating agreement. We affirm the court’s judgment on the plaintiff’s claims, albeit for different reasons with respect to the unjust enrichment claim but reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Colten B.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights of a mother and father to their young son. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination existed due to a prior finding of severe child abuse and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The parents appeal. We affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Natasha C. v. Dustin C.
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to modify the parties’ parenting plan and name Father primary residential parent of the parties’ two children. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Taiden B.
In this action to terminate parental rights, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings by clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned her child and that the termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dilmer S.M. ET AL.
A mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s rights based on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dilmer S.M. ET AL. - Concurring
The majority thoughtfully addresses the present appeal. I agree with the majority that the record establishes that Mother committed severe child abuse and that the termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. I respectfully diverge from the majority insofar as the majority opinion suggests that the termination petition’s notice — which specifically alleges severe abuse against the children that are named in the petition (which does not include Ervin Leonard) — extends to a finding of severe abuse by Mother of another child, Ervin Leonard. I concur in the majority’s conclusion affirming the termination of Mother’s parental rights based on harmless error. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alanna Lee Kummer v. Johnny Kummer, III
A husband never answered his wife’s complaint for divorce, and the trial court entered a default against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and divided the marital estate. Within thirty days of entry of the final decree, the husband moved for relief from the judgment. On appeal, the husband faults the court for denying his motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Marlin Roberts, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, et al.
Homeowners removed underground storage tanks found on their property. After finding evidence of petroleum contamination where the tanks had been located, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation began an extensive cleanup process. The Department subsequently issued a cost-recovery order against the homeowners to recoup its expenditures. The homeowners petitioned for review of the cost-recovery order to the Underground Storage Tanks and Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, which upheld the order. The homeowners appealed this initial ruling to the Board and the order was again upheld. The homeowners then appealed the Board’s final ruling to the trial court, which reversed the Board’s judgment. The Department and the Board now appeal. Because we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for transfer to the proper court. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Sylvia Carlyle Brainard
After two sets of relatives filed competing petitions for the appointment of a conservator over the respondent, the parties entered into an agreed order and settlement agreement that provided that the respondent was not in need of conservator, but that the parties had certain obligations that were subject to review by the court and guardian ad litem going forward. Months later, appellants filed a petition to set aside the agreed order on the basis that appellees had not complied with its terms; appellees responded with a motion to dismiss appellants’ petition on the basis that they had not alleged proper grounds to set aside the parties’ agreement. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order stating that “[a]ll outstanding orders should be set aside and all petitions and the case dismissed” without explanation. Because we cannot review the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal without an adequate explanation, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Claudine Desjardins v. Kelly Wilson et al.
The appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Remington G.
A father filed a petition to establish parentage of the parties’ child. At the trial on the petition, the trial court limited the evidence to events since a hearing on pendente lite parenting time that took place 47 days before the final hearing. We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the evidence in this way. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order in its entirety and remand for a new trial. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
James Henry Whitaker, II v. Viktoria Moor
Following their divorce, a mother informed her children’s father of her desire to move to Germany with the children. The father filed a petition opposing the move. The court found that the relocation was in the children’s best interest and modified the permanent parenting plan accordingly. On appeal, Father contends the evidence preponderates against some of the factual findings and that the court erred in weighing the statutory best-interest factors. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that relocation was in the children’s best interest, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Preston Garner Et Al. v. Southern Baptist Convention Et Al.
The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Grubb Et Al. v. Joe D. Grubb Et Al.
This appeal concerns the end of a business relationship between two brothers, Joe D. Grubb (“Joe”) and James W. Grubb (“Jim”).2 After many years of working together in the cash advance and rent-to-own businesses, Jim sued Joe in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”), asserting breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable relief under the LLC dissolution statute. Joe sued Jim in turn. One of the chief issues concerned Jim’s claim to equal compensation from the brothers’ businesses based on an alleged express oral agreement with Joe. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Jim, awarding him damages based on multiple grounds. Centrally, the Trial Court found that an express oral agreement between Jim and Joe provided for equal compensation, even though Jim testified that the alleged agreement was “unspoken” and “just the way it’s been.” Joe appeals. We hold, inter alia, that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in favor of Jim, what Jim testified to did not constitute an express oral agreement or any other kind of contract as a matter of law. Jim’s alternative theories for relief are unavailing as well. We reverse. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals |
