Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A. - Dissenting
Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lafayette Insurance Company v. Jerry S. Roberts, et al.
In this appeal we must determine whether an injured worker was an “employee” or a |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Main Street Market, LLC v. Emily V. Weinberg
This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Williams v. Katie Singler
This appeal involves the modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties’ minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the mother had violated the parenting plan and held that this constituted a material change in circumstances. It changed the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father, held the mother in contempt, and awarded the father attorney fees as punishment for the contempt. The mother now appeals. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the finding of a material change in circumstances, but hold that the trial court erred in holding that it was in the child’s best interest to change the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father. We also vacate the holding of contempt against the mother and the award of attorney fees as punishment for the alleged contempt and remand for additional findings. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Joseph G., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Joseph G., Trinity G., and Stephen G. (“the Children”), the minor children of a married couple, J.G. (“Father”) and E.G. (“Mother”). The Children, then ages four, two and one respectively, were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) following the incarceration of both parents. The Children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected by stipulation of the parents. A year after the Children entered foster care, DCS filed suit to terminate the parents’ rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted DCS’s petition. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother separately appeal. As to both parents, we reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Chill et al v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Donald Chill and his wife, Martha Chill, brought this action against their homeowner’s insurance carrier, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), alleging breach of contract by virtue of its refusal to pay for their loss caused by an earthquake. The insurance policy required suit to be brought within one year of the loss. The Chills filed their complaint almost seven years after the loss and over three and a half years after the Chills refused to accept Insurer’s offer to settle the claim for $88,086.49. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
The Commissioners of the Powell-Clinch Utility District v. Utility Management Review Board
Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Beaver v. Ford Motor Company
In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Rennee N. Dhillon v. Gursheel S. Dhillon
The trial court granted Mother’s petition to waive mediation and modify custody, and modified the parties’ parenting schedule upon finding a material change of circumstance. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
H. Preston Ingram Et. Al. v. Scott T. Sohr, Individually and As Trustee of the Scott T. Sohr Family 2007 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust et al
This complex litigation arises out of a series of disputes between two former partners and members in more than twenty partnerships and limited liability companies that were in the business of real estate development. Following a tumultuous six year business relationship, in an attempt to extricate themselves from their business relationships, the parties executed a Membership Interest and Exchange Agreement, which distributed the entities so a portion were solely owned by one former partner/member and the others were solely owned by the other former partner/member. After closing on the Exchange Agreement, the plaintiff commenced this action against his former business partner alleging fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent transfer of which most, but not all, of the claims arose from the Exchange Agreement. The complaint was later amended to add additional claims. The defendant filed a Counter-Claim alleging that the plaintiff was also in breach of the Exchange Agreement. The trial court dismissed several of the plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment. The remaining issues were tried. At the close of the plaintiff’s proof during the jury trial, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on some, but not all, of the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury entered a verdict for the defendant on the remaining claims. Although the jury found the defendant in breach of three provisions of the Exchange Agreement and a partnership agreement of a jointly owned company, the jury awarded no damages based upon the plaintiff’s prior knowledge and acquiescence of the breaches. Thereafter, each party sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees pursuant to § 11(l) of the Exchange Agreement. The trial court held that defendant was the prevailing party; therefore, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to recover his attorney’s fees pursuant to § 11(l) of the Exchange Agreement and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. The trial court also awarded the defendant indemnity under the bylaws of one corporation and the partnership agreement of another.The trial court also assessed discretionary costs against the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff raises numerous issues relating to the dismissal of his claims on summary judgment and directed verdict, the instructions given to the jury, the trial court’s ruling on a post-trial motion to amend the defendant’s answer, attorney’s fees and costs, and indemnity. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on summary judgment and directed verdict in all respects. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on attorney’s fees and costs under the Exchange Agreement, holding that as the trial court correctly determined the defendant was the prevailing party for those purposes. We also affirm the trial court’s determinations that the defendant was entitled to indemnification under the provisions of the Partnership Agreement and indemnification under the bylaws of IS Investment, Inc. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Leenhouts v. Gert Jan Leenhouts
This appeal involves a motion to set aside a default judgment. The wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband was served with process. After the husband failed to file an answer, the wife filed a motion for a default judgment. The husband filed no response to the motion. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment and held a hearing on the wife’s divorce complaint. The husband did not appear at the hearing. Based on the evidence wife presented at the hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate. The husband then filed a motion to set aside both the default judgment and the divorce decree. The trial court denied the husband’s motion, and the husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandy Jane Smart v. Brian Wayne Smart
Mother and Father were divorced in 2007 and granted joint custody of their then-six year old child. Mother filed a petition for modification in which she asked to be named the primary residential parent because the joint arrangement was not working for the parties and was not in Child’s best interest. Trial court granted Mother’s petition to be named primary residential parent, but directed that major decisions for Child should be made jointly. Father appealed, arguing that trial court erred in finding material change of circumstances had occurred since the initial parenting plan was entered and that the comparative fitness analysis favored Mother as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed trial court’s judgment regarding major decision making. We affirm trial court’s judgment modifying the parenting plan to name Mother the primary residential parent and amend the plan to have Mother make major decisions for Child rather than both Mother and Father jointly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s attorney fees but award her reasonable fees incurred on appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Henry J. Nagorny v. Sheriff Scott Layel
This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail time credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition sua sponte, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed this appeal. We hold that the Trial Court, stating no compelling substantive basis for its decision, erred in dismissing Nagorny’s petition sua sponte. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for proceedings consistent with our Opinion. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Alexander Owens v. James Emery Owens
Wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony in 2004 that was to terminate in 2012. In 2009 Wife filed a petition to increase the duration and amount of her alimony, or, in the alternative, for an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court found Wife was in need of support, but it denied Wife’s petition, finding Wife had not used all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself. On appeal we find Wife’s inability to be rehabilitated as that term has been defined by the legislature warrants a modification of Wife’s alimony award. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s petition for alimony and conclude Wife is entitled to alimony in futuro but in a lesser amount. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lillie Franchie Huddleston v. Robert Lee Huddleston
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of property, specifically the appreciation in value of farm property he owned in his own name prior to the marriage as marital property and of a life insurance policy owned by Wife as her separate property. Finding that the court erred in its classification of the increase in value of the farm property, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Skylar B. D.
The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Waylon R. D.
The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
David Kwasniewski v. Scott Donna Lefevers
Lessor and Lessee executed a lease agreement that gave Lessee an option to purchase the rented property during a two-year period. A purchase and sale agreement was executed the same day outlining the terms of the sale if the option were exercised. Lessee did not exercise the option during the period specified, and Lessor sued the Lessee for breaching the purchase and sale agreement. Lessee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Lessor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. Because Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property, the purchase and sale agreement did not become operative. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Aayden L. B. et al
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on several grounds and determined that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Groves, Individually And As Next Of Kin Of Charles Groves v. Christopher Colburn, M.D.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital in which she asserted claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a party and did not contemporaneously file a certificate of good faith. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Cooper, et al. v. Robert Ledford Funeral Home, Inc., et al.
We granted Robert Ledford Funeral Home, Inc.’s (“the Funeral Home”) application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to consider the issue of whether the Funeral Home was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that its “on call” employee, Johnny Tipton, was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home when the vehicle accident causing injuries to the plaintiffs occurred. We find and hold that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mr. Tipton was not acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Funeral Home, and that the Funeral Home is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Spencer v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
Andrew Spencer (“Plaintiff”) sued Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that the Railroad was not at fault for Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff appeals raising an issue regarding jury instructions concerning foreseeability and notice. We find that the jury instruction regarding foreseeability and notice was misleading, and we vacate and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Bell v. Tennessee Department of Corrections
This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enterprises, L.P. et al
In this dispute concerning a real estate sale contract, we have concluded that the gravamen of the action is for injury to property and that, under the applicable legal principles, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding as to when the statute of limitations began to run. Because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Anne McDaniel v. Robb Ashby McDaniel
Mother appeals the designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children and the parenting schedule which gave Father substantially more parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision which was primarily based on the importance of continuity in the children’s lives. As for the parenting schedule, which awards Father 245 days and Mother only 120 days a year, we find that the evidence preponderates against such a disparity of parenting time; therefore, we reverse the parenting schedule and remand this issue for the trial court to adopt a revised parenting schedule that permits each parent to enjoy the maximum participation possible in the children’s lives that is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
