William H. Worley, et al v. Rarity Communities, Inc., et al
Following a trial where Plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages, Defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial based on juror misconduct. Defendants alleged the jurors arrived at the punitive damages amount using a quotient, or gambling, verdict. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for a new trial and Defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the jurors’ affidavits indicate that not all jurors agreed in advance to be bound by the mathematical process involved in arriving at a quotient verdict. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Faith A. F.
Father in child custody and support proceeding appeals the trial court’s findings: (1) that he was in criminal contempt of court; (2) that he was in civil contempt of court and setting the amount necessary to purge himself of contempt; (3) in suspending his parenting time; (4) modifying his child support obligation; and (5) ordering him to pay Mother’s attorney fees. We have determined that the finding of criminal contempt, the order modifying his child support obligation, and the order that Father pay Mother’s attorney fees should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings in connection therewith. In all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Anderson d/b/a ABC Painting Company v. The Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency
A painting contractor filed a complaint against Nashville’s Metropolitan Housing and Development Agency (MDHA) alleging that the agency had violated its own rules by failing to choose him as the lowest bidder on a painting contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because an administrative decision, such as the award of a painting contract, can only be challenged through a petition for writ of certiorari, and the contractor had filed his complaint after the sixty day time limit for filing the writ had passed. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston v. Marilyn Swing et al
The plaintiff, an attorney representing himself, filed this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Metro Clerk in her official capacity, and the Director of the Metro Department of Parks and Recreation Services in his official capacity. He asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that arises from him being prohibited from speaking on behalf of his clients at two separate meetings of the Board of the Metro Department of Parks and Recreation, because he failed to give timely notice to the Board. He alleges the defendants deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee constitution and seeks nominal damages for the alleged deprivation of his rights. He also seeks a declaratory judgment that the Parks’ Board rule requiring fourteen days’ notice to be heard at a Board meeting is invalid. We have determined, as the trial court did, that the plaintiff’s claims related to the first Board meeting are time-barred. As for the claims related to the second Board meeting, we have determined that the plaintiff’s rights were not violated because the plaintiff had actual notice of the Board policy requiring fourteen days’ notice well in advance of the second meeting. Finally, we have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment because he failed to demonstrate that he is seeking to vindicate an existing right under presently existing facts. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
H. G. Hill Realty Company, L.L.C. v. Re/Max Carriage House, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from the denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from a default judgment. Appellee’s original complaint was filed against the Appellant’s company for breach of a commercial lease agreement. Appellee was granted leave to amend the complaint to add Appellant, individually, as a party-defendant. Appellant failed to file any responsive pleadings in the case and a default judgment was entered against him. Several months later, Appellant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment against him. We conclude that the trial court did not err in piercing the corporate veil to add Appellant as a defendant, or in the amount of damages awarded in the default judgment. Because Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof on the Rule 60.02 motion, we also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion. Affirmed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Wade McCoy v. Alisha Poindexter McCoy
This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court denied Mother’s motion to correct a clerical mistake in the permanent parenting plan pursuant to Rule 60.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Mother appeals. Vacated and Remanded. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Muhlstadt v. Larry David Muhlstadt
Petition to modify child support obligation was filed by Father; Mother filed a counter-petition requesting that the court make a determination as to where their child would attend school. The trial court dismissed Father’s petition when he did not provide information to support his assertion that he no longer received a portion of the income upon which his child support obligation was based and therefore he failed to show a change of circumstance relative to his income. The court found that it would be in the child’s best interest to attend school in the school for which Mother’s residence was zoned and granted Mother’s counter-petition; the court also awarded attorney fees to Mother. We affirm the court’s decision relative to the child’s school enrollment. We reverse the order dismissing Father’s petition for modification and remand the case for reconsideration; we reverse the award of attorney fees. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Fonda Blair v. Rutherford County Board of Education
Teacher who brought action against Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Board of Education, and two employees of the Board appeals the grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissal of her claim that defendants violated the Education Truth in Reporting and Employee Protection Act of 1989, as well as her claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, misrepresentation, and harassment. We affirm the trial court’s holding that there is no general cause of action under the Education Truth in Reporting and Employee Act of 1989. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation which preclude summary judgment, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the remaining claims. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Hearing Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility
An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board hearing panel that decided his case. The attorney asserts that the hearing panel violated the Open Meetings Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board’s hearing panels. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Limited Partnership, et al. v. Bluff City Community Development Corporation
The trial court appointed a receiver for the appellant nonprofit corporation and held its president in contempt for repeated failures to comply with the court’s previous orders. The nonprofit corporation appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Shandajha A.G.
This is a parental termination case. The child at issue was removed from the mother as a result of the mother’s drug abuse. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and clear and convincing evidence that such termination was in the child’s best interest. The trial court further allowed the non-relative petitioners to adopt the child. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Arleen Christian v. Ebenezer Homes of Tennessee, Inc. D/B/A Good Samaritan Nursing Home
Visitor to a nursing home who was injured when a door swung into her brought suit against the nursing home, alleging that the door constituted a dangerous and defective condition and that the nursing home failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to visitors. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted on the basis that the door did not constitute a dangerous or defective condition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Duane Christy v. Mitchell B. Dugan, Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Laura Antoinette Long, Deceased
In this action for damages related to a motor vehicle collision, Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff contests Defendant’s compliance with summary judgment requirements and the trial court’s consideration of extraneous evidence in reaching its decision. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Adedamola O. Oni, M.D. v. Tennessee Department of Health & Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
This appeal arises out of disciplinary proceedings against a physician before the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The proceedings were instituted after the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct disciplined the physician. The Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners revoked the physician’s medical license and the physician appealed to the chancery court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322. The chancery court reversed and vacated the order revoking the physician’s medical license. The Tennessee Department of Health and the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners appealed. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for reconsideration. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lyle Douglas Vaughan, et al. v. Hawkins County, Tennessee, et al.
In a prior appeal of this matter, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that a road in dispute was private rather than public. Ten months after our decision, the defendants, the Brewers, filed a Rule 60.02 motion to vacate with the trial court based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court overruled the motion. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Ramon Williams v. Dana Randolph
This is an appeal from the trial court’s final order modifying the visitation schedule as required upon remand from a prior appeal. See In re Iyana R.W., No. E2010-00114-COAR3- JV, 2011 WL 2348458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). The trial court denied the father’s attempt to modify custody of the minor child and ordered the case transferred to the Davidson County Juvenile Court as the more convenient forum for any further proceedings. The father appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
BancorpSouth Bank v. David J. Johnson, Eugene Gibson, and Cheryl Gibson
This appeal involves the enrollment of a foreign judgment. The plaintiff creditor sought to enroll in Tennessee a deficiency judgment obtained in Arkansas. The defendant debtors contended that the Arkansas judgment should not be given full faith and credit in Tennessee, alleging inter alia the fraud exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the constitution. The trial court enrolled the Arkansas judgment, and the debtors appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Shannon P. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the five minor children (“the Children”) of Tineaka P. (“Mother”) and Shannon P., Sr. (“Father”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on June 14, 2011. The petition alleged several grounds for termination, including severe child abuse, abandonment based on willful failure to support the Children, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial, which concluded in February 2012, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse, that she had abandoned the Children due to her willful failure to pay child support, that she had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, and that the conditions leading to removal persisted. Father was granted an additional ninety days to attempt to improve his situation, and a hearing date was set for May 10, 2012, regarding the termination of his parental rights. At the conclusion of the bench trial on May 10, the court also terminated Father’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan and that the conditions leading to removal persisted. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Geret Jesse Johnston v. Susan Harwell
This post-divorce appeal involves the termination of a parent’s obligation to pay support for his two college-age children. The parties were divorced in Hawaii. Under the Hawaii divorce decree, the father was obligated to pay child support for the parties’ two children until they finished their post-high school education or until they reached age 23, whichever was earlier. Subsequently, both parties and their children all moved to Tennessee. Years later, disputes arose and the parties eventually resolved them by agreement. The trial court entered an agreed order assuming jurisdiction over the matter, enrolling the Hawaii divorce decree, and adopting the parties’ agreed permanent parenting plan. The agreed parenting plan was silent on the duration of the father’s child support obligation. Later, after both children reached age 18, the father filed a motion to terminate his child support obligation, arguing that he is not obligated to support his children beyond the age of majority under Tennessee law. The trial court granted the father’s motion and terminated his child support obligation. The mother now appeals. We hold that, by consenting to the prior agreed order enrolling the Hawaii divorce decree without modification of the duration of child support, the father agreed to assume the obligation to pay child support until age 23. This agreement, incorporated into the Tennessee court’s order, is enforceable. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s termination of the father’s child support obligation. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jason C. Woods et al v. David Lowrey et al
The buyers of a house sued their real estate agent, the seller’s real estate agent, and others, alleging that the defendants concealed the fact that their home’s garage violated the neighborhood restrictive covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding, as a matter of law, their garage did satisfy the requirement of the restrictive covenants, i.e., that the garage be large enough to accommodate at least two cars. Because the undisputed material facts establish that the plaintiffs’ home is in compliance, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Joshua P et al
This termination of parental rights case concerns Joshua P. and Quinn W. (“the Children”), the children of G.W. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) after both parents were arrested. Later, DCS petitioned the court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court found that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Children’s best interest, both findings said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Lori K. Wilhoit et al. v. Joshua Andrew Rogers et al.
This case involves an automobile accident wherein a refrigerator being hauled by Defendants fell from a truck and collided with Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Plaintiff, Lori K. Wilhoit, was driving the vehicle and filed suit regarding her personal injuries and the property damage to her vehicle. Her husband, Jeffrey Wilhoit, also asserted claims regarding property damage to the vehicle and loss of consortium with and services of his wife. A jury trial was held in November and December 2011. As the matter of liability was stipulated, the only issues submitted to the jury related to the amount of damages, if any, suffered by Plaintiffs. The jury returned a verdict awarding Plaintiffs $3,200 for property damage and zero damages for all other claimed injuries. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm the jury’s verdict regarding property damage and Mr. Wilhoit’s claims, but we reverse in part the jury’s verdict regarding a portion of Ms. Wilhoit’s injuries and medical expenses. We remand this case for further proceedings regarding Ms. Wilhoit’s damages. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James E Miller
In this action, a creditor brought a claim against the decedent’s estate for the value of cattle and equipment. With the personal representative for the estate filing an exception to the claim, the creditor filed an amended claim, seeking to enforce an attached handwritten contract. The trial court dismissed the amended claim as both untimely and asserting a new and different cause of action. On appeal, the creditor raises two issues: whether the trial court erred (1) by finding that the claimant was not entitled to actual notice of the probate proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-306(d) (2010) and (2) by dismissing the amended claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-307(e)(2) (2010). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Michael Harris, et ux v. Mickey Deanne Haynes, et al.
This appeal concerns whether certain exclusions in a coverage document are permissible. Dennis Michael Harris (“Harris”), then a patrolman with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Mickey Deanne Haynes (“Haynes”). Harris and his wife, Judy A. Harris, (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) sued Haynes and the alleged owner of the vehicle, Richard H. Furrow, in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Plaintiffs also raised claims against Anderson County’s motor vehicle liability coverage provider, Tennessee Risk Management Trust (“TRMT”), for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. TRMT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the relevant coverage document (“the Coverage Document”), Harris was excluded from uninsured coverage as he was an employee of Anderson County who had received workers compensation. The Trial Court granted TRMT’s motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Anderson County was self-insured through TRMT, and, therefore, the uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes do not apply. The Coverage Document excluded employees such as Harris from uninsured coverage. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander A. Rogin v. Joelle L. Rogin
This appeal involves various financial issues related to a divorce. The trial court: (1) calculated both parents’ incomes for purposes of child support; (2) required Father to pay a portion of the children’s private school tuition; (3) entered a permanent parenting plan giving Mother final authority over major decisions regarding the children; (4) divided the marital property; (5) denied Father’s request for transitional alimony; (6) awarded Father alimony in solido; and (7) denied both parties’ requests for attorneys fees. We: (1) reverse the trial court’s determination that Father is willfully and voluntarily underemployed; (2) vacate the trial court’s calculation of Mother’s income; (3) vacate the trial court’s ruling requiring Father to pay a portion of the children’s private school tuition; and (4) remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm as to the remainder of the issues presented. Vacated in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
