Arnold Alphonso Bueno v. Pattie Lynette Bueno Todd
This appeal stems from criminal and civil contempt charges brought by a father of two minor children because of the mother’s failure to pay child support. The father brought his criminal contempt charge based on section 36-5-104 of the Tennessee Code. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court violated the mother’s due process rights during the criminal contempt hearing. The mother asserts on appeal that the chancery court violated her due process rights by (1) allowing the father’s attorney to try the case against her for criminal contempt; (2) failing to provide proper notice to her pursuant to Rule 42 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (3) failing to provide her with a right to a jury trial; and (4) applying the wrong legal standard when it found her guilty of criminal contempt. Also, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court properly terminated the mother’s visitation rights with her children based on the chancery court’s findings that the mother committed perjury, that the mother was in criminal contempt for violating section 36-5-104 of the Tennessee Code, and that the mother was in civil contempt. We vacate the portions of the chancery court order (1) finding Appellant in criminal |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Williams, Sr., et al. v. Linkscorp Tennessee Six, L.L.C., d/b/a Nashboro Golf Club - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority. As stated in the majority opinion, in order for an owner or operator of premises to be held liable for negligence in allowing a dangerous or defective condition to exist on the premises, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to the elements of negligence, that the condition was caused or created by the owner or, if the condition was created by someone other than the owner, that the owner had actual or constructive notice that the condition existed prior to the accident. Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). It is alleged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint that Mr. Williams was walking down a set of steps on the golf course that were made of railroad crossties and that he fell due to the slippery surface of the step. Mr. Williams testified in his deposition that he evidently hit some mud and moss1 on the stairs, which caused him to fall. He testified that it was “raining real, real hard at that time.” However, Mr. Williams recanted this testimony in a subsequent affidavit wherein he stated, “it may have been sprinkling, but it was not raining hard.” In response to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs filed affidavits of Arthur Overall and Larry Rees, both of whom were golfing with Mr. Williams. Mr. Overall stated that it had been raining heavily early that morning, but at the time we were playing golf, |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Williams, Sr., and wife Janet Williams v. Linkscorp Tennessee Six, L.L.C., d/b/a Nashboro Golf Club
This is a premises liability action. While playing golf in the rain, the plaintiff slipped and fell on stairs on the golf course made of railroad cross ties. The plaintiff claimed that the stairs were covered with mud and some variety of moss or algae, making them dangerously slippery. The plaintiff sued the golf course for negligence. The defendant golf course filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff failed to proffer evidence of notice, either actual or constructive. The trial court also found that the plaintiff’s evidence of a dangerous condition was speculative. We reverse, finding sufficient evidence to create a factual issue on whether a dangerous condition existed and whether the defendant golf course had constructive notice. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Memphis Health Center, Inc. et al. v. Gregory Grant, et al.
This is a derivative action. The board chairman of a nonprofit health care center was found guilty of submitting false claims in violation of federal law. Thereafter, the health care center’s chief executive officer and two of its board members filed a derivative action on behalf of the health care |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Henry Kent Sudberry v. Royal & Sun Alliance, et al.
Trial court granted motion to dismiss tort claims as barred by statute of limitations where the injury alleged was loss of employment. To the extent the employee alleged he had a contract for continued employment, his complaint was not subject to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal because the three year statute of limitations applies to cases involving loss of property, including contractual rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Lee Barlow Long v. Bobby Ray Long
In this post-divorce action, the Trial Court entered Judgment against the defendant for previously awarded obligations, and held him in contempt. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sumner County Board of Education v. Carden Company, Inc.
In this action, the Trial Court stayed defendant’s planned arbitration and defendant has appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Jonathan Hulon Brown v. Jackie Lynn Ross
Jonathan Hulon Brown (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s refusal to change the surname of his minor child, born out of wedlock, from that of the minor child’s mother Jackie Lynn Ross (“Mother”) to that of Father. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of E.J.M. d.o.b. 10/31/1994, Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This is a child custody case which originated in juvenile court. On March 24, 2005, the court entered an order which, inter alia, awarded joint custody to the parties, with the mother being the primary custodian. Relying on Local Rule 15 of the Shelby County Juvenile Court, father timely appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. By order entered October 11, 2005, the circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On October 28, 2005, father filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court, appealing the final judgment of dismissal in the circuit court and the final judgment of the juvenile court entered on March 24, 2005. We vacate the order of the circuit court dismissing the case and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter an order transferring this appeal to the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Phillips & Associates v. George D. Blackburn, et al.
Defendants/Appellants appeal the order of the circuit court dismissing their appeal from general sessions court based upon their failure to appear for trial in the circuit court. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Bowers Smith v. Riley Dean Smith
This is a divorce case. In a post-trial proceeding after remand by the Court of Appeals, Husband appeals the order of the trial court which effectively awarded certain stock to Wife. The appeal is dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Burks, et al. v. Elevation Outdoor Advertising, LLC f/k/a Delta Outdoor Advertising, LLC
The Appellee is a billboard advertising business engaged in selling advertising space on the billboards it maintains. The Appellants contracted with the principal owner of the business to sell the business in exchange for a commission. One of the Appellants had partial ownership interest in three of the billboards serviced by the business. After closing the sale, the Appellee paid the Appellants a significantly smaller commission than the parties had agreed upon. The Appellants brought suit for breach of contract seeking to recover the remainder of the commission allegedly owed. The Appellee subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, pursuant to the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973 codified at section 62-13-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code, the Appellants could not recover a commission as a matter of law. The Appellee also sought to invoke the Act’s provisions to recover the commission already paid to the Appellants. Finding it undisputed that the Appellants did not have a real estate broker’s license when negotiating the sale of the business and that real estate comprised a significant portion of the Appellee’s assets, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Further, the trial court ordered the Appellants to return the commission already paid by the Appellee. The Appellants have appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Melton, R & J of Tennessee, Inc., and State of Tennessee, on the Relation of John Melton and R&J of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Lexington, Tennessee
This case involves equitable estoppel against a municipal government. In 1998, a real estate company developed a large residential subdivision just outside the defendant city. The city annexed the property and provided services to the area. The developer later became insolvent and failed to pave one of the roads in the subdivision. Subsequently, the plaintiffs purchased lots in the subdivision fronting the unpaved road and applied to the defendant city for building permits for the lots. The city denied the permits in part because the road in front of the lots was unpaved. The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action against the city, arguing that the city was estopped from denying the building permits on the basis of the unpaved roads, and that city was obligated to pave the road and to issue building permits to the plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the city was not estopped from enforcing the requirement that the road be paved and was not obligated to pave the road. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision not to apply equitable estoppel under the circumstances of this case. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Lelsa L. Parks v. Dennis Parks
This is an attempt to set aside a child support order. The child in question was born in February 2001. The mother of the child and the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, certifying that respondent was the child’s biological father. The respondent’s sister obtained primary custody of the child and began to collect State benefits for the child. In September 2003, the State, on behalf of the sister, filed a petition against the respondent to set child support payments. An order was entered, setting current and back child support payments. Subsequently, the State filed a petition for contempt against the respondent for failing to make the child support payments required under the order. The respondent appeared at the contempt hearing and signed an order acknowledging being in contempt and agreeing to make support payments as provided. A week later, the respondent filed a petition to set aside the original support order, asserting that he was not served with process and that he is not the biological father of the child. The trial court permitted the respondent to undergo DNA testing, which showed that he was not the father of the child. On that basis, the trial court dismissed the case against the respondent. The State now appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part, concluding that the respondent is not entitled to retroactive relief from the support order, but that he is entitled to prospective relief because he submitted sufficient evidence on which to rescind his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex. rel., Jacqueline Evonne Chears v. John Edward Barrett
The juvenile court established child support based on a finding that the obligor was capable of earning $6 per hour. Having determined that the record before us contains no evidence to support that finding, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Linda L. Evans v. Audrey H. Evans
In this divorce action, the parties announced a property settlement in open court which settlement was made a part of the Divorce Decree. Defendant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion to Set Aside Divorce and to reopen the issue of the property settlement which the Trial Court refused. On appeal, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie J. Pate v. Samuel D. Pate
This is a divorce involving the classification of property as “marital” or “separate.” The parties were married in 1986. In 1998, the wife received a substantial inheritance. She used a portion of the inheritance to pay off the mortgage on the marital home, to purchase undeveloped property adjacent to the marital home, and to purchase a vehicle. Later, the parties separated and the marital home was sold. From the proceeds of the sale, the wife received her separate contribution to the property, as well as half of the profit earned on the property. She used her proceeds to purchase another home. The husband’s name was on the title of the new home, but he was not an obligor on the mortgage. The parties made an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile, and subsequently filed cross petitions for divorce. They resolved all issues, except for the classification and division of certain property that was titled in both parties’ names but purchased with the wife’s inheritance. After a hearing, the trial court found that the wife did not intend to transmute any of her inheritance into marital property. Based on this finding, the trial court determined that the parties had already equitably divided their interest in the marital property, and that there was no property left to divide. From this order, the husband now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Smith Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Premier Hotel Development Group, et al.
Washington County- This appeal involves the construction of a hotel in Johnson City, Tennessee. During construction, the general contractor, Barker Building Company, Inc., ("Barker Building") agreed to subordinate its lien rights to a deed of trust to be filed by First Tennessee Bank (the "Bank") related to the Bank's loaning of funds which allegedly were represented to Barker Building as being sufficient to complete construction of the hotel. In reliance on the alleged representation and in order to protect its subcontractors, Barker Building, before entering into the Subordination Agreement, also obtained a Performance Bond to assure that its subcontractors would be paid. Barker Building obtained the Performance Bond from Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America ("Travelers"). Several lawsuits were filed and the hotel's owner filed for bankruptcy protection. One of the lawsuits filed was a suit for injunctive relief filed by the Appellants in this appeal, Barker Building and Travelers, against the Appellee in this appeal, the Bank, seeking injunctive relief for various reasons after the Bank filed the Performance Bond with the Register of Deed's Office in order to bond-off subcontractors' claims. The lawsuit seeking injunctive relief was resolved in favor of the Bank by a judgment on the merits which became final several years ago. The lawsuit now on appeal involves various other claims by Barker Building and Travelers against the Bank challenging the validity of the Subordination Agreement and Performance Bond. The Trial Court ruled all claims by Barker Building and Travelers against the Bank at issue in the lawsuit now on appeal were barred by the res judicata effects of their previously completed lawsuit against the Bank seeking injunctive relief. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Franklin v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. First, we must bear in mind that the sole issue for this Court is whether the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for Swift and in not granting Swift a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Franklin v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc.
This is a retaliatory discharge case. The former employee of a trucking company filed suit against the trucking company for statutory and common law retaliatory discharge, alleging that his employment was terminated due to his refusal to violate a Tennessee Department of Safety regulation that required the truck to carry an original “cab card” showing registration. The employer had directed the employee truck driver to deliver merchandise to a customer, assigning him a particular truck. The original cab card for the truck could not be found, so the employer gave the employee a photocopy of the cab card. The employee refused to drive the truck with only a photocopy, and another truck could not be located. The next day, the employee truck driver was fired. The truck driver sued the employer trucking company for retaliatory discharge, alleging that his employment was discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal activity. The Shelby County Circuit Court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the employee. We reverse, finding that the employee’s refusal to perform the assigned work based on the regulation requiring the original cab card, as opposed to a photocopy, did not further important public policy concerns, and therefore would not support a claim of retaliatory discharge. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Emmett Clifford et al. v. Crye-Leike Commercial, Inc.
This appeal involves a business patron who tripped over a snow-covered wheelchair ramp during a snowstorm. The patron filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that the landowner was negligent for failing to keep the ramp clear of snow or to post warnings of the presence of a wheelchair ramp concealed by the fallen snow. The landowner filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it did not have a duty to remove the snow or provide warnings of the presence of the wheelchair ramp as long as the snow was falling. The trial court granted the summary judgment, and the patron appealed. We have determined that the landowner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because it did not owe a duty to the public to keep the wheelchair ramp clear of snow during the snowstorm or to warn persons coming onto the property of the existence of the wheelchair ramp that was concealed under several inches of snow. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Diane V. Vannucci, et al. v. Memphis Obstetrics and Gynecological Association P.C. et al. and Diana V. Vannucci, et al. v. W.B. Moss, et al.
Following the untimely diagnosis of her cervical cancer, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against several doctors and the laboratory that interpreted her test results. In addition to her individual suit, the plaintiff sued on behalf of her minor son for loss of consortium. Shortly after filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff died. The executrix of her estate was substituted as a plaintiff in the case. Some of the named defendants sought to enter into a settlement with the minor, who was the only beneficiary of any proceeds to be derived from the suit. Pursuant to section 34-1-121 of the Tennessee Code, the settling parties petitioned the trial court to approve the settlement. At the hearing, the trial court excluded the non-settling defendants from participating in the hearing. The trial court subsequently entered an order approving the settlement, but the court sealed the contents of the settlement. Thereafter, the non-settling defendants moved the trial court judge to recuse herself, arguing that she could no longer impartially preside over the remainder of the case by virtue of having heard disputed facts during the ex parte settlement hearing. When the trial court denied their motion, the non-settling defendants applied for and received the trial court’s permission to seek an interlocutory appeal to this Court. We decided to grant the non-settling defendants’ application for an interlocutory appeal to address the narrow issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied the motion to recuse. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the Appellants’ motion for recusal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael B.Todd v. Dean Jackson, et al.
Michael B. Todd (“Plaintiff”) filed a retaliatory discharge claim after being terminated from his position as a water plant operator for the City of Lexington, Tennessee. At trial, the court dismissed his retaliatory discharge claim after finding that Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case. Plaintiff appeals raising the issues of whether the trial court erred in dismissing his retaliatory discharge claim and whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself from this case. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Peggy Hayes v. Luther Carter
This is a Title IV child support case involving the validity of an Order modifying retroactive child support. Following the entryof an agreed order establishing paternity, Father/Appellee entered into an agreed order setting retroactive child support from the time of the child’s birth. Some five years after entering into this agreed order, Father/Appellee petitioned the court to modify the retroactive support order. The trial court granted Father/Appellee’s motion. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Peggy Hayes appeals. We vacate the order of the trial court modifying retroactive child support. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phyllis McCrary, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Both Mother and Father appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County terminating their respective parental rights. Specifically, Mother asserts that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that the Department of Children’s Services did not meet the statutory verification requirement. Father asserts that the grounds cited for termination of his parental rights are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that the Department of Children’s Services did not meet the statutory verification requirement. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the Juvenile Court’s findings terminating the parties’ parental rights based on at least one ground under the statute, and that the Department of Children’s Services did meet the statutory verification requirement,we affirm. Phyllis McCrary (“Ms. McCrary”) is the mother of the three minor children at issue in this case, A.L.M. (d.o.b. 9/18/92), D.D.M. (d.o.b. 9/4/93), and R.R.M. (d.o.b. 9/4/00). Randy Madison (“Mr. Madison”, together with Ms. McCrary, “Respondents”) is the father of R.R.M. (d.o.b. 9/4/00). The parental rights of the fathers of A.L.M and D.D.M. were terminated on November 10, 2005, and they are not parties to this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
