State of Tennessee v. Tino Vernell Rodgers (A Minor)
In this case we are asked to review a juvenile’s confinement following a juvenile court’s finding that the juvenile violated the terms of his probation. The juvenile court found the juvenile to be delinquent after the juvenile entered a guilty plea to an assault charge, and the court placed the juvenile on probation. Thereafter, the juvenile was charged with other offenses, and the juvenile court entered a verbal directive placing the child on house arrest. When the juvenile violated this directive, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the juvenile violated the terms of his probation and committed him to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. After being confined, the juvenile filed a post-commitment petition pursuant to the Juvenile Post-Commitment Procedures Act in the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the juvenile court’s ruling. The juvenile appealed the circuit court’s decision to this Court. During the pendency of this appeal, the juvenile was released from custody. Accordingly, we hold that the present appeal is not justiciable under the doctrine of mootness, therefore, we dismiss the present appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Harding Academy v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al.
The Zoning Administrator of the Metropolitan Codes Department of Nashville and Davidson County issued a permit to an elementary school to create a park on property adjacent to the school campus. The local neighborhood association appealed the issuance of the permit to the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board revoked the permit on the basis that (1) the property would not remain in its natural state; (2) the school intended to use the property as athletic fields for the physical education of their students; (3) instructional activity is not allowed in a park; and (4) the requested use of the property would more likely be classified as a recreation center. The elementary school filed a common law writ of certiorari in Davidson County Chancery Court appealing the revocation. The chancery court reversed the decision of the Board and reinstated the permit finding that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, beyond its authority, and without supporting evidence in the record. We affirm the decision of the chancery court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Horace Ray Runions v. Mary Runions
In this divorce case, Appellant/Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification of certain real property as marital property. The property at issue was Husband’s separate property prior to the marriage. The property was sold to a third party during the marriage, and a deed of trust secured the balance of the purchase price. The third party defaulted in the installment payments, and Husband purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and received a trustee’s deed in his name only. Husband asserts that the property is separate property under either T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(A) or T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(B). The trial court concluded that the property was marital property under T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(A). We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel R. Beaird, et al. v. Willie Rogers, et al.
Plaintiffs/Appellees obtained a judgment on a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court at Lauderdale County requiring the Defendants/Appellants to relinquish possession of the residence at 465 Maple Hill Circle in Ripley, Tennessee. The Defendants/Appellants filed a de novo appeal as of right in the Circuit Court at Lauderdale County. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the sessions court. Appellants appeal. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Kissick v. Edward Kallaher
The juvenile court dismissed Mother’s dependency and neglect petition. Mother appealed to circuit court, which dismissed her appeal without a hearing or presentation of evidence. Mother appeals. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Marie Tait v. William Frank Tait
Donna Marie Tait (“Wife”) filed for divorce from William Frank Tait (“Husband”) citing grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The parties entered into a Permanent Parenting Plan and a Property Settlement Agreement, but reserved the issue of alimony for trial. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that Wife was not in need of additional alimony support from Husband, despite Husband’s ability to pay. Wife appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richardson's Brentwood Homes v. Town of Collierville, Tennessee, Municipal Planning Commission
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s appeal of the Collierville Municipal Planning Commission’s denial of Appellant’s subdivision application as barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse, vacate the order of dismissal, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Northeast Knox Utility District v. Stanfort Construction Company, et al. - Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “Stanfort had sufficient actual knowledge of its injury no later than January 13, 2000.” I also agree that the second amended counterclaim cannot be saved by the relation-back doctrine found at Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. I write separately to state my opinion that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which, if resolved in Stanfort’s favor, would support a determination that Richard Phillips and/or Robert G. Campbell & Associates, LP, are equitably estopped from relying upon the defense of the statute of limitations.
Statements or conduct that support an estoppel claim include representations, made prior to the expiration of the limitations period, that the defendant either would not assert a statute of limitations defense or that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit. Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). I agree that the affidavit of Terry Fortner, Stanfort’s principal, along with the July 27, 1999, letter signed by Campbell and the letter of October 7, 1999, signed by Phillips, establish, for the purpose of this summary judgment analysis, certain things: first, that Fortner had been assured, in the words of the majority opinion, “that the general contractor was pursuing [Stanfort’s] claim for extra compensation” (emphasis mine); second, that Campbell recognized, in the words of the July 27, 1999, letter, that “[Stanfort] reserve[d] the right to file a claim for additional rock excavation, as provided by the contract documents;” and third, that the letter of October 7, 1999, indicated that Stanfort’s claim for compensation for extra rock excavation was “being evaluated” and that there was no contract requirement that the claim be resolved, one way or the other, “prior to the work being executed.” My problem with the majority’s conclusion that these three documents create a genuine issue of material fact is that I find nothing in them that brings this case within the rubric of Ingram. Neither of the letters, expressly or by implication, states that a statute of limitations will not be asserted in the event a lawsuit is filed at a later date. Furthermore, there is nothing in either which could lead one to reasonably believe “that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit.” Certainly, Stanfort had reason to believe that its claim for extra compensation was being considered and might be resolved short of litigation; but this is a “far cry” from the necessary factual predicate for a reasonable belief that the claim was going to be paid without the necessity of suit being filed. In my judgment, the facts before the trial court, construed, as required by applicable law, in Stanfort’s favor, simply do not make out a case of equitable estoppel. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Northeast Knox Utility District v. Stanfort Construction Company., et al.
The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment on the grounds the statute of limitations had run on plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
David Mosley, et al. v. Phillip L. McCanless, The Metropolitan Government
The trial court held the Metropolitan Government comparatively liable for injuries sustained by a motorist injured in a vehicular accident. The Metropolitan Government was held comparatively at fault based upon the finding the intersection where the wreck occurred was dangerous, it had notice of the danger, and it failed to remedy the situation. It appeals, contending the design of the intersection and whether to install a stop sign or traffic light is a discretionary function, for which it is immune under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The evidence supports the findings that the intersection was dangerous and that the Metropolitan Government had notice of the danger, but failed to take remedial action. We therefore affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cathey Jenkins Jackson v. John Jackson, III
This is an appeal from a post-divorce criminal contempt proceeding. The parties were divorced by final decree in July 1999. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, in which the husband agreed to pay the wife spousal support over a period of time. The husband did not make the support payments, and consequently the wife filed several motions for criminal contempt against the husband. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order reserving judgment on the issue of the husband’s criminal contempt, but requiring a non-party corporation in which the husband was a shareholder to pay to the wife a portion of the monies received by the corporation in satisfaction of the husband’s support obligation. The husband now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in holding the corporation liable for his personal debt. We dismiss the appeal, finding that it is not an appeal from a final order, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
J. O. House v. J. K. Edmondson - Dissenting
I concur fully in the majority opinion, except for its conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate on House’s separate claim of breach of contract against Edmondson, based on breach of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement. From this conclusion, I must dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
J. O. House v. J. K. Edmondson
In 1997, the Appellant, a shareholder in a Tennessee corporation, reviewed the corporation’s records and discovered that the corporation’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of the board of directors, had been misappropriating corporate funds for his personal use. In 1999, the Appellant filed a shareholder’s derivative action against the majority shareholder of the corporation alleging breach of fiduciary duty. In addition to his derivative claim, the Appellant also filed a direct claim against the majority shareholder for breach of a Pre-Incorporation Agreement signed by the shareholders at the corporation’s inception. The corporation appointed a one person special litigation committee to investigate the Appellant’s derivative action. The committee determined that the majority shareholder had indeed misappropriated corporate funds. In its report to the board of directors, the committee recommended that the corporation either attempt to settle the lawsuit with the majority shareholder pursuant to terms suggested by the committee or, in the event the majority shareholder declined such terms, proceed with the litigation. The trial court subsequently approved the report, and the corporation settled the derivative litigation. Regarding the direct claim for breach of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement, the majority shareholder moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s decision to approve the special litigation committee’s report. We reverse the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the Appellant’s direct claim, as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Appellant’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Rounds v. Kathleen L. Caldwell
This is an action for damages for alleged legal malpractice in the handling of a lawsuit in a federal district court. This case was dismissed on motion for summary judgment because the cause of action accrued more than one year before suit was filed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Roberts v. Donald Blevins, et al.
The Chief Deputy Sheriff was dismissed by the Sheriff of Hardin County. As Chief Deputy he was not a member of the classified service and served at the pleasure of the Sheriff. The judgment finding otherwise is reversed. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
David Canter v. Richard Ebersole
Plaintiff brought an action in the Chancery Court to pierce the corporate veil to reach assets of a member to satisfy a judgment against the corporation. The Chancellor refused the request and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gail A. Pegues v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, et al.
This case arises from the decision of the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board to terminate the employment of Gail Pegues, a Shelby County Buyer-Program Specialist. The Shelby County Chancery Court upheld the decision of the Civil Service Merit Board to terminate Ms. Pegues employment. She appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Antoinette Christine Regnier v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Police officer filed a sexual harassment retaliation claim under the THRA against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County as a result of her transfer from an instructor at the Police Training Academy to patrol duty. A jury found that Metro had engaged in retaliation in violation of the THRA and awarded Plaintiff $150,000 in damages in addition to $110,180.70 in costs and attorney’s fees. Metro filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, new trial, or remittitur, which was denied by the trial court. Metro appeals claiming that Plaintiff failed to prove, as a matter of law, that her transfer was an “adverse employment action” as required by the THRA or in the alternative, that the amount of the award should be reduced. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Antoinette Christine Regnier v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County - Concurring
I concur with Judge Cain’s decision to affirm the jury verdict in this case. Cases like this are fact-intensive, and thus care must be taken to avoid applying our decisions to dissimilar circumstances. I have prepared this separate opinion to emphasize the evidence upon which the jury’s verdict in this case is based. I. Antoinette Regnier joined the Metropolitan Police Department in 1993. Five years later, in July 1998, she was promoted to sergeant and was selected for a prestigious assignment as an instructor at the Police Training Academy. Three months later, a female intern complained to Sergeant Regnier that Lieutenant Anthony Carter, Sergeant Regnier’s immediate superior, had sexually harassed her.1 Sergeant Regnier herself had been the target of sexually suggestive remarks by Lieutenant Carter,2 and she had also overheard Lieutenant Carter make similar inappropriate comments to other females at the Academy. Following Department policy, Sergeant Regnier reported Lieutenant Carter’s conduct to the Director of the Academy. The Director decided to handle the matter informally by calling a meeting of the entire staff to discuss sexual harassment issues and appropriate conduct on the job. Lieutenant Carter later apologized privately to Sergeant Regnier and publically apologized for his conduct at a staff meeting held several weeks later. Despite his outward contrition, Lieutenant Carter was extremely upset with Sergeant Regnier. He berated her during a staff meeting in March 1999 and characterized her earlier sexual harassment Both Lieutenant Carter and Deputy Chief Faulkner were 1974 graduates from the Academy. They were close friends. In an October 1998 email, Lieutenant Carter told Deputy Chief Faulkner “Trust is earned, and I’ll never betray you. CLASS OF “74” A Friend to the end!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” complaint as “bulls**t.” Lieutenant Carter also decided to exploit his personal friendship with Deputy Chief of Police Deborah Faulkner3 to cause both Sergeant Regnier and the Academy’s Director to be transferred. His efforts bore fruit. Both the Director’s and Sergeant Regnier’s names were on the very next transfer list. Both the Director and Sergeant Regnier attempted to discuss their transfers with the Chief of Police, but he referred them to Deputy Chief Faulkner. Sergeant Regnier had received good performance ratings at the Academy. Deputy Chief Faulkner did not express concerns about Sergeant Regnier’s performance during their meeting, and she did not respond directly to Sergeant Regnier’s concern that her transfer stemmed from the sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant Carter. Deputy Chief Faulkner told Sergeant Regnier that she was “very bright [and] highly educated” and that she would benefit from additional “street experience.” In the final analysis, both the Sergeant Regnier and the Director were transferred away from the Academy. Sergeant Regnier was initially assigned to the B-Detail, apparently to disrupt her law school schedule. Because she desired to complete law school, Sergeant Regnier requested and received an assignment to the midnight shift with few supervisory responsibilities. Deputy Chief Faulkner appointed Lieutenant Carter acting Director of the Academy and later named him the Director. In a November 1999 email to the Deputy Chief, Lieutenant Carter observed “[m]uch better around here since the removal of the last piece of CANCER.” II. The Tennessee Human Rights Act permits an employee to recover damages from his or her employer if the employer retaliates against him or her for complaining about discriminatory conduct in the workplace. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-301(1) (2005). To be compensable, the retaliation must amount to an adverse employment action. Austin v. Shelby County Gov’t, 3 S.W.3d 474, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Newsom v. Textron Aerostructures, 924 S.W.2d 87, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). The Not every employment action that makes an employee unhappy rises to the level of an adverse employment action. Tyler v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2001); Spann v. Abraham, 36 S.W.3d at 468. An employment action must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities to be considered as an adverse employment action. Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002). Lateral transfers that do not involve a demotion in form or substance do not amount to adverse employment actions. Keeton v. Flying J, Inc., 429 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996). Nor does a pure lateral transfer become an adverse employment action simply because the affected employee subjectively prefers one position over another. McKenzie v. Milwaukee County, 381 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2004). However, a transfer or reassignment without a change in salary may amount to an adverse employment action if it involves (1) a less distinguished title, (2) a material loss of benefits, (3) a significant change in work hours or location, (4) significantly different responsibilities, (5) a significant reduction in the employee’s career prospects by preventing the employee from using his or her skills or experience, or (6) other factors that are uniquely relevant to the particular situation. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268-69 (1998); O’Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2004); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996); Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d at 707. III. In order to prevail in this case, Sergeant Regnier was required to prove that a reasonable person in her position would have viewed her transfer from the Academy as an adverse employment action. Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1998). Based on the facts of this case, I have concluded that she succeeded. Sergeant Regnier and her witnesses established that working as an instructor at the Academy was a prestigious position compared to other positions in the Department. The job is highly sought-after, and officers competed for the assignment. Working at the Academy required more skills than other assignments in the Department.4 Sergeant Regnier’s patrol assignment involved significantly different work hours and a significantly different schedule, and her position at the Academy involved significantly more and different responsibilities than her patrol assignment. A court should grant a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.02 motion in accordance with the motion for directed verdict only when it finds that reasonable minds cannot differ with regard to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tenn. 2000); Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tenn. 1994). Based on my review of the record, I concur with Judge Cain’s conclusions that the trial court properly denied the Metropolitan Government’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.02 motion and that the damages awarded by the jury are not excessive and are supported by the evidence.
1The intern reported that Lieutenant Carter had shown her a suggestive picture of himself wearing a lime green bikini and had asked her whether she would like to “try riding this wild stallion.” 2Lieutenant Carter had called Sergeant Regnier a “lean mean sex machine” and had commented to her that “[y]our husband must be real proud of the way you look under those clothes.” 3 Both Lieutenant Carter and Deputy Chief Faulkner were 1974 graduates from the Academy. They were close friends. In an October 1998 email, Lieutenant Carter told Deputy Chief Faulkner “Trust is earned, and I’ll never betray you. CLASS OF “74” A Friend to the end!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” 4The fact that a position requires more qualifications is an indication of prestige. 4 White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 803 (6th Cir. 2004), cert granted, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 797 (2005). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bob Patterson, Trustee of Shelby County, Tennessee v. A.C. Wharton, Jr., Mayor of Shelby County, Tennessee
After the Board of County Commissioners for Shelby County passed the county’s 2003–2004 budget, the Trustee of Shelby County filed suit against the county mayor pursuant to section 8-20-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code seeking additional personnel and funding for his department. After entering into a settlement agreement with the county, the trustee filed a motion seeking to recover his attorney’s fees at a rate of $250 per hour. The county asserted that such fees were capped at $100 per hour pursuant to a budget resolution passed by the Board of County Commissioners. The trial court entered an order awarding the trustee his attorney’s fees at a rate of $250 per hour pursuant to section 8-20-107 of the Tennessee Code. The county appealed arguing that the trial court did not have the discretion to award attorney’s fees in excess of the $100 per hour limit placed on such fees by the county legislative body. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pun Wun Chan, D/B/A #1 China Buffett v. State of Tennessee, Knox County, and City of Knoxville
In this inverse condemnation action, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which was approved by the Trial Court after a slight reduction in the amount. The State appealed and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth T. Whalum, Jr., et al. v. Pamela Harris Marshall, et al.
After delinquent property taxes accumulated on certain real property, the city and county pursued a tax sale of the subject property. The defendant purchased the property at the tax sale and received a deed from the clerk of the chancery court. After the one-year redemption period expired, the plaintiffs filed suit against various individuals and entities, including the present owner of the property and the county, seeking to rescind the sale. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were not provided with notice of the sale. The county subsequently conceded that it did not provide notice of the sale to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The present owner did not file an answer to the complaint and did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. After the trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the present owner of the property filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 asking the trial court to set aside the order granting summary judgment. In her motion, the present owner sought to introduce evidence related to her claim that she was entitled to reimbursement for the approximately $68,000 spent improving the property. The trial court denied the motion, and the present owner appealed to this Court. We affirm the decisions of the chancery court in all respects. Moreover, we find this appeal to be so devoid of merit as to warrant the imposition of damages for the filing of a frivolous |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of James W. Ford, M.D.
This is the second appeal of this probate case in which this Court is asked to determine whether the Appellant’s claim against the decedent’s estate should be treated as a verified claim under the Claims Act, T.C.A. §30-2-306 et seq., as the trial court found, and controlled by the authorities therein, and then to determine the priority of Appellant’s claim as against the Internal Revenue Service/Appellee’s claim against the estate for decedent’s unpaid taxes. We find that Appellant’s claim is a verified claim against the estate and, as such, is subject to the Claims Act. Pursuant to both the Claims Act, T.C.A. §30-2-317, and the Federal Insolvency Act 31 U.S.C. §3713, the IRS’s claim is prime. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Clifford Franklin Baker, et al. v. Lee King, et al.
This appeal involves a challenge to the validity of an antenuptial agreement. Executors under the decedent’s Will filed a petition in the General Sessions Court of Madison County, Probate Division, to have Will admitted to probate. Decedent’s wife then filed a notice and petition for elective share, for specific property, year’s support, homestead, and expedited hearing. The Executors, also beneficiaries under decedent’s Will, opposed the petition based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent prior to their marriage, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a hearing, the court upheld the validity of the antenuptial agreement, finding that the wife entered into the agreement knowledgeably and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prohibited the wife from contesting the antenuptial agreement. Wife appeals. The dispositive question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. We conclude that the record and applicable law do not support the trial court’s decision to enforce the antenuptial agreement. We reverse and remand this case to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander C. Wells v. James Hefner, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his complaint for malicious prosecution against three officials at Tennessee State University. A former student of Plaintiff, a professor at Tennessee State University, filed a complaint with the Affirmative Action Officer at TSU, alleging sexual harassment by Plaintiff in the fall of 1990. Following a series of administrative proceedings within the university, Plaintiff was found to have violated its policy on sexual harassment and its standards of professional conduct and responsibility for which his employment was terminated. Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Review with the Chancery Court and successfully appealed his termination. As a consequence, his employment was reinstated. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against three university officials who participated in the proceedings that led to his termination, asserting they lacked probable cause. We have determined the defendants never brought a lawsuit or judicial proceeding against Plaintiff, an essential element to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, and thus affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
