Lucy R. Chapman v. H & R Block Mortgage Corporation, et al.
This appeal presents the issue of the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The plaintiff entered into a loan transaction with the defendant mortgage corporation to obtain funds on behalf of her daughter. The loan was secured by a mortgage on plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's daughter subsequently discontinued making payments on the loan, and plaintiff filed a petition to rescind the loan, asserting that plaintiff was caused to sign the loan by defendant lender's fraud. Several months after the case had been pending, lender demanded that the case be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an agreement signed by plaintiff when the loan was closed. The trial court granted lender's motion compelling arbitration. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the arbitration agreement she entered into is unenforceable because it is an adhesion contract and is unconscionable and unreasonable. Plaintiff further argues that lender waived its right to compel arbitration under the circumstances in this case. We hold that the arbitration agreement is enforceable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of A.M.H., a minor Jerry L. Baker and Louise Baker v. Shao-Quiang (Jack) He and wife, Qin (Casey) Luo - Concurring and Dissent
While I concur in the majority opinion on some issues, I must dissent from the affirmance of the termination of the Hes’ parental rights on the ground of willful failure to visit.1 I would instead reverse the trial court’s termination of the Hes’ parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of AMH, a minor Jerry L. Baker and wife, Louise K. Baker v. Shao-Qiang (Jack) He and wife, Qin (Casey) Luo
In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents to a minor child. The biological parents are Chinese immigrants who are presently in this country illegally and are subject to deportation proceedings. Shortly after coming to the United States, the biological parents had a daughter. Facing financial difficulties at the time of their daughter’s birth, the parents decided to place their daughter in the care of an adoption agency until their financial situation improved. The agency placed the child with foster parents who agreed to care for the child over an initial three month period. At the conclusion of the three month foster care period, the biological parents agreed to the entry of a consent order by the juvenile court transferring custody of the child to the foster parents. The biological parents continued to visit with their daughter at the home of the custodial non-parents approximately once each week for one hour each visit. However, they paid no child support to the custodial non-parents. The biological parents subsequently filed a petition to modify the juvenile court’s custody order seeking to regain custody of their daughter, which the court denied. Thereafter, the biological parents continued to visit their daughter with the same frequency as before. On one day in particular, the biological parents asked to take their daughter fora family portrait, and the custodial non-parents refused their request. When the biological parents refused to leave the custodial non-parents’ home, the police were called. After speaking with the police, the biological parents left the home and never returned to visit their daughter citing their fear of arrest. A short time after this incident, the biological parents filed a second petition to modify the juvenile court’s custody order. In response, the custodial non-parents filed a petition to adopt the child and to terminate the biological parents’ parental rights in the chancery court, primarily relying on the ground of abandonment. As a result, the biological parents’ petition to modify the custody order was transferred to the chancery court. Following a lengthy and tortured procedural history, the chancery court held a bench trial in the matter and subsequently entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights. The biological parents filed a timely appeal to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decisions of the chancery court in this case. However, in light of our decisions on certain issues presented in this case, we need not remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Edward H. Tenison v. The Penn Warranty Corporation
This appeal involves interpretation of a warranty contract for used cars. Since the contract provided no exclusion for an inaccurate odometer, we affirm the trial court's enforcement of the warranty. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion. The issue presented for review, as stated by the Appellants is: Whether the Chancery Court correctly held that County Charter, Article II, § 2.03(g)(the “Charter”and the “Amendment”), which provides that no County Mayor or County Commissioner is eligible to be elected to or to hold office for more than two consecutive four year terms, is valid in accordance with the third paragraph of Tennessee Constitution, Article VII, Section 1 and Tenn. Code Ann. § § 5-1-201, et seq. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Bailey, et al. v. County of Shelby, et al.
This appeal from a declaratory judgment action requires us to determine whether term limits imposed on Shelby County Commissioners by the 1994 amendments to the Shelby County Charter, Article II, section 2.03(G), are permissible under Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-210 and, if so, whether § 5-1-210 is unconstitutional under the Tennessee Constitution, Article VII, Section 1. We hold that term limits are permitted as “qualifications” under Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-210(4). We further hold that Tennessee Code Annotated § 5-1-210(4), insofar as it permits county charters to prescribe the qualifications of members of the county legislative body, is void as unconstitutional under Article VII, Section 1, of the Tennessee Constitution. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the trial court, award summary judgment to Plaintiffs/Appellants, and enjoin enforcement of section 2.03(G) of the Shelby County Charter. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
M.D. v. R.L.H.
M.D. ("Mother") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of R.L.H. ("Father") to the parties' seven year old son. Following a hearing, the Juvenile Court held that grounds for terminating Father's parental rights had been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Juvenile Court made no factual findings or conclusions of law as to whether terminating Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly C. Smith v. Ronnie R. Smith, et al.
This case involves an intrafamily transaction in real property. A now-deceased owner of a piece of commercial property held by tenancy by the entireties agreed to sell it to his nephew in a handshake transaction. The nephew made a $10,000 down payment, began paying off the balance in monthly installments, and made improvements to the property. After the seller died, his widow filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the court to declare the rights of the parties with regard to the real property. Although the trial court found there was indeed an agreement between the uncle and the nephew to sell the land to the nephew, the court declined to require the widow to effectuate the contract, not because she had not agreed to the sale, but because she offered to reimburse the nephew for all his out-of-pocket costs. Because we conclude the widow should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds to avoid the sale, and because her offer cannot limit the buyer’s remedies, we reverse. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Cigna Healthcare of Tennessee, Inc.
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County appeals the summary dismissal of an action against Cigna Healthcare of Tennessee, Inc. The claims are a result of Cigna's failure to purchase a performance bond in assurance of Cigna's fulfillment of its obligation to Metro employees. Metro circulated a Request for Proposal to provide health insurance services for Metro employees for a four-year period which required the successful bidder to purchase a performance bond. Cigna was a successful bidder and fully performed all obligations, with the exception of the performance bond. As the term neared expiration, Metro discovered Cigna had not provided the bond and, moreover, that the parties had failed to execute a written agreement. After negotiations to execute a written agreement failed, Metro filed this action contending Cigna was unjustly enriched by failing to provide the performance bond and, alternatively, that Cigna was in breach of contract by failing to provide the bond. Cigna denied liability and moved for summary judgment. The trial court summarily dismissed the unjust enrichment claim finding Cigna had not charged Metro for the cost of a performance bond, thus it was not unjustly enriched. The trial court also dismissed the breach of contract claim finding Metro had failed to satisfy a condition precedent to recover on the claim. Metro appeals contending material facts are in dispute. We affirm the dismissal of both claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Edward L. Ellis, Jr. v. John W. Bacon, M.D.
The unsuccessful plaintiff brings this appeal from the trial court's summary judgment dismissing his malpractice claim. Because the plaintiff did not respond to the defendant's properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Maurice Hughley v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal by the trial court of his action under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act challenging the calculation of his prison sentence. Holding that his petition to review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County was untimely under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(b)(1), the trial court dismissed the action. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Dorning, Sheriff of Lawrence County, Tennessee v. Ametra Bailey, County Mayor of Lawrence County, Tennessee
The Sheriff of Lawrence County filed an application in the circuit court pursuant to section 8-20-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code seeking, among other things, funding for new vehicles, an additional administrative assistant for his investigators, two additional corrections officers for his jail, and increased salaries for his employees. The trial court granted the sheriff additional funding for these items. Regarding the salary increases, the trial court ordered that they be retroactive to the beginning of the prior fiscal year. The county appealed the trial court's decision regarding the aforementioned items to this Court. We reverse in part and affirm in part the decisions of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Stace Lee Thompson v. The City of Lavergne
This appeal involves an action brought by Lieutenant Stace Thompson of the City of LaVergne Police Department under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Lt. Thompson alleged he was demoted as a result of investigating the alleged sexual harassment of a police officer within the department by the administrative assistant to the Chief of Police. After a trial by jury, judgment was rendered in favor of Lt. Thompson in the amount of $300,000.00 for embarrassment and humiliation and $4,000.00 for loss of benefits. The City of LaVergne has appealed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Yvonne N. Robertson v. Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure, et al. - Dissenting
There is no question the Board could sanction Ms. Robertson for her undisputed violation of the ethical rules of conduct. While the severity of the sanction may appear disproportionate to the violation itself in view of all the circumstances, courts will generally refrain from reviewing the relation of a sanction to the violation, as long as it is within the range of authorized sanctions. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Yvonne N. Robertson v. Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure, et al.
The Tennessee Board of Social Worker Certification and Licensure appeals from the decision of the ChanceryCourt to set aside its disciplinary ruling revoking a licensed clinical social worker’s license for two years for engaging in a dual relationship with a client. The Chancellor set aside the Board’s ruling on the grounds the sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion and were arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the decision of the Chancery Court and reinstate the Board’s order of revocation. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Wilson v. Blount County, Tennessee; Darrell McEachron; and Danny K. Carrigan
In this action against the County, which sold plaintiff’s properties at a back tax sale, plaintiff charges sheriff failed to comply with process statutes before returning the process “not to be found” and county improperly relied on publication to give notice to plaintiff. The Trial Court held sheriff exercised due diligence and constructive notice was proper. On appeal, we reverse. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Janey Fluri and David Fluri v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, Dawn Taylor, Melinda Blue, M.D., and Vista Radiology, P.C.
The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the grant as to defendants Blue and Vista Radiology, arguing the Trial Court erred in granting judgment on grounds that the statute of limitation had run. We vacate and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: A.S., Q.S., and J.S.
This is a mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her three children. Mother suffers from a cocaine addiction. She has had numerous opportunities for rehabilitation but failed to stay drug-free. At the time of trial, the children had been in foster care for two years during which time Mother only exercised token visitation. The juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dena M. Taylor v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a Regional Medical Center at Memphis, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the circuit court erred when it granted a defendant doctor’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff asserts, as she did at trial, that there was a genuine issue of material fact, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. The plaintiff filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. v. Eastman Chemical Company
Eastman Chemical Company ("Eastman") and Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc. ("Cryotech") entered into an agreement whereby Cryotech would purchase non-food grade feedgas from Eastman which was roughly 78% carbon dioxide ("CO2"). Cryotech then would purify the feedgas and sell it as food grade CO2. Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. ("Messer") purchased the CO2 from Cryotech. Messer in turn sold the CO2 to soft drink manufacturers. The CO2 sold to Messer was contaminated with cyanide and resulted in property damage to Messer and Messer's customers. In the third appeal arising from this litigation, we must determine whether the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Eastman on Messer's claims for breach of warranty, products liability, and negligence, and whether the Trial Court properly refused to allow Messer to amend its complaint to assert a claim for negligence per se. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Samuel Bennecker, et al. v. Howard Fickeissen, et al.
This appeal involves the enforceability of the parties' oral settlement agreement. The parties, who were next-door neighbors, were involved in a lawsuit over their common boundary line. The parties appeared for depositions, but before depositions commenced, they allegedly reached a settlement and cancelled the depositions. A dispute later arose as to whether there had been a settlement of all issues in the case; the Defendants filed a motion seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. The Plaintiffs responded that there was no enforceable contract because there had been an agreement as to some, but not all, of the issues in the case. The trial court determined that there had been a settlement agreement as to all issues and ordered enforcement of the agreement. After careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's determination that the parties had an enforceable agreement to settle all claims. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Dot Bush Goot et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County
This appeal involves a dispute between the surviving spouses of five disabled city employees and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County over the amount of life insurance benefits payable after the employees died. The surviving spouses filed three separate lawsuits asserting that the city had breached their spouses' employment contracts as well as its fiduciary duty and had committed fraud by concealing information and by knowingly providing false information regarding a waiver of premium benefit that would have greatly increased their death benefits. These suits were consolidated in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing all the surviving spouses' intentional tort claims because they were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The remaining breach of contract claims of three of the surviving spouses were tried to a jury, and the trial court directed a verdict for the city at the close of the plaintiffs' proof. Thereafter, the trial court granted a summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims of the other two surviving spouses. All the surviving spouses have appealed. We affirm the summary judgment orders dismissing the surviving spouses' intentional tort claims and the breach of contract claim of one surviving spouse. We reverse the directed verdict with regard to three of the remaining surviving spouses' breach of contract claims, as well as the summary judgment dismissing the other surviving spouse's breach of contract claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria Mastilir v. The New Shelby Dodge, Inc.
Plaintiff Gloria Mastilir filed a tort action against Defendant The New Shelby Dodge arising from the Defendant’s alleged faulty repair of Plaintiff’s motor home. Plaintiff subsequently took a voluntary non-suit and later failed to refile her action within the one-year savings statute under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. As a result, the general sessions court and circuit court held that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals arguing that the lower courts erred in not finding that Defendant was equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitation defense and also asserts that Defendant revived Plaintiff’s suit by promising to repair or pay for repairs to Plaintiffs vehicle. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dempsey Ausley v. Ferrell Shaw, et al.
This case arises from alleged defamatory statements made by Defendants David Smith, Vanessa Smith, and Charles Pagett, Jr. against Plaintiff Dempsey Ausley. The alleged statements were made subsequent to Ausley's termination as Pastor of Parker's Chapel Missionary Baptist Church in Portland, Tennessee. Plaintiff sued the three Defendants asserting claims of slander. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) after finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims because they were too closely entangled with Plaintiff's termination as pastor, which is an ecclesiastical matter of the church. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kardoush, LLC, d/b/a Caesar's Wine and Liquor, et al. v. City of Memphis Alcohol Commission
The Memphis Alcohol Commission denied Plaintiffs/Appellees’ Kardoush’s application for a certificate of compliance over 80 days after the application was filed, and Kardoush appealed to the chancery court. The trial court determined that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 57-3-208(e), the Memphis Alcohol Commission would have been deemed to have granted the application where the Commission had failed to either grant or deny the application within 60 days of submission. Thus, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-208(f), Kardoush was not required to submit a certificate of compliance with its application to the Tennessee Alcohol and Beverage Commission. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
