Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Camilla Jean Palmer Revocable Trust
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Rebecca Warren
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Charles A. Deshler and Martha A. Deshler Joint Caring Trust et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. James R. Stephenson, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Robert G. Ingrum et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Michael Rippy et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. James Lassiter, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Ronald R. Dunn, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company v. Charles Carter, et al.
This appeal is one of twenty-seven similar appeals arising from a dispute between a natural gas company that has the power of eminent domain and the owners of twenty-seven properties who are resisting the company’s efforts to construct an extension of an existing pipeline. After these property owners refused to permit the company to conduct preliminary examinations and surveys on their properties, the company filed separate complaints against the owners of each tract in the Circuit Court for Sumner County seeking orders authorizing it to conduct the preliminary examinations and surveys necessary for the siting of the project pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 (2000). The trial court conducted an expedited joint hearing and entered an order dismissing the company’s complaints. The company appealed, and we consolidated the cases for oral argument. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-121 is not preempted by the Natural Gas Act and that the company is entitled to the orders of preliminary entry it sought. Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court erred by dismissing the company’s complaints. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Shields Mountain Property Owners Assocation, Inc., et al. v. Marion A. Teffeteller, et al.
Shields Mountain Property Owners Association, Inc., James R. Hall, and Terri L. Hall ("Plaintiffs") sued Marion A. Teffeteller and Charlene A. Teffeteller ("Defendants") seeking, among other things, to enforce restrictive covenants and enjoin Defendants from renting their property in Shields Mountain Estates for overnight vacation purposes. The Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the covenants and restrictions at issue are applicable to the lots within Shields Mountain Estates including Defendants' lots; that Defendants' use of their lots for vacation rentals is a violation of the covenants and restrictions; and that Defendants are permanently enjoined from using property they own in Shields Mountain Estates for vacation rentals. Defendants appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Kuykendall v. Margaret Harper
Plaintiff sued for attorney's fees under contract of employment with defendant. The Trial Court awarded Judgment for fees. Both parties appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Grigsby v. University of Tennessee Medical Center, et al.
In this pro se medical malpractice case, the issues on appeal are whether the Appellant, Larry Grigsby, timely filed a notice of appeal as regards Defendants Dr. Paul A. Hatcher and Dr. E. Jay Mounger, and whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the University of Tennessee Medical Center ("UTMC"). We dismiss the appeal as to the Defendant doctors because we find that Mr. Grigsby did not comply with the jurisdictional requirement of Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), mandating the timely filing of a notice of appeal. We affirm summary judgment in UTMC's favor because Mr. Grigsby proceeded solely on the vicarious liability theory of respondeat superior, pursuant to his allegations that Drs. Hatcher and Mounger were agents and/or employees of UTMC. Because the alleged agents have been exonerated by an adjudication of non-liability, and therefore the alleged principal, UTMC, may not be held vicariously liable, we affirm summary judgment in favor of UTMC. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Jamison v. Harrell Ulrich, et al.
The issue presented in this case is whether the policemen and firemen's rule applies to an animal control officer who was bitten by a Doberman pinscher while performing the duties of his employment. The plaintiff, an animal control officer for the Chattanooga Police Department, was bitten when, in the course and scope of his employment, he attempted to take possession of the defendants' dog at their home. The plaintiff sued the defendants for compensatory damages, claiming that they were negligent in failing to warn him about the dangerous nature of the dog. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment upon its determination that the dog's owners owed no duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances pursuant to the policemen and firemen's rule which precludes police officers and firefighters from recovering for injuries arising out of risks peculiar to their employment. Upon review, we find that the dog's owners owed no duty of ordinary care to the animal control officer and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Lee Dotson v. William Ennis Dotson
The husband appeals from a final decree of divorce challenging the award of divorce to the wife, the distribution of property, and the award of some property as alimony in solido to the wife. Because the husband raises factual issues and there is no transcript or statement of the evidence in the record, we must presume the record would have supported the factual findings of the trial court and accordingly affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Progressive Funding, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation, v. Henry Hoover, a/k/a Henry N. Hoover, Jr., a/k/a H.N. Hoover, Jr.
In an action to quiet title, the Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment and defendant appealed. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Alexander Henderson v. Ross Bates, et al.
Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed a Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against the Appellee/Associate Warden and Appellee/Pre-Release Coordinator alleging a violation of the inmate’s civil rights arising from a change in inmate’s custody status. The trial court granted the Appellees’ Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
UT Medical Group, Inc. v. Val Y. Vogt, M.D.
This appeal stems from a contract dispute between an employee doctor and her employer where the employer alleged that the doctor anticipatorily breached a covenant not to compete provision in the employment agreement between the parties. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether (1) the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the doctor was proper; (2) the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the employer was proper; (3) the trial court’s grant of the doctor’s motion to stay discovery was proper; (4) the doctor’s voluntary nonsuit of her counter claims while the employer’s motion for summary judgment was still pending was proper; (5) the chancery court erred when it returned interpled funds back to the doctor; and (6) the chancery court abused its discretion when it denied the employer’s motion to amend its complaint. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Suddarth, Jr., et al. v. Household Commercial Financial Services, Inc., et al.
Billy Suddarth, Jr. and Angela Suddarth appeal the summary dismissal of their action, which was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the compulsory counterclaim rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the former action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois wherein the Suddarths were defendants, Household Commercial Financial Services, Inc. alleged the Suddarths breached a guaranty agreement by failing to pay a deficiency owing on the underlying credit agreement they had guaranteed. Household prevailed on the merits in the former action against the Suddarths. In the present action in the Circuit Court of Davidson County the Suddarths allege fraud, fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy against Household and two other defendants concerning the guaranty agreement that was the subject of the former action in the United State District Court. The present claims by the Suddarths arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of Household's action in the United State District Court; therefore, it was compulsory that the Suddarths' claims be presented in the former action. The Suddarths failed to do so. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of this action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marie Soledad Torrico (Morales) v. David Randal Smithson
David Randal Smithson ("Father"), a Tennessee resident, is a pilot for a major airline and his job duties require him to fly to Bolivia, South America. During one of these trips to Bolivia, Father became romantically involved with Marie Soledad Torrico (Morales) ("Mother"), a citizen and resident of Bolivia. In April of 2001, Mother gave birth in Bolivia to the parties' son, who is a citizen and resident of Bolivia and has been since his birth. After obtaining a temporary Visa authorizing her to come to the United States, Mother filed this paternity action in the Wilson County Juvenile Court. Based on DNA test results, the Juvenile Court enter an Order establishing Father as the biological father of the child. The Juvenile Court later entered an order requiring Father to pay child support based on the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. Father appeals claiming, among other things, that the Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order requiring him to pay child support when the child was conceived in Bolivia, born in Bolivia, and when both Mother and the child are citizens and residents of Bolivia. We hold that the Juvenile Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings but erred in applying Tennessee law. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Wilson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Following his convictions for two disciplinary infractions, the prisoner filed a pro se petition for a common law writ of certiorari in the chancery court. While he attempted to verify the petition by stating that it constituted his first application for such writ and that its contents were true and correct to the best of his knowledge, the prisoner failed to swear to the contents of the petition under oath by having the petition notarized. The Tennessee Department of Correction moved to dismiss the petition for its lack of a proper verification and for being filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the state’s motion on both grounds. The prisoner filed a pro se appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Joan Oates v. Chattanooga Publishing Company D/B/A Chattanooga Times Free Press
Joan Oates (“Plaintiff”) was employed by the Chattanooga Publishing Company (“Defendant”) for approximately twenty-three years. In January of 2004, Plaintiff was observed on Defendant’s security camera making obscene gestures with her middle finger toward the camera and then covering the security camera with a cup for a period of time. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that she was terminated because of a disability. Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and malicious harassment while employed by Defendant. Plaintiff also sued for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Burton v. Kizzy McCary
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court at Madison County terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the ground of persistence of conditions is not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interest of the minor child. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
James Stroud, et al. v. Shelby County Civil Service Commission
Shelby County terminated the employment of Eric Thomas and James Stroud. Upon writ or certiorari, the Shelby County Chancery Court reversed, and Shelby County appeals. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. T.M.B.K.
In this appeal, T.M.B.K. ("Mother") contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the initial child custody proceeding. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We futher hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence of a failure to remedy persistent conditions. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Woods, Tawana Polk, Jonathan Joy, and Clifton Polk v. Cathy N. Jones, Administrator of Elections, Hardeman County Election Commission, et al.
This is an election contest. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful candidates for office in a municipal election held on May 19, 2005. On June 3, 2005, they filed this election contest. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit based on the special ten-day statute of limitations for election contests, which is set out in T.C.A. § 2-17-105. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, concluding that, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.01, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the computation of the time in which the plaintiff must file suit. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals |
