Donna Renee Morgan vs. Jeffrie W. Morgan
Donna Renee Morgan ("Mother") filed a complaint for divorce from her husband of 11 years, Jeffrie W. Morgan ("Father"). The trial court awarded Mother a divorce and designated her as the primary residential parent of the parties' minor child. In addition, the trial court divided the parties' property and awarded Mother alimony and child support, basing its child support award on an annual salary for Father of $110,000. Father appeals, arguing that he should have been awarded primary residential parent status and contending that the trial court erred in its determination of his annual income. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Lynn Swift v. Gale Joann (Ritchie) Swift
This appeal involves the division of property upon divorce where there existed a valid Antenuptial Agreement that included provisions governing such distribution. Because we find that the trial court's distribution was consistent with the terms of the agreement and supported by the record, we affirm. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
Annie B. Cochran v. Robinhood Lane Baptist Church, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked by the appellant to determine whether the chancery court erred when it granted summary judgment to the appellees, finding that there was no consideration to support the Pastor’s Spouse Benefits agreement between the parties and that the theory of promissory estoppel is inapplicable in this case. On appeal, the appellant asserts that her presence as first lady of the church, her loss of benefits previously received from the Church, and/or the restraint of marriage provision in the agreement constituted legally adequate consideration for the Agreement. In the alternative, the appellant asserts that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in this case. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.B., T.B., E.B. and B.M. State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Belinda Medlin
This is a termination of parental rights case. In 1999, DCS removed three of the four children living with mother from the mother’s home. They were found to be dependent and neglected, and placed in the custody of DCS. The children were in foster care until October 2002, when they were returned to the mother. By that time, the fourth child had been born. In May 2003, all four children were again removed from the mother’s custody based on reports that the mother had left the children unsupervised, and that the eighteen-month-old was found in the street and was almost hit by a car. Authorities later discovered that minors had been drinking alcohol in the mother’s home, and that the mother had struck one of the children in the eye and told her to lie about the resulting bruise. The trial court again found the children to be dependent and neglected. The mother and DCS entered into a permanency plan with several requirements for the mother to complete in order to regain custody of the children. Eight months later, DCS filed the instant petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, alleging, inter alia, that the conditions which led to the removal of the children from the mother’s home persisted. The trial court granted the petition and terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding ample evidence on the ground of persistent conditions, as well as clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin Foster, et al. v. Harold Collins, et al.
Fourteen members of a church filed a complaint against the church leadership seeking an injunction to prevent the church from renewing the pastor’s contract and to enjoin the church leadership from utilizing church funds in a manner which displeased them. The parties ultimately settled the case by entering into a settlement agreement, which the chancery court incorporated into its order dismissing the case with prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the members filed a petition seeking to hold the church leadership in contempt for violating the terms of the settlement agreement. The chancellor found the church leadership to be in civil and criminal contempt of the order dismissing the case and imposed fines and jail time. The church leadership appealed to this Court. After reviewing the record in this case, we hold that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case from the outset. Accordingly, the resulting order, which served as the basis for the chancery court’s finding of contempt, is void. We reverse the chancery court’s ruling in this case and dismiss the case in its entirety. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Security Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.
In this appeal, we are called upon to review the trial court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the bank. After one of its customers deposited a counterfeit check into its account at the bank, the bank filed a claim with its insurance company to recover for its loss under a bond. Specifically, the bank sought coverage under two provisions in the bond. The bank filed its first motion for summary judgment on one of the bond’s provisions. The insurance company responded by agreeing that, for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the bank’s customer intended to commit a fraud when he deposited the check. By doing so, the insurance company sought to trigger an exclusion provision in the bond. Thereafter, the bank filed a second motion for summary judgment on the other provision in the bond. In response, the insurance company, in an effort to create a disputed issue of material fact as to this provision, asserted that the customer did not intended to commit fraud when he deposited the check. The trial court granted the bank’s motions for summary judgment. In regards to the bank’s motions for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the bank and find that genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided, therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Wood v. Metropolitan Nashville & Davidson County Government et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a citizen and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County regarding the regulatory oversight of the now defunct Nashville Thermal Transfer plant. The Metropolitan Department of Health decided to reopen the plant’s operating permit and to assess monetary penalties for the plant’s violations of air quality regulations. The plant appealed these decisions to the Metropolitan Board of Health. While the administrative appeal was pending, the plant and the Department of Health settled their dispute. The Board of Health approved the settlement and even reduced the monetary penalties assessed against the plant over the objections of a private citizen who had unsuccessfully sought to intervene in the proceeding. The citizen then filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court seeking judicial review of the Board of Health’s decision. After the plant was totally destroyed by fire, the trial court dismissed the citizen’s petition on the ground that it was moot. We affirm the dismissal because the citizen lacked standing to file the petition for a common-law writ of certiorari. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Tigg et al. v. Pirelli Tire Corporation et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between workers who were hired to replace striking workers and the employer as well as the international and local unions representing the striking workers. After a class action purportedly filed on their behalf was dismissed before the class was certified, some of the replacement workers who would have been members of the class filed another class action complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the employer and the unions. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches. The trial court granted the motion, and the replacement workers appealed. We have determined that the trial court erred by concluding that the replacement workers' claims for breach of contract and interference with contract are time-barred and that the doctrine of laches prevented them from maintaining these claims against the employer and the unions. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe W. King, Jr., et al. v. General Motors Corporation, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether (1) the jury based its awards of damages for lost earning capacity and future medical expenses on speculation; (2) the trial court erred when it denied the defendants' motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' medical experts; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied an award of prejudgment interest to the plaintiffs. The defendants contend that there was no material evidence to support the jury's awards of lost earning capacity and future medical expenses and that the trial court should have granted their motion in limine because the court was required to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs' medical experts as a sanction for plaintiffs' failure to include those medical experts as experts in the plaintiffs' responses to interrogatories. With regards to prejudgment interest, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it refused to award prejudgment interest because this type of award is applicable to some awards from personal injury cases. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Marlin & Edmondson, P.C. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA., et al.
This case involves a denial of coverage under a professional liability insurance policy. The gravamen of this case is whether the Appellant/insurance company received proper notice under the policy, of a claim by Appellee/accounting firm. Appellee/accounting firm purchased the Policy through its usual insurance broker, also an Appellee in this appeal. Appellee/accounting firm notified Appellee/insurance broker of its claim, but no written notice was forwarded to Appellant/insurance company. The trial court found, inter alia, that notice to the Appellee/insurance broker constituted notice to the Appellant/insurance company. Consequently, the trial court entered judgment against Appellant/insurance company and dismissed Appellee/accounting firm's cause of action against Appellee/insurance broker. We reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Retail Builders, Inc. v. Margaret Latham
This is a construction case. The plaintiff construction manager agreed to manage the construction of a restaurant for the defendant restaurant owner. Preliminary documents showed that the construction manager agreed to provide its services for a guaranteed maximum price. During construction, there were unanticipated problems that increased costs. After construction was completed, the construction manager sought payments from the restaurant owner over and above the guaranteed maximum price, but the restaurant owner refused to pay more. The construction manager filed this lawsuit against the restaurant owner, claiming that the parties did not enter into an enforceable contract, and that the restaurant owner should pay the construction manager the reasonable value of its services under a theory of quantum meruit. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the restaurant owner, determining that the parties had entered into a binding fixed price contract. The construction manager now appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's determination and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Jerry Cox v. Pamela Kay Cox
This is a divorce case. Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Wife. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie Wayne Gordon v. State of Tennessee
An inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a complaint charging the department with negligently disposing of certain items of personal property. The claim was denied by the Tennessee Claims Commission and the claimant appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Advocate and Protection Division v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
On November 29, 2005, this court issued an opinion finding that the Tennessee Regulatory Authority (Authority) failed to follow the requirements of then-existing law when it declined to convene a contested case proceeding with regard to BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.’s “Welcoming Reward Program” tariff. Both the Authority and BellSouth have filed timely petitions for rehearing in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 39 with regard to portions of that opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Franklin Capital Associates, L.P. v. Almost Family, Inc. f/k/a Caretenders Health Corporation
This court issued an opinion on November 29, 2005 affirming in part and modifying in part the trial court's judgment, the result of which was an award of damages against Almost Family, Inc., f/k/a Caretenders Health Corporation, (Caretenders) in the amount of $658,886.50 in favor of Franklin Capital Associates, L.P. See Franklin Capital Associates, L.P., v. Almost Family, Inc., f/k/a Caretenders Health Corporation, No. M2003-02191-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3193688, (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005). On December 9, 2005, Franklin filed a timely petition for this court to rehear that portion of the case relating to the application of a block discount to determine Franklin's damages. Having considered the petition for rehearing, we have concluded the trial court did not err by applying a block discount to determine Franklin's damages. Accordingly, we deny the petition for rehearing. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
W. Robert Vance, Jr., et al. v. Robert C. McEwan, M.D., et al.
This case arises from lease negotiations between Plaintiff W. Robert Vance, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants, Robert C. McEwan, Dane Flippen, and Edward Caldwell (“the Defendants”). After the Defendants ultimately decided not to sign a lease with Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants asserting claims for (1) breach of agreement to enter into a lease agreement; (2) breach of lease agreement; (3) detrimental reliance; (4) fraud and misrepresentation; and (5) negligent misrepresentation. After a trial on the merits, the trial court entered an order disposing of Plaintiff’s contract claims. Plaintiff subsequently filed a “Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, to Alter or Amend Judgment and/or Make and/or to Make Additional Findings of Fact Pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 59.02, 59.04, and 52.02,” which the trial court denied. Plaintiff appealed. Because we find that the trial court failed to execute a final order disposing with all of Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr.
On October 21, 2005, this court issued an opinion vacating the trial court's December 14, 2001 order admitting Joseph Owen Boote, Jr.'s will and first two codicils to probate in solemn form. In re Estate of Boote, No. M2002-02234-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2739287, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005). We instructed the trial court on remand to determine first whether the third codicil to Mr. Boote's will was properly executed, and then, if the trial court determined that it was, to conduct further proceedings preliminary to a will contest. In re Estate of Boote, 2005 WL 2739287, at *21. On October 31, 2005, Mr. Boote's daughters, Helen Boote Shivers and Linda Boote Gerritsen, filed a timely petition for rehearing, and on November 3, 2005, we entered an order requesting supplemental briefing on one of the issues raised in the petition. Ms. Shivers and Ms. Gerritsen, as well as Martha M. Boote, Mr. Boote's widow, have now filed their supplemental briefs. Having carefully considered the petition for rehearing and the supplemental briefs, we deny the petition for rehearing. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Candice D. Dunn vs. David L. Silvers
This appeal arises from a paternity action. The trial court, inter alia, established paternity, awarded custody of the parties' six month old child to Mother, established Father's co-parenting time, ordered Father to pay the birth expenses, and a portion of Mother's lost wages incurred as a result of giving birth to the child. Father appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
James K. Cannon v. Loudon County, Tennessee et al. - Concurring
I agree completely with the excellent opinion authored by Judge Lee. I write separately to emphasize what I believe is the most important aspect of this case: the plaintiff, as an incarcerated person, had no place to go, i.e., he could not leave the recreation room to completely avoid the water problem! He was “trapped” along with the seven or eight other inmates in the room. This event happened at night when the sleeping mats of the inmates obviously covered a portion of the floor, thereby further reducing the walking area. I am sure – as the dissent emphasizes – that there was some light in the room; but it obviously wasn’t lighted to the full extent. In the evening, the room was a sleeping area, not a recreation room. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
James K. Cannon v. Loudon County,Tennessee et al. - Dissenting
The majority finds defendant 100% at fault in the face of the Trial Court’s ruling that each party was 50% at fault. In my opinion, the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that plaintiff was 50% at fault for his fall and injuries. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
James K. Cannon vs. Loundon County, Tennessee et al.
The issue presented in this slip-and-fall case is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Plaintiff and Defendants were each 50% at fault and dismissing the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. While incarcerated in the Loudon County jail, James K. Cannon slipped on a floor wet from rainwater leaking through the ceiling and window frame of his cell. Because we find that (1) Defendants were responsible for creating the hazardous condition, and had prior notice of the hazardous condition and opportunity to remedy it but did not, and (2) Mr. Cannon had little, if any, opportunity to avoid the known risk of walking to the bathroom on a wet floor in rubber “flip-flop” type sandals, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Mr. Cannon was 50% at fault. We hold the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that Defendants were 100% at fault in the accident causing Mr. Cannon’s injury, and remand the case for a determination and award of damages. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
City of Clarksville v. Marcus Dixon and Anthony P. Barnett
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred when it granted two petitions for writ of certiorari, held that the city court's penalties issued to Marcus Dixon and Anthony Barnett violated Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution, and held that the city court's procedure for collection of fines in chronological order violated public policy. The appellant asserts (1) that the appellees' use of petitions for writ of certiorari were used impermissibly as a substitute for appeal; (2) that the issues raised by the appellees in their petitions for writ of certiorari were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (3) that the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. City of Chattanooga, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), applied prospectively and, thus, did not apply to the appellees' penalties; and (4) that the city court's collection of fines in chronological order was not against public policy. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
The Westchester Company, LLC v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
This dispute arose after the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro") rezoned property owned by the plaintiff, The Westchester Company, LLC ("Westchester"), from multi-family to single-family. As a result of the zoning change, Westchester was unable to carry through with its contract to sell the property to a third party for the development of multi-family town houses. Westchester sought a declaratory judgment as to whether it had a vested right in the previous zoning classification by virtue of the fact (1) that it relied upon statements made by Metro employees regarding the then-existing zoning and Westchester's rights under that zone; (2) that the rezoning caused it to lose the profit it would have received under the contract; and (3) that it is potentially liable for breach of contract. As an alternative theory of recovery, Westchester argued that the zoning change amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its property. The trial court ruled in favor of Metro and dismissed Westchester's claims. Westchester appeals, but only as to the trial court's determination that it did not have a vested right in the previous zoning. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re B.N.W.
This appeal involves the decision of the Davidson County, Tennessee, Juvenile Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction, other than temporary emergency jurisdiction, in a child custody case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Harold L. Jenkins, Deceased, Dolores Henry Jenkins v. Joni L. Jenkins, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked by the appellant to determine whether the probate court erred when it did not include income earned from the decedent's intellectual property after July 1, 2000 when it calculated the surviving spouse's elective share under the changing fraction method pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Principal and Income Act. The appellees assert that this issue was decided in the first appeal of this case and that the ruling in that appeal is the law of the case. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |
