The Center for Digestive Disorders and Clinical Research, P.C. v. Ronald J. Calisher, Individually and Norman A. Lazerine, Individually
Plaintiff sued defendants alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct on the part of defendants resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Babajide Familoni v. The University of Memphis
This case is about subject matter jurisdiction. A professor employed by the University of Memphis filed a lawsuit in chancery court against the University, alleging claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and failure to execute a settlement agreement on his discrimination claims. The University filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear contract claims against an agency of the State of Tennessee. The trial court granted the motion, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint. We affirm in part and reverse and remand, finding that the chancery court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims for discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Huan Ouyang v. Xiaohui Chen
This is a divorce case. The parties were declared divorced in February 2003. The divorce decree reserved issues regarding their minor child, property valuation and distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. After a hearing on the reserved issues, the trial court granted the wife alimony and designated her the primary residential parent of their child, set child support, and distributed the marital property. The husband appealed the trial court’s decision on all of the reserved issues. We affirm the trial court’s decision, with modification on the issue of the husband’s residential parenting time. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Greg Hopper v. Betty J. Moling
The plaintiff, an unlicensed home improvement contractor, entered into an agreement with the defendant/homeowner to make certain improvements to her existing home. Shortly after the plaintiff left the job site, the defendant/homeowner began to experience several problems associated with the plaintiff’s work. The defendant/homeowner paid to have the defects repaired and/or completed. The plaintiff filed a petition against the defendant/homeowner to enforce a materialman’s lien. The defendant/homeowner filed a counter-complaint seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, fraud, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the chancellor held that the plaintiff’s conduct amounted to constructive fraud, thereby voiding the contract; the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the cost of his labor and materials under quantum meruit; and the defendant/homeowner was entitled to damages, attorney’s fees, and discretionary costs. The plaintiff appealed to this Court to contest the chancellor’s inclusion of certain costs in the damage award, the limitation of his quantum meruit recovery, the finding of constructive fraud, and the award of attorney’s fees to the defendant/homeowner. The defendant/homeowner appealed the chancellor’s exclusion of certain costs from the damage award and the method used by the chancellor in calculating the damages. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Hazlerig v. Millington Telephone Company, Inc.
This case involves the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff telephone customer paid a fee to the defendant telephone company to block calls to 900 numbers from being made from her phone. Despite this, charges for 900 calls continued to appear on the customer’s bill. The customer disputed this, and the telephone company cut off her telephone service. The customer filed a claim against the telephone company in general sessions court for breach of contract and the telephone company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid charges for the 900 number calls. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the telephone company, and the customer appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court ruled in favor of the customer. The customer then filed a separate lawsuit against the telephone company in chancery court, seeking injunctive relief to require the telephone company to reinstate her telephone service. The telephone company answered, and later sought to amend its answer to plead the defense of res judicata. The chancery court refused to allow amendment of the answer to assert the defense. The chancery court then ruled in favor of the telephone customer. The telephone company appeals, asserting that the chancery court erred in not allowing amendment of its answer to assert the defense of res judicata. We affirm, finding that the principle of res judicata did not apply and the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit amendment of the answer. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael E Ingle, et al. v. Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC
Michael E. Ingle and his wife, Melissa R. Ingle ("the plaintiffs"), purchased a house from Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC ("the defendant"). The defendant had constructed the residence and the plaintiffs were the initial purchasers. The plaintiffs began to experience problems with their home and filed suit against the defendant on several theories, including a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). The trial court, following a bench trial, found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, but not under the TCPA. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. They also claim that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found by the trial court. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, challenge the trial court's ruling with respect to their claim under the TCPA. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Bracken Orten v. Thaddeus Charles Orten
Carol Bracken Orten (“Wife”) sued Thaddeus Charles Orten (“Husband”) for a divorce. During the course of discovery, Husband refused to provide certain financial information as he felt the information to be irrelevant. After Husband failed to appear without explanation at the second Trial Management Conference, the Trial Court entered a default judgment against Husband as a sanction for his actions. Husband’s attorney immediately withdrew from the case and the Trial Court then proceeded to distribute the marital property and award Wife alimony and child support based solely on Wife’s uncontested testimony. Husband secured new counsel and filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. The Trial Court denied Husband’s motion and this appeal followed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Bracken Orten v. Thaddeus Charles Orten - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold that the trial court erred in not setting aside the entry of the default judgment against Mr. Orten. In my judgment the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Orten did not intentionally fail to appear at the second Trial Management Conference, but simply forgot to appear. Entry of a default judgment against Mr. Orten is too drastic a measure in this case. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rabia Kafozi, et al.. v. Windward Cove, LLC
Rabia Kafozi and Audry C. Kafozi ("Plaintiffs") signed an installment sales contract to purchase real property from Windward Cove, LLC ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs made some, but not all of the payments as scheduled. Defendant declared a default and then sold the real property to another party. Plaintiffs sued Defendant seeking, among other things, either specific performance or the return of payments made by them. The case was tried and the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the installment sales contract did not set a due date and, therefore, Plaintiffs never were in default. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in interpreting the installment sales contract. We reverse, and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mold-Tech USA, LLC v. Holley Performance Products, Inc.
Mold-Tech USA, LLC ("the Supplier") brought this action against Holley Performance Products, Inc. ("the Manufacturer") for breach of contract, seeking to recover the cost of component parts purchased by the Supplier in connection with its contract with the Manufacturer. Following a bench trial, the court found that the Manufacturer had breached the contract, and the court awarded the Supplier $79,436.87 in damages. In addition, the court awarded the Supplier prejudgment interest at the rate of 4% per annum. The Manufacturer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding for the Supplier because the Supplier failed to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Tennessee version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Manufacturer also contends that the Supplier is not entitled to prejudgment interest. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
John Dolle, et al. v. Marvin Fisher, et al.
John and Christina Dolle ("Plaintiffs") entered into a contract with Fisher Builders, Inc., for the construction of a single family residence. Plaintiffs eventually obtained a judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., for breach of contract and breach of warranty. Plaintiffs' judgment against Fishers Builders, Inc. was for $61,102, plus interest and costs. After the judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., became final, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Marvin Fisher, the president, secretary, sole director, and sole stockholder of Fisher Builders, Inc. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that Fisher Builders, Inc., was a sham corporation, the corporate veil should be pierced, and Fisher should be held personally liable for the judgment against his corporation. The Trial Court agreed and entered a judgment against Fisher personally. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L. - Concurring
I adhere to my longstanding view that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a “clear and convincing evidence” standard are incompatible with each other and cannot be reconciled either in the trial court or in appellate courts. The effort to make these standards compatible, as asserted in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001), and its progeny are in my view incorrect for reasons stated at length in Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) and In re Z.J.S. and M.J.P., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, filed June 3, 2003 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003-Cain, concurring). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrey S. & Victoria L.
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological mother who is serving a lengthy prison sentence. Following years of drug abuse, criminal conduct, periodic incarceration, and inconsistent attention to the needs of her two children, the mother pled guilty to charges of especially aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of fifteen and twelve years in prison. Following her incarceration, the fathers of both children filed petitions to terminate her parental rights. The juvenile court consolidated these petitions with the mother’s petition for visitation and appointed guardians ad litem for the children. The guardians ad litem later filed a joint petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, and the fathers voluntarily dismissed their termination petitions. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court entered orders terminating the mother’s parental rights to both children on three grounds. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating the mother’s parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the court and to support the court’s conclusion that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bernice Walton Woodland and John L. Woodland v. Gloria J. Thornton
This is a personal injury case arising out of an automobile accident. The defendant rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle, and the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant for the damages resulting from the accident. A jury trial was held. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, including an amount for future pain and suffering and permanent injury. The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. The defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that some elements of the jury’s verdict were not supported by the evidence at trial. The motion was denied. The defendant now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to amend the judgment to conform with the evidence at trial. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re C.L.M., M.M.M., and S.D.M.
Mother appeals the Dickson County Juvenile Court’s Order terminating her parental rights to three children, C.L.M., M.M.M., and S.D.M. Father does not challenge the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Clyde Edwards v. Sarah Ann Edwards
This is a post-divorce case. Clyde Edwards (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his alimony obligation to his former wife, Sarah Ann Edwards (“Wife”). Husband’s original motion was premised on the fact that Wife was living with her adult daughter and son-in-law. We affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Clyde Edwards v. Sarah Ann Edwards - Dissenting
I concur completely with the majority’s resolution of Appellant’s first issue. I, respectfully, dissent from the majority’s decision as to Appellant’s second issue. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Cumberland County Bank v. Dee Downs Eastman, et al.
The Cumberland County Bank (“the bank”) filed an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court against Dee Downs Eastman. The bank sought to obtain possession of real property conveyed to it following the bank’s foreclosure of deeds of trust securing promissory notes executed by Ms. Eastman. The general sessions court entered judgment for possession “for which a Writ of Possession may issue.” Ms. Eastman appealed to the trial court and, along with the Dee Downs Eastman Revocable Trust (“the trust”), filed in that court a counterclaim that essentially challenged the validity of the foreclosure sale by which the bank acquired its title to the subject property. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment as to all issues. Ms. Eastman and the trust appeal. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Lee Barnes Williams v. Rodney Lee Williams
Former wife, Cathy Williams, appeals the action of the trial court in reducing the alimony in futuro obligation of former husband, Rodney Williams, from $4,000 per month to $2,000 per month based on a finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to justify the decrease had occurred. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: A.L.N. and B.T.N.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two minor children, arguing that Petitioner, the children's maternal grandmother, did not show by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned his children. Father also asserts that because there is no transcript or audio recording of the trial court's hearing this court is unable to conduct an adequate appellate review. We agree with Father and find that due to the lack of a transcript or audiotape of the evidence presented at the termination hearing, we are unable to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of his parental rights. Consequently, Father has been deprived of an effective review on appeal. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Todd Watson v. Timothy James Watson
This case is about parental relocation and child custody. The parents of a minor child divorced in 2001. Both parents lived in Lexington, Tennessee, and, at the time of the divorce, agreed to joint custody. The child alternated daily between the parents’ homes. In 2002, the mother remarried and moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The mother petitioned the court to designate her as primary residential parent and allow her to move the child with her to Murfreesboro. The father opposed the petition and asked the court to designate him as the primary residential parent. The trial court found that it was in the child’s best interest to move to Murfreesboro with the mother, and designated her as primary residential parent. The father appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to designate mother as primary residential parent and permit the child to move with her. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Ben Pruitt v. City of Memphis and City of Memphis Civil Service Commission
This is an appeal from the trial court’s reversal of an administrative decision. The plaintiff police officer was involved in a one-car collision while driving a police van. At the time, he was on sick leave and was not authorized to be driving the van. The van contained numerous high-powered police weapons. After the accident, the officer locked the van and left it at the accident scene overnight. The next day, the officer notified the police department about the accident. The officer was later terminated for his conduct arising out of the accident. The officer appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission, which upheld the termination. The officer then filed the instant lawsuit in the lower court, seeking a review of the Commission’s decision. The trial court reversed the Commission, holding that no material evidence supported its decision to uphold the termination. From that decision, the City now appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court and uphold the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate the plaintiff officer, finding material evidence in the record to support the Civil Service Commission’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James C. Breer v. Quenton White
Petitioner/Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. This appeal arises from the Appellant’s filing of the underlying pro se petition for common-law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the Warden’s decision to move him from one housing unit to another. The trial court dismissed Inmate’s case based upon its determination that the Warden’s decision was administrative, as opposed to judicial, in nature and that, as such, the common-law writ of certiorari was not the proper vehicle for review. Inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Diane Stutz vs. David Larry Stutz
This case involves a divorce and the validity of a postnuptial agreement. Mr. and Ms. Stutz were married more than twenty years. During most of the marriage, they wanted to have children but were unsuccessful. When a child became available for adoption, Ms. Stutz was elated and aggressive in her actions to secure the adoption of the child, but Mr. Stutz was opposed to the adoption of the child. Over the course of several weeks, Ms. Stutz attempted to change Mr. Stutz's mind regarding the adoption. Finally, she suggested that in exchange for his consent to the adoption, they would enter into an agreement dividing the marital estate and in the event Mr. Stutz was unhappy being a father they would divorce and follow the agreement previously determined. The result was a lengthy postnuptial agreement, which among other things, divided the marital estate giving most of the marital property to Mr. Stutz. Within a few years of the signing of the postnuptial agreement and the adoption, Ms. Stutz filed for divorce. The trial court upheld the validity of the postnuptial agreement with the exception of a section which attempted to waive and/or significantly limit Mr. Stutz's child support obligation. The trial court also granted a divorce to the parties upon Mr. Stutz's motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Ms. Stutz appeals. We hold that the postnuptial agreement is invalid as it is contrary to public policy. We further hold that the trial court erred in granting a divorce to the parties in the absence of a stipulation to or proof of grounds for divorce. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision and remand this case for a trial on the division of the marital estate, alimony, divorce, and any remaining issues. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Diane Anderson (Byrd) v. Donald Matthew Anderson, Sr.
In this extended post-divorce battle over child support, alimony, property division and various other imaginative issues, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the cause is remanded for trial of specific issues. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
