Roger C. Buttrey v. Connie J. Buttrey
The divorced father was found to be in willful criminal contempt of a previous court order by the trial court and sentenced to 10 days in the Williamson County jail for not paying his child support in June 2006, 10 days for not paying his child support in November 2006, 10 days for not paying his child support in December 2006, and 10 days for not paying his share of the medical bills of his minor children. The father appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Bailey v. American General Life & Accident Insurance Company, et al.
An unsuccessful party to an arbitration proceeding appeals the trial court's confirmation of the arbitration decision. The challenge is based on alleged ambiguities in the agreement to arbitrate and alleged failure by the arbitrator to disclose potential conflicts. We affirm the trial court's confirmation. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
AmSouth Bank v. Douglas A. Soltis, et al.
This is a suit for collection of a credit card debt. AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth") filed a complaint on a sworn account seeking a judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Soltis for the unpaid balance on three credit card accounts. Mr. and Mrs. Soltis answered and denied AmSouth was entitled to any relief. AmSouth filed a motion for summary judgment. Mr. and Mrs. Soltis responded by filing three documents entitled "Verified Application to Confirm and Enforce Arbitration Award" and three "Award" documents indicating that AmSouth Bank owed Mr. and Mrs. Soltis money. The parties had not agreed to arbitration and had not participated in arbitration. The trial court granted AmSouth's motion for summary judgment and Mr. and Mrs. Soltis appealed. The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting AmSouth's motion for summary judgment and in entering judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Soltis. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Davidson v. Charles Traughber, et al.
Plaintiff inmate filed a petition with the Tennessee Department of Corrections for a declaratory ruling that he was entitled to a parole hearing. Upon denial of his petition, Plaintiff inmate filed an action against two Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole employees, seeking judicial review of the denial of his petition. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff inmate appeals and we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Sentinel Trust Company
This appeal involves three cases consolidated for oral argument. Because of the duplication of the major issues in the cases, we consolidate the cases into one opinion. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions, acting on statutory authority, took emergency possession of a Tennessee trust company, filing due notice of such action in the Chancery Court of Lewis County. Subsequently, the Commissioner gave notice, as required by statute, of the liquidation of the company, which was commenced in the Chancery Court of Lewis County. The company filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The court denied the petition for supersedeas and dismissed the writ of certiorari. Appellants appeal. We affirm. In the Lewis County Chancery Court proceeding, the court approved the transfer by the Commissioner of the various fiduciary accounts administered by the company and other assets of the company, and the appellants appeal. We affirm. Included in the disposition of the property was real estate located in Bellevue, and the Commissioner filed a motion in the Lewis County Chancery Court for approval of the sale of this real estate. Objections were filed to the Bellevue sale motion. The court, after hearing proof, approved the sale. Appellants filed separate appeals. We affirm. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby Electric Company, Inc. v. Paul Forbes and Joseph Strain
This is an action to enforce a commercial guaranty. The defendants were both 25% shareholders in the plaintiff corporation. They each signed a guaranty on a $70,000 line of credit issued to the corporation. Subsequently, two other shareholders of the corporation drew down $50,000 from the line of credit without notifying the defendant guarantors or the corporation’s board of directors. Two days later, the guarantors resigned from the corporation. Within weeks, the two other shareholders who drew the money from the line of credit caused the corporation to default on its obligation. These two shareholders then purchased the corporation’s debt from the bank in the name of the plaintiff corporation and demanded payment from the guarantors under their guaranties. The guarantors refused to make the requested payments. The plaintiff corporation then sued the guarantors pursuant to the guaranties. The guarantors filed an answer asserting the affirmative defenses of fraud and fraud in the inducement of the guaranties. The plaintiff corporation filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the broad “waiver of defenses” provision in the guaranties. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff corporation, concluding that the defenses asserted by the guarantors were waived under the general waiver-of-defenses provision. From that order, the guarantors now appeal. We reverse, concluding that the defenses of fraud and fraud in the inducement were not waived in the general waiver-of-defenses provisions in the guaranties at issue. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
M&M Auto Sales v. Old Republic Surety Company v. Brooks Road Auto Mart, LLC et al.
This is an action to recover on a surety bond. The plaintiff automobile wholesaler sold vehicles to the third-party defendant automobile retailer. The retailer gave thewholesaler the certificates of title for the vehicles as security, pending the retailer’s payment in full for the vehicles. Subsequently, the retailer sold the vehicles to third parties, but did not pay the wholesaler. The wholesaler, therefore, retained the certificates of title. Consequently, the retailer was unable to transfer the certificates of title to the third-party purchasers when they bought the vehicles. Later, in a separate lawsuit, the wholesaler obtained a judgment against the retailer for breach of contract. The wholesaler then filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant surety company on the retailer’s automobile dealership surety bond, claiming that it was damaged by the retailer’s failure to transfer the certificates of title to the purchasers of the vehicles. The surety company filed a third-party complaint against the retailer, asserting that the retailer was required to indemnify the surety company for its attorney’s fees expended in defending the underlying lawsuit. The surety company filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the surety company against both the wholesaler and the retailer. The wholesaler and the retailer now appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marilyn Stavely v. Amsouth Bank (Milan, TN) And Mary Jane Miller
This is an action to recover damages for the alleged improper disposition of funds in a conservatorship account, conspiracy, and false advertising. The plaintiff’s mother was placed under a conservatorship, and the conservator opened an account at the defendant bank for the conservatorship. After the plaintiff’s mother died, the account was settled and the accounting was approved by the Gibson County Chancery Court. The plaintiff sought to recover funds from the account, but was informed that the account was settled. The plaintiff sued the bank and its branch manager for conspiracy, false advertising, and disappearing funds. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Taylor Lopez v. Danny Holbrook Taylor, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between divorced parents over one of their son's college expenses. Their older son became eligible for a substantial tuition discount after his father was employed by the university where he was enrolled. However, the father and son concealed the father's employment and the son's discount from the mother and actually sent her statements that did not reflect the discount. The mother paid one-half of the expenses reflected in these statements until she discovered the tuition discount. She then filed suit against her former husband and her son in the Circuit Court for Wilson County alleging breach of contract and fraud. She also sought a declaration regarding her continuing obligation to pay her son's college expenses. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the father had breached the marital dissolution agreement and ordered the father to pay the mother $2,737.01. The court also found that the mother had breached the marital dissolution agreement by declining to pay her son's college expenses after discovering the tuition discount and ordered her to resume paying her share of these expenses. The mother appealed. We have concluded (1) that the father committed a material breach of the marital dissolution agreement, (2) that the father and the son engaged in fraudulent conduct by concealing the tuition discount from the mother and then pocketing her overpayments, (3) that the mother did not breach the marital dissolution agreement when she stopped paying her son's college expenses, and (4) that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of the mother's overpayment. Accordingly, we have determined that the mother is entitled to recover $3,590 from the husband and that the actions of the father and son warrant terminating her obligation to pay the son's college expenses. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
LDI Design, LLC v. Glenn G. Dukes, et al.
This appeal arises from a multi-faceted business dispute. LDI Design, LLC, an engineering firm, was engaged by Dukes & Co., a real estate developer, to design plans for Spencer Hall, a planned subdivision in Franklin, Tennessee. LDI provided its engineering services, however, Dukes failed to fulfill its financial obligation to LDI. The parties negotiated a new agreement in April 1999 compromising a claim for damages by Dukes in consideration of a reduced fee for LDI's services. After Dukes failed to honor the new agreement, LDI filed this action. Dukes filed an answer denying liability and filed a counter complaint for damages due to deficiencies in the plans prepared by LDI. Spencer Hall, LLC, owner of the Spencer Hall subdivision, while not a party to the contract, joined in the counter complaint claiming to be a co-developer of the project and the third-party beneficiary of the contract between LDI and Dukes. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim finding the renegotiated agreement between LDI and Dukes constituted an accord and satisfaction that barred Duke's claims, and the evidence insufficient to prove any claim for damages against LDI. Although we find the new agreement did not bar Dukes' claim, we affirm the trial court's finding that the evidence failed to prove any claim for damages against LDI. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of all claims against LDI. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. J.A.H., Jr., et al.
In this case, the biological father of a child contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. Father argues that the evidence presented is not sufficient to establish statutory grounds for termination and that the Tennessee Department of Children's Services failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Upon our finding that father was incarcerated when the petition to terminate was filed and failed to visit the child for four consecutive months immediately preceding his incarceration and our further finding that the Department made reasonable efforts at reunification, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Lynn Gass Nichols v. Lynn Allen Schubert, et al.
The wife died in 1998, and her holographic will was admitted to probate and the estate closed. In 2002, the husband died, and his formally executed will was admitted to probate. Thereafter, his executrix determined that a question existed concerning the ownership interest in the marital residence held by the husband at his death. As a result, the executrix filed a declaratory judgment action in the probate court to construe the wife’s holographic will. At trial, the wife’s daughter by a previous marriage attempted to prove that the wife’s holographic will was a forgery. The trial court determined that the daughter’s proof was not credible, and the court ruled that the wife’s holographic will vested fee simple title of the marital residence in the husband following her death. The wife’s daughter filed a motion for a new trial. While the motion was pending, the daughter filed an action in the chancery court against the husband’s children from a previous marriage asserting, in essence, the same allegations she raised in the probate court action. The probate court subsequently denied the daughter’s motion for a new trial. In turn, the chancery court transferred the complaint to the probate court, and the probate court entered an order dismissing the complaint. The daughter filed an appeal to this Court raising numerous issues related to the declaratory judgment action and the compliant filed in chancery court. As for the declaratory judgment action, we are without jurisdiction to entertain issues related to that case since the daughter failed to file a timely appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: J.L.C., V.R.C. and E.R.C., John Richard Simmons, et al. v. James Cordell, et al. - Dissenting
I write separately to voice my dissent to the holding reached by the majority in this case. The majority concludes that Father expressly waived the issue of whether the trial court correctly determined him to be voluntarily unemployed. Although Father did state in his brief that he is not challenging the trial court’s determination that he is voluntarily unemployed on appeal, I believe the issue should nonetheless be addressed. In doing so, I would hold that the trial court erred in finding that Father was voluntarily unemployed and in imputing potential income to Father on which to base an award of child support. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: J.L.C., V.R.C. and E.R.C., John Richard Simmons, et al. v. James Cordell, et al.
This is a child support case. Custody of the minor children was removed from the biological father, and he was convicted of and incarcerated for aggravated sexual battery of his child and the manufacture of methamphetamine. The custodians of the children petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights, adopt the children, and obtain back child support from the father. The father owned 1500 acres of farmland. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights, assessed back child support against him, found him voluntarily underemployed and, based on the incomeproducing farmland, imputed an earning potential of $45,000. The custodians appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by not imputing a higher earning capacity to the biological father. We affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: T.M.C.
Mother appeals custody order of the Juvenile Court of Williamson County relative to her oldest child who had been previously determined by that Court to be a dependent and neglected child. The appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter of jurisdiction and the case remanded to the Williamson County Juvenile Court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Fay Demonbreun v. Richard Austin Demonbreun
In this post-divorce case, Richard Austin Demonbreun ("Father"), filed a petition to modify the parties' visitation arrangement, seeking additional time with one of the parties' three children. Rhonda Fay Demonbreun ("Mother"), the primary residential parent of the children, countered with a petition requesting an increase in child support and the imposition of an obligation upon Father to pay the children's unreimbursed medical expenses. In addition, Mother sought one-half of the refund associated with the parties' 1998 income tax return, and an award of her attorney's fees and court costs. Following a bench trial, the trial court (1) denied Father's petition to modify visitation with his oldest son; (2) increased Father's child support obligation and his share of non-covered medical expenses; (3) awarded Mother one-half of the 1998 income tax refund; (4) awarded Mother $5,000 in attorney's fees; and (5) ordered Father to pay all court costs. Father appeals all of the trial court's decrees, and Mother seeks an award of attorney's fees for the filing of a frivolous appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part, but do not find this appeal to be frivolous in nature. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Frank G. Barton, Jr., deceased Patricia Levine v. Estate of Frank G. Barton, Jr.
This is a claim against an estate. The claimant and the decedent had a romantic relationship. After the decedent’s death, the claimant filed a claim against the decedent’s estate, based on alleged promises of financial support by the decedent in the course of their relationship. The estate moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the claimant could not establish the existence of an enforceable contract or a valid gift. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Virginia Starr Segal v. United American Bank, David Charles Segal, Martin Grusin, and Rhonda Dileonardo
This is an action for conversion involving two ex-spouses. The wife was the lone signatory on two trust accounts for their daughters. Without authorization from the wife, the defendant bank transferred all of the funds in both trust accounts to the husband’s account. The wife then filed this lawsuit for conversion, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against the bank, the bank employee who transferred the funds, and the husband. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. As part of the plaintiff wife’s response, she admitted that she originally put the money into the trust accounts in order to defraud creditors during their divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, based in part on the doctrine of unclean hands. The plaintiff wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the trial court properly applied the doctrine of unclean hands. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Gates d/b/a Furniture World v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company and Walter Wallace
This case involves business interruption insurance. The furniture store owned by the plaintiff typically sells furniture under “rent to own” payment plans, whereby customers purchase the furniture through payments over time. The furniture store was damaged by a tornado. As a result, the store was closed for eight months for repairs. The plaintiff store owner had a business interruption insurance policy with the defendant insurance company that covered the loss of business income during the time in which the store was closed for restoration. The store owner sued the insurance company for the loss of business income it would have received during the eight-month period of restoration. Cross-motions for partial summary judgment were filed regarding how to measure the loss of income. The store owner claimed he was entitled to the entire value of sales contracts that would have been signed during the period of closure, even though most of the payments under those contracts would be due after the eight-month restoration period. The insurance company, on the other hand, claimed that the store owner was entitled only to the value of payments that actually would have been received by the store during the eight-month restoration period. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the store owner, finding that the store owner was entitled to the entire value of the contracts that would have been signed during the restoration period. The insurance company was granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur W. Anderson, Sr., et al. v. James W. Rayner, et al.
This is the second time that this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants assert that summary judgment was appropriate based on the claims and defenses raised at trial, including res judicata, law of the case, and statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Arthur W. Anderson, Sr., et al. v. James W. Rayner, et al.
This is the second time that this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants assert that summary judgment was appropriate based on the claims and defenses raised at trial, including res judicata, law of the case, and statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
N. Victoria Holladay v. Charles Speed, et al.
Plaintiff homeowner filed a cause of action against Defendant builder alleging breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of good workmanship, misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff alleged damages in the amount of $15,000 and “other damages,” and also sought punitive damages. The trial court found no violation of the Consumer Protection Act and awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $11,103 for the cost of repairs. Plaintiff appeals and Defendant cross-appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of the Conservatorship of Doris Davenport Doris Davenport, Doris Davenport, et al. v. Ruth Adair, et al.
In this conservatorship case, we are asked to evaluate the probate court's decision that an elderly female was mentally disabled and in need of the court's assistance. The elderly female executed two powers of attorney for health care; one in 1996 and the other in 2003 after the nieces of the elderly female filed their petition in this case to appoint a conservator. The attorney-in-fact under both powers of attorney filed a counter-petition asking the probate court to appoint her conservator over the elderly female. The probate court ruled that the power of attorney executed in 1996 was void due to improper execution and that the power of attorney executed in 2003 was void because it was executed while the elderly female was mentally disabled. The probate court found that the elderly female's nieces and the attorney-in-fact should not serve as conservators in this case. Instead, the probate court appointed the public guardian to serve as the elderly female's conservator. The attorney-in-fact and the elderly female filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Lynae Watson vs. Harold Guy Watson
This is a divorce case. The parties, Donna Lynae Watson ("Wife") and Harold Guy Watson ("Husband"), ultimately stipulated to the existence of grounds for divorce and reached an agreement pertaining to the disposition of much of their marital property. A bench trial was held to resolve the parties' disputed issues, which, among other things, included the issue of how the marital real property should be disposed of in the overall division of the parties' marital property. The trial court awarded the marital real property to Wife, subject, however, to the mortgage on the property; Husband appeals this action by the trial court. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
May Slone v. James M. Mitchell, et al.
This medical malpractice case focuses on the correct interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 as we attempt to ascertain whether this suit, filed pursuant to the saving statute, was pursued so as to “toll the running of [the] statute of limitations.” The trial court held that, since no process was issued within 30 days of the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint 1 and since the process that was eventually issued and later served on the defendants was not issued within one year of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff’s suit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. She appeals. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals |
