In the Matter of: J-Bar Corporation, A Tennessee Corporation, Ben A. Dicke, et al. v. Ronald Lee Parrish, et al.
Appellants Ben and Janice Dick ("the Dickes") appeal the trial court's grant of pre-judgment interest against the J-Bar Corporation ("J-Bar") on a promissory note issued by J-Bar to Appellees Ronald and Judith Parrish. Because we find that the Dickes lack standing to appeal this issue, we dismiss. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lloyd McPherson v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking custodial parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole denied his request, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Northcott v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole et al.
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking to be released on parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to grant him parole, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed, and the prisoner appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Miley Hoyt Bell ex rel. Roberta L. Bell v. Tennessee Department of Human Services
This appeal involves a dispute between a widow and the Tennessee Department of Human Services regarding the Department’s denial of her deceased husband’s application for Medicaid nursing home benefits. The widow filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Robertson County asserting that the Department erred by classifying as available resources four tax deeds for real property in Georgia being held in her revocable trust. The trial court found that the Department’s classification of the four tax deeds as available resources was supported by substantial and material evidence. The widow asserts on this appeal that the tax deeds should not have been classified as available resources because they were “unavailable” and because they were income-producing property. Like the trial court, we have determined that the Department’s classification of the four tax deeds for real property in Georgia was correct. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Davidson v. Quenton White et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Department of Correction regarding his eligibility to be considered for parole. The prisoner filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the Department and three of its employees seeking declaratory relief and damages because he had not been declared eligible to be considered for parole. The Department's employees moved to dismiss the complaint because the prisoner had failed to specify whether they were being sued in their personal or official capacities. The court dismissed the complaint after being informed that the prisoner had been considered for and had been denied parole. We have determined that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert L. Lamar v. Donna Blackburn et al.
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking to be released on parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to release him on parole, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mable B. Beal, et al. v. Walgreen Co.
In 2001, a pharmacy, when filling the plaintiff’s prescription, gave the plaintiff the wrong medication. The plaintiff began taking the medication as directed, but she soon developed symptoms related to taking the wrong medication. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy alleging negligence, misrepresentation, and strict liability, and she sought compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages. The pharmacy served the plaintiff with discovery requests specifically designed to discover the basis for the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and the plaintiff responded. The pharmacy deemed the plaintiff’s responses inadequate, and it filed a motion to deem facts admitted, a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the motions for summary judgment. At a hearing on the pharmacy’s motion to deem facts admitted and the plaintiff’s motion to strike, the trial court orally indicated its intention to grant the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Thereafter, the plaintiff orally stated that she wished to take a voluntary nonsuit of her remaining claims. The plaintiff has filed an appeal to this Court asking us to review the grant of partial summary judgment to the pharmacy on her claim for punitive damages. We have determined that, due to the plaintiff’s decision to nonsuit her remaining claims, the present appeal is presently moot. Moreover, we find that this appeal is so devoid of merit that it warrants the imposition of damages for the filing of a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney M. Butler v. Quentin White, Commissioner, et al.
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Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Townsend Scientific Trust v. Food Technology Investors, L.P., et al. v. Townsend Scientific Trust and John Townsend
This case stems from a business deal gone sour. This is the third time that these parties have brought identical claims against one another. In the previous versions of this suit, the cases were dismissed without prejudice. At this trial, both the plaintiff’s claims and the defendants’ counter claims and third-party claims were dismissed with prejudice based on the doctrine of laches. Upon a motion to alter or amend judgment, the trial court modified its order to dismiss all claims without prejudice based on a failure to prosecute. In this appeal, appellants ask this Court to determine (1) whether the chancery court erred when it amended its judgment with prejudice granting the appellants’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of laches to a judgment without prejudice based on a failure to prosecute and (2) whether the chancery court erred when it dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte. The appellants argue that the chancery court should not have amended its judgment dismissing the defendants’ counter and third-party claims because the facts presented at trial warranted a dismissal based on the doctrine of laches. Further, the appellants argue that the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte based on the doctrine of laches because the defendants did not demonstrate at trial any undue prejudice to them. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Paul Sutphin v. Sally Ann Osborne Sutphin
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred when it modified the original custody order between the parties. Appellant contends that there are no material changes of circumstances to warrant modification of the original custody order. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly K. Houston v. Asian Import and Manufacturing Group, Inc.
This appeal involves an employment dispute. Following his termination, the employee filed suit against his former employer in the Circuit Court for Williamson County alleging retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and conversion. The trial court directed a verdict for the employer at the close of the employee's case-in-chief, and the employee appealed. We have determined that the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict was proper. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
William M. Hensley, et al. v. Robert Carrier
William M. Hensley and Mary Hensley ("Plaintiffs") sued Robert Carrier ("Defendant") regarding the use of a driveway. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court found and held that it was the intent of the original grantors that the driveway be a joint driveway; that if this holding was incorrect, that the Plaintiffs had established a right to the driveway through adverse possession; that if the prior two holdings were incorrect, that Plaintiffs had proven a prescriptive easement or an implied easement to use the driveway. Defendant appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding a prescriptive easement or an implied easement, and also that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing Plaintiffs' claims based upon the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce R. Goodman v. Judy Lynn McMurray Goodman
Appellant Bruce Goodman ("Husband") filed for divorce from Appellee Judy Goodman ("Wife") after twenty-six years of marriage. The parties entered into a permanent parenting plan and subsequently went to trial seeking a property settlement and a decree on spousal support. The trial court awarded each party approximately $1.4 million from the marital estate and also granted Wife $4,000 per month in alimony in futuro. Husband appeals the alimony award. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Monumental Life Insurance Company v. Lindsay Puckett
This appeal stems from a declaratory judgment action determining the rights of the parties to a life insurance contract. On appeal, the insurer asserts that the chancery court erred when it found that the agent for the insureds was acting outside the course and scope of her authority when she terminated the life insurance contract. Further, the insurer asserts that, even assuming that the agent was acting outside the course and scope of her authority, the insureds ratified her actions. We reverse and declare that the insurance policywas not in effect at the time of Mr. Puckett’s death. We remand for a determination of whether Ms. Puckett’s actions constituted a violation of section 56-53-103 of the Tennessee Code, and if so, the related expenses the insurer is entitled to receive pursuant to section 56-53-103. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth S.F. Martella v. David R. Martella
This appeal involves a parental dispute over the payment of child support for a fifteen-year-old child. One year following the divorce, the child's father filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Franklin County seeking to modify his $2,100 per month child support obligation because his visitation with his daughter had increased and because his daughter was receiving Social Security benefits as a result of his retirement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the father was willfully unemployed and declined to lower his child support obligation. However, the court determined that the father was entitled to an offset in the amount of the Social Security benefits that the child was receiving as his dependent. Both the mother and the father take issue with the judgment. The father asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to lower his child support obligation. The mother insists that the court erred by giving the father credit for the Social Security benefits the child was receiving. We affirm the judgment. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Hodge v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a motorcycle rider who was seriously injured while crossing two heavy steel plates placed over the surface of a portion of a state highway that was under construction. The rider filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission asserting that the front tire of his motorcycle became lodged in a gap between the two steel plates and that this gap was the dangerous condition that caused his injuries. Following a hearing, a claims commissioner dismissed the claim after concluding (1) that the rider had failed to prove that the State, rather than the highway contractor, was responsible for maintaining the steel plates, (2) that the rider had failed to prove that the State had notice of the gap between the plates, and (3) that the rider’s negligence exceeded that of the State. The motorcycle rider has appealed. We have determined that the claims commissioner erred by concluding that the State was not on notice of the dangerous condition on the highway and that the motorcycle rider’s negligence exceeded the State’s negligence. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Anthony Chatman v. City of Chattanooga
Mr. Chatman was a policeman in Chattanooga. He was fired on September 15, 2003 for untruthfulness during an investigation, and for conduct unbecoming a police officer. He appealed to the Chattanooga City Council which upheld his dismissal. His petition for certiorari was denied and he appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James Killingsworth, et al. v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur completely in the majority’s conclusion that “the facts preponderate against the Trial Court’s holding that only $2,000 in fees was a reasonable amount for work performed at the trial court level.” I also agree with the majority’s decision that $6,500 is a reasonable fee for counsel’s work at the trial court level. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Killingsworth, et al. v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc.
This appeal centers around the Trial Court’s award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs in this Tennessee Consumer Protection Act case. Following remand after the first appeal, the Trial Court awarded attorney fees of $2,000 for work performed in preparation for and the jury trial of this case, and an additional $4,500 in attorney fees incurred on the first appeal. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court’s award of $2,000 in fees incurred at the trial court level was unreasonably low. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in awarding any fees incurred on the appeal. We reverse the award of fees incurred on the appeal, and modify the Trial Court’s judgment to award $6,500 in fees for work performed at the Trial Court level. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Suzanne Kay Burlew v. Brad Steven Burlew
The trial court modified the parties’ decree of divorce, changing custody of parties’ minor child from joint custody to Father, and transferred control of a custodial account from Mother to Father. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition to set visitation and ordered Mother to have no contact with child. Mother appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order regarding visitation and the award of attorney’s fees and remand on these issues. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Edward Ort v. Lora Jeanette Ort
This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property, award alimony in futuro to Wife, naming of Wife as primary residential parent, and child support order. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Sowell Needham v. Chad Dearman
Plaintiff appeals from failure of the trial court to allow interest on a child support arrearage judgment pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-5-101(A)(5). The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenny Vaughn, et al. v. Notie L. Cunningham, et al.
Kenny Vaughn and Barbara Vaughn ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Vaughn" and "Mrs. Vaughn" as appropriate) sued Notie L. Cunningham and John Doe concerning an automobile accident that occurred in Hamilton County. The case was tried before a jury and the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. The jury found John Doe 100% at fault for the accident, but awarded Plaintiffs no damages. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court claiming that the jury verdict is contrary to the evidence because the amount of damages is not within the range of reasonableness, and that the Trial Court erred by not granting a new trial and by awarding court costs against Plaintiffs. We affirm as modified. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Barron And Ronald Barron v. Louise Stephenson d/b/a Louise Learning Tree
In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a premises liability suit. After reviewing the record, we hold that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant owed her a duty of care. Specifically, the plaintiff failed to offer any proof tending to show that the ramp on which she slipped and fell constituted a defective and/or dangerous condition. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Yelena Utkina Kesterson v. Thomas Michael Kesterson, et al.
This case involves issues arising out of the parties’ divorce. The chancery court designated and divided the parties’ assets and placed an equitable lien on the separate property of the husband. The chancery court did not award alimony or attorney’s fees and discretionary costs to the wife. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Further, we decline to award attorney’s fees and costs on appeal |
Carroll | Court of Appeals |
