David Helton, et al. v. Glenn Enterprises, Inc., dba Linmar Hospitality
David Helton and his wife, Charlotte Helton, brought suit against Glenn Enterprises, Inc., dba Linmar Hospitality, the operator of a Fairfield Inn in Knox County, for compensatory damages arising out of the theft of their drag racing vehicle and other personal property losses, all of which occurred while the plaintiffs were guests at the defendant's motel. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, holding that there was no liability shown by the proof. This holding was predicated upon the fact that the parking lot where the plaintiffs parked their truck and trailer, while close to the defendant's motel, was not actually on the defendant's property. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the duty established by the Supreme Court in the case of McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996) should apply to the facts of this case. They contend that they made out a question for the jury on the McClung issue as well as on the issue of liability under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). We vacate the trial court's judgment on these two issues and remand for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Adoption of J.A.K. & K.R.K.
This is the second appeal in this proceeding to terminate a biological mother’s parental rights. On the first appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the mother had abandoned the children but remanded the case to the trial court to make specific findings regarding whether the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The trial court determined that terminating the mother’s rights would be in her children’s best interests, and the mother appealed. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Adoption of J.A.K. & K.R.K. - Concurring
The court reiterates a statement first appearing in a published opinion in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). Quoting from In Re M.O.,173 S.W.3d 13, 18-19 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005, the court says: |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth B. White v. Dr. William Bacon, et al.
Inmate filed a medical malpractice and negligence action against Defendants involved in his care following a slip-and-fall injury at the prison and Defendants involved in the maintenance of the prison. The trial court dismissed all named Defendants and inmate appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
XL Sports, LTD. v. $1,060.000 Plus Interest Traceable to Respondent, RES, and Jerry Lawler
Following a transaction involving the sale of a business, the plaintiff filed suit against several defendants in federal court alleging causes of action grounded in federal and state law. The federal jury found some of the defendants liable, but they concluded that one of the defendants did not engage in any wrongdoing during the transaction at issue. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in a Tennessee chancery court seeking to impose a constructive trust over funds held by the defendant exonerated by the jury. The defendant removed the case to the federal district court. The district court determined that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff appealed to the federal court of appeals, which ruled that the case was not properly removable, as it only presented a claim based upon state law. On remand to the chancery court, the defendant asserted the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The chancery court subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The defendant appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancellor’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, and we hold that the plaintiff’s claim for a constructive trust is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we dismiss the case in its entirety. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re. N.R.P.
This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Rutherford County to consider a mother’s appeal from a decision of the Rutherford County Juvenile Court changing custody to the father. The Circuit Court denied the father’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but granted mother permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the Circuit Court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Juvenile Court’s decision does not arise out of a dependant or neglect proceeding, the appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order lies to this court rather than the Circuit Court. Accordingly, we vacate the Circuit Court’s order and remand the case to the Circuit Court with directions to transfer the appeal to this court.1 |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Hopkins Lindsay v. Dwight Kelley Lindsay
This primary issue on appeal is whether Dwight Kelley Lindsay ("Mr. Lindsay") was properly advised of his constitutional right to counsel before being found guilty on twelve counts of criminal contempt for his failure to pay court ordered child support and health insurance reimbursement payments. All parties to this appeal now agree that Mr. Lindsay was not adequately advised of his right to counsel. The judgment of the Trial Court finding Mr. Lindsay in criminal contempt is vacated. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Hopkins Lindsay v. Dwight Kelley Lindsay
Tammy Hopkins Lindsay ("Mother") and Dwight Kelley Lindsay ("Father") were divorced in December of 2000, but have returned to court numerous times since then. Most of the post-divorce controversy centers around the amount of Father's child support payment and the arrearages which have accrued since the divorce. After the most recent hearing, the Trial Court entered a detailed order resolving competing petitions filed by the parties. The only issue in this appeal concerns that portion of the Trial Court's order which requires Father to pay an additional $50 each time he fails to exercise co-parenting time on a weekend, and an additional $25 for each day that he fails to exercise co-parenting time on a holiday or during the summer. We vacate only this particular portion of the Trial Court's Order, and affirm the order as so modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Jaime v. American Water Heater Company
The plaintiff brought this action against her former employer, alleging that the defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for her pursuit of a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge and that she also failed to rebut the defendant's proffered legitimate reason for termination. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Lynelle Gardner v. Richard Wendell Gardner
Amy Lynelle Gardner appeals the post-divorce modification of child support provisions. Father, Richard Wendell Gardner, petitioned the court for modifications claiming the child support provisions were unconscionable, in part due to the fact the parties used one attorney for the divorce proceedings from which the child support provisions emanate. The trial court found Father was not properly represented and that certain provisions were unconscionable. As a result, the trial court relieved Father of the contractual obligation to pay support for a child past majority, required that Mother apply her state employee discount to the child’s college tuition, and awarded Father the tax deduction for the years he paid tuition. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Smith v. Deborah Smith
This appeal arises from a custody dispute involving an eleven-year-old boy. After the parties agreed to end their marriage, the father filed a complaint for divorce in November 2001 in the Chancery Court for Cheatham County. In addition to the complaint, the father filed a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan designating the mother as the primary residential parent. The child remained in the mother's custody until October 2002 when the trial court awarded the father temporary custody of the child. Following a hearing in July 2003, the trial court entered an order in September 2003 declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as the primary residential parent. The mother has appealed. Despite the father's conduct following the parties' separation, we have concluded that the trial court's decision to designate him as the child's primary residential parent does not fall outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from a correct application of the governing law to the facts established by the evidence in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Angela McDaniel v. Carolina National Transport, et al.
In this action arising from a vehicular accident, the issues presented are whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence deposition testimony of a Defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01, and whether the amount of the jury verdict was supported by material evidence. We hold the trial court did not err in its discretionary decision to admit the deposition testimony, and that there is material evidence supporting the duly approved jury verdict. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Barnes & Robinson Company, Inc. d/b/a One Source of Tennessee, Inc. v. Onesource Facility Services, Inc. et al.
Barnes & Robinson Co., Inc. filed this action against two related companies claiming breach of contract, failure to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel. The claims arise from negotiations pursuant to two letters of intent and subsequent representations upon which Barnes & Robinson contends it relied to its detriment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending Barnes & Robinson failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted, which the trial court granted. Barnes & Robinson appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pfizer, Inc. v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Pfizer, Inc. challenges the assessment of the additional rate of business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). It contends the sales in question, which were from one wholesaler to another wholesaler, were not within the definition of “wholesale sales” as the term is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-702(a)(19), and thus not subject to the additional business tax. The State of Tennessee contends sales, whether a “sale at retail” or a “sale at wholesale,” are taxable pursuant to the percentages set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). The facts are not disputed. Based upon a statutory interpretation, we find sales from one wholesaler to another wholesaler are not subject to the additional business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Polygram Records, Inc., et al. v. Legacy Entertainment Group, LLC
Three competing parties claim rights to commercially exploit performances of legendary performer Hank Williams that were recorded and broadcast by WSM Radio in the 1950s. Polygram Records, Inc., claims exclusive phonograph exploitation rights, relying on a contract Williams entered into with its predecessor in interest, MGM Records. Legacy Entertainment Group, LLC., claims rights of exploitation to the recordings under a chain of title. Williams' heirs, Hank Williams, Jr. and Jett Williams, contend neither Legacy nor Polygram have contractual rights to exploit Williams' performances embodied in the WSM recordings, and further contend the rights passed to his heirs. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims of Polygram and Legacy, finding neither own rights to exploit the recorded performances, and the rights belong to Williams' heirs. Legacy and Polygram appeal. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scotty Henry Pace, Jr.
The defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail for violating an Order of Protection. He appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient. We agree. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christian B., Nathaniel B., Stepan B., Reanne B., & Dolton B.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mary Katherine W.B. ("Mother") and Christopher M.B. ("Father") with respect to their five minor children: Christian B. (DOB: August, 13, 1993), Nathaniel B. (DOB: August 11, 1996), Stepan B. (DOB: April 22, 1998), REanne B. (DOB: March 3, 1999), and Dolton B. (DOB: January 1, 2001). Mother and Father appeal, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings, stated to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination exist in this case. We affirm the trial court's judgment terminating the parental rights of the parents but vacate one of the bases upon which the trial court relied. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Heinrich W. Oberkirsch v. Janis L. Oberkirsch
This appeal stems from the change of a nine-year-old child's custody. The child was removed from his mother's custody after animal control officers, responding to complaints of animal abuse, discovered deplorable conditions in her home caused by a menagerie of cats. The father filed a petition for change of custody in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County. Following a bench trial, the court granted the father's petition and designated him as the primary residential parent. We agree with the trial court that there was a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the initial custody determination and that it is in the child's best interests for the father to be the primary residential parent. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Donita Dale Dowden v. Ronald J. Feibus
After fourteen years of marriage, Donita Dale Dowden ("Wife") sued Ronald J. Feibus ("Husband") for a divorce. After trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the parties' marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro of $1,000 per month. Husband appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony, in awarding Wife 50% of Husband's federal pension when a portion of that pension was earned prior to the marriage, and in dividing an award that Husband received from a personal injury lawsuit. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Alfred Joe Hill v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Inmate filed a petition for certiorari contesting his housing placement while incarcerated at WTSP. The trial court dismissed the petition under the doctrine of mootness in view of the fact that inmate, during the course of the proceedings below was incarcerated at another penal institute. The trial court further determined that the placement in housing was an administrative decision by the prison authorities and Petitioner’s rights were not violated by their decision. We affirm the dismissal under the doctrine of mootness. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Darrell L. Tipton, Michael L. Ross, & Dale M. Ross v. City of Knoxville
In this quo warranto action contesting annexation by the City, the Trial Could held landowners were not entitled to a jury trial and they had the burden of proof to contest in the annexation. Following trial, the Court held landowners had carried the burden of proof to invalidate the annexation. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's preliminary rulings, but reverse the invalidation of the annexation. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. W. Frank Crawford, et al.
This appeal involves the imposition of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against a lawyer. The lawyer filed a civil rights suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against five state judges seeking monetary damages to punish the judges for their judicial actions in a prior case. The judges filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and later imposed monetary and other sanctions against the lawyer. The lawyer insists on this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against him. We have determined that the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions fashioned by the trial court are carefully tailored and are clearly warranted by the lawyer's conduct. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Danny R. Coleman v. Stephanie D. Wilwayco, M.D., et al.
The unsuccessful plaintiff brings this appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Stephanie Wilwayco, M.D., and St. Thomas Family Health Center. Upon de novo review we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alton Bowman v. Charles Waggoner, et al.
This is an action by Alton Bowman seeking damages against Smith County Motor Co., Inc. arising from the purchase of two vehicles. Bowman claims damages based on alleged misrepresentations and fraud concerning his intent to purchase disability insurance when he purchased the vehicles. He contends he requested both disability and life insurance when he purchased the vehicles from the dealership, however, only life insurance was provided and the contracts executed by the parties at the time of the sale clearly evidence only life insurance was provided. Bowman suffered a stroke subsequently and when he attempted to file a claim for disability coverage he was notified he did not purchase disability insurance. Bowman filed suit seeking damages in the amount of the balance owing on the vehicles. The case went to trial and at the close of Bowman's proof, the dealership moved for a directed verdict on all issues, which the trial court granted. On appeal, Bowman contends the trial court erred by granting a directed verdict and by failing to grant a voluntary non-suit as to the issue of negligent misrepresentation. Finding there is no material evidence to support a verdict for Bowman, we affirm the grant of directed verdict. We also find that Bowman did not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1) by providing an unequivocal notice of dismissal in open court and, thus, affirm on this issue as well. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Christina M. McWhorter v. James C. McWhorter
Defendant in this divorce case appeals asserting that the trial court erred in failing to treat his admittedly untimely Motion for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend the Divorce Decree as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 Motion. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
